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Executive Summary/Key Findings 
 
The Purpose of the Paper / Health Canada’s Objectives  
 
The purpose of this Paper was to consider the suitability of the General Safety 
Requirement (GSR) as a regulatory instrument to help to help Health Canada 
achieve multiple objectives under its ‘Legislative Renewal Initiative’, namely: 
 
1. To promote a culture of safety as a unifying principle under a proposed 
Canada Health Protection Act by including a general prohibition against 
manufacturers and suppliers producing or supplying unsafe products to 
the public; 
2. To authorize Health Canada to take timely, precautionary action, before 
injury occurs, against unsafe unregulated products or products that, 
although nominally regulated, present serious emerging risks not dealt 
with under existing regulations; 
3. To reinforce the “front end” obligation of producers to properly assess and 
manage, on a life-cycle basis, risks associated with products to be 
supplied to the public; 
4. To expedite the detection, remediation or removal of unsafe products from 
the market through mandatory reporting by producers and suppliers of 
substantial product hazards; 
5. To foster an “outcome oriented” (or performance-based) product safety 
regime which facilitates both technical innovation and continuously 
improving safety standards; and  
6. To promote the enhanced use and continuous improvement of voluntary 
standards by giving official recognition and effect to private voluntary 
standards and industry codes of practice, by providing that compliance 
with such standards will raise a legislative “presumption of conformity” with 
general product safety requirements. 
 
Evolution of the GSR 
 
The European model of the General Safety Requirement evolved in a unique set 
of political, economic and legal circumstances.  It is premised on a New 
Approach to Regulation” developed in Europe in 1985 to overcome regulatory 
gridlock resulting from diverse Member States trying to agree, unanimously, on 
the content of highly detailed product standards that were being harmonized for 
the purpose of establishing and improving the European Common Market.  The 
legal and political raisons d’etre for the GSR is internal trade.  Product safety is 
an ancillary consideration under the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
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Europe’s New Approach to regulation makes use of voluntary standards in a 
manner likely to be construed in Canada and the United States as a form of  
“Back-door Rulemaking.  Only the essential requirements (broad performance 
standards) are included in legislation.  Responsibility for establishing technical 
product standards is, in effect, sub-delegated to private standard-setting 
committees that are usually dominated by industry experts.   
 
Although the standards thus established are ‘voluntary’, they are quasi-
mandatory in practice, especially for medium and small enterprises that do not 
have the capacity to develop acceptable alternative standards.  The New 
Approach to Regulation was based on a regulatory framework employed in 
Germany and some Nordic countries that legislate only essential product 
requirements, leaving the matter of compliance with those requirements to the 
private sector based on codes of practice, standards and official guidelines. 
 
The GSR is also premised upon absolute liability for product ‘defects’ based on 
Europe’s Product Liability Directive of 1985.  This concept is not generally 
replicated in Canada, but is a major factor in compelling positive compliance 
behaviour in the area of product safety in Europe, including under the GSR. 
 
Initial Development 
 
The European Union’s policy rationale for the General Product Safety Directive 
was that it would temporarily fill out the regulatory gaps created by new 
unregulated products or emerging risks with the expectation that the scope for 
the GPSD would diminish as new product legislation was developed. In practice, 
the tendency for the general safety provision is to expand into a permanent form 
of horizontal regulation characterized by multiple layers of uncertainty. The 
reasons for this include: the failure of industry standards to meet safety 
objectives; slow progress in harmonizing European product standards due to a 
general policy bias against regulation if it was not rigorously justified; failure to 
meet the five year target for reviewing approved standards leaving more scope 
for the GSR and the fact that new Member States with inadequate product safety 
legislation or product standards employed the general safety provision as an 
instrument of first resort.   
 
The GSR is a performance-based regulatory technique under which regulations 
are effectively replaced by voluntary specification standards, only some of which 
are ‘approved’ by government.  The regime, unfortunately, is characterized by 
multiple layers of uncertainty, including built-in uncertainties in the definition of  
‘safe’ product, inconsistent methodologies for assessing product risks, 
uncertainty about the threshold for identifying ‘serious’ risks, residual uncertainty 
about the manner of establishing conformity with the GSR and the paucity of 
product standards approved under the General Product Safety Directive.  The 
GSR is not a good candidate for effective enforcement under a criminal law 
model.  This is especially so, given the degree of imprecision in the definition of 
the general duty violation; the fact that Courts construe definitions of criminal 
offences strictly in favour of the defendant as a matter of legal principle and the 
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requirement that the State prove the factual elements of an offence beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the defendant is placed under any onus to disprove 
negligence, or otherwise mount a positive defence. 
 
Implementation 
 
Although “beguilingly simple” in concept, the General Safety Requirement is 
difficult and expensive to implement. In theory, pre-marketing duties (product 
development, product design, hazard assessment, risk management and 
production) are reinforced in law under the GSR as the responsibility of 
producers.  In practice, the degree of uncertainty associated with the GSR’s 
highly flexible framework results in industry seeking comfort from the public 
authority on a day-to-day, product-by-product basis, concerning not only how the 
law will be administered but also, in effect, about what the law is.  (ie: Is there an 
approved domestic standard applicable to this product?  If not, what foreign 
standards are acceptable for the purposes of the domestic GSR? Does this 
product present a ‘minimal’, ‘acceptable’ or ‘serious’ risk?  If we alter our 
production process in this or that manner, will the end product be viewed as 
meeting the exigencies of the GSR?) 
 
European experience under the General Product Safety Directive confirms the 
need for extensive advice and guidance from public authorities, particularly on 
the part of small enterprises.  Small enterprises seldom have the capacity for 
rigorous risk assessment, testing or for developing new technical standards and 
innovative quality management systems.  If they cannot afford third party 
expertise, they look to government officials for advice and assistance in these 
matters.  In some cases, local authorities have had to take over testing functions 
for small enterprises to make the scheme work.  
 
Three case studies developed under this Report, and the results of interviews 
conducted during its preparation, illustrate the major elements of cost associated 
with implementing a GSR.  They include: an extensive advisory program of 
‘expert’ advice, scientific testing, rulings, guidelines and operational manuals; 
new skills training for the inspectorate (e.g. auditing quality systems vs. 
inspecting products); financial support for standard-setting agencies to expedite 
the establishment of new product safety standards; compensation for 
government officials and consumer representatives on standard-setting 
committees to maintain some stakeholder balance in the standard-setting 
process, research into world-wide product standards to develop a rolling 
inventory of standards available for the administration of the GSR; augmenting 
the capacity of government testing  laboratories, and the cost of hiring and 
retaining various government ‘experts’ to sustain an effective challenge function 
against industry ‘experts’ under a GSR regime that is largely industry self-
regulated. 
 
The compliance and enforcement measures that a public authority must 
undertake under a highly self-regulatory regime like the GSR may be somewhat 
different from those under an inspection-oriented prescriptive regime, but do not 
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likely involve resource savings for government.  Hodges1, in his text on European 
Regulation of Consumer Product Safety sets out a framework for the post-
marketing activities of authorities under the GSR which includes the following 
elements: verification: that economic operators have correctly and adequately 
carried out their pre and post-marketing functions; market surveillance to identify 
unsafe products; taking action to ensure that appropriate action is taken when 
safety issues are identified; collaboration with other regulatory authorities, 
economic operators, and consumers/users; enforcement, that is,  imposing 
sanctions, or proposing to courts the imposition of sanctions on economic 
operators for non-compliance with legal obligations and, in addition, providing 
public information such as through vigilance information databases, answering 
questions from stakeholders about reporting thresholds, and possibly providing 
rulings on whether particular products meet the general safety requirement.   
 
Each of above functions involves a broader subset of tasks, many of which will 
be resource-intensive. In elaborating on the public authority’s post-marketing 
verification activities under a GSR where it must assess risks associated with 
potentially “dangerous products,” Hodges notes that a public authority must have 
the ability to address a series of detailed questions associated with the prior 
conduct of the producer or supplier.   
 
Examples of such questions may include: Has the producer assembled the 
technical documentation on the product’s design and manufacture and labeling, 
including a risk assessment, and kept it up to date and available?  Did the 
producer collect, record and collate safety information from users, retailers, 
distributors, regulators, or any other source, including scientific and technical 
literature, on how safe the product is in practice and whether it continues to 
conform to the standards of safety as these evolve in the light of new scientific 
and technical information?  Did the producer adequately investigate negative 
incident information? Did the producer undertake an adequate assessment of the 
information thus garnered?  Did the producer make appropriate use of external 
technical, regulatory, medical, or legal advice, or update the product’s 
assessment, where appropriate?  Was information required in law to be reported 
to the Authority adequately reported?  Did the producer make an appropriate 
decision on whether any changes needed to be made or action taken as a result 
of the assessment, such as (i) changes in the design, manufacture, labeling, or 
packaging in relation to products not yet placed on the market, or (ii) action such 
as informing users, distributors, regulators, or others of changes in potential risks 
with the product, or instituting a recall of products already on the market?2  
 
In practical terms, the Case Studies submitted with this Report illustrate how 
many of the above-mentioned tasks would have to be addressed under a GSR 
by Health Canada in relation, for example, to bicycles (an unregulated product); 
Konjac Jelly Mini Cups (an inadequately regulated product); and electrical 
household products (an area of federal-provincial regulatory overlap). 
                                            
1 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 2005, Oxford University Press, 
2 (Hodges, p. 132.) 
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Outcome oriented (performance-based) regulation like the GSR, though largely 
untested by time and the courts, is viewed by major industry and the public sector 
as a promising vehicle for better meeting regulatory objectives and advancing a 
growing convergence between business and regulatory practices.  Yet the 
benefits and limitations of performance-based regulation, in which law, business, 
industry and the stakeholders relying on regulatory protection, interface, remain 
the subject of continuing debate and controversy.  Performance measurement 
and enforceability will be significant challenges for Health Canada if it introduces 
an “outcome-oriented” GSR regime, particularly under the constraints of a 
criminal law model.  The advantages and limitations of performance-based 
regulation are discussed in this Report with reference to a Harvard University 
seminar on the subject; a report of an Australian Commission on ‘Grey-Letter 
Law’; the expectations of Canada’s Auditor General when auditing performance-
based approaches to regulation; and to practical considerations associated with 
performance-based regulation in the experience of the Offshore Oil and Gas 
industry.  
 
Cost/Benefit Considerations 
 
The cost / benefit considerations applicable to the GSR differ significantly 
between Europe and Canada. Cost-benefit and business impact considerations 
will be especially important in determining whether to proceed with a full 
European style GSR under the proposed new Canada Health Protection Act, or 
to incorporate only some of its features in existing legislation, or to rely on other 
legislative options as a ‘safety net’ for regulating emerging product risks. 
 
The cost/benefit considerations of Europe’s ‘ New Approach’ to regulation and 
the GSR are unique.  While the regulatory costs to government and industry 
inherent under the European GPSD regime are significant, the financial and 
political benefits associated with achieving an effective European Common 
Market and functioning Union are enormous.  In Europe the benefits of these 
regulatory techniques are measured almost exclusively in macro-economic and 
political terms.  Product safety is an ancillary consideration under the terms of the 
Treaty establishing the European Union.    
 
The precise effect of a General Product Safety Directive to ensuring safe 
products in Europe is far from clear. Much of the effectiveness of the European 
product safety regime seems attributable to the formidable market sanctions that 
may be imposed on producers, suppliers and exporters within the Common 
Market, and the producers’ absolute liability for defective products under the 
European Product Liability Directive.   There is little case law, and Europe has 
had only minimal experience with the GSR in its present, substantially revised, 
form (The revised GPSD came into force only in January of 2004).  
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Effect on Compliance Behaviour 
 
There is little evidence that the mere enactment of a General Safety Requirement 
(to supply ‘safe’ goods) has any appreciable effect on compliance behaviour in 
the absence of vigorous industry / government programs  to promote safe 
practices.. The requirement to report serious product risks to public authorities is 
an effective element of the GSR, given the consequences that may flow from 
such a report in Europe such as absolute liability in damages for product defects, 
suspension or banning from the European Common Market, prohibition against 
exporting the product beyond the EC and loss of commercial reputation in the 
wider European Community.  
 
With the exception of large enterprises, there is little awareness of the general 
safety requirement in Europe.  The General Safety Requirement is a difficult 
concept to explain to ‘regulation-centric’ industries and has proven to be a 
significant communications challenge for European administrators.  Extensive 
safety programming that is backed up by credible safety enforcement is the 
minimum requirements for bringing about a ‘cultural’ change in this area.   
Despite sectoral differences, the programming lessons learned in the 
Occupational Health and Safety area are likely to be helpful to Health Canada in 
promoting a ‘culture of safety’ in the consumer product sector.  
 
However, the more mature consumer product safety programs in European 
Member States do seem quite effective - to the point where product safety is not 
regarded as a significant problem in several jurisdictions.   In the UK and the 
Netherlands, for example, there appears to be a significant ‘culture of safety’ 
already in place amongst local industries.  Some have argued that the GSR is a 
disproportionate response to the real product safety problem, which, 
overwhelmingly, is cheap imported electrical goods and toys from China and the 
Far East.  Some argue that a more targeted solution to the problem is called for – 
specifically, tighter border control and education of foreign exporters about 
European standards.  But Europe’s strict product liability laws, coupled with the 
potential enormity of a loss of market possibilities following a Rapex Report on a 
dangerous product, and fear of damage to corporate reputations remain the main 
compliance incentives for industry.    
 
Benefits and Disadvantages of a GSR 
 
Health Canada should carefully weigh the benefits and offsetting disadvantages 
of a GSR regime before deciding to include it as part of a proposed Canada 
Health Protection Act.     
 
The GSR is a form of performance-based regulation under which voluntary 
standards, in effect, substitute for technical regulations.  The GSR’s advantages 
and limitations are summarized in this Report: in both cases they closely parallel 
the advantages and limitations of any performance-based regime.  The GSR’s 
‘advantages’ are expressed as perceived advantages because the advantages 
are sometimes illusory, or may be offset by corresponding disadvantages.   
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For example, the view that merely by enacting a GSR (in effect codifying the 
common law duty of care to avoid producing unsafe products) will improve 
industry’s pre-marketing practices seems largely illusory based on the low level 
of industry knowledge and understanding about the GSR achieved in Europe.   
While the GSR seems effective as a regulatory ‘safety net’ to catch unregulated 
dangerous products, an important offsetting disadvantage is that it is difficult to 
contain and tends to become an expansive form of horizontal regulation 
characterized by multiple layers of uncertainty.   
 
Again, though public authorities usually look for resource savings from reduced 
inspection costs under highly self-regulated schemes like the GSR, the reality is 
that industry will likely seek ‘comfort’ from Health Canada’s advice, assistance 
and rulings to clarify the requirements under an uncertain law, possibly on a 
product-by-product basis.  Industry often views regulatory flexibility and closer 
harmonization with industry practices as a clear benefit in terms of product 
innovation, or the harmonization product standards, or in terms of minimizing 
regulatory distortion of the marketplace.  However, these advantages for industry 
can be offset by disadvantages for government and stakeholders in terms of 
undue industry influence on disputed safety issues, anti-competitive behaviour 
toward small enterprise and weakening of the government’s ‘challenge function.” 
This Report includes a much longer list of potential advantages and (sometimes 
offsetting) limitations under the GSR for Health Canada to weigh. 
 
Legal Considerations and Impediments 
 
There are a number of legal considerations, and some impediments, to 
implementing a GSR as an operative provision of the proposed Canada Health 
Protection Act. 
 
The legal framework that Health Canada is constitutionally bound to utilize in 
implementing a GSR – a criminal justice framework - is an impediment to fully 
realizing the plenary administrative, civil and criminal powers (and programming 
opportunities) of European product safety regimes under Member States that 
have full constitutional and regulatory authority for product safety within their 
respective jurisdictions.  The administrative recall power that is considered so 
important to the success of the GSR by some officials, for example, may not be 
constitutionally available under health protection statutes based exclusively on 
the federal authority to enact criminal legislation for the purpose of protecting 
public health and safety.   Effective alternative methods for resolving complex 
disputes under civil processes (Is the product “safe”?) are not directly available 
under the criminal process; such techniques have to be carefully crafted to be 
compatible with the administration of criminal justice, for example, along the lines 
of environmental protection alternative measures developed for the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act. 
 
The GSR also raises important ‘rule of law’ issues that could emerge as serious 
impediments to implementing a GSR.  Laws should normally be made in advance 
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of when they are to be applied, should operate prospectively, and should be 
publicized or otherwise made available to those whom they are to govern.   In the 
case of unregulated products for which no standards exist, a “general” safety 
requirement leaves such an enormous charging discretion in the hands of 
administrators that Courts might view the Government as trying to ‘establish’ the 
law on a case by case basis.  Alternatively, the requirements of the general duty 
violation may be so uncertain, or so easily circumvented by the defendant 
advancing alternative versions of the legal requirements (e.g. foreign standards), 
that the GSR will be extremely difficult or, in some cases, impossible to 
prosecute, given legal requirements for precision in penal processes.   
 
There are other legal considerations, not amounting to impediments, which would 
have to be addressed in implementing a GSR.  Mandatory reporting 
requirements under the GSR would have to be developed and administered in a 
manner that did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination in penal 
proceedings.  In practice, Health Canada would also have to carefully manage 
the heightened risk of regulatory liability for negligent misstatements under an 
extensive program of advice, testing, and rulings that the Department would likely 
have to maintain (in particular, for small enterprises) in order for the GSR regime 
to function.  Other legal considerations are discussed throughout this Report. 
 
Summary 
 
By way of summary, there are a number of reasons mentioned throughout this 
Report as to why Health Canada may wish to reconsider including a general 
safety requirement as a central element of the proposed new Canada Health 
Protection Act.  The GSR is difficult to implement under a criminal law model and 
some of the remedies, such as administrative recall orders, may not be available 
to the Department.  The need for a ‘safety net’ is not the same under the CPHA’s 
constituent Acts and Regulations and the Department has much closer control 
over emerging risks under the pre-marketing licensing and certification regimes in 
the Food and Drugs Act than it does under the Hazardous Products Act. 
 
The case for implementing a GSR in Europe was based on circumstances very 
different from those in Canada.  A GSR model imported from Europe that is 
based primarily on trade considerations may not be the best approach to 
achieving Health Canada’s safety objectives, or for harmonizing Canada/ United 
States product standards.  The cost / benefit considerations associated with a 
GSR in Europe are highly different from those in Canada; the economic and 
political benefits associated with the GSR and its underlying  New Approach to 
Regulation in Europe are potentially enormous and justify considerable 
administrative expense to make the Common Market and the European Union 
work.  The resource savings that Health Canada might have anticipated under a 
highly self-regulatory GSR regime are unlikely to materialize under a full 
consideration of the cost elements inherent in administering such a regime. 
 
While Canada’s regulatory policy encourages the use of voluntary standards to 
achieve regulatory goals by supplementing regulations and promoting a ‘best 
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practices’ approach, it does not, on its face, go so far as to countenance the sub-
delegation of quasi-regulation-making power to domestic or international 
standard-setting bodies operating outside of the domestic regulatory process, as 
occurs in Europe under the  New Approach to Regulation.’  In addition to raising 
‘rule of law’ considerations, the compatibility of the GSR with Canada’s evolving 
regulatory policy should be settled with central agencies of Government before 
Health Canada proceeds with the GSR initiative.   
 
The Department’s potential exposure to regulatory liability, particularly from 
negligent misrepresentations made under the extensive advisory program 
required to make the scheme work, may increase significantly.   This warrants 
careful analysis with the Department’s Legal Services Unit when and if the terms 
of a GSR scheme are finalized. 
 
Alternatives 
 
There are a number of alternatives Health Canada may wish to consider, 
separately or in combination, as methods for achieving the regulatory objectives 
outlined at the beginning of this Executive Summary.  The purpose of this Paper 
was to consider the suitability of the GSR as a regulatory instrument for achieving 
Health Canada’s objectives under the Legislative Renewal Initiative.  Our 
research has led us to question the suitability of employing a GSR under the 
proposed Canada Health Protection Act.   While reaching that conclusion might 
have been sufficient for the purposes of our mandate under this Project, we are 
outlining five broad options for Health Canada to consider for addressing its 
regulatory goals and objectives, four of which are alternatives to the GSR, 
namely:   
 
1. The European Model – Attempt to adapt the European model of the GSR 
to the Canadian legal context for inclusion in the proposed Canada Health 
Protection Act. (This was the principle subject of this Report)  
 
2. Incremental Reform – Import only needed elements from the GSR into 
the constituent Acts originally intended for consolidation under the CHPA 
should the Department decide not to proceed with a consolidation. (i.e. 
reporting requirements, data-based detection system, missing 
enforcement powers, etc.)  This is the approach adopted by Australia 
following an extensive review of its consumer protection legislation 
completed in 2005. 
 
3. Modified American Approach (HPA Only) – Under the Hazardous 
Products Act, Health Canada would enact a general prohibition against 
advertising, selling, importing etc. consumer products that present an 
unreasonable risk of injury.  ‘Risk of injury’ would be defined on a basis 
consistent with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act, to mean “a risk of 
death, personal injury, or serious or frequent illness.”  ‘Risk of injury’ is an 
issue that can be determined with much greater certainty, (including by 
criminal courts) than the question as to whether particular products are 
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“safe” or “unsafe.”  This Option has the additional advantage of facilitating 
closer harmonization of North American consumer product standards, 
injury data collection and enforcement practice. 
 
This Option would apply only to the Hazardous Products Act on the 
assumption that there is no real need for a general prohibition of this kind 
under the Food and Drugs Act and related regulations where closely 
controlled licensing and certification schemes with pre-marketing and 
adverse incident reporting requirements are already in place.  The GSR is 
a post-marketing mechanism that assumes little to no government 
oversight at the pre-marketing stages of product design, development and 
production. Moreover, an incremental reform approach is already evident 
under the Medical Devices and Natural Products Regulations, which now 
include a virtual GSR regime linked to conditions of licensing. 
 
4. Modified American Approach (All Constituent Acts) – If Health Canada 
wishes to extend the general prohibition outlined in the previous Option 
beyond the Hazardous Products Act, the scope of the HPA could be 
extended to apply to dangerous unregulated products and serious 
unforeseen risks in product areas covered by the other Acts administered 
by Health Canada.  While the general duty violation and related powers 
might be situated in the HPA, the authority would be accessible to 
enforcement officials administering the other enumerated Acts, as needed, 
perhaps without requiring significant changes to the Department’s internal 
organization. 
 
While the HPA is mentioned as a possible ‘home’ for the general 
prohibition based on American ‘risk of injury” terminology, it might be 
located in some other generic statute administered by the Department 
such as the Department of Health Act3, or the proposed CHPA if the 
Department proceeds with the consolidation of constituent Acts under the 
Legislative Renewal Initiative. 
 
5. Status Quo with Administrative Reform -  Under this Option, the 
Department would rely on the existing provisions for Ministerial Interim 
Orders in the Hazardous Products Act or the Department of Health Act  as 
the main safety net for dealing with unregulated dangerous products, and 
unforeseen, emerging and serious risks in regulated products. 
 
In this case, however, the focus would be on making the Minister’s existing 
remedy more efficient by developing internal policies for triggering the use 
of this power together with a fast-track process for exercising it - all in 
collaboration with the Minister’s Office and relevant Central Agencies of 
Government.  The policy and fast-track process would then become a 
routine element of briefing for new Ministers of Health so they would be 
                                            
3 S.C.  1996, c. 8 
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familiar with the emergency measure in advance of the need for urgent 
intervention. 
 
Options two to five (i.e. the ‘alternative’ options) might be accompanied by a 
Health Canada program to encourage the development and use of effective 
voluntary product standards with a view to achieving levels of product safety that 
routinely exceed minimum legal requirements.  For example, on July 10, 2006, 
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission published a final rule on 
Commission Involvement in voluntary Standards indicating how the Commission 
intends to promote improved voluntary product standards in collaboration with the 
private sector without compromising the public authority’s institutional 
independence or oversight role.4  
                                            
4 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131 
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1. Introduction  
 
Objectives and Methodology 
 
Description of the Project  
This research project consists of three general components: a gathering of 
information; a synthesis, and a comparative analysis of the information; and an 
analysis and assessment of lessons learned from the Canadian perspective. 
More specifically, the project’s scope and objectives were described in the 
proposal document as follows: 
 
Following an introductory discussion of the place of the GSR as an instrument for 
goal-based regulation in relation to health protection, the proposed research will 
provide a summary and description of the legal and policy underpinnings of GSR 
in several jurisdictions. The project will synthesize the regulatory frameworks 
employed, compare the approaches adopted for defining a General Safety 
Requirement, and develop a taxonomy of the policy, legal and voluntary 
instruments used to give effect to it. In addition the proposed research will review 
practical experience with GSRs, including compliance and enforcement 
experience. This aspect of the research will involve an examination of the effects 
of a GSR on program administration as well as an outline of impacts on industry 
and business, and on the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory regime, among 
other stakeholders. 
 
The analysis will be guided by reference to issues raised by Health Canada’s 
Legislative Renewal Initiative and to the issues to be addressed by Health 
Canada in adapting promising GSR approaches employed in jurisdictions outside 
Canada to Health Canada’s specific regulatory objectives, including the 
harmonization of regulatory approaches and standards with trading partners.  
  
The Comparative Experience with GSR: EU and US 
In order to pursue the comparative dimension of the information-gathering 
component of the project in a manner that would be most suited to the needs and 
expectations of Health Canada, a series of issues or questions intended to guide 
research and interviews was developed in consultation with supervision officials 
from the department. In the case of the European Union, members of the 
research team conducted in-depth interviews with government officials in 
Brussels and selected Member States, and consulted academic specialists. In 
the case of the United States, Professor Nicholas Ashford was recruited to 
provide information on the U.S. approach to and experience with a comparable 
set of issues.5  Professor Ashford’s research paper, “Options for a Statutory 
General Safety Requirement (GSR): Lessons from Selected Experience in the 
United States,” is included as Annex 12 to this report. 
 
                                            
5 See Annex 12 
                                                                                             2
Evolution of Instructions  
In the course of ongoing consultations and discussions with Health Canada, the 
researchers were provided with draft legislation developed within the department 
and, subsequently, with an indication that internal consideration of the GSR was 
proceeding at an accelerated pace in contemplation of a draft memorandum to 
Cabinet, expected to be presented prior to the completion date for this project. 
 
Case Studies and an Emphasis on Implementation Issues  
With much of the background research (including interviews) in the European 
Union completed, it was no longer possible to substantially re-direct the research 
effort. However, to accommodate as much as possible the acceleration and 
intensification of Health Canada’s needs for advice on the GSR, two significant 
changes were made in the presentation of the report. Firstly, to increase the 
immediate practicality of this GSR research, detailed case studies were added 
for illustrative purposes. Secondly, to enhance the accessibility of the overall 
findings, the original intention as to table of contents and organization were 
abandoned in favour of an approach oriented more towards specific issues 
arising from the research and with an increased emphasis on matters that might 
be expected to arise on implementation of a GSR. Much of the historic and 
comparative material gathered during the course of research therefore appears 
interspersed throughout the discussion of issues rather than in a consolidated 
form as background to analysis. 
 
Overview of the Report 
 
Following a brief review of the general context for regulatory reform in Canada 
and discussion of the specific objectives of Health Canada’s Legislative Renewal 
initiative, including expectations associated with the possible adoption of a 
General Safety Requirement, this report proceeds in the following manner. 
Chapter 2 What is a General Safety Requirement? seeks to explain several 
alternative ways in which the GSR may be understood. In chapter 4  Evolution of 
the General Safety Requirement, the report reviews the evolution of the GSR  
within the European context where several streams of policy development 
contributed to the adoption and ongoing refinement of this instrument. Chapter 5 
addresses in detail The Case for Reform in Europe with reference to the 
experience of other jurisdictions and in light of objectives previously identified by 
Health Canada. Before proceeding to analyze the Operative Provisions of a GSR 
and Implementation Experience (chapters 6 and 8), the report identifies a series 
of Underlying Policy Considerations, which apply generally to Canadian federal 
regulatory initiatives. In the context of examining Operative Provisions and 
Implementation Experience, we make particular reference to a series of case 
studies designed to illustrate the potential of a GSR to address certain generic 
categories of regulatory challenge. These generic challenges arise where: (1) a 
product is entirely un-regulated; (2) a product is subject to over-lapping federal 
regulatory requirements derived from two or more statutory schemes; or (3) a 
product is un-regulated at the federal level, but is subject to provincial 
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requirements. For comparative purposes the United States Experience and some 
existing Canadian initiatives involving GSR-type instruments or performance-
based regulation are also described. The report concludes with a Summary of 
Advantages and Limitations of a General Safety Requirement (chapter 13) and a 
statement on Policy Options. 
 
Background 
 
General Regulatory Context 
Modern Regulatory Reform 
Before addressing the General Safety Requirement itself, it is appropriate to 
review the broader context within which discussion of a GSR has taken place. 
This is important because the GSR is but one instrument or approach to 
governance, and health protection is but one policy field or sector in which 
governments seek to promote the well-being of the societies for which they are 
responsible. 
 
Western governments and their citizenry have debated extensively in the past 
quarter century such general issues as regulatory effectiveness, regulatory 
burden and regulatory reform. This has involved consideration of alternative 
approaches to regulation and enforcement in the context of the multiple 
objectives of modern governance: not only to promote health, but also economic 
well-being, social harmony, environmental sustainability, peace and security.  
  
Recent discussion of the background to this evolution in the nature of 
governance, with particular reference to market regulation, provides an 
instructive introduction to the broad process of transformation in which the GSR, 
amongst other proposed instruments of regulatory reform, is situated: 
 
Leaving tax policy aside, the regulation of markets was the purview of lawyers 
and others familiar with criminal justice. Offensive behaviour was defined by law, 
and transgressions were punished by sanctions. Perhaps at one time that 
regulatory model was perceived as effective. When the number of offences was 
relatively small, when industry participants could be expected to know or to be 
able to acquire knowledge of the legislation that defined permissible behaviours, 
when obedience to the law was a commonly held norm of behaviour, when social 
stigma existed in local markets and could be trusted to impose magnified costs 
for transgressions of legal norms of conduct, and when firms were more local 
than transnational, the criminal justice model of regulation may have worked. As 
well, in liberal societies, ‘law’ was a symbol of the appropriate role of the State -  
its process was conceived of as neutral, it left the market to work its wonders 
within the parameters set  by the law, and the costs of the system were relatively 
low and largely private.6  
 
                                            
6 David Cohen, “The Role of the State in a Privatized Regulatory Environment” in Kernaghan Webb, ed. 
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation, 35 
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Circumstances have changed in several important respects, and, consequently, 
attitudes towards the role and nature of regulation have also changed. Business 
activity now operates on a much larger scale, far removed from local markets, 
and increasingly involving international trade. In addition, the costs of 
governance have grown considerably.  A line of criticism charges that traditional 
regulation is inefficient in that its costs exceed the value of resulting benefits.  In 
the words of Jeremy Fraiberg and Michael Trebilcock, “We spend too much 
money for too little safety.”7 These authors attribute the sub-optimal results of 
existing regulatory initiatives to deficiencies in institutional arrangements, notably 
the undisciplined and inconsistent responses that are made to shifting public 
pressures. They quote N. Lind to the effect that present arrangements have a 
tendency towards “overreacting to small and speculative risks while leaving 
larger and more certain risks unattended.” Accepting for present purposes the 
validity of this assessment, one might imagine a GSR serving to alleviate 
concern around those smaller and speculative risks and allowing regulators to 
direct their attention and resources to more fundamental challenges. 
 
What must be emphasized, however, is that consideration of the GSR is taking 
place within the context of overall re-assessment of regulation and that the 
Canadian characteristics of the regulatory environment are themselves in some 
ways distinctive. As an example, this country’s comparatively small market may 
be more dependent than others on the importation of manufactured products that 
are potentially subject to a GSR. Industrial structure may therefore be relevant to 
the operation of the instrument in different jurisdictions. Or, what is widely 
perceived as a more vigorous product litigation environment in the United States, 
may affect the operation of a GSR. Compensatory mechanisms and the 
incentives they provide “to take care” may also affect the manner in which a GSR 
might work. Similarly, insofar as a GSR falls within the overall category of self-
regulation, the strength and sophistication of consumer organizations may be a 
relevant variable in assessing the level of performance likely to be achieved. 
 
An Introduction to Smart Regulation and Precaution  
It is impossible in the present context to offer a thorough discussion of industrial 
structure, the litigation environment, or consumer culture as factors influencing 
the utility and operation of a GSR. It is however important to emphasize the 
significance of certain current developments in federal regulatory policy, notably 
the Smart Regulation initiative, the precautionary principle/approach, and 
growing concern with compliance. While each of these will be considered more 
fully below, it is noted that a GSR may be viewed within the context of broader 
regulatory objectives associated with or emerging from the Smart Regulation 
initiative, and as such, the GSR might be viewed as an example of a “non-
conventional policy instrument.”  
 
Measures of this kind may be considered attractive insofar as they might achieve 
any of the following: 
                                            
7 Jeremy Fraiberg and Michael Trebilcock, Risk Regulation, 837 
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• Supplement conventional regulatory approaches, thus reducing the need 
for regulatory enforcement action through the courts; 
• Address problematic activity more quickly than conventional approaches; 
• Overcome or avoid issues of federal-provincial jurisdiction; 
• Address fast-moving technologies or issues; 
• Address issues that fall outside the legislative scope of government; 
• Allow governments to encourage activities it wishes to promote without 
making it a requirement; and/or 
• Provide Canadians with faster, more convenient, less intimidating redress 
options than going to court, thereby reducing the burden on courts.8   
 
Health Canada’s Legislative Renewal Project 
Health Canada Objectives for Legislative Renewal 
Roughly a decade ago, Health Canada initiated a process of legislative review 
whose general objectives were to modernize and strengthen the legislation so as 
to help better protect Canadians against health risks, and provide policy direction 
in the area of health protection. Extensive consultations and research were 
undertaken to lay the foundations for a comprehensive health protection regime 
that would replace a number of existing federal health protection statutes 
including the Food and Drugs Act, the Hazardous Products Act, the Quarantine 
Act and the Radiation Emitting Devices Act. These legislative initiatives, having 
been implemented on a piecemeal basis, were perceived to be outdated in the 
context of modern technology and society. 
 
Health Canada’s legislative renewal initiative thus resembles in several respects 
the previous effort by Environment Canada to consolidate and enhance the 
effectiveness of a series of environmental statutes which had been introduced 
over a period of decades to address such disparate concerns as environmental 
contaminants and ocean dumping. 
 
Certain general features associated with the legislative renewal initiative merit 
attention for they are not unrelated to the proposal for a General Safety 
Requirement included amongst proposed reforms. In particular, the legislative 
renewal initiative proposal contemplates fundamental values, guiding principles, 
federal-provincial relations concerning new technologies, health surveillance and 
research, information collection and disclosure, the enhancement of regulation-
making powers, enforcement and emergency responses. These areas have been 
discussed with different degrees of detail in departmental documentation as the 
legislative renewal proposal has evolved.  
 
Should a decision be taken to pursue implementation of a GSR, these various 
features of the overall legislative renewal proposal, as this report’s issue-based 
approach underlines, would also be relevant.  
                                            
8 Confidential: PCO, 2005 “Assessing, Selecting and Implementing Instruments for Government Action” 8-
9     
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The General Safety Requirement Proposal 
In an Issue Paper on the GSR prepared in conjunction with the overall legislative 
renewal agenda, Health Canada identifies certain important objectives 
associated with this specific instrument: 
 
A General Safety Requirement would… clarify the responsibilities of suppliers of 
products with regard to health and safety and it would ensure that the health 
protection system has the proper legal authority to consistently and effectively 
address risks to health.9 
 
The same document, in summarizing the department’s expectations, concluded 
that the GSR would: 
• Offer better protection to Canadians by making all products to which the 
Act would apply subject to a comprehensive safety standard; 
• Establish a legal regime that is outcome oriented and offers more flexibility 
and consistency; 
• Provide Health Canada with the legal tools it needs to address health 
risks; and 
• Bring Canada up to speed with what already exists in other developed 
countries.10 
 
If these are general expectations, it is also important to observe that their 
realization through a GSR is conditioned by a number of further assumptions. 
Thus, the Issue Paper suggests that the GSR impose requirements that are 
consistent with current practices of responsible manufacturers and that would be 
enforceable through prosecutions for a series of non-compliance provisions. 
 
Another way to formulate Health Canada’s objectives for the GSR is to associate 
the potential of this new instrument with limitations found in the current regime.  
Three apparent limitations were identified in the Issues Paper. Firstly, it is 
observed that the current regime, constitutionally anchored in criminal law 
authority is subject to restrictive interpretation, and some of its terms are too 
narrow to encompass the full range of those who might be injured, or the manner 
in which their injuries might occur. Secondly, it is suggested that civil law, due to 
procedural and remedial constraints, exerts only a limited preventive or deterrent 
function against a wide range of minor injuries. Thirdly, insufficient resources are 
available to exercise existing regulation-making power with the consequence that 
only a limited number of products can ever be covered by the present health 
protection regime.11 
                                            
9 Legislative Renewal – Issue Paper on GSR, 6 March, 2003, 17 
10 Ibid, 19 
11 Ibid, 9 
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In addition to discussing existing regulatory limitations, the Issue Paper on GSR 
identifies a number of ways in which this instrument might operate to safeguard 
the public from risks to health. Some of the observations are of a theoretical 
nature while others take the form of empirical claims about how a GSR works. 
Although Health Canada’s thinking has certainly evolved in the three years since 
this document was produced, it may still be worthwhile to highlight some of the 
assumptions that contributed to the department’s attraction towards the GSR 
concept. These may provide some basis for assessing the additional information 
assembled in the course of research for the present report. 
 
Assumptions and Expectations for a GSR 
In introducing the concept of a GSR, it is suggested that: 
• A GSR prohibits the manufacture, promotion and marketing of any product 
that could present an undue risk of harm to the health of a person during 
its manufacture, its foreseeable use or its disposal; 
• A GSR requires the maker of a product to determine the risks that a 
product poses, and to take reasonable steps to eliminate those risks 
before the product is put on the market; 
• A GSR compels the maker to monitor the product for risks throughout the 
lifetime of the product and, if a significant risk is identified, to take 
appropriate corrective action; and 
• A GSR requires others in the chain of supply to cooperate with the maker 
by transmitting safety information to the end user and cooperating with the 
maker’s corrective actions.12 
 
The extent to which any of these anticipated consequences of a GSR are 
actually realized depends on the precise manner in which the scope of 
responsibilities are defined, including the nature of safety/risks to be considered, 
and on the manner in which obligations are implemented and enforced. Even if 
an elaborate system is initially established, its ongoing reliability are subject to 
conventional business considerations. For example, among the range of interests 
concerned when a manufacturer or importer faces bankruptcy, where will the 
interests of consumers in ongoing monitoring, reporting and corrective action 
pursuant to a GSR lie? 
 
In addressing possible attractions of the GSR from the perspective of the public 
the Issue Paper indicates that: 
 
A GSR will eliminate gaps and inconsistencies in safety standards, impose a 
clear obligation to ensure safety, authorize preventive action by Health Canada, 
incorporate the concept of precaution, involve consideration of risks on a life-
cycle basis, ensure monitoring of adverse health incidents, and not preclude 
standard setting by way of regulation. 
 
                                            
12 Ibid, 2 
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Again, the specifics of drafting and implementation will greatly influence much of 
this, and interesting questions arise such as the applicability of the precautionary 
principle to the private sector and the relationship of precaution to due diligence 
or negligence. 
 
The possible impacts of a GSR on industry are also addressed:   
Responsible makers of products are already exercising due diligence and 
addressing the health or safety risks in their products, thus conforming with the 
General Safety Requirement.13 
 
This observation combines an empirical assertion about existing levels of product 
safety with the suggestion that a GSR will not require different behaviour on the 
part of “responsible makers of products.” Industry observations may be of 
considerable interest in this regard. Do “responsible makers of products” 
anticipate that adjustments in their operations will be required as a consequence 
of the introduction of a GSR? Equally, if not more significantly from the 
perspective of enhanced safety, will those falling outside the category of 
“responsible makers of products” be persuaded by the creation of a GSR to 
exercise a more appropriate standard of care? 
 
It is also anticipated by proponents of a GSR that this instrument offers more 
flexibility, eliminates barriers to innovation, facilitates harmonization, and 
promises a more equitable marketplace.14  These expectations are in keeping 
with some of the underlying goals of regulatory policy overall. However, 
assuming that the GSR may stimulate efforts to avoid liability for introducing an 
unsafe product there is an obvious legal interest in the nature or standard of 
behaviour to be met. Amongst the many ways to establish suitable standards 
some, more than others, encourage flexibility, innovation, and harmonization. It 
will be worthwhile to inquire whether the Europeans, on the basis of ten years 
experience, consider that these conditions were realized through the GSR. 
 
An observation is also made that “Most developed countries to which Canadian 
products are exported and from which many products are imported into Canada 
have already adopted a GSR in one form or another.”15  Assuming the validity of 
this assessment, it offers little insight into the actual scope of the GSR in any of 
the relevant countries and is silent as to the volume of trade that flows under 
some form of GSR. More information on the distribution of product risks between 
developed countries and developing or emerging economy producers would 
seem to be of value. 
 
A further advantage associated with a GSR is the possibility that it can permit 
Health Canada to take preventive action before injury or death occurs.  This 
would appear to be a strong attraction and so it may be worthwhile to attempt to 
                                            
13 Ibid, 3 
14 Ibid, 3 
15 Ibid,  
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identify examples where, in the absence of preventive action, injury or death 
subsequently occurred. This inquiry may fall outside the scope of the present 
report, but one would want to distinguish situations in which preventive 
measures, though available, were not used from situations in which such 
measures were not actually possible. It may also be worthwhile to look for 
indications of successful preventive intervention from Europe and at the 
circumstances in which that was made possible. 
 
A further argument in favour of a GSR revolves around existing experience with 
such an instrument. Thus, it is noted that a GSR already exists in Canada in the 
form of certain provisions of the Food and Drugs Act and the Radiation Emitting 
Devices Act. Proposed legislation would extend the existing principles to all 
products and all risks that cause undue adverse health effects. The implication is 
that we are already familiar with the GSR and that the only innovation proposed 
is an extension of the scope of application to other sectors. The extent of that 
expansion is extraordinarily vast, however, and existing experience, while 
valuable, must be acknowledged to be very modest in comparison. 
 
Reference is also made to “a series of limited General Safety Requirements” in 
U.S. legislation (eg: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Consumer Product Safety 
Act, etc.). Although HC refers to US experience as being in the nature of a GSR, 
it will be of interest to consider the extent to which these provisions are actually 
viewed in this light in the US and the extent to which they are considered 
analogous to EU measures under the directive. It may also prove to be the case 
that Canadian federal reliance on the criminal law power as a source of authority 
for the GSR may not offer as much flexibility and scope as other jurisdictions 
have had available to them. 
 
Other more detailed observations are made concerning various aspects of the 
background tort regime and the relationship of the GSR to formal regulations. 
The foregoing indicates the considerable extent of aspirations and expectations 
for a GSR in the Canadian context.  
 
Health Canada’s Objectives 
 
As part of Health Canada’s Legislative Renewal Project, the Department is 
proposing to enact a new Canada Health Protection Act that would consolidate 
and reform several related health and safety statutes and regulations. The 
Department proposes to include a ‘General Safety Requirement’ as part of the 
new Act with a view to achieving several regulatory goals.  We have attempted to 
distil Health Canada’s explicit and implicit goals into the following general 
objectives: 
 
• To promote a culture of safety as a unifying principle within proposed new 
health protection legislation by including a general prohibition against 
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manufacturers and suppliers producing or supplying unsafe products to 
the public; 
• To authorize Health Canada to take timely, precautionary action, before 
injury occurs, against unsafe unregulated products or products that, 
although nominally regulated, evidence serious emerging risks not dealt 
with under existing regulations; 
• To reinforce the “front end” obligation of producers to properly assess and 
manage, on a life-cycle basis, risks associated with products to be 
supplied to the public; 
• To expedite the detection, remediation or removal of unsafe products from 
the market through mandatory reporting by producers and suppliers of 
substantial product hazards; 
• To foster an “outcome oriented” (or performance-based) product safety 
regime which facilitates both technical innovation and continuously 
improving safety standards in the public interest; and 
• To promote the enhanced use and continuous improvement of voluntary 
standards by giving official recognition and effect to voluntary standards 
and industry codes of practice, by providing that compliance with such 
standards raises a legislative “presumption of conformity” with general 
product safety requirements.16 
While Health Canada’s objectives for the role of the GSR under the proposed 
Canada Health Protection Act align closely with the purposes that the GSR is 
intended to serve in Europe, its overall effectiveness as an instrument for 
achieving those purposes is not yet well established.   
 
 
2. What is a General Safety Requirement? 
 
The “General Safety Requirement” (GSR) is the product of policy development in 
four separate areas - occupational health and safety, consumer product safety, 
product liability and the harmonization of technical product standards in Europe 
to enable the free movement of goods within the European Community.   
 
The ‘General Safety Requirement’ (GSR) in Europe has been characterized as:  
 
• Target standard setting out a broad safety requirement that prescribes no 
specific standard for the supplier’s processes or output, but imposes 
criminal liability for certain harmful consequences, or the risk thereof, 
                                            
16 Health Canada Legislative Renewal Initiative, summary can be accessed at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-
asc/activit/legren/docs/docu-7page_e.html; and  Issues Paper on The General Safety Requirement, accessed 
on July 20, 2006 at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/pubs/legren/general_e.html  
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arising from the output; 
 
• A horizontal approach to regulation under which voluntary standards are 
substituted for regulations as a means of determining conformity with 
essential safety requirements; and as a form of  
 
• Codification of the common law duty of care to produce safe consumer 
products such as to pose no foreseeable risk of harm to consumers when 
used in a normal or foreseeable fashion. 
 
Under a general safety requirement, the basic regulatory objective, framed as a 
target standard, is included as an operative provision of the statute, rather than 
as part of the preamble or in a purpose clause as a mere aid to its interpretation.   
 
The GSR is a form of performance-based regulation.  From a policy development 
perspective, its advantages and limitations closely parallel those of a 
performance-based approach to regulation. 
 
As in the case of performance-based regulation, Europe’s  ‘General Safety 
Requirement’ is given operational effect through a series of directives in the 
nature of performance standards (essential requirements), supplementary duties 
and obligations, specification standards, guidelines, codes of practice and related 
guidance documents, ever increasing in their operational detail. 
 
In stark contrast with the pre-marketing approval procedures applicable to closely 
regulated areas such as drugs, natural health products and medical devices, the 
focus of regulatory effort in Europe under the General Product Safety Directive 
(GPSD) is on post-marketing measures – verifying the documentation and risk 
assessments of producers after production or marketing, auditing quality 
systems, receiving reports, and following up on complaints.   
 
A Target Standard Linked to Europe’s New Approach to Regulation 
 
A general safety requirement is a broad safety objective, standard, or duty of 
care enacted as an enforceable legal obligation in legislation.  The general 
product safety requirement employed throughout the European Community has 
also been described as a target standard set out in statutory format: 
 
A target standard prescribes no specific standard for the supplier’s processes or 
output, but imposes criminal liability for certain harmful consequences (or risks) 
arising from the output.17 
                                            
17 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Safety, Oxford University Press, at p. 14, citing 
Ogus.  “A target standard is to be distinguished from a performance or specification standard - A 
performance standard (or output) standard requires certain conditions of quality to be met at the point of 
supply, but leaves the supplier free to choose how to meet those conditions.  A specification (or output) 
standard can exist in either a positive or negative form: it compels the supplier to employ certain production 
methods or materials, or prohibits the use of certain production methods or materials”. 
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In the conventional approach to regulation, broad regulatory objectives, or target 
standards, are commonly found in the preamble or in the purpose clause of a 
statute as an aid to interpreting the legislation, rather than as an operative, 
enforceable provision of the Act.  Customarily, the essential substantive 
requirements are set out in the statute, and detailed provisions required to give 
the Act operational effect are prescribed in regulations.  Industry standards, or 
standards established by standard setting agencies, when referred to in 
regulations, may be incorporated directly into the regulation itself.  In these 
circumstances, the standard becomes part of the regulation and is enforceable 
as law, but only after it has cleared the scrutiny of a democratic regulatory 
process.18 
 
Under a General Product Safety Requirement, legal consequences flow directly 
from a breach of the target standard.  Production, distribution or importing a 
product determined to be ‘unsafe’, enables the public authority to take 
enforcement action whether or not voluntary product safety standards exist, or 
are met.   
 
The General Product Safety Directives of 1992 and 2001(it came into force in 
2004) were premised on a New Approach to Regulation established by an EEC 
Directive in 1985.19  The purpose of the New Approach was to expedite the 
harmonization of product technical standards across Europe and with a view to 
eliminating inconsistent standards in national regulations that would otherwise 
constitute barriers to the free movement of goods across Europe.  Prior to 1985, 
every European Directive had to be submitted for political consideration along 
with detailed technical specifications for unanimous approval of all Member 
States. This requirement slowed the creation of a harmonized system of 
legislation to a virtual halt.20   
 
The essential purpose of the GPSD was to ensure a minimum standard of 
product safety protection throughout Europe as the process of harmonizing 
thousands of regulations proceeded.  The GPSD is thus an integral part of 
Europe’s New Approach to Regulation. The approach adopted under the GPSD, 
particularly in the use made of voluntary standards, reflects New Approach 
thinking. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
18 Occasionally standards are incorporated “as amended from time to time” to ensure currency where rapid 
technological change is likely to outstrip the regulatory process.   
 
19 See Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a  New Approach to technical harmonization and standards 
 Official Journal C 136 , 04/06/1985 P. 0001 - 0009  
 
20 Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, supra footnote 1, at p. 53 
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An Alternative Approach to Regulation 
 
While Europe’s New Approach to Regulation expedited the harmonization of 
product standards across Europe, many products were still not covered by the 
vertical directives.  To remedy this regulatory gap, Europe enacted the General 
Product Safety Directive premised on the New Approach to Regulation with two 
objectives in mind:  
 
• To establish a “final safety net” in case vertical harmonization was not fully 
achieved under the New Approach to Regulation and thus ensure that 
products were generally “safe” throughout the European Community; and  
 
• To ensure, under the 2001 (revised) Directive21, that Member States had 
both the obligations and the necessary powers to ensure safe products in 
their respective jurisdictions.  The expanded powers available under the 
revised General Product Safety Directive were made uniformly available in 
Member States to enforce not only the General Product Safety Directive, 
but also any of the European Commission’s vertical product directives 
where such powers were lacking. 
 
The European General Product Safety Directive is thus a form of horizontal 
regulation covering potentially dangerous products or risks not covered by 
Member State laws or by Europe’s vertical (harmonized) regulations.  Its scope is 
both residual and comprehensive. Its reach is extremely broad.  If Health Canada 
were to adopt a GSR, its regulatory reach would be vastly extended the instant it 
was enacted.  The policy, administrative, resource, and liability implications of 
such a development are explored throughout this Report.  
 
A Form of Codification of the Common Law Duty of Care 
 
A General Safety Requirement is sometimes viewed as a mere codification of an 
existing civil responsibility.  In effect, the GSR restates the tort obligation to 
exercise due care in producing products so as to avoid foreseeable harm to the 
users of such products.  Interestingly, this has also been a major argument 
advanced by public authorities to secure industry support of the GSR.  The 
argument is that the GSR requires no more of industry than is required by good 
practice under the law.  Big industry in Europe has largely been receptive to this 
argument, but remains concerned about compliance by smaller entities because 
selective non-compliance adversely affects the ‘level playing field’ for competition 
in that industry.  On the other hand, many small industries view the GSR regime 
as providing a competitive advantage for larger industries that are usually better 
equipped to undertake complex risk assessments, testing and innovation.  The 
regulatory ‘flexibility’ offered under the GSR may, for small industry, be largely 
illusory. 
 
                                            
21 2001/95/EC 
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In the UK review that preceded the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, the Review 
Committee acknowledged that the proposed GSR would amount to a codification 
of the common law in the following terms: 
 
The Government accepts that there is a case for widening the scope of the Act to 
place a general obligation on the suppliers of consumer goods to achieve an 
acceptable standard of safety where it is reasonable to expect them to anticipate 
and reduce risks arising from those goods.  This would induce a greater sense of 
responsibility on the part of those suppliers who currently regard themselves as 
unaffected by the legislation (and who may not be adequately deterred by the 
common law duty of care).  At the same time, it would provide wider scope for 
swift remedial action by enforcement authorities in the case of newly identified 
dangerous products.22 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the UK, the idea of codifying a general obligation under the common law, and 
coupling it with standards or codes of practice evolved initially from the Robens 
Inquiry into Health and Safety in the Workplace (1970-72).23 The Robens Inquiry 
Report made recommendations about how to reform and consolidate a number 
of piecemeal workplace safety statutes under a single Act – ultimately the Health 
and Safety in the Work Place Act, 1974.  This undertaking is similar to Health 
Canada’s current “Legislative Renewal” initiative which proposes to reform and 
consolidate The Food and Drugs Act, the Hazardous Products Act and the 
Radiation Emitting Devices Act under a single statute: the proposed Canada 
Health Protection Act.  
 
Until 1972, the traditional model of regulation governing safety in the workplace 
in the UK involved “a mass of detailed, highly technical rules under a variety of 
statutes.  These laws lacked coherence and proved impossible to keep up to 
date.  Exclusive reliance on detailed specification standards neither encouraged 
nor enabled employers to innovate in their safety practices.”  Then, as with most 
regulation throughout the Commonwealth at the time, traditional workplace 
legislation “created a climate of dependence on state regulation.”  There was little 
involvement by unions or workers in the regulatory process.24 
 
                                            
22 The Safety of Goods, Paper presented to the UK Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, Cmnd. 9302, at para. 34 
23 Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Robens Committee, UK 1970-72  -- “A view put to us by some 
legal experts – although not shared by some others – was that a statutory statement of general principles is 
unnecessary because it would amount to no more than a statement of the existing common law on this 
subject, that it would simply mean ‘writing down a duty which we all know’.  Our answer to this is that few 
laymen are familiar with the common law on this subject, however clear it may be to members of the legal 
profession.  (para 132) 
 
24 National Research Centre for OHS Regulation, Australia, commenting on the evolution of Occupational 
Health and Safety from the British Model.  http://www.ohs.anu.edu.au/ohs/index.phpa, accessed October 
24, 2005 
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The Robens Committee developed a new regulatory model – one similar to the 
New Approach to Regulation initiative advanced more than a decade later, in 
1985, by the European Community.  The “new style” of regulation suggested by 
Robens in 1972, which was designed to promote a culture of safety in the 
workplace, had the following key features: 
 
• A more unified and integrated system of laws was established under 
broad general duties of care in matters affecting safety in the workplace.  
These duties were imposed on parties whose activities may affect safety 
in the workplace, including employers, employees, the self-employed, 
occupiers, manufacturers, suppliers and designers of plant equipment or 
producers of substances used in the workplace; 
 
• The bare statutory duties were to be fleshed out” by standards and codes 
of practice; 
 
• A unified inspectorate was given new administrative sanctions 
(improvement and prohibition notices) as alternatives to prosecution; and 
 
• “A more effectively self-regulating system”25 was created, the most 
important element of which was “a statutory duty on every employer to 
consult with … employees or their representatives at the workplace on 
measures for promoting safety and health at work, and to provide for the 
participation of employees in the development of such measures.”26   
 
Instead of always trying to specify in minute detail how a product should be 
manufactured in order to be “safe” – a largely impossible task across the broad 
range of marketed products – Robens suggested that regulations be developed 
in a manner that required, or encouraged, producers to meet standards of safety 
established and kept up to date by experts external to government, or developed 
by experts in collaboration with government, through industry associations, or 
domestic and international standard-setting agencies. 
 
The general duty of care in the workplace was viewed as a preventive regulatory 
measure.  It was intended to reinforce the manufacturers’ common law duty to 
take care to supply only safe consumer goods by providing a legal framework for 
elaborating the voluntary or mandatory standards or desirable steps a 
manufacturer should meet or take to ensure he is, in fact, manufacturing safe 
products.  It forms a separate, statutory head of authority for enforcing the 
manufacturers’ and suppliers’ common law duty of care - as elaborated through 
the standards or process measures developed under the safety regime. 
 
                                            
25 Robens Inquiry Report, supra, para 41 
 
26 Ibid., para 70   
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There is a dynamic relationship between standard setting under a statutory 
general duty of care and the common law duty of care.  The same is true under a 
general safety requirement, which is another form of statutory general duty of 
care.  As safety standards evolve and improve under a general safety 
requirement, it is possible that the legal minimum standard of care employed by 
the courts in penal proceedings may also become more rigorous, though not 
necessarily in lock step with GPSD standards.   Different principles may apply in 
determining an appropriate standard of care in penal proceedings.  The dynamic 
relationship between regulatory standard setting and the common law duty of 
care is examined in greater detail in this Report under the heading,“Due 
Diligence.” 
 
While prescriptive regulations remain an essential component of safety 
regulation, Robens viewed a standards-based approach to regulating as a 
promising method of achieving a better balance between the need for flexibility 
and precision in regulations that might otherwise have a limited “shelf life” given 
the pace of technological change.    
 
The broad argument…is that many of the defects (flowing from undue reliance on 
prescriptive regulations) can be remedied by a switch in emphasis away from the 
extensive use of statutory regulations towards greater reliance on standards and 
codes of non-statutory origin.  In future there should be more discrimination and 
selectivity in making statutory regulations.  Thus the system would comprise a 
main Act, plus statutory regulations, plus codes of practice, but the intermediate 
stage of statutory regulations would often be dispensed with. (emphasis added)27 
 
Significantly, section 6 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, a 
consequence of the Robens Report, included a general safety requirement 
covering goods and substances supplied to the workplace.28  A decade of 
favourable experience under this provision later became part of the case for 
including a general safety requirement in the UK Consumer Protection Act, 
1987.29 
 
The standards-based approach to safety regulation appears to have worked 
reasonably well in the workplace arena, perhaps because its governing legal 
framework provides many extra-judicial mechanisms for making concrete 
decisions about “safety” - an inherently relative concept.  The issue of “safety” in 
the workplace, for example, may be determined in the discretion of a safety 
representative or in the deliberations of on site safety committees, or in contract 
negotiations, in grievance hearings, in labour arbitrations under collective 
                                            
27 Robens Inquiry Report, para. 134. 
28 Health and Safety at Work Etc Act, UK, 1974, c. 37, s.6   
29 See, The Safety of Goods, Cmnd 9302, July 1984, para. 36.  After nearly 10 years of experience under the 
general safety requirement imposed under section 6 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, “there (does) not 
appear to have been serious problems of interpretation of the level of safety required by the general duty for 
industrial goods…” 
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agreements, or by other informal means unique to particular employers.  An 
overarching consideration in these proceedings is the employees right of refusal 
to work in an unsafe work environment.   
 
In this Report, therefore, one key question to be addressed is how the 
mechanisms that seem to work well in the workplace model for making concrete 
decisions about the safety of particular products are replicated, or have evolved 
separately, under the consumer product safety regimes. 
 
 
 
3. What Purposes Does a GSR Serve?  
 
In Europe, the ‘General Safety Requirement is thought to serve several 
purposes.  It serves as:    
 
• A safety net, or emergency response mechanism enabling a public 
authority to deal – temporarily - with unregulated products, or with new 
and emerging risks in otherwise regulated products, until the risks can be 
evaluated, or a regulation enacted;  
 
• A unifying statutory principle designed to promote a ‘culture of safety’ by 
fixing producers, distributors, importers and others in a position to 
influence safety outcomes with the primary responsibility for ensuring 
product safety; 
 
• An aid to interpreting the product safety regulations transposing the 
General Product Safety Directive30; and as 
 
• A legal framework for timely settlement or remediation discussions 
between enforcement officials and the regulated community.  
 
Safety Net   
 
The preamble to the General Product Safety Directive (2001/95/EC) sets out its 
essential purpose as a safety net:  
 
"5) It is very difficult to adopt Community legislation for every product which 
exists or which may be developed; there is a need for a broad-based, legislative 
framework of a horizontal nature to deal with such products, and also to cover 
lacunae, in particular pending revision of the existing specific legislation, and to 
complement provisions in existing or forthcoming specific legislation, in particular 
                                            
30 In the conventional approach to regulation, broad regulatory objectives, or target standards, are 
commonly found in the preamble or in the purpose clause of a statute as an aid to interpreting the 
legislation, rather than as an operative, enforceable provision of the Act.   
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with a view to ensuring a high level of protection of safety and health of 
consumers, as required by Article 95 of the Treaty. 
 
"12) If specific Community legislation sets out safety requirements covering only 
certain risks or categories of risks, with regard to the products concerned the 
obligations of economic operators in respect of these risks are those determined 
by the provisions of the specific legislation, while the general safety requirement 
of this Directive should apply to the other risks." 
 
The General Product Safety Directive was designed as a “final safety net” in case 
product harmonization was not fully achieved in Europe, or not achieved on a 
timely basis under Europe’s evolving vertical directives.  It was to ensure, at a 
minimum, that products were “safe” throughout the E.U.  The essential rationale 
for the GPSD was that it would temporarily fill out the regulatory gaps created by 
new products or emerging risks.  However, it was based on the policy 
assumption that the regulatory gaps would be filled, over time, under vertical 
legislation that was continuously being developed for new products. 31     
 
The expectation, initially, was that the scope for the GPSD would diminish as 
new product legislation was developed.  However, there is a growing pressure in 
Europe (as well as in Canada) to require increasingly rigorous justifications for 
new regulation.  The concern is to avoid ‘excessive’ reliance on formal regulation 
and to encourage alternative approaches to achieving regulatory objectives 
where they are likely to be as, or more, effective in achieving regulatory 
objectives.  As a result, there are fewer new legislative initiatives in the E.U., 
except for regulations governing high-risk products such as drugs, foodstuffs, 
toys, machinery, and the like. The role of the GPSD is thus changing from its 
original purpose as a ‘safety net’, to that of an alternative form of standards-
based regulation in the model of Europe’s New Approach to Regulation.’   
 
There are several reasons for this change.  Firstly, Europe’s regulatory policy (as 
in the case of Canada’s regulatory policy) has a bias against new regulation 
unless a strong case can be made for regulating and alternatives to prescriptive 
regulation are considered.  Secondly, the five-year period for reviewing 
harmonized standards in Europe seems not to have been realistic, leaving a 
broader scope for application of the GPSD.  Thirdly, new countries entering the 
EU that do not have comprehensive (or perhaps any) consumer product 
legislation, often rely on the more detailed GPSD as an instrument of first resort.  
Fourthly, some of the standards developed by the standards groups do not result 
in adequate safety protection due to various factors, including the overwhelming 
representation of industry on standardization committees, industry imperatives 
                                            
31 Interview, November 28 2005, with Erik Hansson, European Commission, DG Health and Consumer 
Protection.  Mr. Hansson was one of the principle architects of the General Product Safety Directive.  See 
also Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 2005, Oxford University Press at p. 
22….”A further approach acts as a longstop for all consumer products not covered by a specific vertical 
regime, and involves a ‘horizontal’ basis.  The focus of the GPSD requirements is on provision of 
information and, from 2004, post-marketing systems.” 
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and the intransigent positions sometimes taken by industry on such 
committees.32   
 
Unifying Statutory Principle (Culture of Safety)  
 
The UK, in the 1970’s, - like Health Canada today - was considering how best to 
reform and consolidate a series of safety-related statutes under a single coherent 
Act with a “culture of safety” as its policy thrust.  The Robens Committee took a 
comprehensive view of problems confronting the UK system of health and safety 
in the workplace.  Just as Canada (under the “Smart Regulation” initiative) has 
adopted a broader view of the concept of “regulation”, Robens took a 
comprehensive view of the workplace safety “system” which required reform. 
 
By ‘system’, we mean here the whole complex of arrangements and activities, 
whether of a statutory or voluntary nature, which seek to protect and promote the 
safety and health of people at work, and to protect the public from hazards of 
industrial origin.  The system can be seen as comprising two very broad 
elements: regulation and supervision by the state, and industrial self-regulation 
and self-help.  The most fundamental issues before us are concerned with the 
relationship, balance and interaction between theses two broad elements.  
 
The Robens Committee viewed the general obligation to ensure safety in the 
workplace that was required of employers and others as a unifying principle 
lending coherence to the new legislation; in other words as a “statement of 
general principle designed to govern a conglomeration of prescriptions and 
prohibitions” as well as to inform a range of preventive, voluntary and self-
regulatory actions.33   
 
In the occupational health and safety arena, therefore, Robens proposed a form 
of general safety obligation in the workplace, similar to the general product safety 
requirement later prescribed across Europe for the consumer product area, as 
the focal point of what ultimately became the Health and Safety at Work Act, 
1974.  Section 6 of that Act, as noted, also included a general product safety 
requirement covering equipment and substances supplied to the workplace.   
 
 The Robens Committee set out the new general safety obligation in the following 
terms:   
 
We believe that the general principles of safety responsibility and safe working 
should be embodied in a statutory declaration, which would set all of the detailed 
statutory and other provisions in clear perspective.  We recommend, therefore, 
that the Act should begin by enunciating the basic and over-riding responsibilities 
of employers and employees.  This central statement should spell out the basic 
duty of an employer to provide a safe working system including safe premises, a 
                                            
32 Interview with Arnold Pindar, December 9, 2005, British Standards Institution, (Consumer 
Policy) 
33 Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Robens Committee, UK 1970-72, p.41, para. 128 
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safe working environment, safety equipment, trained and competent personnel, 
and adequate instruction and supervision.  It should also spell out the duty of an 
employee to observe safety and health provisions and to act with due care for 
himself and others.34   
 
The criticism quickly emerged that such a statement of basic principles might be 
too general to be meaningful.  Robens rejected this, arguing that the statutory 
declaration was essential to establishing a ‘culture of safety’ under the new 
regime and that it would help to delineate a broader role for inspectors35 in 
promoting workplace safety in addition to enforcing safety laws. 
 
We do not accept the argument that such a statement of basic principles would 
be too general to be meaningful and helpful in practice.  On the contrary, we 
think it would have important practical effects.  A positive declaration of over-
riding duties, carrying the stamp of Parliamentary approval, would establish 
clearly in the minds of all concerned that the preservation of safety and health at 
work is a continuous legal and social responsibility of all those who have control 
over the conditions and circumstances in which work is performed.  It would 
make it clear that this is an all-embracing responsibility, covering all workpeople 
and working circumstances unless specifically excluded and applying whether or 
not a particular matter of detail is covered by a specific regulation.  It would 
encourage employers and workpeople to take a less narrow and more rounded 
view of their roles and responsibilities in this field.  It would provide guidance to 
assist in the interpretation of detailed statutory provisions, a process that 
sometimes created problems for those responsible for accident prevention. 
(emphasis added) 36 
 
Robens proposed a broader preventive role for the inspectorate under the new 
workplace safety regime, including in-depth safety audits. The Robens 
Committee underscored the importance of inspectors taking a preventive 
approach to safety – an approach that many of today’s field safety inspectors 
might consider part of their routine responsibilities.  Robens considered that the 
recommended general safety obligation would, as an underlying general 
principle, reinforce the inspectorate’s preventive and remedial functions.37 
                                            
34 Robens Inquiry Report, supra, p.41, para. 129 
  
35 Robens Inquiry Report, supra. at para131…..”A governing statement of principles would have particular 
relevance to the development of  the wider role for the inspectorates that we discuss in chapter 7.  The 
limited nature of some of the present work of the safety inspectors derives from their preoccupation with – 
and indeed to some extent their dependence upon – a large number of detailed statutory regulations 
unrelated to any over-riding general requirement.  The statutory framework within which they work is a 
constrictive one, and they have no authority to go beyond it.  When an inspector visits a workplace he 
should be concerned with the total picture as much as with those particular details, which happen to have 
been made the subject of a specific regulation; and for this he needs a broad statutory mandate. 
36 Ibid. at para. 130 
37 Ibid., at para 212…. We believe that there is great scope for experiment with new types of inspection 
such as safety audits in depth, and team visits.  There is also scope for closer contacts with manufacturers in 
connection with the planning and design of new premises, plant and equipment; and for closer liaison with 
senior managements of very large industrial and commercial organizations.  
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Like the New Approach to Regulation adopted in Europe in 1985 (the regulatory 
model underpinning the General Product Safety Directive), the general safety 
obligation proposed by Robens for the occupational health and safety sector in 
1972 was to be supplemented and clarified by voluntary standards and industry 
codes of practice. 
 
We have advocated that statutory regulations should be simpler in style and that 
the procedure for formal consultation on regulations should be less cumbersome.  
We go further than this.  We recommend that in the future no statutory regulation 
should be made before detailed consideration has been given to whether the 
objectives might adequately be met by a non-statutory code of practice or 
standard.38  (Emphasis added) 
 
Concern about the need for harmonization and avoiding unjustified regulation 
where industry standards suffice, resonates freshly with regulatory policy in 
modern Western democratic countries, including Canada.  But globalization and 
the need for international competitiveness, rather than safety considerations, are 
the most prevalent reasons advanced today for product harmonization. 
Compelling justifications are often required before a proposed regulation will be 
approved.  Mandatory consideration of feasible alternatives to regulation are 
routinely required as part of the regulatory process.  In the UK, recent proposed 
reforms call for stricter adherence to the precepts of risk assessment and risk 
management in all aspects of regulation.   
 
There is also a clarion call in Europe, and particularly in the UK, for a “light touch” 
to enforcement practices.   Regulatory reform in the UK has been significantly 
influenced by two recent reports; the Hampton Review39 and the Less is More 
Report by the UK Better Regulation Task Force.40   
 
Hampton Review focuses on regulatory enforcement.   It proposes entrenching 
the principle of risk assessment throughout the regulatory system, so that the 
burden of enforcement falls most on highest-risk businesses and least on those 
with the best records of compliance. At present, not only are unnecessary 
inspections said to be carried out, but necessary inspections are not carried out. 
Under the proposals in the report, inspection rates would be reduced where risks 
are low, but enhanced where necessary. 
 
                                            
38 Robens Committee Report, supra., para. 142 
39 Phillip Hampton, ‘Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement’,March 16, 
2005.  Press release accessed on September 24, 2006 at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/budget/budget_05/press_notices/bud_bud05_presshampton.cfm  The Review itself was 
accessed on September 24, 2006 at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/budget/budget_05/other_documents/bud_bud05_hampton.cfm  
40 Regulation: Less is More Reducing Burdens, Improving Outcomes, March 2005, accessed on September 
24, 2006, at http://www.brc.gov.uk/downloads/pdf/lessismore.pdf  
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The Review speculates, based on regulators’ past experience, that 
comprehensive risk assessment in a streamlined structure could: 
• Reduce the need for inspections by up to a third, which means around one 
million fewer inspections; and 
• Reduce the number of forms regulators send out by perhaps 25 per cent. 
 
In addition, the Review recommends: 
• Making much more use of advice, again applying the principle of risk 
assessment; 
• Substantially reducing the need for form-filling – in practice, most 
businesses’ most frequent and direct experience of regulatory 
enforcement – and other regulatory information requirements; 
• Applying tougher and more consistent penalties where these are 
deserved; 
• Reducing the number of regulators that businesses have to deal with, by 
merging 31 national regulators into 7; 
• Entrenching reform by requiring all new policies and regulations to 
consider enforcement, and use existing structures wherever possible; and 
• Creating a new business-led body at the centre of Government to drive 
implementation of the recommendations and challenge departments on 
their regulatory performance. 
 
On 18 October 2004, the U.K Prime Minister asked the Better Regulation Task 
Force to examine: 
a. The new Dutch approach of introducing a target for reducing 
administrative costs to minimize the paperwork burdens faced by 
business; and 
b. A 'one in, one out' rule for regulation, where new regulations would have 
to be matched by deregulatory measures proposed by the Department 
promulgating the new regulatory initiative. 
 
The Better Regulation Task Force undertook feasibility studies of these two ideas 
and recommended that the UK government adopt them. The Task Force 
suggests that the government should introduce new procedures to measure and 
then reduce the administrative burdens faced by businesses and other 
organizations in the UK. The Task Force also suggested that government should  
adopt a 'One in, One out' approach to regulation in order to achieve a better 
balance between new regulations coming in and simplify existing regulations, 
including the removal of unnecessary regulations. 
 
The impact of regulations on global competitiveness was not a material 
consideration in The Robens Committee proposal to make enhanced use of 
voluntary standards and codes of practice in the occupational health and safety 
arena.  The Committee’s recommendation was based almost exclusively upon 
the conviction that ‘standards and codes developed within industry and by 
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independent bodies are more practical and therefore potentially more effective 
instruments of progress than statutory regulations’.41  Robens was not 
advocating “a slacker approach to regulation”, only that “the whole system should 
be more flexibly based and more discriminating in the use of formal regulations,” 
especially in areas where they were demonstrably inadequate.42   
 
Today, questions still abound in the product safety area concerning the legality 
and the enforceability of voluntary standards, as well as their potential for 
undermining the democratic regulatory process due to the lack of transparency 
surrounding their creation.  These same questions were also at the forefront of 
debates within the Robens Committee.  
 
The question of the desirable balance between the use of statutory regulations 
and the use of non-statutory codes of practice and standards is a controversial 
one.  Statutory regulations are subject to the approval of Parliament.  They 
express unequivocal legal obligations, and can be strictly enforced.  On the other 
hand, they often take a long time to make, technical details can quickly become 
out of date, and in practice once made they are seldom easy to revoke.  Non-
statutory codes of practice and standards are more flexible.  They are easier to 
introduce and to revise.  They are more progressive in that they need not be 
restricted to minimum standards, and they are less likely to inhibit new 
developments.  They are not, however, subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and 
approval, and they cannot be directly enforced.43 (Emphasis added) 
 
The question for Robens was not only how voluntary standards should be taken 
into account in compliance and enforcement activity, but which voluntary 
standards deserved recognition by the public authority. 
 
There is no simple definition of what constitutes a non-statutory or voluntary code 
of practice or standard.  They emerge in a variety of ways and in a variety of 
forms.  Some are prepared and promulgated by government departments, others 
by independent bodies such as the British Standards Institution, still others by 
joint safety committees or employer organizations at industry-level.  They may 
describe desirable procedures or systems, or specify requirements in design, 
materials and performance.  They may be concerned specifically with safety and 
health or with quality generally.  The constant multiplication of non-statutory 
codes of diverse origin and authority can be as confusing and unhelpful as the 
multiplication of statutory regulations.  We suggest that some measure of control 
and co-ordination can be injected into this area without inhibiting the continued 
spontaneous development of good safety and health standards.44 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
The Robens Committee identified three circumstances where voluntary 
standards should be taken into account in enforcement proceedings; namely: 
                                            
41 Robens Committee Report, supra., para. 148 
42 Ibid., para. 148 
43 Ibid., para. 143. 
44 Ibid., para. 149 
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• Where voluntary standards have been incorporated directly into UK 
regulations; 
• Where the Authority has agreed to undertake, or to sponsor, the 
preparation of a non-statutory code as an alternative to preparing a 
statutory regulation on the matter in question; and 
• Where the Authority has power under enabling legislation to publish lists 
of voluntary codes or standards ‘which they regard as conforming to the 
general purposes of the Act’, that is, where the codes and standards in 
question ‘are directly relevant to the Authority’s specific purposes and 
responsibilities’.45 (emphasis added) 
 
The third criterion for making use of voluntary standards under a workplace 
safety regime became, of course, the principle basis for using voluntary 
standards under Europe’s General Product Safety Directive.  Voluntary 
standards were to be taken into account for the purposes of administrative action 
in furtherance of the public authority’s injury prevention role. 
 
Briefly, our intention is that inspectors should have power to issue improvement 
notices in individual cases, taking into account not only any relevant statutory 
regulation but also any relevant voluntary code or standard that has been 
formally approved by the Authority in one or other of the ways mentioned.  Such 
codes and standards would be admissible in evidence in proceedings before 
tribunals in much the same way as he provisions of the Industrial Relations Code 
of Practice are admissible under the Industrial Relations Act.46 
 
An analogous power to the UK ‘Improvement Notice’ exists under the compliance 
orders provision of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, (CEPA).47   
However, CEPA, like the proposed Canada Health Protection Act, is 
constitutionally grounded on the federal responsibility for substantive Criminal 
Law.  Action under the compliance order provision of CEPA, therefore, is 
necessarily based on an inspector’s reasonable belief that there has been a 
contravention of the Act or of a CEPA regulation.  In the absence of an ‘general’ 
safety requirement (i.e. a prohibition against producing ‘unsafe’ products) linked 
to a significant risk of harm and reasonably precise standards of safety, an 
improvement notice of the kind employed under the UK Health and Safety at 
Work Act, 1974 would be open to legal challenge where no law was contravened. 
 
 
Aid to Statutory Interpretation 
As already noted, under the conventional approach to regulation, broad 
regulatory objectives, or target standards, are more commonly found in the 
preamble or in the purpose clause of a statute as an aid to interpreting the 
                                            
45 Ibid., paras. 150-152 
46 Ibid., para. 153 
47 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, c. 33,  s. 235 
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legislation, rather than as an operative, enforceable provision of the Act.  
Notwithstanding that the GSR is an operative and enforceable provision, its 
generality and overarching effect may serve both as a unifying principle for the 
governing Act, and also as the principle context for interpreting the intent of the 
legislation and the meaning and scope to be given to other, more specific 
provisions.  This is one of the purposes it has served in the area of occupational 
health and safety legislation prescribing a general duty to maintain safe working 
conditions in the workplace. 
 
A Legal Framework for Timely Settlement or Remediation 
Discussions 
Because the General Safety Requirement constitutes a legal obligation, rather 
than a mere policy objective or statement of statutory purpose, an apprehended 
failure to meet the obligation to supply safe products may immediately trigger a 
public authority’s use of its inspection and enforcement powers.  This often 
provides an incentive for defendants to undertake early remediation or settlement 
dialogue with the public authority.  It is this immediacy that makes the GSR 
attractive as an emergency response mechanism for dealing with unregulated 
products, or emerging risks in regulated products.  
 
 
4. Evolution of the General Safety Requirement 
 
Four Separate, Merging Strands of Policy Development 
 
As noted above, the “General Safety Requirement” (GSR) is the product of policy 
development in four separate areas - occupational health and safety, consumer 
product safety, product liability and the harmonization of technical product 
standards in Europe to enable the free movement of goods within the European 
Community.   
 
The major development thresholds for the general product safety requirement -
using the experience of the United Kingdom as a Member State example, were:   
 
• The Robens Inquiry into Health and Safety in the Workplace between  
1970 and 1972 proposing an outcome-oriented regulatory model for 
workplace safety, the first GSR (for goods and substances supplied to the 
workplace) and a regulatory regime with a significant degree of voluntary 
self-regulation; 
 
• The enactment of a general safety requirement for articles and substances 
supplied to the workplace under the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 
in the UK  The general safety requirement developed for workplace 
products was strikingly similar to the GSR developed thirteen years later 
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for the product safety sector, and similarly based on legislative 
approaches adopted in Germany and Sweden dating back to the 1960’s; 
 
• An abortive, first attempt, in 1974, to make the case for including a general 
product safety requirement in the UK Consumer Safety Act,1978.  The 
reasons given for the failure to implement a GSR in the 1978 Act highlight 
some of the concerns which a few stakeholders, even today, express 
about this regulatory mechanism (including uncertainty and inconsistency 
of application); 
 
• The promulgation, in 1985, of two important European Union directives 
concerning the New Approach to Regulation and Product Liability which 
were major contributing factors in the ultimate acceptance of a GSR into 
UK consumer protection legislation; 
 
• Trade-related events in Europe in the mid-1980’s (stalled regulatory 
process) along with some high profile safety issues (Mad Cow disease, 
Far Eastern imports) in the early 1980’s combined, finally, to make the 
case for including a general safety requirement in the UK  Consumer 
Protection Act, 1987; 
 
• The enactment, in Europe, of a General Product Safety Directive for 
application throughout the European Community (92/59/EEC), which the 
UK was required to transpose into domestic law; 
 
• A comprehensive study of experience with the original General Product 
Safety Directive by the European Commission highlighting some difficult 
and complex implementation issues   This study led, to a revised Directive 
(2001/95/EC, which came into force January, 1, 2004; and 
 
• The enactment, in 2005, of the UK General Product Safety Regulations48 
transposing the revised Directive. 
 
It should be noted that Europe’s General Product Safety Directive, even with the 
major revisions implemented in January of 2004, remains a work-in-progress.  
Various committees and working groups are continuing to examine a                
number of seemingly intractable implementation issues.  A four-year formal 
review of the experience under the revised GPSD is also under way.  In addition, 
Europe’s New Approach to Regulation, which constitutes the regulatory 
framework underpinning the GPSD, is undergoing fundamental review.  
 
“What may be needed, is a New, ‘New Approach’,“ commented one presenter at 
the European Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the New Approach         
                                            
48 General Product Safety Regulations, 2005, (S.I. 2005, No. 1803) 
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held in Brussels on November 30, 2005.49  Another presenter warned that it was 
important to consider the changes flowing from the New Approach Review 
“before extending the  New Approach to consumer products or the 
environment.”50   
 
Occupational Health and Safety  
 
In the United Kingdom, the first general product safety requirement was 
developed as an aspect of occupational health and safety reform in the early 
1970’s to cover goods and substances supplied in the workplace.  The idea of 
codifying a general safety obligation under the common law and coupling it with 
standards or codes of practice evolved in the UK almost a decade before 
Europe’s New Approach to Regulation.’51  Both initiatives were modeled to some 
extent on regulatory practices in Germany and Sweden dating from the 1960’s. 
 
A more comprehensive approach to safety regulation in the UK was first 
proposed in the seminal UK report entitled Safety and Health at Work, (1970-72), 
chaired by Lord Robens.52  The Robens Committee made recommendations 
about how to reform and consolidate a number of piecemeal workplace safety 
statutes under a single Act – the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974.  This 
undertaking, while similar to Health Canada’s current ‘Legislative Renewal’ 
initiative, was considerably more complex.  It involved reforming and 
consolidating four groups of safety statutes and more than 500 statutory 
instruments.   
 
The UK workplace safety reform addressed many of Health Canada’s key safety 
objectives, including the objective of creating a pervasive “culture of safety” by 
focusing the primary responsibility for safety on those in a position to influence 
safety outcomes.  
 
The first and perhaps most fundamental defect of the statutory system is simply 
that there is too much law. The existence of such a mass of law has an 
unfortunate and all-pervading psychological effect.  People are heavily 
conditioned to think of safety and health at work as in the first and most important 
instance a matter of detailed rules imposed by external agencies….This attitude 
will not be cured so long as people are encouraged to think that safety and health 
                                            
49 Proceedings accessed on September 06, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/new_approach_conference_en.htm    (Two members of the 
Project Team attended this conference which coincided with the timing of the Interviews with European 
Officials.) 
50 Ibid., per Han 
51 See Robens Committee Report, para. 132: “A view put to us by some legal experts – although not shared 
by some others – was that a statutory statement of general principles is unnecessary because it would 
amount to no more than a statement of the existing common law on this subject, that it would simply mean 
‘writing down a duty which we all know’.  Our answer to this is that few laymen are familiar with the 
common law on this subject, however clear it may be to members of the legal profession.” 
52 Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Robens Committee, UK 1970-72 
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at work can be ensured by an ever-expanding body of legal regulations enforced 
by an ever-increasing army of inspectors.  
 
The primary responsibility for doing something about the present levels of 
occupational accidents and disease lies with those who create the risks and 
those who work with them.  The point is quite crucial.  Our present system 
encourages rather too much reliance on state regulation, and rather too little on 
personal responsibility and voluntary, self-generating effort…There is a role in 
this field for regulatory law and a role for government action.  But these roles 
should be predominantly concerned not with detailed prescriptions for 
innumerable day-to-day circumstances but with influencing attitudes and creating 
a framework for better safety and health organization and action by industry 
itself. (Emphasis added) 
 
While prescriptive regulations remain an essential component of safety regulation 
in the workplace, the Robens Committee viewed a standards-based approach to 
regulating as a promising method of achieving a better balance between the 
need for flexibility and precision in regulations that might otherwise have a limited 
“shelf life” given the pace of technological change.    
 
The broad argument…is that many of the defects (flowing from undue reliance on 
prescriptive regulations) can be remedied by a switch in emphasis away from the 
extensive use of statutory regulations towards greater reliance on standards and 
codes of non-statutory origin.  In future there should be more discrimination and 
selectivity in making statutory regulations.  Thus the system would comprise a 
main Act, plus statutory regulations, plus codes of practice, but the intermediate 
stage of statutory regulations would often be dispensed with. (Emphasis added)53 
 
In pursuing the theme that primary responsibility for ensuring safety should be 
fixed on those in a position to influence safety outcomes, the Robens Committee 
noted that existing laws placed undue emphasis on the safety obligations of 
users of factory machinery and equipment and an insufficient emphasis on the 
safety obligations of designers and manufacturers.  Robens’ recommendation for 
dealing with this imbalance led to the UK’s first general product safety 
requirement covering goods and substances supplied to the workplace. 
 
We recommend, within the context of our general proposals that the approach to 
this subject should be along the following lines.  First, there should be a general 
statutory obligation on those making and marketing plant, machinery and 
equipment for industrial and commercial use to ensure that it is in a condition 
enabling it to be used in compliance with all safety provisions relating to design, 
construction and safeguarding.   
 
Secondly, the Authority should have powers to prepare special regulations as 
necessary concerning safe design and construction, and these regulations 
should impose direct obligations on manufacturers.  
                                            
53 Robens Committee Report, supra., para. 134. 
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 Thirdly, in deciding on the extent to which these regulatory powers need to be 
used, and how they should be used, full account should be taken of any relevant 
British and international standards. Standards of specification, testing and 
certification will continue to be developed by the various expert bodies engaged 
in this work, and the Authority for Safety and Health at Work should have power 
to require compliance with particular standards or approval arrangements made 
and operated by such bodies. 
 
Flexibility would be needed in exercising these powers.  In some cases the 
general requirement backed up by testing and inspection arrangements would 
suffice.  In others it might be appropriate to use regulations to spell out or refer to 
specific standards. (Emphasis added) 
 
Section 6 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 included a general safety 
requirement covering goods and substances supplied to the workplace.54  A 
decade later, favourable experience under the GSR in the occupational health 
and safety arena became part of the case for reform for including the first general 
safety requirement for consumer products in the UK Consumer Protection Act, 
1987.55  
 
The standards-based approach to safety regulation appears to have worked well 
in the workplace arena, in part, because the governing legal framework for 
occupational health and safety provides many extra-judicial mechanisms for 
making concrete decisions about “safety” - an inherently relative concept.  
Disputes about “safety” in the workplace may be resolved in the discretion of a 
safety representative or in the deliberations of on-site safety committees, or in 
management/union contract negotiations, as an incident of grievance hearings, in 
labour arbitrations under collective agreements, or by many other informal means 
of dispute resolution unique to particular employers.  The right of employees to 
refuse work in unsafe conditions is a powerful incentive to reaching agreement 
on safety issues.   
 
A key question, therefore, is how mechanisms for making concrete decisions 
about the relative safety of particular products or working conditions that seem to 
work well in the workplace model may be replicated in, or adapted to, consumer 
product safety regimes for the benefit of largely unorganized consumers. 
 
 
 
                                            
54 Health and Safety at Work Etc Act, UK, 1974, c. 37, s.6   
 
55 See, The Safety of Goods, Cmnd 9302, July 1984, para. 36.  After nearly 10 years of experience under the 
general safety requirement imposed under section 6 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, “there  ((does) 
not appear to have been serious problems of interpretation of the level of safety required by the general 
duty for industrial goods…” 
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Product Liability 
 
The development most influencing the evolution of the General Product Safety 
requirement was Europe’s adoption, in 1985, of the Product Liability Directive.56  
This Directive, which has no exact parallel in Canada, imposed virtually absolute 
liability on producers for defective products. The Product Liability Directive led to 
important changes in consumer protection legislation in Member States to 
account for this fundamental legal change.  Subsequently, it became an 
important factor in the adoption of the General Product Safety Directive across 
Europe, which is largely premised on absolute liability for safety defects.  The UK 
passed the Consumer Protection Act, 1987 incorporating a general safety 
requirement applicable to consumer goods for the first time, along with provisions 
transposing Europe’s Product Liability Directive.57 
 
In Europe in the 1980’s, there was a lot of discussion about unsafe products, 
accompanied by the expectation that the Product Liability Directive would result 
in many claims.  (This did not turn out to be the case.) The assumption at the 
time was that there were many unsafe products on the market.  These concerns 
underscored the need for a ‘modernization’ of the consumer protection legislation 
to ensure regulatory order, especially in the aftermath of the Product Liability 
Directive.58 
 
The usual remedy in law for injury or loss caused by unsafe products is a fault-
based proceeding in negligence, requiring proof of a duty of care, a breach of 
that duty, proof of damage, and proof that those damages were caused by the 
negligence of the defendant supplier.  In Europe, under the Product Liability 
Directive, nearly absolute liability is imposed on producers of goods for ‘defective’ 
products.  Article 6 of the Directive defines a ‘defective’ product to mean “a 
product that does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all circumstances into account.”59   
 
While a producers’ liability for defective products in the E.U. is nearly absolute, 
there are enumerated defences under the Directive, including a defence that “the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when (the producer) put 
                                            
56 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products; Official Journal 
L 210 , 07/08/1985 P. 0029 – 0033 
57 The Consumer Protection Act, 1987 (Product Liability) Modification Order 2000 (S.O. 2000, No. 2771) 
58 Interview with Christopher Hodges, December, 2005. 
59 Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive Provides:  that “. A product is defective when it does not 
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:  the 
presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be 
put; (c) the time when the product was put into circulation.  A product is not be considered defective for the 
sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.”  
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the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect 
to be discovered.”60 
 
A key objective of the Product Liability Directive, as with the GPSD, was to 
harmonize the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States, in this case, concerning liability for defective products.  The 
‘approximation’ of the Member State laws concerning the liability of the producer 
for damage caused by defective products was considered necessary to prevent 
existing divergences in the laws from distorting competition and affecting the 
movement of goods within the common market.  Diverging product liability laws 
also results in differing degrees of protection throughout Europe for the consumer 
against damage to personal health or property caused by a defective product.  
 
Following the enactment of the UK Consumer Protection Act, 1987, the 
Department of Trade and Industry developed a Guide, including a checklist, to 
help businesses meet the combined requirements of the EU’s Product Liability 
Directive and the new General Safety Requirement.   The checklist contained a 
rudimentary list of production and marketing measures that should be taken by 
producers to ensure the supply of safe products and their financial ability to meet 
claims for defective products.61  
 
Not all Member States transposed the Product Liability Directive exactly as 
intended.  In the Commission v. France (Approximation of laws), the Commission 
obtained a Declaration in 2002 that the French Republic had failed to fulfill its 
                                            
60 Other defences under article 6 of the Product Liability Directive include: a) The producer did not supply 
the product, b) The defect was caused by complying with the law, c) The defect was not in the product at 
the time it was supplied (e.g. careless handling by supplier d) The product was not supplied in the course of 
business (eg. Donation of homemade toys to church bazaar), and e)The producer of a component is not 
liable where the damage is caused by the product design or by giving the producer of the component faulty 
specification. 
61 Guide to the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, Product Liability and Safety Provisions,  UK Department 
of Trade and Industry, accessed on September, 19 at: 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file22866.pdf?pubpdfdload=01%2F1438#search=%22consumer%20protection
%20act%2C%201987%20uk%20s.%20%22general%20product%20safety%22%22   The checklist for 
business included the following advice: “a) review management procedures to ensure that all stages of 
production (design, manufacture, presentation and marketing) help to ensure that only safe products reach 
the customer, b) check whether there are any specific regulations setting mandatory requirements for the 
firm’s products; also check whether there are any published or proposed safety standards for its products 
and to what extent they meet, or could be made to meet, the standard, c)consider introducing quality 
assurance at each stage of the production process, d) assess whether the businesses insurance cover is 
adequate, including product liability insurance.  The matter of insurance obtained is a matter for 
commercial judgment, but businesses should seek advice from their own insurance advisors, e) review any 
contractual arrangements with suppliers, customers or others with whom the business has relevant contracts 
(a business cannot contract out of liability under the Act. but might, for example, seek indemnity from 
others in the event of liability under the Act.), and f) decide whether the records kept by the business are 
adequate, bearing in mind the working life of the product, the ten year potential for liability for product 
liability claims, and the possible need to identify suppliers of defective products to the business in 
defending a product liability action (particularly relevant to ‘own branders’)” 
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obligations under the Product Liability Directive by varying the damage and 
liability provisions and the obligations of producers, ostensibly to enhance the 
protection of French consumers under its product liability laws beyond the 
protection available in other European States. 62 
 
Geraint G. Howells63, in the Sydney Law Review, 2006, examines the impact of 
European harmonization on the consumer protection laws of Member States, 
including under the Product Liability Directive.  Howells concludes that, while 
Europe originally intended a minimal harmonization to provide a ‘floor of 
protection’ for consumers, EC consumer law has moved toward ‘maximal 
harmonization’ providing, in effect, a ‘ceiling of protection.’  “E.C. law, under a 
maximal harmonisation approach,” Howells concludes, “is no longer a benevolent 
friend of the consumer guaranteeing minimum rights, but becomes the guardian 
of trade interests.”64 
 
Minimal harmonisation was originally the dominant philosophy of consumer 
policy in the EC. This was combined with mutual recognition of national 
standards, unless receiving states could justify imposing higher standards under 
EC law. It was recognised that some areas needed to be totally harmonised, but 
for the most part Europe saw its role as creating a floor of rights on which 
Member States could build. Indeed for many years the European Commission 
encouraged States to develop more protective rules so that other Member States 
could benefit from these experiences. The model was one under which European 
consumer rights could progressively be improved by building on best practice 
from the Member States. This has all changed. The Commission now believes 
that consumers can only be delivered the benefits of the internal market if 
businesses can trade with ease across borders. In their opinion this demands 
that no national rules be more protective than European laws. Businesses should 
not be put off by the risk of being exposed to laws other than those found in their 
own legal system. This is not, as in the past, limited to rules which actually affect 
the content of the product, labelling or even advertising that might require 
producers to change their practice to trade in other states, but seemingly will be 
extended to all consumer protection laws. 
 
Maximal harmonisation turns the EC rules into the ceiling of protection. Any more 
protective national rules are simply not permitted as a matter of EC law. EC law 
under a maximal harmonisation approach is no longer a benevolent friend of the 
consumer guaranteeing minimum rights, but becomes the guardian of trade 
interests. Business only has to be concerned to lobby hard for favourable 
                                            
62 ) [2002] EUECJ C-52/00 (April 25, 2002), accessed on September 27, 2006, at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=eu/cases/EUECJ/2002/C5200.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%20%2
2 
 
63 Professor of Law, Lancaster Law School, United Kingdom. 
64 The Rise of European Consumer Law – Whither National Consumer Law, Sydney Law Review, 2006.  
Article accessed on September 19, 2006 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/journals/SydLRev/2006/4.html?query=%22general%20product%20safety%20directive%22#
fn1 
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European laws and national legislators are unable to react to any remaining 
consumer concerns. Consumer protection has truly been integrated into other 
community policies as the European Economic Treaty requires in fact it seems 
sometimes as if consumer protection policy has become internal market policy. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Europe’s enactment of the Product Liability Directive in 1985, however, clearly 
paved the way for both the enactment of a general safety requirement in the UK 
as part of a ‘modernized’ UK Consumer Protection Act, 1987 and for Europe’s 
General Product Safety Directive (92/59/EEC).  Both initiatives have strong 
elements of ‘’absolute liability.’  Neither fits comfortably with the Canadian 
defence of due diligence in regulatory prosecutions.   
 
 
Consumer Product Safety in the Member States 
 
Prior to enactment of the initial General Product Safety Directive (92/59/EEC), 
some Member States had already included a General Safety Requirement in 
their consumer product safety legislation.  These States included Germany, 
some Nordic Countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (The 
Consumer Protection Act, 1987).  
 
In Europe, national consumer product legislation must be looked at both in 
domestic and E.U. terms.  There are different forces at work in the national and 
European contexts.   These forces – political, economic, scientific, parochial - are 
sometimes parallel, and sometimes not.  The United Kingdom experience serves 
as an example in this Paper. 
 
Consumerism in Europe was the product of a post war industrial expansion and 
dates mainly from the 1960’s (the thalidomide crises).  It gathered substantial 
momentum in the 1980’s (the mad cow crisis among other concerns) and 
continues to evolve at a quickening pace today.   
 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and a few other 
European countries developed embryonic consumer safety legislation around the 
early 1960’s.   The UK the Consumer Safety Act, 1961, while it addressed the 
issue of consumer protection, was also viewed as a pro-industry statute in that it 
constituted a base for standardization which facilitated trade.  The Act was 
administered by the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK, as is the 
current Consumer Protection Act, 1987. 
 
UK industry is generally reputed by the Department and Trade and Industry to 
produce safe products because the UK developed an industry-made form of self 
regulation over the past forty years based on quality systems which came to form 
the basis for ISO 9000 standards.  The standards-based approach to the 
regulation of consumer products and reliance on quality systems for conformity 
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assessment purposes under Europe’s GSR is, therefore, not just familiar to UK 
industry, but largely integrated with industry practices.   
 
The details of how the general safety requirement evolved under UK consumer 
legislation are set out in the section of this Paper entitled The Case For Reform, 
below. 
 
Harmonizing Technical Standards for the European Common Market 
 
Prior to 1985, Member States adopted diverse approaches to regulating 
consumer products.  Germany defined broad safety principles in legislation and 
left their implementation to producers, with guidance from standards, codes of 
practice or official guidelines.  The Federal German Law on Technical 
Equipment, 1968 (‘the Equipment Safety Law’) required only that “all 
manufacturers and importers must ensure before sale that their equipment, when 
properly used, is safe from hazards to life and health.”   
 
France adopted a contrasting approach to product safety: it employed formal and 
highly detailed regulation.   The French approach eventually ran afoul of the 
principle of free movement of goods under the mutual recognition provisions of 
the European Community Treaty of 1957 on the grounds of alleged 
protectionism.  The United Kingdom faced similar challenges from other Member 
States under the Treaty.  Germany, on the other hand, avoided the anti-
protectionist features of the Treaty by the flexible approach it followed in meeting 
the essential safety requirements set out in its legislation.   
 
Initially, two changes in policy helped speed up the process of integrating the 
numerous European laws engendered by rising concerns about product safety.   
 
First, a mechanism was put in place to prevent Member States spontaneously 
adopting technical barriers to trade without prior notification, coupled with 
(judicial) reinforcement of the principle that products placed on the market in a 
Member State should be entitled to move freely throughout the Community, in 
accordance with the principle of mutual recognition.65 
 
The Cassis de Dijon66 decision of the European Court of Justice was the first decision 
of the Court to give a clear signal that it was prepared to assist with the creation 
of an internal common market without barriers to trade between Member States.   
This decision established that a product (in this case, a French blackcurrant 
liqueur) sold lawfully in one member state could not be prohibited in another 
member state (Germany) except on public health grounds under the principle of  
‘mutual recognition’ of Member State laws. 
 
                                            
65 Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety., Oxford University Press, 2005,  p. 53,  and 
footnote 3,  See also council Directive 83/189/EEC of March 1983 laying down a procedure for required 
sharing information in the field of technical standards and regulations.   
66 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
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In the first meeting of the Committee struck by the Commission to facilitate 
information sharing on European technical standards and regulations, the 
German representative invited the Member State representatives present to 
consider adopting the German approach to regulating product safety.  Only the 
essential safety principles developed to protect the public interest would be set 
out in legislation.  The technical details required for implementing the essential 
requirements would be determined by enterprises and private standardization 
agencies employing standards, codes of practice and guidelines that they 
developed with the aid of ‘technical’ experts. 67 
 
Immediately following this meeting, the French and British representatives 
examined the German approach with the Chairman, Paulo Cecchini, then Deputy 
Director-General of the European Commission.  At an informal meeting with the 
German and British representatives at the Chateau de Namur in Belgium in June 
of 1983, Mr. Cecchini presented a paper outlining the framework of a New 
Approach to Regulation for Europe based on the German regulatory practice.  
With minor amendments, the proposal was accepted for later presentation to the 
Member States.  
 
The follow up of the result of the Château de Namur meeting was embodied in a 
presentation by Mr. Narjes, Member of the Commission for the Internal Market, 
which led to Council conclusions of the 16th of July 1984, annexed later to the 
Council Resolution of 7th of May 1985(Official Journal of the European 
Communities n. C 136/1 of the 4th of June 1985).  (The New Approach to 
Regulation)68 
 
The essential features of Europe’s New Approach to Regulation are that:  
• Only “essential requirements” are set out in technical directives, for which 
the means of compliance is left to individual manufacturers; 
• The technical specifications of products meeting the essential 
requirements set out in the directives are established through harmonized 
standards developed by technical experts and approved by 
standardization committees; 
• Compliance with harmonized or other standards remains voluntary.  
Manufacturer’s are permitted to apply other technical specifications to 
meet the essential requirements of the legislation if they chose to do so; 
• Products manufactured in compliance with harmonized standards benefit 
from a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential 
requirements – although individual products may still be found to be 
“unsafe” and acted against by the appropriate public authority; 
• European New Approach directives are treated as “total harmonization 
directives”, that is, the provisions of these directives supersede all 
corresponding provisions in the laws of Member States; and 
                                            
67 Correspondence, dated February 3, 2006, from Mr. Paulo Cecchini, former Deputy Director-General of 
the European Commission to Lyle S. Fairbairn, Q.C., filed with this Report. 
68 Ibid. 
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• New Approach directives are ultimately addressed to Member States, 
which have an obligation to transpose them into their national legislation.69 
 
Europe has approximately 20 vertical directives dealing with such matters as 
appliances burning gaseous fuels, construction products, lifts, low voltage 
equipment, machinery, medical devices, toys, and personal protective 
equipment, among others.   
 
The following examples illustrate the very general level at which “essential 
requirements” are struck in the vertical European directives and transposed in 
Member State regulations. The vertical directives are, in effect, broad 
‘performance standards’. 
 
• Appliances burning gaseous fuels must be so designed and built as to 
operate safely and present no danger to persons, domestic animals, or 
property when normally used (as defined in article 1.4)70 
 
• Low voltage electrical equipment, together with its component parts 
should be made in such a way as to ensure that it can be safely and 
properly assembled and connected.71 
 
• Medical Devices must be designed and manufactured in such a way that 
when used under the conditions and for the purposes intended, they will 
not compromise the clinical condition or the safety of patients, or the 
safety and health of users or, where applicable, other persons, provided 
that any risks which may be associated with their use constitute 
acceptable risks when weighed against the benefits to the patient and are 
compatible with a high level of protection of health and safety.72 
 
• Toys…The user of toys as well as third parties must be protected against 
health hazards and risk of physical injury when used as intended or in a 
foreseeable way, bearing in mind the normal behaviour of children.73 
 
Under the New Approach, therefore, detailed regulations are effectively displaced 
by ‘technical’ specifications for products as set out in voluntary standards struck 
by standardization agencies and expert committees, which are submitted to the 
European Commission for approval and publication.  If a product meets the 
specifications in production, it will benefit from a presumption of conformity with 
                                            
69 European Commission Guide to the Implementation of directives based on the  New Approach and the 
Global Approach, pp. 8,11, accessed February 9, 2006, at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pdf  
69 Ibid., para 149:  
 
70 90/396/EEC, 1.1 
71 73/23/EEC, 1.22 
72 93/EEC, 1. 
73 88/378/EEC,1. 
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the essential requirements of the relevant European Directive.  The specification 
standards are numerous and certainly as detailed as any prescriptive regulation, 
however, compliance with them remains voluntary.  Ultimately, the onus is on the 
manufacturer to establish conformity with the essential requirements.  This may 
be done with reference to ‘approved’ European standards – or to standards 
developed or employed by the manufacturer that meet or exceed the ‘essential 
requirements.’ 
 
In the case of Toys, numerous standards have been developed by European 
Standards Agencies (or by Member States submitting national standards for 
approval by the European Commission as “European” standards”).  Specification 
standards for toys include standards relating to flammability, the mechanical and 
physical properties of toys, the potential for migration of chemical elements, and 
age labeling warning symbols.  Particular categories of toys likely to expose 
children to accidental injury are also covered by specification standards; 
including swings, slides and similar ‘activity’ toys, finger paints and chemical toys. 
 
Despite the modest standard setting resources available in the UK in 1972, the 
Robens Inquiry anticipated that any safety regime relying extensively on 
voluntary standards would soon see an exponential increase in the development 
of standards.  This had been the case in Germany under its Equipment Safety 
Law, 1968.   It also proved to be the case in Europe after the New Approach to 
Regulation in Europe was adopted.  The European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN), which has access to more than 60,0000 technical 
experts, has developed more than 12,000 European standards under the New 
Approach.  The European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC) has developed over 5100 European standards.74 
 
Conformity Assessment Modules 
The ‘ New Approach’ standards are, as noted, are strictly voluntary, but the onus 
is on producers to establish conformity with the essential requirements of the 
vertical directives.  In 1990, nine harmonized methods, or modules for the 
assessment of product conformity were laid down in Council Decision 
90/68/EEC.75  In 1993, the European Council laid down criteria for which of the 
conformity assessment procedures are appropriate for the particular technical 
harmonization directives (93/465/EEC).  In some instances, producers are given 
a choice amongst the various modules where more than one approach is 
consistent with ensuring compliance with the ‘essential requirements’ of a vertical 
directive.   
 
 The conformity assessment modules usually address both the design and 
production phases of a product. Depending upon the product in question, the 
                                            
74European Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the  New Approach, Brussels, November 30, 2005, 
presentation by Michael Kelley, Chairman of CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Joint Presidents Group, accessed on 
June 5, 2006 at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/new_approach_conference_en.htm  
75 December 13, 1990, OJL 380/13,31,12.90. 
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conformity assessment module might involve a simple self-certification of the 
design, manufacture and operation of the product, possibly with a supplementary 
requirement for specified tests on aspects of the product.76  Other modules 
involve the participation of “notified bodies” (independent laboratories serving a 
quasi-governmental surveillance and testing function); the production and 
assessment of prototypes; approval by a notified body of a quality assurance 
system covering production; final product inspection and testing; unit by unit 
verification by a notified body; verification of manufacturing processes or “full 
quality assurance”, which incorporates many of the features of other modules 
covering design, manufacture, and final product  inspection and testing.77  
 
Standard Setting Under the GPSD 
The European Commission has established a process to evaluate and identify 
standards that will provide a supplier with a "presumption of conformity" to the 
general safety requirements of the GPSD. A list of qualifying standards is 
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The 
recommendation for a standard to be included in the list of published standards 
may come from a number of sources including European Standards Bodies, 
industry, consumer associations and member states. 
Before making a decision on a standard, it is evaluated by two Expert 
Committees with representatives from member states and stakeholders who 
provide advice on standardization matters.78  Members of these committees are 
asked to provide their opinion on whether they consider the standard to fulfill the 
requirements of the GSR under the GPSD. No specific criteria are set for the 
process other than what is specified in the GPSD. If it is the opinion of the 
committees that the standard fulfils all the requirements of the GSR, the standard 
is deemed to confer conformity to the general safety requirements of the GPSD 
and is published.  
The questionnaire used by the Committees in carrying out this analysis, includes 
criteria similar to U.S. criteria under the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act (for 
deferring to voluntary standards) and is attached as Annex 2.  To date, only one 
rather limited list of standards has been published under the GPSD, it deals 
                                            
76 The producer is obliged to retain supporting documentation in support of the self-certification for periods 
up to 10 years or the expected duration of the product. 
77 See Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, supra Appendix 5: Modules 
for Conformity Assessment Procedures Under the  New Approach. 
78 Directive 98/34/EC “Standing Committee, the members of which will be appointed by the Member 
States with the task of helping the Commission to examine draft national standards” and “the Standing 
Committee should be consulted on the draft standardisation requests referred to in this Directive;” 
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mainly with child care articles, children’s’ furniture and lighters.79  A second list is 
currently being developed for publication.80  
 
Trade-based Jurisdiction of the GPSD 
 
The European Community’s competence to legislate in relation to product 
regulation (including for the general product safety requirement) is limited to 
measures that help establish or improve trade throughout a European Common 
Market.81   This contrasts significantly with the jurisdictional basis for Health 
Canada’s proposed Health Protection Act, founded on the exercise of the federal 
criminal law power for the exclusive purpose of protecting public health and 
safety.  This difference in Europe’s underlying authority for product safety is an 
important influence on Europe’s perspective on product safety issues.  In 
particular, it affects European approaches to setting and amending standards 
and the role of those standards in achieving product safety.   It also affects which 
stakeholders occupy the ascendant role in the regime’s regulatory processes, as 
well as the perspective of officials engaged in market surveillance, compliance 
and enforcement measures.  
 
Article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community provides: 
 
By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this 
Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives 
set out in Article 14. (i.e. establishing the internal market) The Council shall, 
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.  (Emphasis added) 
 
Product safety, as such, is not within the European Community’s Treaty express 
mandate, although consumer protection and product safety are an important 
ancillary consideration because the laws, regulations and technical requirements 
of Member States are required to be harmonized “to a high level of protection.”   
Section 95(3) of the Treaty provides:  
 
The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, 
safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a 
high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development 
                                            
79 See Commission communication in the framework of the implementation of Directive 2001/93/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December of 2001on general product safety of listed 
European Standardization Organizations, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, (2004/C 
100/04) 
80 Personal electronic communication between Elizabeth Nielsen and Erik Hansson, Deputy Head of 
Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection. April 29, 2006. 
81 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
pages 28-37 
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based on scientific facts.  Within their respective powers, the European 
Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective. (emphasis 
added) 
 
The preamble to the General Product Safety Directive, recites the trade-based 
jurisdiction to make clear that a major purpose of the GPSD is to avoid differing 
levels of protection being accorded to like products within various Member States 
to avoid barriers to trade or distortions of competition in the European 
Community.  If the European Commission’s GPSD measure had been advanced 
to meet product safety objectives exclusively, it would clearly have been 
challenged on jurisdictional grounds under the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.  
 
The preamble of the Directive alludes to the trade-based objective in the 
following terms:   
 
(2) It is important to adopt measures with the aim of improving the functioning of 
the internal market, comprising an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is assured. 
 
(3) In the absence of Community provisions, horizontal legislation of the Member 
States on product safety, imposing in particular a general obligation on economic 
operators to market only safe products, might differ in the level of protection 
afforded to consumers. Such disparities, and the absence of horizontal legislation 
in some Member States, would be liable to create barriers to trade and distortion 
of competition within the internal market.82 
 
The ancillary, safety-based, objective of the GPSD (which links to the “high level 
of protection” terminology in the Treaty) is expressed in the following terms:  
 
(4) In order to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community must 
contribute to protecting the health and safety of consumers. Horizontal 
Community legislation introducing a general product safety requirement, and 
containing provisions on the general obligations of producers and distributors, on 
the enforcement of Community product safety requirements and on rapid 
exchange of information and action at Community level in certain cases, should 
contribute to that aim. 
 
While both trade and safety objectives are recited in the GPSD directive, it is 
important to emphasize that the trade objective is paramount in Europe and any 
safety measure undertaken by the EU cannot usually be divorced from its 
common market objectives.  This is significant because trade and safety 
objectives sometimes conflict.  It is important to keep this in mind should Health 
Canada decide to adapt aspects of the European model to the Canadian health 
protection legislation.    
 
                                            
82 General Product Safety Directive, 2001/95/EC, preamble, section (3).  
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5. The Case for Reform in Europe 
 
Europe: The General Product Safety Directive  
 
The Case for Europe’s General Product Safety Directive 
The German and Nordic approach to regulation was adapted to the general duty 
of care prescribed under occupational health and safety legislation in the United 
Kingdom in the early 1970’s83, and to workplace safety regimes in numerous 
other Commonwealth countries, including Canada.  These initiatives in the 
occupational health and safety sector were preceded by a seminal UK report84 
that made a compelling safety case for placing primary statutory responsibility for 
safety on those in the best position to influence safety outcomes.  This was the 
Report that led to the enactment, in 1974, of the UK’s first general product safety 
requirement covering goods and substances supplied to the workplace.85 
 
The case for a standards-based approach to regulatory reform in Europe was 
grounded on the compelling need to overcome regulatory gridlock in Community 
legislation and to expeditiously establish a viable, internationally competitive, 
common market by establishing harmonized voluntary product standards.86  The 
case for reform in Europe was primarily trade-based; it was not predominantly a 
case for improved product safety.   
 
Under the Treaty establishing the European Union, Member States retain the 
residual power and the European Parliament relies exclusively on the provisions 
of the Treaty for its authority.  Under the Treaty, product safety is an ancillary 
issue.  The Treaty requirement that product standards be harmonized to a high 
level of protection (Article 95) is only “procedural and aspirational,” and would be 
difficult to enforce as a matter of binding policy.87  In 2000, for example, the 
European Court of Justice struck down a European Community Directive on 
tobacco advertising because the measure was found to be concerned strictly with 
public health policy and did not contribute to market building. 
 
The original GPSD underwent major revisions in 2001 and the overall role of the 
GSR is now undergoing a metamorphosis in Europe.  Through inertia in the 
regulatory process, the GSR is becoming transformed from a temporary ‘safety 
net’ into a more permanent horizontal form of regulation for unregulated 
consumer products at the pan-European level generally.  This is occurring for the 
                                            
83 I.e. Under the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 
84 Report of the Robens Committee on Safety and Health at Work, 1970-72 
8585  See Annex 3 for a discussion of the first GSR in the UK under a Workplace Safety Model. 
86   See Annex 2 for a more detailed description of  Europe’s  New Approach to Regulation and its 
relationship to the General Safety Requirement 
87 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, Oxford University Press, 2005 
at p. 31 
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following reasons: 
 
• There is a policy bias against regulation unless the need for regulation is 
compellingly justified;  
 
• Some new countries entering the E.U. do not have mature, or any, 
consumer product legislation and thus rely heavily on the General Product 
Safety Directive as framework legislation; 
 
• There are vastly differing capacities and resources within the Member 
States for developing, administering and enforcing product safety 
regulations; 
 
• Europe’s targeted five-year period for reviewing standards is not always 
achieved, leaving additional, unintended, scope for the GPSD; 
 
• Some of the standards developed by standards groups are simply not 
effective safety standards, by reason of trade imperatives or intransigent 
positions taken on largely industry-controlled standardization committees; 
and  
 
• The capacity of new Member States for transposing new regulations is 
also limited due to onerous demands on their regulatory process. (New 
States being brought into the European Union must adopt approximately 
26,000 European laws as a condition of admission.)   
 
European community standards are moving in the general direction of 
international standards in the interest of enhancing international trade and 
competitiveness.  International product standards, ironically, may sometimes 
provide lower safety levels than national standards due to the degree of 
compromise required to achieve a consensus at the international level and the 
general absence of consumer representation on international standard-setting 
bodies. 
 
All of these factors are important considerations for Health Canada in assessing 
whether, or how far, to adapt aspects of the European model of the GSR to 
Canada’s health protection legislation. 
 
The United Kingdom – Consumer Product Safety Legislation 
 
The General Safety Requirement in the current UK Consumer Protection Act was 
influenced by two separate policy strands, namely: the workplace safety reforms 
of the early 1970’s and the trade-based regulatory reform in the European Union 
in the 1980’s. Both policy strands placed an emphasis on enforced self-regulation 
and the substitution of voluntary standards for prescriptive regulation, where 
feasible. 
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The UK experience in crafting general product safety requirements in the 
workplace and product safety sectors illustrates key policy and practical 
considerations associated with this regulatory technique.  The outcome-oriented 
reforms of UK workplace safety legislation in the 1970’s - including the GSR on 
which the UK product safety requirement was later based - mirror Health 
Canada’s objectives under the Legislative Renewal initiative to a remarkable 
degree.    
 
In the early 1970’s, the consumer safety regime was somewhat rudimentary.  Its 
deficiencies included a significant lack of information about consumer safety 
issues, limited availability of operating standards, and a somewhat limited power 
to make regulations. 
 
One of the deficiencies under the UK consumer safety regime in the 1970’s, 
resonates with Health Canada’s principle reason for wanting to include a general 
safety requirement in the proposed Health Protection Act: 
 
Regulations provide a long-term safety measure by ensuring that all goods of a 
particular class are made to minimum safety standards.  But they cannot be 
invoked to take speedy action to deal with a newly discovered hazard, or against 
dangerous goods of a sort not covered by regulations.  Other procedures are 
required to enable action to be taken in such circumstances, and there is no 
power at present to order the immediate withdrawal from sale of dangerous 
goods.88 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the UK, the case for including a GSR in consumer product safety legislation 
was not easily made.  In 1974, the UK first considered, and rejected, a GSR for 
inclusion in the Consumer Safety Act, 1978.  Consumer groups had pointed out 
that, but for a few product-specific statutes, there was no comprehensive 
legislation which prohibited the marketing of dangerous goods; nor was there any 
statutory power under which a trader could be compelled to withdraw dangerous 
goods. The proposal to include a ‘General Safety Requirement’ in the legislation 
was clearly regarded as a radical proposal. 
 
Some have gone so far as to propose that it should be made an offence for any 
person to supply a dangerous product which is dangerous or a risk to health.89  
(Emphasis added) 
 
Criteria for UK Rejection of the GSR in 1976 
In 1976, the GSR proposal was rejected for numerous reasons.  Based on Health 
Canada’s consultations under the Legislative Renewal Initiative, some of the 
reasons (those in italics) are still topical concerns in Canada. 90 
                                            
88 Ibid., para. 45 
89 Consumer Safety, A Consultative Document, UK February, 1976; Cmnd. 6938, para. 80 
90 Others reasons for rejection of the GSR in the UK in the 1970’s are of less concern in Canada today 
because ‘regulatory offences’ have been distinguished from purely criminal offences by the Supreme Court 
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• “A trader might find himself at risk of prosecution for an absolute criminal 
offence although he had taken all reasonable care in the course of his 
business;” 
• Even if a statutory defence of due diligence were included, this would still 
leave “the onus on the defendant to prove that he was not negligent;” 
• “It also leaves the main emphasis of the prosecution case on whether the 
product was unsafe; this could tend to underline the difficulty of 
establishing criteria of safety, on which opinions of experts are liable to 
differ; 
• Imposing a duty on any person supplying a product to ensure that it is 
safe, as an alternative, would amount to making it a criminal offence to fail 
in the common law duty of care which already rests on manufacturers and 
others supplying goods; 
• To secure a conviction under such a provision, it would not be sufficient to 
for the prosecution to prove that a product was unsafe, it would also have 
“to show that the accused failed in his duty to take reasonable steps to 
establish the safety of the product;” 
• A GSR would not guarantee that unsafe goods would not reach the 
consumer, nor would it “adequately secure the withdrawal of any such 
goods found on sale;” 
• There was doubt about whether the resulting encouragement to traders “to 
exercise more care” warranted the creation of a new offence, or the 
additional case load on the criminal courts; 
• The problem of defining what is “safe” would become more critical in 
criminal proceedings than it is in civil proceedings and was “bound to raise 
problems of consistency”, not only in day to day prosecutions, but also in 
international for a like the EEC; and 
• The GSR would only serve a purpose “in extreme circumstances”; 
regulations and “direct action by the Department would remain the main 
instruments for ensuring adequate safety standards.”91 
 
Factors Underlying UK Acceptance of The GSR in the mid-1980’s 
The United Kingdom had an opportunity to reconsider the GSR proposal in 1984 
while reviewing the effectiveness of The Consumer Safety Act, 1978.92   The 
review was prompted, in part, by an influx into the UK in 1981 of over one 
hundred types of dangerous electrical hair curling brushes imported from the Far 
                                                                                                                                  
of Canada.  (R. v. Sault Ste Marie, 1978, CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] S.C.R. 1299)   Regulatory offences now 
generally carry a lesser social stigma and provide for a defence of ‘due diligence’ so as to prevent quasi- 
criminal liability without fault.  The new regulatory offences enable a defendant to escape liability if he can 
establish on a civil burden of proof (beyond a preponderance of probabilities) that he exercised all due care 
to avoid committing the offence.  However, the prosecution must still establish the factual elements of the 
offence on a criminal burden of proof, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt.     
91 Ibid., Cmnd. 6938, paras. 79-84 
92 Report to Parliament on The Safety of Goods, by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, July, 
1984, Cmnd 9302 
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East, The curling brushes lacked adequate insulation and posed a severe 
electrocution hazard.  The expense and difficulty in tracking down these 
appliances and removing them from the market, together with long delays 
between the identification of suspect goods and their removal from the market, 
clearly pointed to the need to reform the 1978 legislation. 
 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) circumscribed its proposed 
reforms with two important cost/benefit parameters: 
 
10. In safety, as in other fields, there does, however, come a point where 
additional benefits begin to become disproportionately expensive. Safety 
policy must reflect a judgment on the degree to which the community as a 
whole is prepared to pay for additional safety.  The Government has not 
pursued suggestions which would involve major interference with the normal 
processes of manufacture and trade and so put up unduly the prices which 
consumers have to pay. 
 
11. The Government has also excluded options which could be implemented 
only by directing large additional resources to enforcement.  Again 
consumers – as tax and rate payers – would have to meet much of the cost.  
The Government’s intention is to encourage more efficient use of existing 
resources by facilitating better identification of unsafe goods before they are 
distributed and streamlining the procedures for halting their supply.93 
(emphasis added) 
 
The DTI proposals involved “wider powers for enforcement authorities (which 
were) balanced by appropriate safeguards for traders.”94  The approach to be 
adopted in balancing new powers with appropriate safeguards is an important 
policy issue for Health Canada, should it adopt a GSR.  This regulatory technique 
involves a considerable expansion of administrative discretion in the process of 
determining the ‘safety’ of consumer products and in selecting appropriate 
actions, including prosecution, to be followed in the case of ‘unsafe’ products.  
 
In 1984, the UK Government accepted that there was a case for widening the 
scope of the 1978 Act “to place a general obligation on the suppliers of consumer 
goods to achieve an acceptable standard of safety where it is reasonable to 
expect them to anticipate and reduce risks arising from those goods.”95  The 
Government recommended the inclusion of a GSR in its consumer product safety 
legislation for the following reasons: 
 
• The GSR was considered to induce a greater sense of responsibility on 
the part of those suppliers who regarded themselves as unaffected by the 
                                            
93 Ibid., paras. 10 and 11 
94 Ibid., para 12. 
95 Ibid., para. 34 
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legislation (and who might not have been adequately deterred by the 
common law duty of care);96  
 
• Local authorities already dealt informally with complaints about the safety 
of unregulated goods and often sought to persuade suppliers to withdraw 
or modify such goods, or drew attention to the attention of the Secretary of 
State for consideration of possible use of prohibition powers.  The 
introduction of a general duty would enable enforcement officials to take 
action on the basis of a legal obligation on suppliers;97 
 
• In ten years of experience with a general safety requirement in section 6 
of the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, there did not appear to have 
been serious problems of interpretation of the level of safety required for 
industrial goods; 98 
 
• A general safety duty was thought likely to stimulate the formulation and 
wider use of safety standards for consumer goods and thus contribute to 
the development of a more effective standards system – an objective to 
which the UK was already committed;99 
 
• While the proportion of accidents caused directly by dangerous products 
was thought to be small, a major purpose of safety legislation was thought 
by DTI to “help prevent accidents by setting new standards for reducing 
risks;”100 
 
• Greater enforcement at the point of first supply was thought likely to be 
more cost effective than the former practice of concentrating on the retail 
stage;101 and 
 
• The powers to require production of documents or to seize and detain 
goods for testing would be available for new products which, in the 
absence of a general legal duty to produce ‘safe” products, would only 
have been available where the enforcement officer had reasonable cause 
to suspect or believe that specific regulations, orders or notices had been 
contravened.102  
 
Proposed Use of Voluntary Standards 
To address earlier concerns about how to determine what level of safety would 
be required to meet the new general duty to produce ‘safe’ products, the UK 
                                            
96 Ibid., The hope and expectation was that a GSR would encourage or re-enforce good risk assessment and 
risk management practices at the pre-manufacturing stage. 
97 Ibid., para 35 
98 Ibid., para 36 
99 Ibid., para. 36 
100 Ibid paras. 9, and 36 
101 Ibid., para. 21 
102 Ibid., para. 21 
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Government proposed to link the general duty (along the lines of the German 
approach to regulation) with a broadly defined reference to standards such as 
‘sound modern standards of safety’.103   
 
The purpose of this linkage would be to ensure that the level of safety which can 
legitimately be expected is interpreted by reference to identifiable and accepted 
points of comparison rather than simply left to more subjective assessments of 
safety.  Such points of comparison would have to embody established and 
proven technology, recognized by expert opinion in the field and already 
available at reasonable cost.104 (Emphasis added) 
 
Where a published standard was accepted as a safety benchmark for the product 
in question, the standard would still be treated as voluntary.  “Achievement of the 
same level of safety by compliance with equivalent standards, or by other means, 
would be equally acceptable.”105  
 
Influence of the ‘ New Approach’ Regulation 
 It is noteworthy that the date of the UK proposal to rely on voluntary standards 
as an aid to interpreting the meaning of ‘safety’ in the consumer safety area 
occurred at precisely the same time as Europe’s New Approach to Regulation 
was being developed. In 1983, a British official and a German representative had 
collaborated with Paulo Cecchini, then Deputy Director-General of the European 
Commission in proposing the new, standards-based, approach to regulating the 
technical aspects of products as a means of overcoming regulatory gridlock on 
technical issues.    
 
Europe’s New Approach to Regulation was adopted by a European Council 
Resolution of May 7, 1985, two years before the enactment of a General Safety 
Requirement in the Consumer Protection Act, 1987.  It is probable, therefore, that 
the ‘ New Approach’ developments in Europe - in which the UK played an active 
role - made the UK rather more receptive to a standards-based approach to 
regulation than had been the case in 1974 when the UK rejected the GSR 
proposal, almost out of hand.106   
 
Canada’s policy position on the role of voluntary standards in regulation is still 
evolving, but it does not yet reflect a commitment to using voluntary standards in 
substitution for regulations to the same extent as under Europe’s ‘ New 
Approach’ regulation or under the GPSD.  Canada’s position, over time, will be 
influenced significantly by the United States’ position on the role of voluntary 
standards in regulating consumer products since the U.S. is its major trading 
partner.  Europe’s use of voluntary standards as a quasi-mandatory substitute for 
regulations is likely to be regarded, in the United States, as ‘back door rule 
making’.  
                                            
103 Ibid., para. 37 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., para 38 
106 Official Journal of the European Communities n. C 136/1 of the 4th of June 1985. 
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The role of voluntary standards in regulation in Europe, Canada and the United 
States is discussed later in this Paper under the heading Implementation and 
Operational Experience.  
 
Balancing Enhanced Flexibility with Increased Accountability  
Enhanced producer responsibility for verifying the safety of products was the quid 
pro quo exacted by the UK for allowing increased flexibility to producers in 
meeting safety requirements.  Enhanced self-regulation also implied the need for 
increased stringency in the penalties for non-compliance, and also for limiting the 
excuses that constitute a defence of ‘due diligence’. 
 
As a general rule, however, the Government considers that the first suppliers 
should be allowed to retain flexibility in choosing how to set about ensuring that 
their goods meet safety requirements.  The counterpart of that flexibility is 
responsibility.  There is a case for greater stringency, in both the penalties for 
infringements and the criteria for defences to criminal charges, in the case of first 
suppliers.  First suppliers whose method of doing business leads them to rely for 
the specification of products, or materials for finished products, on other suppliers 
will need to take this into account in deciding the degree of confidence they wish 
to place in their sources of supply.107 (Emphasis added) 
 
The UK Government therefore proposed that a first supplier could not, in 
advancing a due diligence defence in a general safety requirement proceeding, 
rely on information supplied by another person, unless they had taken 
reasonable steps to verify that information.  The wording of the due diligence 
defence in the Consumer Protection Act, 1987 further restricted the due diligence 
defence by requiring a defendant to establish, in addition to having exercised all 
due diligence, that he or she had taken “all reasonable steps” to avoid committing 
the offence.  This requirement has been carried over to the UK General Product 
Safety Regulations, 2005, transposing the revised GPSD.108   
 
29. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this regulation, in proceedings 
against a person for an offence under these Regulations it shall be a defence for 
that person to show that he took all reasonable steps and exercised all due 
diligence to avoid committing the offence. (emphasis added) 
 
Compensation to Traders for Ungrounded Action by the Public Authority   
The expanded powers given to the Public Authority were counterbalanced with 
upgraded safeguards for the Trader where the Public Authority exercises powers 
of seizure against consumer products later determined to be safe.  
 
Expanded seizure powers and the power to require suppliers to hold goods 
suspected to be dangerous for six months are two of the “wider powers for 
enforcement authorities (which were to be) balanced by appropriate safeguards 
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for traders.”109  In the event that the authority’s initial suspicions could not 
subsequently be confirmed, the Government considered it fair that the authority 
be liable to compensate the trader for loss.  
 
Australia’s Recent Review of Consumer Product Safety  
 
The Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs of Australia (MCCA) composed of 
representatives from the Australian Government and the Governments of the 
States and Territories undertook a review of the Australian Consumer Product 
Safety System.110  The main goals were to ensure that consumers could 
purchase safe products and that unsafe products would be readily detected, 
reported to the authorities and, if necessary, removed from the market. In 
addition to protecting consumers, they wanted to promote an efficient market for 
consumer products and use of limited government regulatory resources.   
 
The main reasons for the review111 identified by the MCCA are very similar to 
those behind the proposal to renew the Health Protection Legislation in Canada. 
They included:  
 
• The need for a more proactive system that did not place the onus on 
government to identify, assess and regulate each product hazard amongst 
the increasing number of new and innovative consumer products on the 
market.  As in Canada, the ability of government to address all the 
potential safety hazards associated with these products is affected by the 
resources available for regulatory development and enforcement.  Also, 
the system suffered from an inability to detect unsafe products at an early 
stage since regulators did not have access to industry information on 
product safety problems nor did it have national statistics on product 
related injuries; and 
 
• The need for a more efficient system that reduced the impact of their 
regulatory initiatives on consumers and businesses in the broader context. 
Since the Australian System includes product safety regulation not only at 
the Commonwealth level but also at the level of the individual states and 
territories, it resulted in duplication of effort, the potential inefficient use of 
public funds, and additional costs for business.   
 
The MCCA identified a number of options to be considered in order to reform the 
system and requested the Australian Productivity Commission to assess the 
system’s ability to address the safety of consumer products; to examine the 
impacts of the options identified including the direct and indirect costs; and to 
evaluate the benefits of implementing the proposed options versus retaining the 
                                            
109 Ibid,  para.  12 
110 Australian Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, Review of the Australian Consumer Product Safety 
System Options for Reform, August 2004. 
111 UK Consumer Protection Act, 1987, s. 14 (Suspension Notices). 
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current system.  Some of the options proposed by MCCA112 are the same as 
those in the Canadian Legislative Renewal Proposal113 such as: 
 
• A general legal obligation for businesses to market only safe consumer 
products commonly known as a General Safety Requirement or General 
Safety Provision (GSP); 
• A revised definition of unsafe goods; 
• The provision of improved product safety information to businesses and 
consumers; 
• New requirements for businesses to monitor and report on the safety of 
their product; 
• A new requirement for businesses to recall unsafe products; and 
• Measures to harmonize product safety legislation, administration and 
enforcement between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories. 
 
Issues Identified by Stakeholders 
Extensive consultation with stakeholders was carried out on the review of the 
system as proposed by the MCCA.  A wide range of stakeholder groups from 
industry associations to consumer protection organizations responded and they 
identified a number of common issues needing to be addressed.  Both Consumer 
Groups114,115 and Industry Associations116,117, 118 were concerned about: 
• The fragmented product safety system with different rules in different parts 
of the country resulting in uneven protection to consumers and added 
costs to industry and consumers; 
• The level of non-compliance with Australian standards and consistency of 
enforcement across the country; 
• The lack of adequate data about the level of injuries associated with 
consumer products;  
• The lack of sufficient research in the area of consumer product safety; and  
• The differences between Australian and international standards. 
 
Although Consumer Groups strongly supported the implementation of a GSP and 
reporting of adverse incidents, industry associations did not, primarily, because 
of the added cost burden and uncertainty due to the vagueness of a GSP. 
                                            
112  Australian Productivity Commission, Review of the Australian Consumer Product Safety System, 
Discussion Draft, August 2005. 
113  Health Canada, Health Protection Legislative Renewal, Detailed Legislative Proposal, 2003. 
114  Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, Submission to the Review of the Australian 
Consumer Product Safety System. 
115  Australian Consumer’s Association, Submission to the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
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Results of the Productivity Commission’s Research 
Problem Areas Identified 
In carrying out its research on the existing regulatory system, the Productivity 
Commission concluded that the most significant problem areas needing to be 
addressed appeared to be: 
 
• Product misuse and poor product maintenance rather than faults inherent in the 
products themselves were found to be the most common cause of product-
related injury; 
• The inability to accurately define the size of the problem raised the issue of 
whether or not more public resources should be used to improve the safety of 
products or used to address other sources of hazards; 
• The inadequate collection and use of evidence to help identify hazards as early 
as possible to permit a reasonable assessment of risks, and to fashion an 
evidence based response;  
• Cases where the injury or death associated with a product has a delayed onset 
so that it is not easy to make the connection to the product; and 
• Products supplied by recalcitrant and ‘fly-by-night’ sellers and manufacturers, 
rather than long-standing suppliers concerned to protect their reputation.119 
 
Incentives to Achieve Adequate Product Safety or Change of Behaviour 
Achieving a situation where consumer products do not cause injury or deaths is a 
responsibility that is shared between suppliers, consumers and governments. To 
achieve appropriate safety levels, the Commission suggested that a mix of cost 
effective incentives is required to encourage appropriate behaviours among 
those responsible.  For suppliers, these included: 
 
• The threat of adverse media coverage or criticism by consumer 
organizations and subsequent loss of reputation; 
• Strict product liability rules, improved enforcement, and general legal 
remedies which encourage suppliers to implement measure to reduce 
their liability and potential damages; 
• Insurance for suppliers; and  
• Research into the health and safety of consumer products. 
 
These conclusions were also identified by a number of consumer product 
suppliers who indicated that damage to company reputations, reduced sales and 
costly litigation acted as strong incentives to put into place programs to manage 
the safety and quality of the products they sell. 120   
 
The factors that were found to influence the behavior of consumers and as a 
result the injuries and deaths associated with consumer products included: 
                                            
119  Australian Productivity Commission, Review of the Australian Consumer Product Safety System, 
Discussion Draft, August 2005, Pg.  XXVI 
120  Corporate Executive Board, General Counsel Roundtable, Strategies for Managing Product Safety 
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• Provision of targeted information and education on the safe use and 
maintenance of products that is effective in influencing consumer 
purchasing decisions and behavior; 
• Health care costs; and  
• The potential of injury and death. 
 
Key Findings and Related Rationales 
The Productivity Commission after examining the existing product safety system 
in Australia did not recommend the establishment of a GSP similar to that being 
proposed in Canada and existing in Europe.  The Commission was not 
convinced that a GSP would result in net benefits for Australia.  The research 
instead indicated that in Europe, suppliers have a low awareness of the GSP 
requirements, are concerned about its vagueness and uncertainty and are 
influenced to a greater extent by liability rules.  Moreover, the implementation of 
a GSP would be accompanied by additional transition costs lasting a number of 
years.   
 
The Commission, in addition, did not recommend moving from the voluntary 
recall system that has worked well in Australia to a mandatory recall requirement 
as exists in Europe and the United States.   It indicated that the incentives 
present to achieve product safety were sufficient for businesses to voluntarily to 
recall their products. 
 
The Commission did however identify a number of areas where improvements 
could be made, such as:  
 
• Harmonizing legislation across the States and Territories so that the 
implementation of any bans or standards were national in scope; 
• Developing or improving mechanisms to detect unsafe products at an 
early stage121 such as a linked national system of complaints information, 
hospital data, mortality data, international information on injuries and 
hazards related to consumer products that is readily accessible to 
regulators; 
• Including the concept of  ‘foreseeable misuse’ in the definition of ‘unsafe’, 
as long as it is limited to behavior which is reasonably predictable and not 
unreasonable; 
• Providing better information to businesses on regulatory requirements; 
• Targeting information campaigns to consumers to influence their behavior; 
• Improving data collection and research so that evidence-based hazard 
identification and risk management can be central to policy making, 
standard setting and enforcement;  
                                            
121  Australian Productivity Commission, Review of the Consumer Product Safety System, 
Chapter 11 Early warning and information sharing, August 2005. 
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• Making greater use of cost-benefit analysis, embodying risk assessment, 
in determining whether and how to intervene to address identified product 
hazards so that public resources can be focused on the most serious 
product related hazards; and  
• Targeting enforcement resources on the “fly-by-night” businesses that are 
most likely to supply unsafe products. 
 
Response of the MCCA to the Productivity Commissions Findings 
The findings of the Commission supported by the MCCA particularly as they 
relate to harmonizing the Australian Product Safety System and enhancing the 
proactive nature of the system were: 
• Developing a hazard-based approach to product safety 
• Undertaking a base-line study of product-related accidents; 
• Establishing an internet one-stop shop to provide product safety 
information to businesses and consumers; 
• Enhancing business reporting requirements regarding products clearly 
associated with serious injury or death; 
• Ensuring legislative coverage of ‘reasonably foreseeable use’ in  the 
threshold tests for bans and recall orders; and 
• Enhancing the standards making process.122 
 
The Council did not, however, unanimously support the Commission’s 
recommendation that the implementation of a GSP would not benefit Australia.  
They plan to investigate this issue further. 
 
The Ministers directed government officials to investigate how the Productivity 
Commission’s recommendations would work in practice and to report back at a 
meeting in mid September 2006.  
 
Relevance to the Canadian Renewal Proposal 
The review of the Australian Product Safety System and the detailed evaluation 
of implementing a GSP, a mandatory adverse incident reporting system and 
mandatory recalls is very relevant since these options are also being considered 
by Health Canada for possible inclusion in new legislation.  In many cases, the 
findings of the Productivity Commission could apply to Canada as the issues 
identified by government and stakeholders are very similar.  For example as in 
Australia, there is a need in Canada: 
• To improve injury data collection, product safety research and cost/benefit 
analysis in order to determine whether and how to intervene to address 
product related hazards.  This makes it possible to target public resources 
on the most serious problems; 
• To develop or improve ways of detecting unsafe products at an early 
stage, particularly for consumer products; 
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• To include the concept of  ‘foreseeable use’ in the definition of ‘unsafe’, as 
long as it is limited to behavior which is reasonably predictable and not 
unreasonable; and 
• To provide better information to businesses on regulatory requirements. 
 
The Commission was not convinced that the benefits associated with the 
implementation of a GSP would justify the costs.  They were concerned that a 
GSP would fail to target areas of the biggest risk and to deliver benefits beyond 
what could be achieved with modifications to the existing system.  Similar 
conclusions were reached with respect to mandatory reporting and recalls mainly 
due to the fact that the Australian government is notified of many unsafe products 
due to its current voluntary recall system.  A similar analysis of the Canadian 
situation including cost and benefits would assist Health Canada in determining 
whether or not to proceed with these initiatives in new legislation. 
 
 
Generic Lessons Learned from Reform in the Occupational Health 
and Safety Sector 
 
Employees do not occupy the same position relative to employers that 
consumers occupy to producers and suppliers but there are many parallels in the 
regulatory and safety considerations in these areas and numerous lessons for 
consumer product safety that can readily be extrapolated from the workplace 
safety regime. This is especially true when considering methods for ensuring 
transparency, consistency and accountability under a self-regulatory regime – all 
areas of observed weakness in Europe’s general product safety regime 
 
There are remarkable parallels between Europe’s New Approach to Regulation in 
which voluntary standards supplant regulations and the justification for using 
voluntary standards to supplement regulations under generally prescribed duties 
of care in occupational health and safety legislation.  Typically, under workplace 
safety legislation, everyone in a significant position to influence safety outcomes 
in the workplace has a duty of care toward safe working conditions.  The purpose 
of this legislative approach, as with Health Canada’s approach under the 
proposed Canada Health Protection Act, is to displace a culture of mere 
compliance with regulations with a ‘culture of safety’ and injury prevention.   
 
Europe’s general product safety requirement and the UK’s reformed occupational 
health and safety regime, though more than a decade apart in their inception, 
were both founded on a form of New Approach to Regulation under which 
voluntary standards were given a significant role in regulation.  Both regimes are 
highly self-regulatory in nature.  Both resonate with key elements of modern 
regulatory policy and ‘smart’ regulation concepts.  Despite important differences 
between the two sectors, there is much to be learned from tapping into more than 
thirty years of experience in the workplace safety sector with the ‘ New Approach’ 
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principles that they share with the product safety area.  There are useful lessons 
to be shared between the Sectors concerning:   
• Formalizing participation by the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory 
requirements in assessing safety risks and in monitoring compliance with 
essential safety requirements; 123 
• Approaches to prevention, safety training and communicating safe 
practices to industry and consumers; 
• How to achieve an appropriate balance between flexibility and precision 
when regulating safety; 
• Developing informal methods of dispute resolution regarding ‘safety’ (an 
inherently relative concept) and for minimizing the need for judicial 
intervention; 
• Methods for ensuring that industry risk assessment and risk management 
practices in product development become routine aspects of ‘good 
management’ and part of a ‘systematic’ approach to self-regulation; and 
• The role of good monitoring and enforcement techniques, and 
proportionate and appropriate sanctions, to the effectiveness of a 
prevention-focused regulatory regime characterized by a significant self-
regulation component.  
 
In Europe, the general product safety requirement is a ‘work-in-progress’ with 
important aspects of its implementation still undergoing careful review. The GSR 
has important deficiencies that are still being addressed. The primary focus of 
Europe’s New Approach to Regulation - upon which the General Product Safety 
Directive is premised - is not safety, but trade harmonization and the effective 
operation of an internal European common market that is also competitive 
internationally.   
 
The Robens Committee, in effect, developed a standards-based ‘ New Approach’ 
in the occupational health and safety area more than a decade before the 
European New Approach to Regulation was implemented – and did so 
exclusively from a safety perspective.  European experience under the General 
Product Safety Directive is much more recent than the ‘ New Approach’ initiative 
and its overall effectiveness in achieving the kinds of objectives established by 
Health Canada for the GSR remains inconclusive.  The formal use of voluntary 
standards was incorporated into the revised General Product Safety Directive 
only in 2001, for implementation only as of January 2004.124 
  
The Importance of Balancing Flexibility with Precision in Regulations 
Canada’s Government Directive on Regulating - though still a consultation 
document - sets out the federal Government’s current policy expectations of 
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regulatory departments in their regulatory initiatives.  Part of the Directive 
provides that when federal departments are developing or changing technical 
regulations, particularly regulations affecting trade, they are expected to: 
 
• Specify, where possible, technical regulatory requirements in terms of their 
performance rather than their design or descriptive characteristics to ensure that 
regulations do not restrict trade any more than necessary to fulfill the intended 
policy objectives; and 
• Make use of voluntary, consensus-based standards or guides when they 
adequately fulfill intended policy objectives.125 
 
While the balance achieved between regulations and voluntary standards as 
alternative means of meeting regulatory objectives is quite different in Europe 
from that in Canada, the rationale advanced by the Robens Inquiry in the early 
1970’s might well have been written as a justification for using voluntary 
standards as a means of introducing flexibility into regulation under Canada’s 
regulatory policy in 2006.   
 
If legislation is to remain current and effective, it is important to achieve an 
appropriate balance between rigid prescriptive regulations and a more flexible 
performance-based, voluntary self-regulatory approach to regulation. 
 
Regulations which lay down precise methods of compliance have an intrinsic 
rigidity, and their details may be quickly overtaken by new technological 
developments.  On the other hand, lack of precision creates uncertainty…The 
need is to reconcile flexibility with precision.   We believe that, wherever 
practicable, regulations should be confined to statements of broad requirements 
in terms of the objectives to be achieved.  Methods of meeting the requirements 
may often be highly technical and subject to frequent change in the light of new 
knowledge.  They should, therefore, appear separately in a form which enables 
them to be readily modified.126 
 
The Robens Committee considered that the enabling legislation proposed to 
govern health and safety in the workplace should be supported by detailed 
provisions not only in statutory regulations, but also in voluntary standards and 
industry codes of practice.   
 
We concluded that what was needed was less law and more provision for 
voluntary self-regulation… The broad argument in the present chapter is that 
many of the defects we described in chapter I can be remedied by a switch in 
emphasis away from the extensive use of statutory regulations towards greater 
                                            
125 Canada, Government Directive on Regulating, accessed at 
http://regulation.gc.ca/docs/smartregint/gdrfinalv4_e.pdf on June 5, 2006.lines 235-242. This part of the 
Directive on Regulation addresses Canada’s broad commitments set out at the beginning of the Directive to 
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term  regulatory cost- effectiveness. (see lines 45-70).  
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reliance on standards and codes of non-statutory origin. In future, there should 
be more discrimination and selectivity in making statutory regulations.127  
  
The Limited Role of the Criminal Law in Regulation 
Robens articulated something most regulatory officials know instinctively, 
namely, that the criminal law is a blunt and often ineffective instrument for 
dealing with regulatory non-compliance.  Since Canada’s proposed Health 
Protection Act is based on the exercise of the federal criminal law power, it is 
important to consider the scope for regulation under that power and how criminal 
processes might be adapted to achieve some of the efficiencies of civil and 
administrative regulatory instruments.  In particular, what kind of a framework can 
be developed under a criminal law model to enable the negotiation of good 
remedial solutions to regulatory non-compliance?  
 
In addressing some of the shortcomings of the criminal law and procedure, 
Robens noted: 
 
Sanctions under the criminal law have only a very limited role to play in improving 
standards of safety and health.  Truly criminal sanctions should be employed 
only for “offences of a flagrant, willful or reckless nature that either have or could 
have resulted in serious injury.”128 
 
We found that those who took the opposite view were unable to deal convincingly 
with the fundamental weakness of legal sanctions in this field – that criminal 
courts are inevitably concerned more with events that have happened than with 
curing the underlying weaknesses that caused them.  The main need is for better 
prevention.  Technical problems of safety organization and accident prevention 
are matters for experts in the industrial field, rather than for the courts. 
 
…It is fair to say that inspectors value the threat of possible prosecution as a 
potent sanction, and that they attach importance to the deterrent effect of the 
adverse local publicity which prosecutions frequently attract.  Nevertheless, the 
weight of the evidence points to the conclusion that the lengthy process of 
investigation, warning, institution of criminal proceedings, conviction and ultimate 
fine is not a very effective way of producing an early remedy for known 
unsatisfactory conditions.  In sum, we do not believe that the traditional sanction 
commands any very widespread degree of respect or confidence in this field. 
 
The U.K in 1972, unlike Canada in 1978, had not developed a separate, less 
stigmatic, regulatory (or negligence) offence.  The significance of this distinction 
is discussed later in this Report under the heading “Due Diligence.” The Robens 
Committee noted, however, that most regulatory offences were the result of 
inadvertence or negligence. 129  The defence of due diligence still exists in 
                                            
127 Ibid., para 134) 
128 Robens Inquiry Report, supra, para 255 et seq. 
129 Ibid.,  para. 261 “The fact is - and we believe this to be widely recognized - that the traditional concepts 
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England, even in regulatory prosecutions brought under the General Product 
Safety Directive, though it is not a comfortable fit with a GSR premised on 
absolute liability for product defects. 
 
The distinction between crimes and regulatory offences bears importantly on the 
design and implementation of any General Product Safety regime developed 
under the federal criminal law power.  The distinction affects such matters as the 
burden of proof in regulatory enforcement proceedings, the choice of regulatory 
instruments, and the safeguards, which must attach to those instruments.  
 
None of these developments, however, would alter the views expressed by 
Robens about the basic shortcomings of the criminal law and process when 
employed as the chief, or only, means of dealing with regulatory non-compliance. 
 
The Importance of a Preventive Focus  
Health Canada has a dual role – that of promoting and enforcing safety.  Robens 
commented on this dual role after noting that a regulatory authority under Health 
and Safety law should seek “to promote, as much as to control.”  
 
The basic function of state inspection services should be, and be clearly seen to 
be, the provision of advice and assistance towards progressively better 
standards… (The Health and safety administration should operate) under a 
framework for stimulating and encouraging self-regulation by industry and the 
exercise of individual and co-operative responsibility. 130   
 
While criminal prosecution will remain appropriate in a minority of cases, and the 
penalties available should be strengthened accordingly, we believe that in the 
future much greater reliance should be placed on non-judicial administrative 
techniques for ensuring compliance with minimum standards of safety and health 
at work.  Where advice and persuasion fails and pressure is necessary, the 
pressure should be exerted in a form that is positive and constructive as well as 
quick and effective.  For the most part, as we have argued, prosecution is none 
of these things.131  
 
Robens considered that inspectors had a leading role to play in promoting a 
‘culture of safety’ under a safety regime premised upon individual responsibility 
for safety outcomes.  The Committee expressly considered what the role of the 
inspectorate should be under such a regime. 
 
What should the role be?  It is not enough to think in terms of ‘ensuring 
compliance with minimum legal requirements.  Whatever the means adopted, 
this concept is too narrow and restrictive.   Inspectors should seek to raise 
standards above the minimum levels required by law.  They should advise on 
                                                                                                                                  
causing injury, and few can be laid without qualification at the door of a particular individual.  The typical 
infringement or combination of infringements arises rather through carelessness, oversight, lack of 
knowledge or means, inadequate supervision, or sheer inefficiency. 
130 Robens Committee Report, UK, supra., para. 254 et seq. 
131 Ibid. para. 265 
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better organization.  They should be concerned with the broad aspects of safety 
and health organization at the workplaces they visit, as much as with those 
narrow aspects, which may have been made the subject of detailed statutory 
regulations.  We believe that, as a matter of explicit policy, the provision of skilled 
and impartial advice and assistance should be the leading edge of the activities 
of the unified inspectorate.132 
 
Under any regulatory regime with a general safety requirement as an operative 
provision, there is bound to be uncertainty - and a corresponding need for careful 
advice from the governing public authority.  European experience under the 
General Product Safety Directive confirms the need for extensive advice and 
guidance, particularly on the part of the small business community.  Small 
businesses seldom have the capacity for rigorous risk assessment, testing or for 
developing new technical standards and quality management systems.  If they 
cannot afford third party expertise, they look to agents of the public authority for 
assistance in these matters.  This has important training, cost and organizational 
implications for the inspectorate.  It also has legal implications in terms of 
regulatory liability, and the possibility of raising grounds for defences of “official 
misdirection,” should negligent or erroneous advice be given. 
 
The duality of Health Canada’s role – to promote, and enforce, safety - has 
implications for the design and implementation of a general product safety 
regime under the proposed Health Protection Act.   For example, voluntary 
standards developed to meet the highest safety standards achievable under best 
practices may not be strictly appropriate when determining what constitutes 
“compliance” in penal proceedings.  
 
 It is not always easy to know what standards of reference a court will examine in 
determining whether a defendant has exercised “due diligence” in a particular 
penal proceeding.  “State of the art” or “best practices” standards may be given 
modified application in penal proceedings.  This matter is discussed in greater 
detail later in this Report under the heading of “Due Diligence”. 
 
It is noteworthy that the definition of the term ‘safe product’ under the European 
Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC) includes the following 
qualification:  
 
The feasibility of obtaining higher levels of safety or the availability of other 
products presenting a lesser degree of risk shall not constitute grounds for 
considering a product to be unsafe.133 
 
The somewhat loose terminology used in connection with the general safety 
requirement in the consumer product area to describe levels or standards of 
safety may require some reconsideration if they are to be imported into a 
Canadian penal model, which requires a reasonably high degree of certainty to 
                                            
132 Ibid., para. 211 
133 2001/95/EC, para. (b) (iv) 
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function properly.  The legal issues raised by imprecise terminology are 
discussed in chapter 10 Other Legal Considerations, and more specifically under 
the headings Uncertainty and Delegation of Legislative Authority – Back-Door 
Rulemaking? 
 
The Importance of Available Standards to Implementing a GSR 
Robens emphasized that the widespread availability of effective and relevant 
standards would ultimately be essential to the success of the general safety 
regime it proposed for workplace safety.  In the 1970’s, the state of standards 
development was rudimentary compared with today.  The Robens Committee 
accurately foresaw the exponential increase in standards development in the UK  
This was viewed as the probable result of implementing a general obligation to 
ensure safety in the workplace once the obligation was placed on all of the 
principle actors in a position to influence workplace safety outcomes. 
   
The constant multiplication of non-statutory codes of diverse origin and authority 
can be as confusing and unhelpful as the multiplication of statutory regulations. 
 
There is no simple definition of what constitutes a non-statutory or voluntary code 
of practice or standard.  They emerge in a variety of ways and in a variety of 
forms.  Some are prepared and promulgated by government departments, others 
by independent bodies such as the British Standards Institution, still others by 
joint safety committees or employer organizations at industry-level.  They may 
describe desirable procedures or systems, or specify requirements in design, 
materials and performance.  They may be concerned specifically with safety and 
health or with quality generally.  The constant multiplication of non-statutory 
codes of diverse origin and authority can be as confusing and unhelpful as the 
multiplication of statutory regulations.  We suggest that some measure of control 
and co-ordination can be injected into this area without inhibiting the continued 
spontaneous development of good safety and health standards.134   
 
The status and potential of Canada’s standard-developing capacity, therefore, is 
a highly important consideration bearing on the feasibility of implementing a 
general product safety requirement under a Canada Health Protection Act.  
 
The Importance of “Extra-Judicial Measures” in Promoting Safety 
The Robens Committee considered administrative and extra-judicial actions, not 
criminal prosecution, as playing the most important role in improving safety 
standards beyond legal minima.  While voluntary codes and standards do not in 
themselves impose legal obligations, it is important to devise effective means for 
taking them into account in enforcement proceedings.  
 
What we have in mind here is that the reduction we propose in the amount and 
detail of general statutory regulation must be coupled with new administrative 
procedures for enforcement….Briefly, our intention is that inspectors should have 
power to issue improvement notices in individual cases, taking into account not 
                                            
134 Ibid., para 149: 
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only any relevant statutory regulation but also any relevant voluntary code or 
standard that has been formally approved by the Authority in one or other of the 
ways mentioned.  Such codes and standards would be admissible in evidence in 
proceedings before tribunals in much the same way as the provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Code of Practice are admissible in proceedings under the 
Industrial Relations Act.135 
 
Voluntary codes and standards may be given an enforcement value by various 
means.  They may be given evidentiary value by allowing them into evidence to 
establish the existence or lack of due diligence in regulatory prosecutions.  They 
may also be given probative value in administrative enforcement decisions 
leading to the issuance of improvement or prohibition notices, stop work orders, 
banning or recall orders, or the development of compliance agreements.   
 
Targeting Strategies, Risk Assessment & Risk Management 
Robens considered risk assessment and risk management practices simply as 
aspects of good management136 and systematic self-regulation.137 
 
The promotion of safety and health is not only a function of good management 
but it is, or ought to be, a normal management function – just as production or 
marketing is a normal function.  The effective exercise of this function, as any 
other, depends upon the application of technique.  Too many firms still appear to 
regard accidents as matters of chance, unpredictable and therefore not 
susceptible to ‘management’.  Too few appear to have made serious efforts to 
assess the total problem, to identify the underlying causes, or to quantify the 
costs.  Too few make use of diagnostic and predictive techniques such as safety 
sampling or hazard analysis, or safety audits in which each aspect of workplace 
organization and operation is subjected to a carefully planned and 
comprehensive safety survey; or systematic preventive procedures such as 
clearances for new equipment and processes, safe access permits and so on. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Although not expressed in terms of risk assessment or risk management, the 
Robens Committee stressed the importance of adopting a targeted approach to 
safety issues and inspections based on risk assessment principles: 138 
 
Our point is that the resources of the inspectorate must be used selectively.  
They should be concentrated on priorities and problems that have been identified 
                                            
135 Robens Committee Report., para. 153   
136 Ibid., para 46   
137 Ibid., para. 50….”We are encouraged by the increasing interest shown by employers in the development 
of more systematic approaches to prevention…More needs to be done to increase industry’s capacity for 
this kind of systematic self-regulation.” 
138 Ibid., para. 219 …Inspection programs should be oriented towards problems rather than based on 
periodical visits of a general character.  This would mean that some workplaces would be visited less 
frequently than at present.  We think this is right.  To the extent that a general watchdog role is necessary, 
occasional spot checks would be just as effective as a comprehensive program of periodical visits.  Over a 
large part of the field the main emphasis should be on self-inspection by employers, in co-operation with 
employees and representatives. (emphasis added) 
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through the systematic assessment of all the available data – general technical 
information, local knowledge, statistics of accidents and so on.  Obvious though 
the point may appear, we found in the major inspectorates less evidence than we 
had expected of serious and sustained priority planning based on the systematic 
appraisal of data.  The preference for set patterns of regular inspection has 
tended to dominate thinking and to pre-empt resources that could be put to more 
efficient use.  In recent years there has been some movement in the direction of 
a more selective approach.  This movement needs to be developed and speeded 
up.139 (Emphasis added) 
 
In our visit to the United Kingdom we learned of a current example, in the 
consumer products area, of a routine inspection practice that was viewed as a 
misallocation of inspection resources.  Local Authorities in the UK annually 
inspect about 370,000 ‘optics’ (a device which pre-measures alcohol shots in 
pubs and other institutions serving alcohol) although the device is designed to 
measure precise amounts of alcohol.  While the device is not tamper-proof, it is 
clear that a more systematic approach to risk assessment would result in many 
fewer inspections of optics, thus freeing up inspection resources to focus on 
areas with a higher risk of non-compliance. 
 
In March of 2005, the UK released a report under the ‘Hampton Review’ entitled: 
‘Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement’.140  The 
Review proposes entrenching the principle of risk assessment throughout the 
regulatory system, so that the burden of enforcement falls most on highest-risk 
businesses and least on those with the best records of compliance. The Review 
estimated, based on regulators’ past experience, that comprehensive risk 
assessment in a streamlined structure could reduce the need for inspections by 
up to a third, leading to about one million fewer inspections. 
 
Monitoring and surveillance of a broad range of consumer products in the 
complex consumer product safety environment presents quite different 
challenges from surveillance and monitoring safety issues in the workplace.  To 
the extent that a “systems” approach to regulation evolves under a general 
product safety regime for consumer products, however, it is clear that different 
skills – including systems auditing skills – will need to be enhanced in the 
inspectorate.  This has both cost and training implications for regulatory planners.   
 
Auditing of management or production processes (as opposed to inspection 
under detailed regulations) is an activity that demands an expertise which can be 
in short supply when both government and industry are bidding for same 
available talent to meet regulatory obligations.  If Government is to exercise an 
effective challenge function under any self-regulatory scheme, it is important that 
it maintain some expert capacity for independent verification.   
 
                                            
139 Ibid., para. 218 
140 The Report may be viewed on the website of the UK Better Regulation Unit, accessed June 11, 2006, at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/  
                                                                                             63
Self-Regulation Requires Effective Accountability Measures 
Heightened reliance on self-regulation is a principle feature of the 1972 Robens 
approach to regulating occupational health and safety.  Industry self-regulation is 
also the hallmark of the voluntary, standards-based, 1985 New Approach to 
Regulation of products in Europe, of which the General Product Safety 
Requirement is an integral part.  
 
It is useful to compare the accountability mechanisms developed for the UK 
occupational health and safety regime, founded chiefly on safety objectives, with 
that of Europe’s ‘ New Approach’ to product regulation, based chiefly on trade 
objectives, where safety is an important but clearly ancillary consideration.141   
European authorities remain concerned that market surveillance, enforcement 
practice and general accountability under the General Safety Requirement in 
Europe needs improvement.  Several major administrative reviews and pilot 
projects are in place to address these concerns.142   
 
Christopher Hodges, in a recent text entitled European Regulation of consumer 
Product Safety describes persistent problems with market surveillance and 
enforcement practice not only under the vertical  New Approach directives, but 
also under General Product Safety Directive: 143 
 
Recent reviews of various ( New Approach) Directives have consistently 
identified ongoing problems with market surveillance and enforcement.  An 
approach based on mutual recognition is increasingly seen as ineffective and 
new initiatives are occurring sometimes based on more prescriptive integration, 
albeit with different approaches remaining in different sectors. 
 
For GPSD products, the Commission has accepted that there are serious 
weaknesses in market surveillance144 and ECOSA (European Consumer Safety 
Association) has said bluntly that most Member States lack even a basic 
enforcement structure and in those that have one responsibility is delegated to 
local authorities that lack proper co-ordination and funding. 
 
Robens foresaw the need for new and to some extent, different, accountability 
mechanisms to ensure that a regulatory scheme with a significant self-regulatory 
component was effective.  While much has been written about how to ensure 
accountability under self-regulatory regimes, Robens proposed the following 
accountability mechanisms:  
 
                                            
141  Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 2005,  Oxford University 
Press, p. 31-32 
142  European Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the  New Approach, Brussels, 2005; see conference 
materials, accessed on October 5,  2006 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/new_approach_conference_en.htm  
143 2005, Oxford University Press, at p. 182 
144 Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Experience Acquired in the 
Application of Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product Safety, COM (2000) 140. 
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• A statutory duty on every employer to consult with his employees or their 
representatives at the workplace on measures for promoting safety and 
health at work, and to provide arrangements for the participation of 
employees in the development of such measures;145 
• A legal obligation on all employers employing 10 or more employees to set 
out their safety and health policy and rules in writing and to make such 
statements available to all employees and, if requested, to visiting 
inspectors.146, and to ensure interest at the corporate board level;147 
• A legal obligation to include in the annual directors’ reports routinely 
lodged with the Registrar of Companies, prescribed information, including 
statistics about reportable accidents and industrial diseases suffered by 
the company’s employees and about measures taken by the company in 
this regard;148 
• New administrative and “extra-judicial procedures, including improvement 
and prohibition notices, administrative monetary penalties, licensing 
provisions; and 
• Strengthened criminal penalties.149  
 
Robens proposed that the form and manner of employee consultation and 
participation need not be specified in detail, so as to provide the flexibility needed 
to suit a wide variety of particular circumstances and to avoid prejudicing 
satisfactory existing arrangements:  
 
Guidance should, however, be given in a code of practice outlining model 
arrangements, including advice on joint safety committees and the appointment 
of employees safety representatives.  We envisage that these appointments 
would be through election by employees, arranged through the trade unions 
recognized at the workplace or through works groups as appropriate.  The code 
                                            
145 Robens Committee Report, supra.  paras. 68-71…The form and manner of such consultation and 
participation would not be specified in detail, so as to provide the flexibility needed to suit a wide variety of 
particular circumstances and to avoid prejudicing satisfactory existing arrangements.  Guidance should, 
however, be given in a code of practice outlining model arrangements, including advice on joint safety 
committees and the appointment of employees safety representatives.  We envisage that these appointments 
would be through election by employees, arranged through the trade unions recognized at the workplace or 
through works groups as appropriate.  The code should deal with such matters as the qualifications, 
training, duties and rights of employees’ safety representatives, arrangements for joint inspections, the 
objectives, composition and procedures of joint safety committees, and so on.  …Above all, the code 
should stress that simply talking together about safety and health is not enough.  It is essential to ensure the 
active follow-through of the measures discussed. (para. 70) 
146 Ibid. para 74. 
147 Ibid. “In addition to setting out main policy objectives, the statements should include information on the 
firm’s safety and health organization , on the duties of its safety officers, on arrangements for joint 
consultation about safety and health measures, and on matters such as safety training, protective clothing 
and so on.”   
148 Ibid. para. 76….”It might be argued against this that a recital of bare statistics can be misleading.   This 
true, but we cannot imagine that a company would quote such statistics without comment or explanation.  It 
is precisely the preparation of such comments and explanations that would ensue attention to the subject at 
the highest level within the firm.” 
149 Ibid. para 265 
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should deal with such matters as the qualifications, training, duties and rights of 
employees’ safety representatives, arrangements for joint inspections, the 
objectives, composition and procedures of joint safety committees, and so on.  
…Above all, the code should stress that simply talking together about safety and 
health is not enough.  It is essential to ensure the active follow-through of the 
measures discussed. 150 
 
Though the parallels are inexact, Europe has developed a framework for 
requiring Member States to institute a number of parallel accountability measures 
under the General Product Safety Directive and the  New Approach to 
Regulation.   These measures include uniform conformity assessment modules 
for use by Producers, the establishment of Notifying and Accreditation bodies, 
mandatory reporting of serious risks, shared risk reporting amongst Member 
States and the Commission, a duty to inform consumers of product risks, 
consumer participation on standardization and advisory committees; the duty of 
producers to adopt remedial measures to deal with identified risks and a broad 
spectrum of powers for governing authorities including banning, export controls, 
product recall and criminal prosecutions.   
 
 
6. Operative Provisions of the European General Product 
Safety Directive (GPSD)  
 
Introduction 
 
In making a decision on whether or not to include a General Safety Requirement 
(GSR) in renewed Health Protection legislation, many questions arise that need 
to be resolved in terms of how such a provision would operate and its potential 
impact. Europe is one of the few jurisdictions that has considerable operational 
experience under its General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) in implementing 
and administering a GSR.  The operative provisions that the European 
Commission (EC) put in place, the experience gained and the resulting revisions 
that were made to the directive are presented here.  The main purpose of this 
section is to assist Health Canada in resolving the issues that have been raised 
with respect to including a GSR in Canadian legislation. 
 
Regulation of the Safety of Consumer Products in Europe 
Regulation of the safety of consumer products in Europe follows either directives 
that are sector specific and establish either technical details (old approach) or 
essential requirements ( New Approach) within the text or a Directive such as the 
GPSD which is not sector specific. Sector specific directives cover such goods as 
food products, pharmaceuticals, children’s toys, personal protective equipment, 
cosmetics and electrical equipment. 
 
                                            
150 Ibid., para. 70 
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The old approach directives made assessment against the legislation relatively 
easy; however, the directives needed to be updated frequently as products were 
improved or as new products entered the market. The process of updating these 
specifications and legislation proved to be complicated and time consuming and 
often differed in member countries resulting in barriers to trade.151  In response to 
the problems identified and the need to establish a market based on the free 
movement of goods, the " New Approach" was defined in a Council Resolution of 
May 1985.152  This approach was intended to emphasize a less prescriptive and 
more flexible regulation aimed at ensuring the safety of each product in its 
entirety.  The “ New Approach” directives set out the essential safety 
requirements which a product must fulfill in order to be considered safe in 
general terms and to be marketed in Europe.  The European national standards 
bodies are entrusted with the developing the detailed technical specifications. As 
a result, there is a clear separation of responsibilities between the legislator and 
the European standards bodies.    
 
Unlike the sector specific directives, the GPSD establishes rules regarding 
product safety that are applied throughout the European Union (EU) and are 
aimed at ensuring that all consumer products placed on the market are safe.   
The European Product Liability Directive of 1985 described in this report paved 
the way for the GPSD by harmonizing the laws concerning liability of defective 
products and establishing the elements of absolute liability on which the GPSD is 
based. 
 
 
The European General Safety Requirement (GSR)  
 
The first general safety requirement (GSR) was introduced as part of the United 
Kingdom’s Consumer Protection Act in 1987153 and was followed by the adoption 
of a GSR in Europe’s General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) in 1992.154.  The 
GPSD was revised and the current European version became effective in 
2004.155   
 
Under the GPSD, member states are required to enact the laws and/or 
regulations necessary to implement its requirements.  Therefore, businesses do 
not have to comply directly with the GPSD but rather must comply with the laws 
and regulations of member states, which should include requirements to 
                                            
151  Nordic Council of Ministers, Guide on Market surveillance and safety of consumer products, Best 
Practices in Nordic countries, Temanord, 2006:511, www.norcon.org 
152  Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a  New Approach to technical harmonization and standards , 
Official Journal C 136 , 04/06/1985 P. 0001 - 0009 
153  UK Department of Trade and Industry, Product liability, defective products, unsafe products fact 
sheet, URN No: 05/1728 
154  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (92/59/EEC), OL 
L 228, 11/08/1992 P. 0024-0032 
155  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), OL 
L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
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implement the GSR.  It would appear that all pre-expansion EU countries have 
transposed the GPSD into national legislation but in different ways to 
accommodate local considerations and differences in legal and constitutional 
frameworks. This section will focus on the provisions of the GPSD in general 
across the EU rather than on the particular laws of any one member state. 
 
The Purpose and Scope   
The purpose of the GSR specified in the GPSD is to ensure that consumer 
products placed on the European Market do not present a risk under normal, 
or reasonably foreseeable, conditions of use and to harmonize the measures 
taken by Member States to impose this obligation on producers.  Thus, it aims to 
ensure both a consistent and high level of protection of consumer health and 
safety through the EU and support the proper functioning of the internal 
market.156,157 According to the preamble of the Directive, a broadly based, 
legislative framework of a horizontal nature was also needed to complement 
sectoral legislation by covering products not covered by the legislation as well as 
covering gaps in existing sectoral legislation.  
 
The Directive applies to products that are intended or are likely to be used by 
consumers. This includes new, used and reconditioned products, with the 
exception of antiques and products sold with a view to being reconditioned, 
provided that the supplier informs the consumer of this fact.  Products intended 
for professional use that are likely to migrate to the consumer market are also 
covered. The Directive requires producers to place only “safe” products on the 
market.  When the producer is not based in the EU, the obligation applies to his 
representative in the EU or the importer 
 
The Evolution of the GPSD  
The GPSD was first adopted in 1992 (Directive 92/59/EEC) and included the 
following main features:158 
 
• Obligations for producers 
o To place only safe products on the market; 
o To provide consumers with the relevant information to assess the 
risks associated with a product; and 
o To adopt measures to ensure that they will be informed of risks 
posed by the products, which they supply, and to take action to 
prevent those risks, including withdrawal of products when 
necessary. 
                                            
156  Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on general product safety, COM (2000) 139 final/2, Brussels, 15.6.2000 
157  Commission of the European Communities, C omission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Experience Acquired in the Application of Directive 92/59/EEC on general product safety, COM (2000) 140 
final, Brussels, 29.3.2000 
158  Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on general product safety, COM (2000) 139 final/2, Brussels, 15.6.2000, p 5. 
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• Obligations for distributors 
o Not to supply products which they know or should have presumed 
to be dangerous; 
o To collaborate in the monitoring of the safety of products they 
supply; and  
o To prevent any risks posed by such products. 
 
• Definition of criteria for assessing product safety and deciding under which 
conditions a product is deemed to be safe 
o Products conforming to specific rules of national law of the Member 
State in which they circulate are deemed to be in compliance with 
the GSR of the GPSD; and 
o In other cases, the safety of a product shall be assessed having 
regard to European or national voluntary standards, Community 
technical specifications, codes of good practice, the state of the art 
and expectations of consumers. 
 
• Obligations of the Member States:  
o To take measures in order to make producers and distributors 
comply with their obligations. This includes in particular establishing 
or designating market surveillance authorities empowered to adopt 
a range of control and enforcement measures and to impose 
sanctions in the event of failure to comply with the obligations of the 
Directive;  
o To notify the Commission of the measures they take restricting the 
marketing of products or imposing their withdrawal from the market; 
and 
o To ensure that their officials and agents do not disclose information 
covered by professional secrecy, obtained for the purposes of the 
Directive, except for information relating to the safety of a product, 
which must be made public in order to protect the health and safety 
of persons. 
 
In addition, the European Union also expanded the informal system (RAPEX) 
established by enforcement officers to exchange rapidly information on products 
posing serious or immediate risks as required by the Directive. Under this 
system, when a Member State adopts or decides to adopt emergency measures 
to prevent, restrict or impose specific conditions on the marketing or use of 
products posing a serious and immediate risk, it must notify the Commission, 
which, in turn, will inform the other Member States. Details of the functioning of 
the system are set out in an annex to the Directive. 
 
The Commission funded an in-depth review and assessment of the 
implementation and application of the GPSD before the GPSD was revised in 
2002.  The review undertook a critical analysis of the transposition and 
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implementation of the original GPSD.  The review159 identified a number of 
weaknesses in the GPSD and additional measures that were needed to meet its 
stated objectives.  These weaknesses and needs, outlined below, were the 
reason that the GPSD was revised:160   
 
• Uncertainty, disagreement or lack of awareness existed about the 
application of certain provisions of the GPSD.  Some Member States 
believed that the provisions did not apply to products covered by sectoral 
legislation, in spite of the fact that the legislation did not address the risks 
in question.  The provisions under question included the products covered 
by sectoral legislation where gaps in the risks covered existed, the 
obligations for producers and distributors, market surveillance, notification 
under a rapid alert system and Community emergency measures. As a 
consequence, these important aspects of product safety are not treated in 
a consistent way throughout the Community161 and the scopes of the 
transition acts were found to be ambiguous and confusing.   
 
• There were also uncertainties with respect to whether or not certain 
products were covered by the Directive.  For example, some products sold 
for professional use and not intended for consumers were migrating into 
the consumer market. These products were not subject to the protective 
and control requirements of the GPSD. 
 
• Producers and distributors may discover or be informed of risks related to 
a product.  However, the authorities were rarely informed when producers 
and distributors discovered risks related to a product. The authorities, 
therefore, did not have the possibility of making checks on the product or 
similar products and exchange the relevant information with the other 
Member States and the Commission. 
 
• In addition to withdrawing a dangerous product from the market, the study 
also identified a need for producers and distributors to comply with the 
obligation to inform consumers of the risk presented by a product already 
on the market or sold. The absence of penalties for noncompliance with 
this obligation, ignorance of its existence and the lack of guidelines as to 
what had to be notified and how it should be made were thought by the 
researchers to explain the non-compliance. 
 
• National administrations were also unclear about when to notify and 
considered that the Commission was slow to react. Many only learned of a 
                                            
159  Centre du droit de la Consommation, Universite Catholique de Louvain, The Practical Application 
of Council Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product Safety, 2000 
160     Also refer to Annex 12, Lessons from Selected Experiences in the US and Europe. 
161  Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on general product safety, COM (2000) 139 final/2, Brussels, 15.6.2000 
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measure taken by one Member State many months or even years after 
the measure had been taken. Moreover, the Commission was not obliged 
to notify all the Member States if it disagreed with a measure taken.  This 
discouraged Member States from notifying the Commission when an 
action was taken. 
 
• The review also found that the absence of a definition of  “serious and 
immediate risks” and the exclusion of long-term risks represented a 
shortcoming of the Directive and it posed problems in the implementation 
of emergency action at Community level. 
 
• The potential of the GPSD for ensuring a consistent, high level of 
protection throughout the EU and the proper functioning of the internal 
market was limited by the way in which conformity assessment criteria 
were defined and the lack of a clearly defined legal status for them.  
 
• European standards did not confer a “presumption of conformity” under 
the Directive, unlike the harmonized standards under the “ New Approach” 
directives.  Different documents that could be used to assess the safety of 
a product as mentioned in the Directive resulted in different 
interpretations.  Moreover, the researches indicated that the lack of a role 
of European standards in establishing the conformity of products to the 
GPSD weakened its credibility in ensuring harmonization.  
 
• In order to ensure that a standard provides the required level of protection, 
it was suggested that a “safeguard clause” procedure should be included 
in GPSD.  This would allow Members States or the Commission to 
intervene if a standard did not address a risk associated with a product. 
 
• Differences in the effectiveness of control and enforcement systems put in 
place by Member States resulted in uneven enforcement of the GPSD.  
Moreover, sanctions were often not dissuasive enough or not applied and 
therefore did not always represent an effective means of ensuring 
compliance. 
 
• Finally, market surveillance was fragmented, with little collaboration 
between the relevant authorities of the Member States. 
 
The review resulted in the Commission revising the GPSD.162   The revised 
version maintains the requirements included in the original GPSD, but introduced 
a number of new or reinforced provisions. The new or revised provisions:  
 
• Clarify the relationship between the GPSD and other sectoral legislation; 
                                            
162  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), OL 
L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
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• Extend the scope of the Directive in order to ensure that all products 
supplied or made available to consumers through normal commercial 
retail networks and by service providers are covered by the GPSD; 
• Provide criteria for assessing the conformity of a product with the GSR 
and allow products in compliance with European Standards established 
under certain provisions to benefit from a “presumption of conformity;” 
• Allow for the withdrawal of standards subsequently found to provide an 
insufficient level of safety or “safe-guard” clause; 
• Reinforce the obligations of producers to provide information to the 
authorities, and consumers on product risks and to recall dangerous 
products when necessary; 
• Make a more effective use of standards in order to apply consistently the 
concept of safe product; 
• Establish the obligations of member states to monitor compliance of 
suppliers with the requirements of the Directive;  
• Promote a more systematic and structured approach to market 
surveillance and enforcement activities;  
• Establish a framework for collaboration between the authorities of the 
various Member States on risk assessment, testing of products, market 
surveillance; 
• Improve the Rapid Alert System for circulating and following-up 
information on measures and action related to products posing serious 
risks;  
• Enable exchange of Rapid Alert-notifications with third countries, and in 
particular with candidate countries;  
• Streamline the concepts, conditions and procedures applicable to 
Community-wide rapid intervention measures; and  
• Ensure that products withdrawn following Community rapid intervention 
measures are not exported to third countries.  
 
Definition of Safe Product and Foreseeable Use 
The Directive sets out the generic definition of safe product to which products 
must comply. It states that:  
 
Safe product shall mean any product which, under normal or reasonably 
foreseeable conditions of use, including duration, does not present any risk or 
only the minimum risks compatible with the product's use, considered to be 
acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection for the health and safety 
of persons, taking into account the following points in particular:  
• The characteristics of the product, including its composition, packaging, 
instructions for assembly and maintenance;  
• The effect on other products if used with other products;  
• The presentation of the product, the labeling, any instructions for its use 
and disposal; and 
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• The categories of consumers at serious risk when using the product, in 
particular children. 163 
 
Products in conformity with the specific rules applicable in the Member State in 
which they are in circulation are deemed to meet the definition of safe product.  If 
there are no specific national rules, the safety of a product is assessed in 
accordance with European standards or national standards, Community technical 
specifications, codes of good practice, the state of the art and the reasonable 
expectations of consumers.  Before placing a product on the market, producers 
are expected to perform a risk assessment which forms the basis for determining 
that a product is satisfies the GSR of the GPSD. 
 
Foreseeable use is not defined in the Directive or in guidance documents 
produced by the EU.  However the United Kingdom, in a guidance document 
provided the meaning of foreseeable use, stated that: 
 
Reasonably foreseeable use should, it is considered, where appropriate, take 
account of the intended and potential types of user (i.e. the elderly, the 
unpredictable behaviour of children) and how a reasonable person might use a 
product in the absence of any indications to the contrary.164 
 
It is worth noting that the GPSD does not provide a specific definition and/or 
guidance on acceptable levels of safety, which invariably leads to Member State 
discretion in interpretation, and enforcement of safety requirements as well as 
adopting different approaches to assessing product safety. 
 
Definition of Suppliers 
Suppliers are divided into two groups under the Directive – producers and 
distributors.  A producer is defined broadly to include the manufacturer, anyone 
representing himself or herself as the manufacturer, anyone representing the 
manufacturer, an importer (where no manufacturer or representative is in the 
EU), a person who reconditions a product, and anyone else whose activities 
“affect the safety properties of a product placed on the market.   The term 
distributor means any professional in the supply chain whose activity does not 
meet the safety properties of a producer.165  In the guidance provided by the UK 
government, the meaning of a distributors is clarified further to include 
wholesalers, retailers (shops), agents and auctioneers.   In addition, a person 
                                            
163  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Article 2(b), OL L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
 
164  UK Department of Trade and Industry, General Product Safety Regulations 2005, Guidance for 
businesses, consumers and enforcement authorities, July 2005. 
165  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Articles 2 (e) and 2 (f), OL L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
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who makes a product available for the use of a consumer in the course of 
delivering a service will for the most part also be considered a distributor.  
 
The Principle of Proportionality  
One of the most important principles in the implementation of the GPSD is that 
any measures taken by Member States should be proportional to the seriousness 
of the risk.  Moreover, within the European Union, the precautionary principle is 
considered to be a general principle of international law.  Part III of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe sets out the precautionary principle as a 
fundamental principle of decision making regarding policies and the functioning 
of the Union. The Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety expressly 
states in Article 8 that Member States shall implement measures in a manner 
proportional to the seriousness of the risk and taking into account the 
precautionary principle.  
 
 
Administration and Operation of the GPSD 
 
Powers and Authorities  
The GPSD requires that member states establish or designate authorities to 
monitor product safety and have the powers to take “appropriate measures, 
including the power to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties”. 
Moreover, member states have an obligation to legislate rules on penalties 
applicable to non-compliance within national regulations or legislation adopted as 
a result of the GPSD.  In article 8, the Directive specifies the measures that 
member states are entitled to take which include:  
 
• Requesting relevant information from all parties concerned; 
• Taking samples of products and evaluating them for safety; 
• Requiring that products are marked with suitable warnings; 
• Making the marketing the product subject to prior safety conditions; 
• Requiring that persons at risk be warned; 
• Temporarily banning a product while safety evaluations are being carried 
out; 
• Banning the marketing of a product; and 
• Ordering or organizing a withdrawal or recall of the product, alerting of 
consumers to the risk it presents and ordering the destruction of the 
product. 
 
The Directive specifies that authorities in member states should implement any 
measures taken in a manner that is proportional to the risk posed and one that 
takes into account the precautionary principle.  Member states are also directed 
to encourage and promote voluntary action by producers and distributors in 
carrying out their obligations.   
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The United Kingdom, for example, transposed the provisions of the directive into 
its General Product Safety Regulations 2005.  These regulations specify which 
organizations in the UK enforce the regulations and what powers they are given 
in terms of investigating problem, entering premises, making test purchasing and 
undertaking tests and seizing records and products from producers and 
distributors.  In addition, the regulations set out the measures available to the 
authorities, the offences166 that are punishable and the penalties in terms of 
imprisonment or fines for these offences.  Under the UK regulations the penalties 
imposed include a maximum penalty of £20,000 or 12 months imprisonment for 
serious breaches of the GSR (see following table) or a safety notice, and a 
maximum fine of £ 5,000 or 3 months imprisonment for other offences. 
 
In addition to the measures that may be taken by Member States, the 
Commission, assisted by a Committee, may adopt temporary, Community-wide 
measures concerning products posing a serious and immediate risk.   The 
measures are subject to a number of substantive and procedural conditions.  The 
Commission must consult the member states and a Scientific Committee167 if 
scientific questions arise.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enforcement of the Provisions of the GPSD 
Under the GPSD, the Member States are obliged to establish authorities that are 
responsible for carrying out market surveillance and enforcing the applicable 
national legislation. The Directive also specifies that these authorities must have 
the necessary resources and powers for their surveillance activities.  
 
                                            
166  Department of Trade and Industry, The General Product Safety Regulations 2005, Guidance for 
businesses, consumers and enforcement authorities, July 2005. 
167  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Article 13  OL L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
Offences under the UK General Product Safety Regulations 2005 
 
• A producer who places a product on the market without knowing it is safe 
• A distributor who supplies a product he knows or should have known is   
dangerous  
• A person who contravenes a safety notice which includes a requirement to 
mark, warn, suspend, withdraw or recall a product 
• A producer who fails to provide consumers (within the limits of his 
activities) with relevant information enabling them to assess the risks 
inherent in a product 
• A producer who fails to adopt measures to avoid risks a product might 
pose 
• A distributor who fails to monitor the safety of a product on the market 
• A producer or distributor who fails to notify an enforcement authority of a 
product that he knows poses a risk to the consumer 
• A person who fails to comply with a notice to supply additional information 
• A person who obstructs an enforcement officer 
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Post-market inspection or inspection after the product is placed on the market, 
rather than pre-market assessment and approval, is the general way that 
enforcement is carried out.  Enforcement authorities in Member States monitor 
the consumer products placed on the market to ensure that they comply with 
provisions of the applicable national legislation. The focus is on identifying 
potentially dangerous products and assessing compliance of the products with 
information provided by manufacturers, having the products inspected and tested 
and investigating consumer complaints. The main goal is to quickly identify 
consumer products that seriously infringe the provisions of the applicable 
legislation and take action to have them removed from the market. Minor 
deficiencies such as incorrect labeling and lack of documentation are handled 
differently, for instance, by having the manufacturers remedy the 
shortcomings.168    
 
Each Member State can decide upon its market surveillance infrastructure: the 
only requirement is that it is efficient and covers the whole territory.  As a result, 
the legal and administrative market surveillance infrastructures differ from one 
Member State to another. This requires, in particular, that efficient administrative 
cooperation between competent national authorities is in place so that an 
equivalent level of protection can be ensured throughout the Community, in spite 
of the competence for market surveillance being limited to each Member State’s 
territory169 operations. 
 
As with most post-market surveillance systems, enforcement authorities do not 
inspect every product.  There are thousands of consumer products on the market 
and it is not possible to inspect all of them.  Normally, enforcement authorities 
visit commercial premises on a regular basis and take and test random samples 
of certain product groups based on the risk they pose.  Apart from random 
inspections, enforcement authorities also perform inspections based mainly on 
the following factors:  
• Consumer reports, complaints or accidents in relation to consumer 
products;  
• Reports from manufacturers and importers on dangerous products;  
• Surveys (in cooperation with laboratories), where applicable; and  
• European notifications - RAPEX  
 
If an unsafe consumer product is found on the market in one of the member 
states, the national enforcement authority must consult the manufacturer (or 
distributor) of that product.  Appropriate actions or restrictions must be taken and 
notification sent to the EU Commission. All the others are then notified of the 
action taken so they can check if the same product is circulating in their markets 
and take appropriate measures, as required.  
                                            
168  Nordic Council of Ministers, Guide on Market surveillance and safety of consumer products, Best 
Practices in Nordic countries, Temanord, 2006:511, www.norcon.org  
169  European Commission, Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the  New Approach and 
the Global Approach, 2000. 
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According to a European Third Country Regulation relating to the safety of 
imported products,170 customs authorities can detain goods from third countries 
at the external borders for up to three working days to permit checks by 
enforcement authorities.  This is the case when products bear the characteristics 
suggesting a serious and immediate risk to health and safety of consumers 
and/or they are not accompanied by required documents assuring their safety. 
Given these circumstances, customs authorities play an important role in market 
surveillance activities.  
 
Enforcement authorities have to make available to the public any information 
about specific consumer products that pose risks to the health and safety of 
consumers and the measures that the authorities have taken to remove those 
risks.  In Figure 1,  (following page) the overall approach to ensuring product 
safety in the EU is presented.171 
 
Achieving Consistent Enforcement 
A major problem that exists in any jurisdiction where enforcement of legislation is 
the responsibility of more than one enforcement authority is the necessity to 
ensure consistency in the interpretation and implementation of the legislation. 
The potential consequences of inconsistency in application of risk assessment 
methodologies and enforcement measures taken are considerable. If the risk 
posed by a product is assessed to be higher than is actually the case, there may 
be significant economic consequences, in terms of lost sales for producers and 
distributors and lost access to products for consumers. On the other hand, if the 
risks are assessed to be lower than they actually are, there could be impacts on 
consumer safety in the form of continuing injuries or even fatalities.  The 
European Community in trying to achieve consistency in risk assessment and 
enforcement of the GPSD has taken a number of steps to improve the 
cooperation and uniformity among the enforcement authorities in member states 
such as a the exchange of information via a rapid alert system (RAPEX), support 
of PROSAFE (the Product Safety Enforcement Forum of Europe), and research 
and development of guidance documents for enforcement officials and suppliers. 
                                            
170  EC regulation No. 339/93/EEC (Third Country Regulation) 
171  DG SANCO, European Commission, Establishing a Comparative Inventory of Approaches and 
Methods Used by Enforcement Authorities for the Assessment of the Safety of Consumer Products 
Covered by Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product Safety and Identification of Best Practices, 
Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, February 2006.  
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Exchange of Information Via a Rapid Alert System 
The GPSD172 establishes a system for the rapid exchange of information 
(RAPEX) between Member States and the Commission on measures and 
actions related to consumer products that pose a serious risk for the health and 
safety of consumers.  Moreover, the notification procedure in Article 11 of the 
GPSD is also intended to exchange information on measures and actions in 
relation to consumer products that do not present a serious risk to the health and 
safety of consumers. These procedures are part of the provisions of the GPSD 
aimed at ensuring an effective and consistent enforcement of the applicable 
safety requirements.  In Article 8 of the GPSD, the different types of measures 
and actions that should be notified under RAPEX are listed. These measures and 
actions are aimed at:  
• Imposing conditions prior to the marketing of a product;  
• Requiring that a product be marked with warnings concerning any risks;  
• Alerting consumers about a risk related to a product; 
• Banning temporarily or definitively the supply, the offer to supply or the 
display of a product;  
                                            
172  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Article 13  OL L 011, 15/01/2002 P004-0017 
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• Organizing the withdrawal or the recall of a product; and 
• Ordering producers and distributors to withdraw a product, recall it from 
consumers, and destroy it.  
 
Other measures and actions that authorities can adopt or take and should notify 
are:  
• Agreements with producers and distributors to take actions necessary to 
avoid the risks posed by products;  
• Agreements with producers and distributors to organize jointly the 
withdrawal, the recall of products from consumers and their destruction or 
any other relevant action; and 
• Agreements with producers and distributors to coordinate the recall of a 
product from consumers and its destruction.  
 
Cooperation Among Enforcement Officials  
Prosafe (the Product Safety Enforcement Forum of Europe) is an organization 
that was established entirely by enforcement officers.  These officers recognized 
that it was important to build links in operational understanding and trust between 
them in enforcing community law.   PROSAFE is now supported by the European 
Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate General (DG), Internal 
Market DG, and the Enterprise and Industry DG 
 
Consistent Risk Assessment  
Central to the European consumer product safety system is the identification and 
assessment of risks associated with consumer products.  Guidance on how to 
draft a risk assessment to meet the provisions of the GPSD is provided by 
RAPEX Guidelines.173  However, even though the basic concepts and 
methodology are sound, the guidelines on risk assessment have been difficult to 
apply in practice.   As a result, there are key differences and divergences in the 
approaches and the risk assessment methods used to determine what measures 
should be applied to deal with unsafe products by enforcement authorities and 
conformity assessment bodies.  Different types of products, and risks lead to 
different assessments, and consequently an uneven level of consumer protection 
across the EU. To achieve greater consistency between assessors and improve 
the guidelines, the EU established the Working Group (WG): Improvement of 
Risk Assessment Guidelines.   This WG is following a practical approach, starting 
from the already published RAPEX Guidelines and it is anticipated that a revised 
draft document will be out for information and consultation by the end of 2006.  
 
In addition to the WG the EC commissioned a study to compare and analyze 
current approaches, methods and practices used by enforcement authorities and 
                                            
173  EC DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer 
Products to the Member States by Producers and Distributors in Accordance with Article 5(3) of 
Directive 2001/95/EC. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/guidelines_en.htm   
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conformity assessment bodies.174  The researchers were also required to identify 
best practices, further development needs and standardization of risk 
assessment methods.  The study confirmed that consistency in the level of risk 
that will trigger a notification to the Commission or an enforcement action varies 
from member state to member state.  For example, the significant costs 
associated with risk assessment and product testing can result in some states 
not undertaking such analysis.  Instead, some relied on enforcing notifications 
made by other Member States.  The study found that some Member States have 
the resources to focus on only a limited number of products at any particular 
time. Similarly, other authorities had considerable expertise in risk assessment 
and had the ability to develop and apply reasonably sophisticated approaches. 
The variation was even greater where there are no relevant regulations or 
standards, as there was no common basis against which producers and 
distributors could assess the safety of a product. In such cases, judgments on 
safety tended to be either subjective or based on risk assessment criteria 
developed for other related sectors or products.   
 
The study175 concluded that that risk assessment best practice would include: 
• Providing guidance to ensure that risk assessors actually understand the 
basis (i.e. the strengths and weaknesses as well as bias), process (i.e. 
applying the various scales and ratings) and results of any risk 
assessment methodology applied; 
• Creating a clear link between the output of the risk assessment 
methodologies and the enforcement action to be taken to ensure product 
safety; and 
• Using more than one risk assessment methodology, where possible and 
ensuring that all risk assessment results are discussed and agreed by an 
expert panel. 
 
Guidance Documents  
The GPSD provides for the “establishment of non-binding guidelines aimed at 
indicating simple and clear criteria and practical rules, which may change in order 
to be completed, improved or adapted in the light of the experience and new 
developments, to facilitate the effective operation of RAPEX by the Commission 
and the competent authorities of the Member States”.  Due to these provisions 
and the request of Member States and suppliers, a number of guidance 
documents have been prepared to clarify the relationship between the GPSD and 
                                            
174  DG SANCO, European Commission, Establishing a Comparative Inventory of Approaches and 
Methods Used by Enforcement Authorities for the Assessment of the Safety of Consumer Products 
Covered by Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product Safety and Identification of Best Practices, 
Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, February 2006. 
175  DG SANCO, European Commission, Establishing a Comparative Inventory of Approaches and 
Methods Used by Enforcement Authorities for the Assessment of the Safety of Consumer Products 
Covered by Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product Safety and Identification of Best Practices, 
Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, February 2006. 
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other directives176,177 to facilitate the effective enforcement of the Directive, the 
consistent application of the notification provisions of the GPSD and the 
operation of the RAPEX system.178  In addition, new guidelines were developed 
to provide businesses with the practical details of how they should notify 
dangerous consumer products to the competent authorities179. Prosafe and other 
organizations were also supported by the EC to develop a guide to corrective 
actions including recalls.180 
 
The General Product Safety Directive Committee  
The GPSD provides for the establishment of a Committee to assist the 
Commission with certain tasks related to the implementation of the Directive.181  
The committee is made up of representatives from national authorities 
responsible for product safety at the national level.  The Committee develops 
positions on draft Commission Decisions related to products presenting serious 
and immediate risks and on amendments to the Annex to the Directive, which 
sets out the operating procedures for RAPEX.  The Commission also consults 
the committee on referencing of European standards, in the Official Journal, and 
on other matters relevant to the application of the Directive.  For example, when 
the Commission makes Decisions requiring the Member States to urgently 
introduce temporary measures restricting the placing on the market or requiring 
the rapid withdrawal of products posing serious risks, it is assisted by the GPSD 
Committee. The decisions are valid for up to one year and may be prolonged 
with the assistance of the Committee.182 
 
 
European Standards and Conformity Assessment 
 
Role of Standards  
During revision of the GPSD, provisions were added to ensure that standards 
play a significant role in implementation of the Directive.  As with the “ New 
Approach” Directives, the GPSD now states that compliance with harmonized 
                                            
176  EC DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the 
General Product Safety Directorate (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on 
Product Safety, November 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/keydocs/index_en.htm 
177       EC DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the 
General Product Safety Directorate (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on 
Product Safety, Second Chapter, (Directives on Medical Devices, Construction Products, Machner, 
Medical Products and Motor Vehicles,) November 2005. 
178  EC DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidelines for the Management of the Community Rapid 
Information System (RAPEX) and Notifications Presented in Accordance with Article 11 of Directive 
2001/95/EC. 
179  EC DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidelines for r the Notification of Dangerous Consumer 
Products to the Member States by Producers and Distributors in Accordance with Article 5(3) of 
Directive 2001/95/EC.   
180  Prosafe et al, Product Safety in Europe A Guide to Corrective Actions Including Recalls, June 2004. 
181  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Article 15  OL L 011, 15/01/2002. 
182  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/emergencies_en.htm 
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European Standards183 referenced in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities provides the product with a presumption of conformity to the 
Directive.  This means, basically, that the manufacturer is in conformity with the 
law and the product is presumed to be safe, as long as the risk in question is 
covered by the standard.  Since European standards have to be transposed in a 
uniform way into national standards, the corresponding national standards 
provide the same presumption of conformity. Moreover, the standards provide 
enforcement authorities with a common base for evaluating the safety of 
consumer products.  
 
The European Commission can request the European standards bodies to 
prepare standards in order to implement the Directive.184  A contractual 
relationship is created, with the Commission providing financial support when 
needed. This standardization is 'mandated' by the Commission, through the 
Standing Committee of GPSD.  The contract (or mandate) stipulates that a 
standard will be produced that will provide a technical solution, or a technical 
interpretation, of essential health and safety aspects.  Once completed and the 
conditions of the Commission are met, it is referenced in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities.  In practice, this means that standardization has 
taken on much of the authorities’ previous provisional work. 
 
Compliance with harmonized standards remains voluntary, and manufacturers 
are free to choose any other technical solution that provides compliance with the 
essential requirements.  However, the producer has an obligation to prove his 
products are safe and in conformity with the essential requirements of the 
Directive if he uses other means (for example by means of any existing technical 
specifications). The main advantage of conformity to European harmonized 
standards is the recognition of the standard all over Europe.  It means that the 
supplier can sell his products throughout Europe without expensive retesting in 
every country.   
   
Standards do not, however, remove the need for risk assessment.  Compliance 
with a standard does not remove the general obligation under the GPSD to 
ensure that products are safe.  It is possible for a product to comply with the 
relevant standard(s) and still be unsafe. For example, the standard might not 
address a risk posed by a new or modified version of a product or the fault may 
relate to inadequate quality control procedures or lack of warnings.  Standards, 
by definition, relate to past problems and due to the five year target for review 
can be slow to adapt to modified or new products and the risks associated with 
them.  Concerns have also been raised about the lack of standards for some 
                                            
183  "Harmonized standards" are European standards, adopted by CEN, CENELEC or ETSI, following a 
mandate issued by the European Commission after consultation of Member States. They are 
developed through an open and transparent process, built on consensus between all interested 
parties. 
184  Commission of the European Communities, Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC), 
Article 4  OL L 011, 15/01/2002  
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products and the fact that industry representatives often dominate the standard 
development process.  
 
In some cases, the European standards bodies have failed to elaborate 
adequate harmonized standards.  As a consequence, consumer products made 
according to these standards are not in conformity with the requirement of 
marketing a safe product despite the fact that harmonized standards are used.  
Under such a circumstance, the authority in a member state can take appropriate 
measures to withdraw the product from the market even though it complies with a 
harmonized standard.  Moreover, where a member state has evidence that the 
harmonized standard does not address the risks posed by a product, the issue 
can be brought before the Standing Committee of GPSD and depending on its 
opinion, the publication of the reference in the Official Journal can be withdrawn 
by the Commission. In such cases, the harmonized standard will cease to 
provide a presumption of conformity.185  This authority is commonly referred to as 
the “safe guard” clause, which is a counterweight to the presumption of 
conformity. 
 
Conformity Assessment 
The essential objective of conformity assessment is to provide enforcement 
authorities with confidence that products placed on the market conform to the 
requirements in the applicable directives such as the GPSD.  Conformity 
assessment is based on the manufacturers’ internal design and production 
control activities.  A producer may declare after performing the necessary 
product evaluations (Declaration of Conformity) that the product meets the 
essential requirements of the Directive.  Or he can use a third-party conformity 
assessment body, which is “notified” on the basis of harmonized criteria.   
Notified Bodies are independent testing houses, laboratories, or product certifiers 
authorized by the EU Member States to perform conformity assessment tasks.  A 
Notified Body must have the necessary qualifications to meet the testing and/or 
certification requirements set forth in a directive and must be able to demonstrate 
independence, impartiality, and integrity. 
In the EU, conformity assessment is subdivided into modules, which relate to the 
design phase of products and to the production phase.  As a general rule, a 
product should be subject to assessment for both phases before being able to be 
placed on the market if the results are positive.  There are a number of modules 
that cover the two phases in a variety of ways depending on such factors as the 
product, the risk involved and the type and importance of production.  
 
The EU established a uniform marking system known as the CE-Marking in 
association with the conformity assessment system. Affixing the CE marking to a 
product is a declaration by the manufacturer (or the distributor) that the product in 
question has been designed and manufactured to meet the essential safety 
requirements of a directive and creates a presumption that the product is entitled 
                                            
185  European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, Harmonized standards.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/standardization/harmstds/index_en.html 
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to free circulation within the EU/EEA market.  As the General Product Safety 
Directive imposes a general safety requirement for a wide range of consumer 
products and does not specify any essential safety requirements like the sectoral 
directives, there are no provisions for CE marking on products falling under the 
scope of the GPSD.  
 
Conclusions 
As the second version of the GPSD is still in the initial stage of implementation, it 
is not yet possible to assess the extent to which it will be successful at resolving 
the issues that initiated the revisions to the first version.  Much of the success of 
Directive 2001/95/EC will depend upon the adequacy and consistency of 
enforcement measures. As the national legislation varies and enforcement is left 
to individual Member States, it is likely that the conclusions from risk 
assessments, enforcement measures taken and the penalties applied will not be 
consistent across the EU. That is why steps are being taken to strengthen 
cooperation between enforcement authorities, improve the risk assessment 
process and clarify the criteria for notifications on the part of member states and 
suppliers.  Even though the notification criteria will be clarified, it is anticipated 
that the fundamental conflicts with constitutional protections against self-
incrimination in some Member States will continue to ensure an uneven 
enforcement of these provisions. 
 
Another potential barrier that will continue to contribute to uneven implementation 
is the demanding surveillance burden Article 9 places on Member States. As a 
result of the costs associated with establishing and maintaining such a system, 
many Member States, especially some of the less economically stable ones, may 
experience difficulty meeting these obligations.  
 
The apparent dependence on standards as an alternative form of regulation and 
the issues related to the development of standards will need to be to be resolved.  
There is concern, for example, about the lack of balance and the degree of 
industry influence on the standardization committees.  In addition, government 
may not have the capacity to monitor or participate in the work to develop 
standards for products.  
The Better Regulation initiative186 of the Commission that is designed to improve 
the regulatory environment could result in revisions to the GPSD in the future.  
The range of activities that make up this initiative include the screening of 
pending legislation to identify those that should be withdrawn, the review of 
existing acts for the purpose of simplifying the regulatory environment, revised 
impact assessment guidelines to improve the analysis of economic, social and 
environmental impacts, measurement of the administrative costs arising from 
regulation in order to reduce these costs and the appointment of a high level 
Better Regulation Group to advise the Commission on regulatory issues.  
                                            
186  European Commission, Press Release, Spring Summit 2006: Cutting red-tape and over-regulations, 
MEMO/06/135, Brussels, 21 March 2006  
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It has been argued that there is a need for a central European Agency for 
Consumer Product Safety to provide the ability to move rapidly to address 
emerging product safety problems across the EU, to bring together and make 
available the expertise to deal with highly complex technical issues, to provide 
linear consistency and continuity in policy and decision making, to achieve 
economies of scale and to support the development of standards.  Due to 
problems related to the fact that EC officials are not elected nor are they 
accountable to elected individuals it is unlikely that Member States would support 
the establishment of a central agency.187 
 
 
 
7. Policy Considerations and Underlying Principles188  
 
Introduction 
 
Amongst this report’s Principal Findings and Conclusions are two subjects - 
choosing between regulation or voluntary standards, and the effectiveness of the 
GSR- that call for explicit consideration of relevant criteria. These criteria or 
measures of evaluation are applicable to a clustered sequence of policy 
questions: 
 
• Should government act in response to a particular policy concern? (ie: the 
desire for enhanced consumer product safety.) 
• Which instrument amongst the range of policy tools available to it should 
government chose? (In this case the choice is between detailed or 
product-specific regulation and a performance-based standard taking the 
form of a general safety requirement.) 
• What considerations most directly affect the utility and effectiveness of the 
approach selected? (ie: how can the design and operation of a general 
safety requirement help to ensure compliance?) 
• Whatever decisions are taken in relation to the preceding matters, are 
there factors of general application relating to norms of modern 
governance that should be respected as underlying values?  
 
These, or similar questions related to other sectors and objectives, have been 
repeatedly asked in numerous jurisdictions including Canada, with the result that 
a certain general orientation can be discerned. Drawing upon that experience, an 
overview of general policy considerations (to which more extended reference will 
be made in discussion of particular features of our discussion of the general 
safety requirement) can be provided. 
 
                                            
187  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 
2005. 
188 This section is supplemented by reference to the OECD paper, “Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: 
Challenges for Regulatory Compliance” and the Dutch Ministry of Justice paper “The Table of Eleven.”  
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This overview addresses core principles of regulatory effectiveness, the evolution 
and applicability of those core principles in Canada, factors affecting ultimate 
compliance with regulatory instruments and associated legal principles. 
 
 
Core Principles of Regulatory Effectiveness 
 
In recent advice to the UK government, the multi-stakeholder Better Regulation 
Task Force identified five over-arching principles relevant to the effectiveness of 
regulatory initiatives, with the concept of effectiveness broadly understood to 
encompass what might otherwise be described as legitimacy and acceptability. 
These principles - transparency, consistency, targeting, proportionality and 
accountability - are explained as follows by the task force:189 
 
• Transparency is achieved by ensuring that: policy objectives and the need 
for regulation are effectively communicated to all concerned parties, 
regulations are simple and clear, additional guidance is available in plain 
English, where necessary, individual obligations under the scheme are 
widely understood, and the regulated community knows what to expect 
from enforcing authorities. Consultation and good communication with 
regulator can enhance transparency. 
 
• Consistency is achieved by ensuring that new regulations are consistent 
with existing regulations and with related government obligations, for 
example, under inter-governmental agreements and international treaties.  
Regulatory authorities with overlapping responsibilities and concurrent 
regulation-making powers exercise those responsibilities and powers 
consistently with one another.  Relevant authorities evenly enforce the 
regulatory regime exercising discretionary powers with reasonable 
predictability, and regulations are administered consistently across 
regions.    
 
• Effective Targeting is achieved by ensuring that selected regulatory 
mechanisms are aimed at the problem and not “scatter-gun or universal” 
in approach.  A goals-based approach is adapted to the extent feasible, 
allowing for future flexibility and leaving those being regulated some 
freedom concerning the means of achieving those goals. Regulations are 
                                            
189 The Better Regulation Guide, 1998, prepared by the Regulatory Impact Unit of the Better Regulation 
Task Force. (UK) The Better Regulation Task Force was appointed in September 1997 to advise the UK 
Government on regulatory issues.  It is independent of Government and supported by the Cabinet Office.  
The Task Force is chaired by Lord Haskins, with 18 Members drawn from big and small businesses, 
consumer and citizen groups, the charity and voluntary sector, the trade union movement and enforcement 
community to ensure a balanced approach. 
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revisited from time to time to determine if they are still necessary, or if they 
require modification or elimination. 190  
 
• Proportionality is achieved by ensuring that viable alternatives to 
regulation (or alternative compliance mechanisms) are carefully 
considered before deciding to regulate.  The least intrusive mechanism 
required to achieve the regulatory objectives effectively is employed, the 
regulatory impact on those affected is carefully considered, a good 
balance between risk and cost is attained, and the sanctions imposed are 
proportionate and appropriate to the seriousness of the violation. 
 
• Accountability is achieved through effective mechanisms for making 
regulators accountable to government, citizens and Parliament. There is 
meaningful consultation with affected parties before regulatory decisions 
are taken, the regulatory process is fair and perceived as such, well-
publicized, accessible, fair and efficient appeals procedures are available 
under the scheme, and evaluation of regulatory systems and programs 
are carried out and adjustments made as appropriate. 
 
Arguably, (despite certain differences as to terminology,) the Canadian federal 
regulatory experience has moved into general alignment with these core 
principles of regulatory effectiveness. It is therefore appropriate to briefly review 
that experience. 
 
The Regulatory Reform Process in Canada: 1983-2006 
 
Over the past quarter century, several distinct regulatory reform initiatives have 
been pursued at the federal level in Canada. These initiatives, outlines below, 
have combined distinctive key elements with shifts in emphasis intended to 
highlight particular elements of reform, or to consolidate a more comprehensive 
framework: 
 
• Decriminalization of Regulatory Offences: Efforts were made between the 
1983-86 period to modify the long-established “command and control” 
approach to regulation and to “convert” criminal offences to regulatory 
offences where appropriate.191  
• Streamline Regulatory Process / Compliance Reform: The first 
comprehensive approach to federal regulatory policy became evident 
between 1986 and 1992. This involved measures to streamline the 
regulatory process, to enhance regulatory effectiveness, to manage the 
risk of regulatory liability, and to develop compliance strategy and practice. 
                                            
190 Ibid.,  The Better Regulation Checklist, available on the Better Regulation Task Force Web Site at  
http://www.brtf.gov.uk/ See also OECD’s Web Site Overview on  Regulatory Reform at 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37421_1_1_1_1_37421,00.html  
191  
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During this period the range of regulatory instruments available to 
regulators expanded with encouragement to regulate “smarter” (reflecting 
the growing influence of international trade considerations) ie: to use the 
“least intrusive” regulatory method available.192  
 
• Reinventing Government:193 During the 1992-97 period, the regulatory 
policy focus indicated a shifting emphasis towards deregulation, 
privatization, alternatives to regulation, and regulatory flexibility. Efforts to 
rationalize the role of government vis a vis the private sector, to downsize 
and “reinvent” government, and to explore public-private partnerships 
reflected important concerns surrounding Canadian competitiveness in a 
global economy and fiscal limitations.194  
 
• Performance-based / Accountable Government:  From 1997-2003 the 
focus of federal regulatory policy shifted in the direction of business 
planning intended to enhance operational efficiency and improved 
governance practices. Efforts were undertaken to implement results-
oriented accountability involving the use of objective performance criteria. 
In order to achieve coherence across a range of policy sectors, attention 
was devoted to resolving horizontal issues.  
 
• Smart Regulation: The current period, as indicated in the introduction to 
this report, revolves around the Smart Regulation initiative.   
 
Over the course of the previous quarter century it is possible to discern varying 
degrees of emphasis within Canadian regulatory policy on factors corresponding 
to the core principles of regulatory effectiveness as articulated by the UK Better 
Regulation Task Force. Certainly, attention has been directed towards 
transparency, and accountability, towards the proper definition or targeting of the 
policy challenge, and towards consistency whether in the form of explicit policies 
on enforcement and compliance or in terms of efforts to increase horizontal 
coherence. While reference to proportionality is less common in Canadian policy 
discussion than in other jurisdictions (notably the European Union), significant 
regulatory activity in Canada, whether in the form of RIAS or increasingly 
selective approaches to instrument choice, or, on occasion in the context of 
reasonableness analysis within the framework of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, is evidently directed towards similar considerations. The Canadian 
experience thus broadly mirrors a recent synthesis of regulatory evolution within 
the OECD community: 
 
                                            
192Regulatory policy statement, instrument choice literature, Neilson task force, Prichard and Trebilcock on 
“smarter” regulation 
193 Regulatory Affairs Committee on C-62; PPP literature; early OECD regulation studies 
194 See, for example, the Government’s 1993 Reply to the Parliamentary Subcommittee Report on 
“Regulations and Competitiveness” at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/raoics-
srdc/docs/publications/responsive_reg_canada_e.pdf   
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In the 1990s the focus of regulatory reform at OECD has turned from 
deregulation to regulatory quality management – improving the efficiency, 
flexibility, simplicity and effectiveness of individual regulations and non-regulatory 
instruments. Regulatory reform is now entering a third phase – the management 
of regulation – to improve the total impact of regulatory systems in achieving their 
social and economic goals.”195 
 
 
Regulatory Compliance and Instrument Choice 
 
Within the context of this report’s discussion of a general safety requirement as 
an instrument capable of contributing to increased consumer product safety in 
Canada, issues associated with compliance figure prominently alongside more 
general norms of regulatory effectiveness. This is because any possible 
advocacy of the general safety requirement must ultimately rest on the capacity 
of this approach to bring about beneficial changes in the behaviour of those 
whose conduct and performance affects the level of consumer safety in Canada.  
The general safety requirement is thus fundamentally oriented around 
expectations for behaviour, and within the framework of a new legislative 
initiative the relevant behaviour – and thus the eventual utility of the initiative - is 
measured in terms of compliance. 
 
Insistence on the importance of behaviour and compliance is now central to 
regulatory decision-making and the choice of governing instrument. The OECD 
study quoted above asserts firmly: 
 
The traditional regulatory approach of establishing standards of behaviour and 
legal enforcement mechanisms is not the sole means for governments to 
influence the behaviour of citizens and enterprises and may not be the most 
effective. In order to achieve regulatory objectives, regulatory policymakers need 
a clear understanding of the nature of different policy instruments, of the habits of 
the regulated target group, and of the regulatory context, to achieve regulatory 
objectives.196 
 
An important and influential analysis for the Dutch Ministry of Justice to which we 
will refer again in further detail underlines the centrality of behavioural and 
compliance objectives. It does so, furthermore, with reference to social order and 
the rule of law: 
 
The government wants to make changes to society by influencing the behaviour 
of citizens and businesses. One of the policy tools, which the government can 
use to achieve this, is legislation… Legislation, however, also assumes some 
level of compliance with it by the target group. Non-compliance decreases the 
chance of realizing the policy objective. Moreover, legislation is also meant to be 
                                            
195 “Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance,” OECD, PUMA (2000) 4, 
7 
196 Ibid, 5 
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complied with: compliance maintains the legal nature of society, and non-
compliance affects that nature.197  
 
As a field of specialized inquiry, regulatory compliance is substantially broader in 
scope than the more familiar subject of “enforcement.” Many factors influence 
compliance under regulatory schemes.  Compliance rates may be as adversely 
affected by a confusing legislative mandate as by poor enforcement practices or 
by any number of socio-psychological, sociological or criminological factors 
across the entire spectrum of regulatory activity.  From preliminary consultations, 
through draft legislation to program implementation, compliance promotion, 
monitoring, inspection and eventual enforcement actions, consideration must be 
given to at least this range of influences on the effectiveness of regulation. 
 
The current view of the pre-conditions and components of a successful 
regulatory compliance and enforcement program is the product of numerous 
multi-disciplinary studies, supplemented by general views and practical 
experience in the field of law enforcement.  Despite many different formulations 
of the accumulated wisdom by modern regulators in western democratic 
countries, there is a surprising degree of unanimity on the key factors:  
 
These elements include effective techniques for encouraging voluntary 
compliance, a credible monitoring and inspection scheme, the ability to respond 
quickly and effectively to specific incidents of non-compliance and a flexible 
range of civil, administrative and criminal sanctions to be applied in a manner 
that is proportionate and appropriate to the seriousness of the violation in 
question.198 
 
For many years, Canadian regulatory statutes relied virtually exclusively on the 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions to promote compliance with regulatory 
statutes.  After an abortive attempt was made in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
to find a bright line distinction between “criminal” and “regulatory offences”, the 
federal government adopted a more strategic, problem-solving perspective on 
regulation and compliance.    
 
Recognizing that there are many ways to advance regulatory objectives -
legislative and non-legislative - and many factors which affect compliance, 
government embarked upon a more comprehensive approach. Designing an 
effective regulatory regime including an effective compliance and enforcement 
program, necessarily involves several steps, namely to: 
 
• Carefully identify the significant regulatory issue, compliance problem or 
regulatory objective to be achieved; 
                                            
197 The Table of Eleven (November 2004) 4 
198 See R v. Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd. (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 317, at 338. (Affirmed on 
other grounds by Ont. C.A. at (1996) 28 O.R. (3d) 161; appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada at [1998] 1 S.C.R. 706). 
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• Analyze the underlying reasons for the issue, or problem, including the 
reasons for real or anticipated non-compliance; 
• Consider the policy framework options (including the legal framework 
options) available for addressing the regulatory issue, compliance problem 
or objective to be achieved; 
• Develop the regulatory instruments and programs under chosen policy 
option(s) – legislative or non-legislative  -  which are responsive to the 
identified issues and objectives; and 
• Implement the policy and related programs using good management 
principles. 
 
The incremental reasoning implicit in these five steps is relevant to analyzing the 
effectiveness of existing regulatory regimes, to designing new regulatory 
schemes, or to adapting aspects of foreign regulatory regimes to the Canadian 
context as is contemplated in connection with current consideration of a general 
product safety requirement in the consumer product area. 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Justice, in the study noted above, has elaborated upon 
factors that affect compliance with legislation. Many of these will be more fully 
discussed in relation to specific aspects of the possible adoption, design and 
implementation of a general safety requirement in Canada, but it is nevertheless 
convenient to set out for reference the “Table of Eleven” factors that influence 
compliance.   
 
The Table of Eleven 
1. Knowledge of Rules 
• Familiarity with rules 
• Clarity of rules 
 
2. Cost / Benefits 
• Financial/economic costs and benefits 
• Intangible costs and benefits 
 
3. Extent of Acceptance 
• Acceptance of a policy objective 
• Acceptance of the effects of a policy 
 
4. The target groups’ respect for authority 
• Official authority 
• Competing authority 
 
5. Non-official Control (social control) 
• Social control 
• Horizontal supervision 
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6. Risk of being reported 
 
7. Risk of Inspection 
• Records inspection 
• Physical inspection 
 
8. Risk of Detection 
• Detection in a records inspection 
• Detection in a physical inspection 
 
9. Selectivity (Targeting) 
 
10. Risk of Sanction 
 
11. Severity of Sanction 
 
Each of these factors is explained in a 2004 publication by the Ministry of Justice 
in the Netherlands entitled: The Table of Eleven: A Versatile Tool. 199   A 
variation of the Table of Eleven (focusing on factors affecting voluntary 
compliance, control factors and sanctions) was included as an Annex to a 1999 
report by Lyle S. Fairbairn, Q.C. and Margot Priest to the Canadian Human 
Rights Act Review in 1999.  That material, which contains a point form 
elaboration of many of the factors outlined in the Table of Eleven, is included as 
Annex 3 to this Paper. 
 
The Proportionality Principle (Europe) 
 
European officials have enormous discretion under ‘ New Approach’ regulations, 
the General Product Safety Directive and Member State regulations transposing 
the Directive.  Even where products ‘presumptively’ conform to a European 
Standard, officials may act against an individual product that appears to be 
‘unsafe.’ The European Court of Justice, however, has developed a ‘Principle of 
Proportionality’ as a basis for challenging arbitrary legislative, administrative or  
enforcement action.   
 
In relation to regulations (and, presumably also to ‘standards’ when substituted 
for regulations under the ‘ New Approach’), proportionality requires:200 
 
that a regulation-making authority maintain a proper balance between any 
adverse effect on the rights, liberties, and interests of citizens and the purpose of 
                                            
199 See the Table of Eleven, developed  in the Netherlands by the Ministry of Justice, Law Information 
Expertise Centre, accessed on August 10, 2006, at:  
http://www.sam.gov.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/item_618_NL_The_table_of_Eleven.pdf  
200 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, Butterworths, 2004, pp. 359-61 
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the regulation.  As described by S.A. de Smith, 201 the proportionality test, as 
applied to regulations, has two principle formulations: 
 
1. The balancing test, which requires a balance of the ends to be achieved 
against the means applied to achieve them;202 and,  
 
2. The necessity test, which requires that the least harmful of available 
means be adopted to achieve the regulatory objective.203 
 
While the European Principle of Proportionality, as a basis for challenging 
regulations appears similar to the Canadian administrative law concept of 
‘unreasonableness,’ Canadian law generally limits a challenge of legislative 
action on the basis of ‘unreasonableness’ to questions of jurisdiction.  Did the 
public official, department or agency have legal authority to take a particular 
action or decision, or to enact a specific regulation?   
 
It goes without saying that it is not for a court to determine the wisdom of 
delegated legislation or to assess its validity on the basis of the court’s policy 
preferences.  The essential question for the court always is: does the statutory 
grant of authority permit this particular delegated legislation?.....The regulations 
must of course be seen as in some way related to the purpose of the Act but this 
does not mean that a court can review them to see if they are necessary, wise, or 
effective in practice.204 
 
The reasonability test for attacking general administrative decision-making is 
broader, but still more qualified and limited in reach than the European 
‘Proportionality Principle.’  The legal use of the term ‘unreasonable’ has been 
qualified in Canadian administrative law for many years along the following lines:  
 
But unreasonable in what sense?  If, for instance, they were found to be partial 
and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were 
manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or 
gratuitous interference with rights of those subject to them as could find no 
justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, 
“Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are 
unreasonable and ultra vires”.  But in this sense and in this sense only, as I 
conceive, that the question of unreasonableness can properly be regarded.  A 
by-law is not unreasonable merely because particular judges may think that it 
goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not 
accompanied by a qualification or an exception, which some judges may think 
ought to be there.205 
 
                                            
201 S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 
pp. 595-96 
202 Bela-Muhle Josef Bergmann v. Grows-Farm, [1977] E.C.R., 1211 ; The Case of Lithgow and Others, 
E.C.H.R. (My 22, 1984) Series A, No. 102 
203 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649 
204 Jafari v. Canada (minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 2 F.C. 595 (C.A.) 
205 Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 (H.L.), at p. 99-100. 
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In Europe, the substantive basis of a decision may be challenged if an 
administrative action is disproportionate to the risks involved or is more intrusive 
than necessary. It therefore provides a broader basis for challenging 
administrative action than is available under Canadian administrative law.   In 
Canadian administrative law, the concept of ‘reasonableness’ is not used in its 
intuitive sense, but rather as a “glaring indicator that the power being exercised 
(may be) beyond what Parliament intended to confer, and that the hunt should be 
on for interpretive evidence to substantiate that suspicion.”206 
 
Thus, the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates a by-law is not the 
antonym of ‘reasonableness’ in the sense of which that expression is used in the 
common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a court 
would say ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they 
are unreasonable and ultra vires.  
 
Proportionality arguments have had some impact on judicial review proceedings 
in jurisdictions outside Canada, but have yet to make inroads into Canadian 
administrative law as a ground of judicial review.207  The general principles of 
judicial review are:  
 
1. That judicial review is not an appellate procedure; 
2. That the court must not substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker; 
3. That the court must rule only upon the legality of the decision and not its 
correctness; and,  
4. That the court will concern itself only with the manner in which a decision is 
reached and not with the substantive merits of the decision itself.208 
 
The broad discretion given to administrative officials under the General Product 
Safety Directive in Europe is, therefore, balanced by the Proportionality Principle, 
under which the European Court of Justice can challenge the substantive 
decisions taken by administrative officials.  If Canada were to adopt a voluntary 
standards-based approach to regulating consumer products, it would be 
important to design appropriate checks and balances on the exercise of that 
discretion, since the Canadian concept of ‘reasonableness’ is different and much 
more limited in its application 
  
The concept of proportionality is not entirely foreign to Canadian law of course.  
A concept of ‘proportionality’ is employed in some Canadian Charter decisions 
where the Court must balance competing rights under a constitutional challenge 
to a legislative provision.  Though not legally binding on government, some 
regulatory policies incorporate elements of ‘Proportionality.’  For example, 
Canada’s regulatory policy once prominently included a ‘Citizens’’ Code of 
Regulatory Fairness,’ requiring, among other matters, that sanctions under 
                                            
206 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, Butterworths, 2004 
207 Ibid., at p. 359 
208 Ibid., at p. 354, citing Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948 1 K.B. 223 
(C.A.) 
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federal statutes be ‘proportionate and appropriate to the seriousness of the 
violation.’  Elements of the Citizens Code have been incorporated into 
subsequent updates of the federal regulatory policy,209 including the following 
elements of the Code which address the issue of proportionality in taking 
regulatory action: 
 
(1) Canadians are entitled to expect that the Government’s regulation will be 
characterized by minimum interference with individual freedom consistent with 
the protection of community interests. 
 
(8)  The government will take all possible measures to ensure that businesses of 
different sizes are not burdened disproportionately by the imposition of regulatory 
requirements. 
 
(10) The government will not use regulation unless it has clear evidence that: 
• A problem exists 
• Government intervention is justified; and  
• Regulation is the best alternative open to government 
 
(11) The government will ensure that the benefits of regulation exceed the costs 
and will give particularly careful consideration to all new regulations that could 
impede economic growth or job creation.210 
 
Given the very significant increase in administrative and enforcement discretion 
under a standards-based GSR regime, is the mere possibility of judicial review of 
administrative action a sufficient safeguard against misuse of that discretion?  
Should additional safeguards be included in legislation granting extended powers 
under a GSR regime? For example, if the power to order a recall of consumer 
products were to be included were it otherwise constitutionally appropriate?211   
Since a reference to voluntary standards under a standards-based regime is a 
form of authorized sub-delegation of legislative power, should Courts be given a 
wider opportunity to review the substance of standards substituting for 
regulations where they have an unreasonable or highly disproportionate impact 
on individual rights?   
 
In the early days of Parliamentary democracy, the courts were not reluctant to 
substitute their own views for those of the legislature.  In Bonham’s case, a 
decision rendered in 1610, the court noted: “when an act of Parliament is against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void.”212 
                                            
209 The Citizens’ Code of Regulatory Fairness was a document which helped to explain the guiding 
principles of Canada’s new regulatory policy, established in 1986. 
210 The Citizens’ Code of Regulatory Fairness (This document formed part of the Federal Government’s 
Regulatory Policy of 1986. The Code contained the general principles underlying the new policy.)  Some 
federal regulatory processes also demand that proportionality issues be addressed as regulations are 
developed, such as the requirement for a Regulatory Impact Assessment process, a Business Impact Test 
and Cost-Benefit analysis.   
211 See infra, under the heading Recall: An Instrument of Last Resort. 
212 (1610, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, at 118a, 76 E.R. 646, at 652) 
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Echoes of this view are discernible to this day in the jurisprudence related to 
delegated legislation.  The question this raises, however, is whether the 
separation of the legislature and judiciary in our modern conception of a 
Parliamentary democracy leaves room for the judicial invalidation of a delegated 
law on the ground of the wisdom, or lack thereof, of its substance.213 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
While the legal relevance of the Proportionality Principle is still evolving in the 
European Court of Justice, it is clearly relevant to the issue of ‘recall’, which is 
widely regarded as a remedy of last resort.  The concept has also been given 
recent mention in some European Treaties as a broad principle, alongside the 
principle of ‘Subsidiarity,’ which preceded it.  The essence of the ‘Subsidiarity 
principle’ is that the European Parliament cannot legislate ‘European’ law where 
unnecessary, that is, where the matter is more appropriately left to the Member 
States to legislate for themselves.  Member States retain the residual, or original, 
jurisdiction to legislate in Europe.  Balancing Community and National 
Sovereignty is a delicate process in Europe. 
 
The ‘Proportionality Principle’ is given a similar application.  The Principle was 
originally developed as a brake on administrative action, that is, government 
officials should not take steps disproportionate to the needs or seriousness of an 
issue or problem.  Given the broad new powers and discretion available to 
officials under the GSR to challenge products as ‘unsafe’ (even products 
presumptively conforming to the General Safety Requirement), an important 
policy decision for Canada is how far that discretion or those powers should be 
subject to additional checks or controls other than by normal judicial review by 
the Court.  For example, should something akin to an expanded (or legislated) 
Citizens’ Code of Regulatory Fairness or the UK’s Enforcement Concordat (being 
considered for legislation) be available as a formal basis for reviewing 
administrative decisions and/or enforcement measures?214    
 
The Precautionary Principle  
 
The ‘Proportionality Principle’ raises some conflict with another principle 
incorporated into the revised General Product Safety Directive, namely, the 
Precautionary Principle.  The precautionary principle evolved in the 
environmental area, but was given political impetus in the consumer protection 
area by the BSE (mad cow) crisis.  The Principle was expressly included in the 
General Product Safety Directive at the insistence of the European Parliament.  
Both the wording of the principle in the GPSD, and the meaning of the principle 
                                            
213Paul Salembier,  Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, Butterworths, 2004 at p. 351 
214 The UK has had a voluntary Enforcement Concordat in place as a policy document for about a decade.   
Consideration is now being given to updating the Concordat on risk assessment / risk management 
principles and to legislating the revised Concordat so that it might be enforced against a public authority 
taking disproportionate action against a defendant.   
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itself, are far from clear.215   
.    
The ‘Precautionary Principle” is mentioned not only in the GPSD, but also in 
several recent pieces of European legislation.   The principle, on its face, is in 
conflict with the proportionality principle.  There is currently no guidance on how 
the potential conflict will be sorted out.   For this reason, the European 
Commission is proceeding carefully in terms of developing guidelines on recall, 
so as not to upset the balance between the proportionality, subsidiarity and 
precautionary principles. (Hodges interview) 
 
In theory the Proportionality and Precautionary principles might be reconciled by 
an effective risk assessment process focusing on ‘serious” risk.    However, the 
precautionary principle was really developed to deal with things like climate 
change where the consequences could be quite catastrophic.  Such decisions 
are never easy. 
 
The European Commission considers that serious decisions addressing issues 
like applying the precautionary principle to the BSE issue – where entire 
industries may be destroyed by the exercise of the precautionary measures - 
should be taken at the political level.  Under the UK regulation transposing the 
General Product Safety Directive, however, the decision is given to local trading 
standards officers.  On the one hand, it is difficult to envisage removing 
operational decisions to the political level; on the other, there is compelling logic 
for inserting some political involvement in decisions having such serious 
consequences. 
 
With this uncertain background, the UK Department of Trade and Industry has 
provided the following guidance to Industry, Businesses and Enforcement 
Authorities in its Guidance Note on the UK General Product Safety Regulations 
of 2005, transposing the GPSD: 
 
76. Where appropriate, enforcement authorities are to be guided by the 
Precautionary Principle when taking measures under the Regulations to 
protect consumers from unsafe products. 
 
77. The Precautionary Principle applies where there are threats of 
substantial, serious or irreversible harm to consumers but there is clear 
scientific uncertainty over the extent of the threats posed. 
 
                                            
215 “Article 8.2 requires that Member States shall act in accordance with the precautionary principle.  The 
Directive does not define ‘the precautionary principle’ but some guidance is given in a Commission paper 
issued in 2000, which treats the precautionary principle as ‘part of risk management, when scientific 
uncertainty precludes a full assessment of the risk and when decision-makers consider that the chosen level 
of environmental protection or of human, animal and plant health may be in jeopardy.  The reference to the 
precautionary principle in article 8.2 was politically motivated and its meaning n practice is uncertain.”  
(Hodges p. 170) 
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78. Judgments handed down by the Court of Justice (C-434/02 and C-
210/03) presuppose that for the Principle to apply the risk should be 
plausible and realistic based on the identification of potentially negative 
effects on health and safety and a comprehensive assessment of the 
risks based on the most reliable scientific data available (including 
international research).  Where it proves to be impossible to determine 
with certainty the existence of extent of the alleged risk because of the 
insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of the 
scientific study into the risk, but the likelihood of real harm to public health 
and safety persists should the risk materialize, the Precautionary Principle 
justifies the adoption of measures under the Regulations. 
 
79. A measure adopted under the Precautionary Principle must recognize 
that it is not appropriate to seek to reduce the risk to zero. It should also 
be proportionate to the expected risk and appropriate for attaining a high 
level of public health in accordance with the definition of a safe product in 
the Regulations.  The enforcement authority taking the measure must 
keep it under regular review in the light of new scientific evidence. 
 
In taking enforcement measures, officials often take a pragmatic approach to the 
application of the precautionary principle, that is, they will want to be ‘on the safe 
side of an issue.’  If, for example, officials have concerns resulting from reports 
about metal candleholders exploding for no known reason, they may first raise 
their concerns with producers and others.  If it appears the problem is not so 
serious as first reported, they might continue their discussions until the risk is 
identified and some proportionate action taken.  If the producer agrees that there 
is a severe problem, officials view the precautionary principle as largely 
irrelevant, because they will insist on decisive action. It is treated, in effect, as an 
aspect of risk assessment and risk management.    (Meijer interview) 
 
Officials must recognize, however, that the Precautionary Principle is only a 
principle and not a rule of law. It provides some policy guidance on the exercise 
of pre-existing legal authority; it does not provide original legal authority.   
 
 Decisions which take the Precautionary Principle into consideration must usually 
be based on some evidence of risk and likelihood of harm should the risk 
materialize.  In Europe, the ‘Proportionality Principle’ operates as a check on 
administrative action, thus a decision which takes the Precautionary Principle into 
account may be overturned in Europe under the Proportionality Principle if it is 
not based on appropriate evidence and results in an action being taken which is 
disproportionate to the risk.   
 
Their remains much uncertainty, therefore, about the nature of the ‘Precautionary 
Principle” and the means of applying it, especially in view of the unsettled and 
potentially conflicting relationship with the “Proportionality Principle’.   
 
 
                                                                                             98
The Role of Voluntary Standards in Regulating Consumer Products 
in Europe, Canada and the US 
 
Europe 
At the European level, voluntary standards largely displace technical regulations 
under Europe’s New Approach to Regulation, which provides the underlying legal 
framework for the General Product Safety Directive.  Voluntary standards (and 
especially European Community standards where they exist) play a crucial role in 
establishing conformity with the GPSD in Europe.   
 
Canada 
There is no current commitment under Canada’s regulatory policy to substitute 
voluntary standards for regulation in the manner or on the scale that has 
occurred in Europe under the New Approach to Regulation.’  The ‘ New 
Approach’ has frequently been described as a form of ‘privatization of regulation.’ 
 
In the Occupational Health and Safety area in Canada and the UK, the role of 
voluntary standards is to supplement (rather than supplant) and sometimes to 
defer formal regulation where the regulatory objective can be better achieved 
under voluntary standards on a more flexible basis.  This position is more 
consistent with Canada’s position on the use of voluntary standards under its 
Draft Regulatory Policy.  It is also more consistent with the policy position of the 
United States, its major trading partner, on the use of voluntary standards in 
rulemaking by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).  
 
There is a strong case to be made for encouraging the proliferation of flexible, 
continuously improving, voluntary standards as a complement to safety 
regulation in the consumer products area.  The Robens Committee on Safety 
and Health at Work, 1970-72 discussed in this Paper216 made a compelling case 
for encouraging the use of voluntary standards in the workplace safety area.   
 
The United States 
“The interface between the world of voluntary standards and the smaller universe 
of consumer products, as regulated by the safety responsibilities of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, is unique.  The enactment of the 
Consumer Product Safety Act represented an effort to balance the expertise and 
comprehensiveness of voluntary standards with a high level of concern and 
government involvement in the safety of products which are used by consumers.   
The issue of how to effectively utilize the already vast body of voluntary 
standards in connection with mandatory safety requirements of the CPSA has 
been evolving at least since 1968.”217 
                                            
216 See Section entitled The Occupational Health and Safety Model – Lessons Learned, and Annex 6, 
(supporting text) Lessons Learned from the Robens Committee. 
217 Address by Michael R. Lemov to the 13th Annual Meeting and Training Symposium, of the International 
Consumer Product Health and Safety Association, (ICPHSO), May 11, 2006, at p. 5. Mr. Lemov is a 
principal author of the Consumer Product Safety Act and the author of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission – Regulatory Manual.  (Shepard’s/ McGraw Hill, 1981) 
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In 1968, Congress established a National Commission on Product Safety 
(NCPS) to “conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the scope and 
adequacy of measures now employed to protect consumers against 
unreasonable risks of injuries that may be caused by hazardous household 
products.”218  The Commission was also directed to undertake a study 
determining “to what extent does self-regulation by industry afford adequate 
protection against such hazards” which chiefly involved examining the role of 
voluntary standards.219   
 
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who testified before the Commission, said for 
example that ‘industry codes have a built-in weakness, for they are prepared and 
controlled on a voluntary basis by the very people to whom they are to be 
applied…’   With this and similar testimony, the commission was clearly troubled 
about recommending the unconditional use of such standards in the marketplace 
for the protection of the public.  But the NCPS in its final report ultimately 
concluded that, although the quality of many of the voluntary standards it studied 
was less than acceptable, the potential of voluntary standards to enhance safety 
in the marketplace was very great.  The Commission said: 
 
Industry activities to develop safety standards can provide an important 
forum for marshalling the technical competence necessary for this work, 
but their voluntary nature inherently inhibits the development of optimal 
standards… 
 
However, the Commission concluded that: 
 
…voluntary safety programs with due regard for the public interest need 
and warrant federal technical and financial assistance and oversight.220 
 
Initially, in 1972, the CPSA was cautious in its utilization of voluntary standards 
as rules having the force of law.  It required that all such standards, if they were 
to be utilized by the Commission, be vetted by the CPSC and ultimately be 
issued by that body.  As initially enacted, the CPSA did not contain any reference 
to voluntary standards.   
 
In 1978, the Commission issued regulations describing the extent and form of 
Commission involvement in the development of voluntary standards.221  In the 
Background section, the Commission acknowledged the contribution that 
voluntary standards had made to reducing hazards associated with consumer 
products, and stated that it supported an effective voluntary standards program.  
                                            
218 P.L. 90-136, 1968 
219 The Commission published an extensive evaluation of its findings regarding self-regulation by industry, 
primarily in the form of the voluntary standards process.  See NCPS Final Report, June 30, 1970, Chapter 
4, pp.47-62. 
220 Per Michael R. Lemov to the 13th Annual Meeting and Training Symposium, of the International 
Consumer Product Health and Safety Association, (ICPHSO), May 11, 2006, p. 9 
221 43 FR 19216, 16 CFR part 1032 
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The Commission also stated its belief that a proper combination of voluntary and 
mandatory standards can have a higher ‘payoff’ in increased product safety than 
either mandatory or voluntary standards alone could have.222 
 
In 1981, Congress amended the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, and the Flammable Fabrics Act to require the 
Commission to give preference to voluntary standards over promulgating 
mandatory standards if it determined that a voluntary standard would eliminate or 
adequately reduce an injury risk, and that there would be a likelihood of 
substantial compliance with the standard.  The amendments also required the 
Commission to provide administrative and technical assistance to organizations 
engaged in voluntary standards development.223 
 
Section 7 of the current Consumer Product Safety Act224 enables the CPSC to 
‘promulgate safety standards’ in accordance with the provisions of section 9.  
Section 9 of the CPSA governs the procedure to be adopted in Commission 
rulemaking; it requires, among other matters, that advance notice of a proposed 
rule be published in the Federal Register in order to elicit public comment and/or 
participation in the proposed rule making.   
 
Section 9, subsection (2) (B) also provides that, if a voluntary standard meets the 
‘successful-risk-elimination’ and ‘likelihood-of-substantial-compliance’ conditions: 
 
… the Commission shall terminate any proceeding to promulgate a consumer 
product safety rule respecting such risk of injury and shall publish in the Federal 
Register a notice which includes the determination of the Commission and which 
notifies the public that the Commission will rely on the voluntary standard to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of injury, except that the Commission shall terminate 
any such proceeding and rely on a voluntary standard only if such standard is in 
existence.  (Emphasis added) 
 
The nature of the reliance by the CPSC on voluntary standards deferred to under 
section 9 is a matter of some controversy in the U.S.  There are two schools of 
interpretation.  Some commentators argue that the CPSC is entitled to rely on 
such standards to the same extent (including for enforcement purposes) as if the 
standard had been promulgated by the Commission itself, as a mandatory 
consumer product safety standard.225   They take this position, partly, because 
there is a form of equivalency in the conditions to be met between the proposed 
voluntary standard published by the Commission and one formally promulgated 
by the Commission. 
                                            
222 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131, Background section of final rule on Commission 
Involvement in Voluntary Standards. 
223 Ibid. Background section of final rule on Commission Involvement in Voluntary Standards. 
224 15 U.S.C. 2056 
225 See prepared addresses by David H. Baker LLC, and Michael R. Lemov to the 13th Annual Meeting and 
Training Symposium, of the International Consumer Product Health and Safety Association, (ICPHSO), 
May 11, 2006 
                                                                                             101
 
Others argue that the statutory intent of the CPSC is much more limited.  The 
historical objective of Section 9, they argue, was to avoid unnecessary regulation 
(as part of a ‘de-regulation policy thrust) and cannot be relied upon outside the 
context of rulemaking or, in the case of a breach of such a standard, as 
potentially triggering the obligation to report a “substantial product hazard” under 
section 15.226   It is argued that to rely on voluntary standards, as if they were 
promulgated by the Commission as Commission standards, would be to create a 
form of “back-door rulemaking.”227  This appears to be the prevalent view where 
voluntary standards are treated, as in Europe, as quasi-mandatory. 
   
The only apparent agreement between the two schools of interpretation is that 
the matter should ultimately be sorted out in the legislation itself.  However, the 
importance of Commission involvement in the development of voluntary 
standards as an adjunct the Commission’s role in developing mandatory 
standards is largely unquestioned:  
 
The CPSC has issued less than forty so-called mandatory standards under its 
five jurisdictional statutes (the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, the 
Flammable Fabrics Act and the Refrigerator Safety Act) since its formation in 
1972. 
 
During the same period, the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(‘ASTM’), the American National Standards Institute (‘ANSI’), Underwriters 
Laboratory (‘UL’) and other standards organizations in the U.S. have probably 
issued over twenty thousand standards.228 
 
Recently the Commission has requested voluntary standards organizations to 
assist it by developing voluntary standards for consumer products, including a 
safety standard for children’s folding chairs.   Commission representatives 
regularly participate in the standards development activities of voluntary 
organizations, as do representatives of other government agencies.229    
 
The participation of Commission officials in the development of voluntary 
standards has raised a number of concerns for the Commission relating to the 
possibility of conflicts of interest, confusion about the status of standards in which 
officials have had a hand in developing, unauthorized use of resources, and 
issues of prejudice to the Commission’s enforcement role through a perceived 
loss of independence and impartiality. 
                                            
226 15 U.S.C. 2064.  per address by Rob Raffety, Legal Counsel to the Chair of the CPSC 
227 (See 653 Fed. Sup. 1079 – a voluntary standard does not pre-empt, nor is it the same as, a voluntary 
standard – review case.  
 
228 Address by David H. Baker LLC, to the 13th Annual Meeting and Training Symposium, of (ICPHSO), 
May 11, 2006, supra, at p. 1. 
229 Per Michael r. Lemov, supra, address to ICPHSO, May 11, 2006, p. 6. 
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Given the existence of thousands of voluntary standards, the Commission must 
act judiciously in selecting the appropriate activities in which to engage.  The 
current regulation does not make reference to the existing agency practice of 
permitting staff to participate only in those activities specifically identified in the 
operating plan, performance budget, mid-year review, or other official 
Commission documents.  Where appropriate, Part 1031 should include language 
to permit staff involvement in only those standards expressly approved by the 
Commission.230 
 
On July 10, 2006, the Commission published a final rule on Commission 
Involvement in Voluntary Standards.231  In addition to asserting more control over 
the activities of Commission Staff in the development of voluntary standards, the 
Rule provides that the Commission will consider the extent to which specific 
criteria are met in considering Commission involvement in the development of 
voluntary safety standards for consumer products.   
 
The listed criteria address numerous issues, including: the overall effectiveness 
of a voluntary standard, maintaining its currency, avoiding anticompetitive results 
in the standard-setting process, verification of continuing compliance with the 
standard, tracking products and injuries, and meaningful participation of all 
interested parties in the standard-setting process.  Before participating in the 
development of a voluntary standard, the Commission must now consider the 
following criteria. 
 
a. The likelihood the voluntary standard will eliminate or adequately reduce the risk 
of injury addressed and that there will be substantial and timely compliance with 
the voluntary standard; 
 
b. The likelihood that the voluntary standard will be developed within a reasonable 
period of time; 
 
c. Exclusion, to the maximum extent possible, from the voluntary standard being 
developed, of requirements which will create anticompetitive effects or promote 
restraint of trade; 
 
d. Provisions for periodic and timely review of the standard, including review for 
anticompetitive effects, and revision or amendment as the need arises; 
 
e. Performance-oriented and not design-restrictive requirements, to the maximum 
practical extent, in any standard developed; 
 
f. Industry arrangements for achieving substantial and timely industry compliance 
with the voluntary standard once it is issued, and the means of ascertaining such 
                                            
230 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131, Explanation section, section2 of final rule on 
Commission Involvement in Voluntary Standards. 
231 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131 
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compliance based on overall market share of product production; 
 
g. Provisions in the standard for marking products conforming to the standard so 
that future Commission investigation can indicate the involvement of such 
products in accidents and patterns of injury; 
 
h. Provisions for insuring that products identified as conforming to such standards 
will be subjected to a testing and certification (including self-certification) 
procedure, which will provide assurance that the products comply with the 
standard; and 
 
i. The openness to all interested parties, and the establishment of procedures 
which will provide for meaningful participation in the development of such 
standards by representatives of producers, suppliers, distributors, retailers, 
consumers, small business, public interests and other individuals having 
knowledge or expertise in the areas under consideration, and procedures for 
affording other due process considerations.232 
 
The importance of ensuring meaningful participation of public interest 
stakeholder participation in the standard-setting process to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of any voluntary standard intended to supplement, displace or defer 
regulation is a recurring theme across jurisdictions.  In Europe, it is a concern of 
the European Association for Coordination of Consumer Representation and 
Standardization - a concern recently reiterated in a Report dated March 10, 2006, 
outlining Proposals for Improving Public Interest Stakeholder Participation in 
Standardization.233  As one U.S. commentator also noted: 
 
To the extent public, consumer and non-industry representation is increased in 
the voluntary standards-making process, it is more likely that a risk will be 
adequately eliminated as required by the CPSA and that there will be substantial 
compliance in the marketplace.  To the extent that standards applying to 
consumer safety represent something more than ‘consensus standards’ and 
come closer, through open and inclusive procedures, to a level of safety 
reasonably necessary to eliminate hazards to consumers, they are more likely to 
be accepted by government, recognized by the courts, and complied with in the 
market place.  Compliance would also furnish some evidence of due care by 
manufacturers in the production of consumer products.234 
 
While public officials sometimes consider voluntary standards as an inexpensive 
substitute for regulation, it seems clear that the effective utilization of voluntary 
standards requires considerable input from public authorities.  If it is to be done 
properly, voluntary standards development will often be resource-intensive and 
may be as, and occasionally more, time-consuming than developing regulations.  
                                            
232 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131, Sec. 1031.5 
 
233 See ANEC report, March 10, 2006, Proposals for Improving Public Interest Stakeholder Participation 
in Standardization, p. 2. 
234 Per Michael r. Lemov, supra, address to ICPHSO, May 11, 2006, p. 12 
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Nevertheless, the process may well produce more effective and longer lasting 
safety outcomes for the reasons indicated.   
 
For the purposes of determining the broad range of ‘voluntary standards bodies’ 
with which a public authority may become involved as an advisor or funding 
authority – and in relation to which it should be adequately resourced - it is useful 
to consider the definition of that term by the CPSC: 
 
...’voluntary standards bodies’ are private sector domestic or multinational 
organizations or groups, or combinations thereof, such as, but not limited to, all 
non-profit organizations, industry associations, professional and technical 
societies, institutes, and test laboratories, that are involved in the planning, 
development, establishment, revision, review or coordination of voluntary 
standards.  Voluntary standards development bodies are voluntary standards 
bodies, or their sub-groups, that are devoted to developing or establishing 
voluntary standards. 
 
Policy Criteria for Making a Choice to Regulate or to Rely on 
Voluntary Standards? 
 
When are voluntary standards likely to be inappropriate as an alternative to 
regulation?  “When to regulate?” is a question that is closely related to the issue 
of choices about the utilization of voluntary standards in regulating the safety of 
consumer products.   
 
There is surely no single answer to the question of whether regulatory agencies 
should use performance-based regulation… performance-based regulation is not 
a "magic bullet" or "one size fits all" approach applicable in all situations…  In 
determining whether to use a performance standard, and if so, the specific type 
of standard to adopt (e.g. loosely vs tightly specified), decision makers need to 
consider the conditions under which the standard will be applied."235 
 
The UK Consumer Safety Review in the mid 1970’s considered when formal 
regulation was appropriate and developed a series of factors to be taken into 
account in determining whether to regulate or not, or to adopt some alternative 
approach to dealing with a consumer safety issue.  The criteria developed by the 
Review as to the proper use of prescriptive regulations are instructive in that they 
help identify the scope of operation of a general safety requirement.    
 
The factors that the Review Committee suggested be taken into account in 
considering proposals for regulations were: 
 
a. Evidence whether the goods in question are being widely sold; 
 
                                            
235 Harvard Workshop on Performance-based regulation, supra, under the heading "Conditions for 
Performance-based Regulation. 
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b. The degree of risk which they present and the cost to manufacturers ultimately to 
consumers, of eliminating or reducing the hazard; 
 
c. Whether a British Standard, or other suitable specification on which regulations 
can be based, exists; 
 
d. Any proposals for harmonization of safety requirements under consideration 
within the EEC; and 
 
e. Whether voluntary action the trade itself is prepared to take is likely to be 
effective in reducing or removing the hazards and the risk of such action 
being undermined by lack of co-operation from a minority of 
manufacturers or importers.236 
 
The 1999 Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee Report on 
Quasi-Regulation: Grey-Letter Law sets out the following criteria for choosing 
prescriptive regulation:237 
• The problem is high risk, of high impact / significance, for example a major  
public health and safety issue; 
• The government requires the certainty provided by legal sanctions; 
• Universal application is required (or at least where the coverage of an entire 
industry sector, or more than one industry sector) is judged as necessary; 
• There is a systematic compliance problem with a history of intractable 
disputes or flagrant breaches of fair trading principles and no possibility of  
effective sanctions being applied; or 
• Existing industry bodies lack adequate coverage of industry participants, are 
inadequately resourced, or do not have a strong regulatory commitment. 
 
Criteria for Choosing External Standards (Quasi-Regulation) 
Quasi-regulation in the Australian Report on Grey Letter Law includes the use of 
voluntary performance standards promoted by government for regulatory 
purposes, but not incorporated into regulations.  The Australian Commonwealth 
Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation recommended that Quasi-
regulation be considered where: 
• There is a public interest in some government involvement in regulatory 
arrangements and the issue is unlikely to be addressed by self regulation; 
• There is a need for an urgent, interim response to a problem in the short 
term, while a long term regulatory solution is being developed; 
• Government is not convinced of the need to develop or mandate a code for  
the whole industry; 
• There are cost advantages from flexible, tailor made solutions and less formal 
mechanisms such as access to a speedy, low cost complaints handling and  
redress mechanism; or 
                                            
236 Ibid., para 30 
237 Grey Letter Law, Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-Regulation 
(Australia), p. 409  (Web site: http://www.pc.gov.au/orr/greyletterlaw/) , (Chapter 3 Choosing From the 
Regulatory Spectrum) 
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• There are advantages in the Government engaging in a collaborative 
approach with industry, with industry having substantial ownership in the 
scheme.  For this to be successful, the following conditions need to apply: 
o A specific industry solution is required rather than regulation of general 
application; 
o There is a cohesive industry, with like-minded participants, motivated to 
achieve the goals; 
o A viable industry association exists with the necessary resources to 
develop and / or enforce the scheme; 
o Effective sanctions or incentives can be applied to achieve the required 
level of compliance, with low scope for benefits being shared by non-
participants; and 
o There is effective external pressure from industry itself (survival factors), 
or threat of consumer or government action. 
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8. Implementation, Operational Considerations and 
Compliance Issues 
 
Introduction 
 
Adoption of a GSR, should that decision be made, will require a comprehensive 
program for implementation involving a series of important operational and 
resource considerations, and ultimately requiring compliance measures to 
enhance effectiveness. 
 
In this section of the report, we describe a number of implementation, operational 
and compliance issues and endeavour to assess some of the relevant options 
with reference to guiding principles and compliance factors identified in the 
preceding section. For convenience, the guiding principles are set out below: 
 
• Transparency/Consultation of Canadians.   Regulatory objectives, 
policies and assessments of risks should be accessible and transparent to 
all concerned parties, be easily understood and effectively communicated 
to those affected. Where facts are uncertain or unknown, government 
should seek to make clear what gaps exist and what is being done to 
address them. Citizens and the private sector should have an opportunity 
to actively participate through consultation in the decision making process.  
Moreover, supplier obligations under the scheme need to be widely 
understood so that the regulated community knows what to expect. 
 
• Consistency is achieved by ensuring that new regulations are consistent 
with existing regulations and government obligations such as those 
prescribed by inter-governmental agreements or international treaties. 
Government will seek to apply a consistent approach to its assessment of 
risks.  Regulatory authorities with overlapping responsibilities and 
concurrent regulation-making powers exercise those responsibilities and 
powers consistently with one another.  Relevant authorities enforce the 
regulatory regime consistently across regions. 
 
• Evidence.  Government will aim to ensure that all relevant evidence has 
been considered and, where possible, quantified before it takes decisions 
on risk.  In addition, it will seek impartial and informed advice from a range 
of perspectives. 
 
• Effectiveness is achieved by ensuring that selected regulatory and 
enforcement initiatives are aimed at the problem so they achieve the 
intended objectives and national priorities. A goals-based approach is 
adopted to the extent feasible, allowing for future flexibility and leaving 
some freedom to those being regulated concerning the means of 
achieving those goals. Regulations are revisited from time to time to 
determine if they are still necessary, or require modification or elimination. 
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• Proportionality is achieved by ensuring that government intervention is 
needed and that viable alternatives to regulation (or alternative 
compliance mechanisms) are carefully considered before deciding to 
regulate.  The least intrusive mechanism required to achieve the 
regulatory objectives effectively is employed. The sanctions imposed are 
proportionate and appropriate to the seriousness of the violation. 
 
• Accountability. Regulators must account to government, citizens and 
Parliament for their performance. There is meaningful consultation with 
affected parties before regulatory decisions are taken. The regulatory 
process is fair and perceived as such. Well-publicized, accessible, fair and 
efficient appeals procedures are available under the scheme. Evaluation 
of regulatory systems and programs are carried out and adjustments are 
made as appropriate.  
 
OECD238 research on compliance factors highlighted three main factors that 
affect the level of compliance with regulatory requirements: 
 
• Knowledge and understanding of the rule with which compliance is 
expected, a factor affected by the clarity and certainty with which the rule 
is articulated; 
• Willingness to comply, a factor affected by the cost of compliance, the 
adequacy of prior consultation, and government’s commitment to 
enforcement; and 
• Ability to comply, a factor affected by the skills and capacity of the 
organization and the information and guidance provided by government. 
 
Issue Identification and Summary 
 
For the purpose of identifying implementation issues calling for closer scrutiny, 
this report draws upon three valuable sources:  
 
• Europe. Personal interviews with numerous European experts 
representing the EC, Member States (Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
UK), standard setting organizations, private law firms involved in applying 
the GPSD, and academics. They included Dr. Bernardo Delogu and Dr. 
Erik Hansson who are senior officials at the European Commission and 
were involved with the writing of the first GPSD in 1992 and the revisions 
in 2001; Dr. Dirk Meijer from the Netherlands who is the current Chair of 
PROSAFE, and Dr. Chris Hodges who practiced in the area of consumer 
product safety with a global law firm for many years before writing a book 
and becoming a professor at Oxford. All generously gave up time from 
their busy schedules to help us understand the challenges in developing 
                                            
238 OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance, 2000. 
                                                                                             109
and implementing the GPSD. The general thrust of the interviews was 
guided by the questions we developed (Annex 4).The names and specific 
affiliations of all of the experts interviewed are listed in Annex 5;  
     
• Canada. Departmental consultations with Canadian stakeholders. 
 
• Canada. Academic commentary on consumer safety protection regimes. 
 
Europe.  Implementing the European General Product Safety Directive 
(GPSD):  Highlights and Recurring Themes 
It will be recalled that the European Union has already acquired considerable 
experience with a General Safety Requirement. Indeed, on the basis of an initial 
period of operational experience, the EU conducted a comprehensive review 
prior to revising the governing directive.  
 
We analyzed the information obtained from the interviews that was relevant to 
implementation of the GPSD in light of the three factors identified by the OECD 
as having an impact on the private sector’s ability or willingness to comply with 
regulatory requirements.239   
 
We also took into consideration, the core principles of efficient regulation240 as 
well as the Table of Eleven241 which is a Dutch model using eleven dimensions 
with criteria that enable an assessment of whether draft legislation is 
enforceable.242 According to the Dutch authorities, rather than looking at cost 
benefit of a new regulation, they now use the Table of Eleven to look at the 
likelihood of the regulation being voluntarily enforced and how much effort will 
have to be put in by government to make the regulation work. Questions include: 
how much incentive do people have to comply or not comply, how far is the 
natural inclination to act in the way proposed by the regulation, and does it have 
a good foundation for eliciting good practices. The details of the interviews are in 
Annex 6. The salient points from these interviews are summarized below: 
 
• Evolution of the General Safety Requirement  
There was a need to harmonize regulations to enable free trade within the 
European Union. Under the old approach where everything had to be 
specified within the law, it was impossible to produce enough legislation 
harmonized amongst the Member States to meet the demand.  The 
Cassis de Dijon decision was the first one where the European Court gave 
a clear signal that it would assist with the creation of an internal common 
market without barriers to trade between Member States.  About the same 
time, there was a new directive stating that if a Member State wanted to 
                                            
239 OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance, 2000 
240 Lyle S. Fairburn Q.C., Performance-based Regulations, Current Issues, January 14, 2002 
241 The Table of Eleven, A versatile tool, Law Enforcement Expertise Centre, Dutch Ministry of Justice, 
The Hague, version November 2004.  
242 Table of Eleven p.4 
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enact new technical rules, they would have to give notice to the 
Commission and every other Member State.  This made everyone aware 
of the serious intent and force of the common market on domestic law 
making.  
 
These challenges led to the development of The  New Approach, which is 
a tool for technical harmonization, by the European Council in May 1985. 
This politically changed the rules and allowed the EU to get into the 
business of developing domestic laws. The  New Approach has variously 
been referred to as a policy, philosophy, strategy, but is generally 
regarded as a regulatory technique including an “enforcement measure” or 
a framework for dialogue.  The  New Approach is a two tier system in 
which legislative essential requirements, or the broad principles, related to 
health, safety and the environment are defined in EU Directives, and the 
details on how these requirements can be fulfilled are found in standards 
which are not included in the law.  
 
The 1992 EC General Product Safety Directive had a GSR and followed 
the style of the  New Approach Directives in that it contained the essential 
legislative requirements and some common safety denominators with the 
details for how to meet those requirements specified in standards. 
Member States are obliged to transpose the requirements of the GPSD 
into their country legislation. Since many already had a GSR type of 
approach in their own consumer legislation, the GPSD did not result in 
major changes in approach although some of the powers in the GPSD 
differ.  In particular, recall was not in the UK legislation and resulted in the 
UK not transposing the first Directive.  
 
The GPSD was designed as a “final safety net” to ensure at a minimum 
that products were “safe” throughout the EU in case harmonization was 
not fully achieved. The second objective was to provide Member States 
with the obligations and powers to ensure safe products. The purpose and 
role of the GPSD may be changing from a safety net to an alternative form 
of regulation243.  It was not designed for this; it was to be a means of 
bridging an enforcement gap, to prevent harm while a safety issue is being 
assessed and sometimes, to bridge the gap to formal regulation of the 
risk.  
 
• Scope of the GPSD 
The GPSD applies to non-food consumer products and products that are 
not subject to specific vertical directives. This covers less than 50 percent 
                                            
243 In Canada, there could be pressure to use the GSR excessively as an alternative mechanism to weak or 
lacking remedies or sanctions in the sectoral legislation if those remedies are not separately reviewed for 
their sufficiency – a catchall that could, by default, become an alternative approach to regulating.  
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of the products on the European market. There are GPSD requirements 
including labelling, tracking and notification that apply to specific vertical 
regulations. In addition, the powers in the GPSD can be used across the 
vertical directives. Gaps in the vertical directives should be filled by 
revision, but the GPSD can be used in emergencies. For example, it was 
used to ban phthalates in toys. The GPSD can be used for life cycle 
management, although the view is that a product should be unusable 
before it becomes unsafe. 
 
• Implementation of the GSR 
One of the factors leading to successful implementation is the degree to 
which the target group knows and understands the rules. The first 
Directive was adopted in 1992, with quite some reluctance in several 
Member States.  Those affected by the GSR (Target Group) did not 
appear to know what was intended in the Directive; in fact Germany took 
the EC to court on the basis that it had exceeded its discretion. After five 
years, many of the Member States had still not transposed the Directive 
into their legislation; industry wanted it repealed; and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) believed it would bankrupt them. The situation 
improved with the discussions prior to the revised Directive. Now business 
lobbies to ensure there is effective enforcement. An EC (DG Enterprise) 
study of obstacles to business found the least obstacles to business were 
created by the GPSD.  Industry viewed it as prescribing only what should 
be common practice.  They saw it as a kind of checklist of what they 
should have in place.  
 
The second factor that can influence implementation of a regulation is the 
degree to which the target group is willing to comply voluntarily. This will 
be driven not only by the costs to the target group, but also whether it has 
been consulted before implementation and whether the government is 
serious about enforcing the regulation to deter non-compliance.  
 
In the EU, the consultations on the revised directive, the GPSD, helped in 
securing greater understanding of the intent and functioning of the 
Directive, although there still seems to be misunderstanding particularly 
amongst SMEs and foreign suppliers. The GPSD requires that only safe 
products be produced and leaves it up to industry to determine what that 
entails. In the EU, the requirements vary according to size, capacity and 
volume of the supplier, and administrative discretion is applied to the 
circumstances of the distributor.  
 
The EC has made calculations on costs and determined that the GPSD is 
more costly than the old system.244 In addition to the burden placed on 
industry, the switch from a pre- to post-market approach in the GPSD 
                                            
244 Unfortunately these cost data were not publicly available from the EC at the time of our interviews 
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places a significant burden on the EC245 and Member States who are 
responsible for enforcement.246 In some instances, government assumes 
some of the testing costs as well as the increased costs to enhance 
enforcement and custom control. Systems have to be put in place to track 
suspicious goods and collect injury data, which are then shared with the 
EC and all Member States. Recalls are new to the GPSD and are also 
expensive for all Member States. Because of the variability in enforcement 
across the Community, the EC is financing a project, to be carried out by 
PROSAFE over three years, to develop a common approach to 
enforcement and to develop guidelines and best practices on surveillance 
and enforcement247.   
 
Effective market surveillance is an important component of enforcement.  
Under RAPEX, the Member States are obliged to notify the EC when they 
adopt measures to prevent, restrict or impose conditions on the marketing 
or use of a consumer product and when industry takes voluntary 
measures on products in cases of serious risks. The current level of 
reporting under RAPEX is extremely variable as is the capacity to identify 
cases of serious risk from products on the market and to notify other 
Member States. As a result, the EC is now developing an information 
technology application where notification can be made by and to all EU 
Member States and is working to establish greater consistency in risk 
assessment across the EU. 
 
The third factor influencing implementation of a regulation is the degree to 
which the target group is able to comply with it. Since standards are 
developed at the general (product sector) level, not on the basis of 
individual products, there are additional financial implications. SME’s 
constitute 60 percent of the suppliers in the EU and require considerable 
help under a standards regime including testing by the government and 
compliance advice on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Standard setting is complicated in the EU. There is a push to have 
harmonized or Community standards that would enhance trade amongst 
Member States. The cost of establishing new standards is mainly paid for 
by industry. However for harmonized standard setting through CEN 
(European Committee for Standardization), the EC R&D program puts up 
50 percent of the money for development of methods of analysis, and the 
EC funds the secretariat.  National standard setting bodies can set 
standards, and some of them are used as the basis of harmonized 
                                            
245 EC is funding Prosafe, CEN (European Standards Body) and upgrade to RAPEX 
246 The NL have 120 FTEs and 15 million Euros for enforcement with an additional 1 million Euros for 
improvements to RAPEX and increased investigations; Belgium has 50 million Euros for GPSD activities 
and considers it insufficient. 
247 Prosafe247 is an informal network that allows discussion (not at an official level) amongst market 
surveillance officers across the EU on issues arising on products, and sharing of what worked and what did 
not work 
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standards at the EU level. Over the years, the EU has evolved from relying 
on national standards to developing harmonized European standards, and 
there is some movement towards harmonization between European and 
ISO standards.248  
 
Once the standards are set, industry needs to have a clear understanding 
of what it takes to comply with those standards, and they look to 
government to provide the information on what is required. As a result, the 
EC puts forth great effort not only to encourage development of 
harmonized standards, but also to produce guidance documents for 
industry on what is involved in assessing the safety of their products. In 
the case of toys and electrical products from China where most problems 
arise, the EC has an initiative to educate Chinese manufacturers since it 
appears that many of them are not aware of the GPSD.  Another approach 
taken by many companies to assure compliance is to 
submit their products to independent testing labs (Notified Bodies) since 
they believe it helps build a defence in the case of enforcement action249.  
 
Cost-Benefit of a GPSD in Europe 
There was strong political interest in reducing technical barriers to trade 
within the EU. The first step was the introduction, in 1985, of the  New 
Approach, which was a tool for technical harmonization. This approach 
was extended to consumer products in 1992, and there was a subsequent 
revision of that Directive in 2004.  Although there was evidence that a 
GSR would be more costly than the existing regulatory systems within 
each of the Member States, these costs were considered outweighed by 
the significant economic benefits emanating from enhanced free trade of 
European manufactured goods within the EU.  The costs of implementing 
a GSR in Canada are likely to be similar to those in Europe, but the 
benefits may be significantly different.  
 
• Compliance and Enforcement  
The inclusion of recall in the revised Directive caused anxiety in some of 
the Member States, which felt that there were other less draconian ways 
of removing unsafe products. Relevant to the issue of recall in the EU is 
the proportionality principle. In the latest European Treaty, proportionality 
is mentioned as a broad principle where steps should not be taken that are 
disproportionate to the needs or seriousness of the issue. The inclusion of 
                                            
248 Canada has some reservations about adopting ISO as a default position.   Also, there are other North 
American standards, which are not ISO standards that Canada must take into account.  
249 A Notified Body (NB) is an inspection body or organization (private company) which is competent to 
perform tasks relating to the conformity assessment mentioned in certain directives. This authority is 
designated by the Member State on the territory where it is established if it satisfies the criteria with regard 
to competence and the requirements established in the relevant directive and is notified to the Commission 
and to the other Member States. It could be called an “approved laboratory”, authorized by the government 
in the country in which it exists to do testing within the GPSD for approval for the CE marking for 
example.   
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the Precautionary Principle in the GPSD appears to be in conflict with the 
proportionality principle. Another complication in Europe is the principle of 
subsidiarity, meaning that a matter cannot be legislated on a European 
law basis where unnecessary, and it should be left to the Member States 
to legislate for themselves.  The Member States have the residual or 
original jurisdiction.  Clearly, there is a balance between Community and 
National Sovereignty. Given all the issues, the EC is proceeding carefully 
in terms of developing guidelines on recall so as not to upset the balance 
between proportionality, subsidiarity and precautionary principles.  
 
The EC considers that recall is a last resort and that less intrusive action 
(than full recall) should be taken if possible, although there may be some 
increase in recalls because of the attention paid to it in the revised 
directive. In the UK, section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act allows the 
Secretary of State to make regulations in respect of the product. He can 
do that on an emergency basis without consulting or on a general basis 
with consultation (the emergency regulation). The action can last for 12 
months, and if it needs to be extended there has to be a proper 
consultation.  The recall power does not appear to have been abused. In 
one case in the European court, not under the GPSD, but some other 
directive, the court found the action was correct.   
 
• Legal Considerations 
Key Legal Issues: Key legal issues that arose or were considered include: 
(i) the nature of a GSR and how to interpret it in practice (what kind of 
guidance can be found to design and produce a product; what standards 
exist and documents are available; what kind of assistance is available); 
(ii) delegation of legislative responsibility – ministerial responsibility; (iii) 
due diligence; (iv) liability creep; (v) interface between tort and GSR (two 
aspects are the government liability ie: for responding effectively to 
complaints, and the industry side ie: the possibility of liability creep; (vi) 
safeguards in recall; and (vii) the European principle of proportionality and 
how it is applied. 
 
Case Law: There is very little case law experience in the courts because 
so few cases go to prosecution. There seems to be a sense that most 
products are safe and a light touch is justified; nevertheless a big stick is 
necessary to wield for the few that need it. The legal profession is 
interested in the GPSD, in particular the new obligation on business to 
notify authorities when they have placed non-compliant products on the 
market because of the potential for self-incrimination.  There is not much 
case law yet to answer this.  
 
Due Diligence: The very limited case law on the GPSD makes it difficult to 
assess the impact of new and improving standards on the standard of care 
required to be shown to establish a due diligence defence.  There seems 
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to be a presumption that the natural result of new and improving standards 
will inevitably raise the bar on a due diligence defence, but the same might 
have been true no matter the reason standards were improved.  The UK is 
probably the only country in the EU to insist upon the due diligence 
defence which sits uncomfortably alongside the absolute liability posture of 
the Directive. 
 
• Stakeholders’ Position on the GSPD 
The GPSD which some feel “privatizes the regulatory process” still causes 
some problems, especially with consumer interest groups which feel that 
their modest influence is overwhelmed by industry interests and that the 
standards, once published can be difficult to amend or place under review.   
 
Canadian Stakeholder Concerns Regarding GSR Implementation 
During the course of consultations on a GSR carried out by Health Canada 
officials, stakeholders identified a number of concerns or policy issues relating to 
implementation and compliance with the proposed regime. 
 
One of the central considerations affecting regulatory effectiveness is the need 
for the regulated community to understand what is required to comply with any 
regulations and to know what is expected from enforcing authorities.  However, in 
departmental consultations, suppliers250 raised a number of concerns that are 
related to this very principle, including the lack of guidance and clarity around 
many of the provisions that would normally be included in a GSR.  The concerns 
underline the degree to which suppliers remain unsure about what will be 
expected from them.  Basically, they are asking for clear policy direction from 
Health Canada with respect to a series of questions: what would be acceptable 
to demonstrate compliance i.e. that the product in question did not present an 
undue health risk; how much safety is ‘reasonable’ or ‘adequate’ for purposes of 
compliance; what decision-making process should be followed in product 
development; what criteria should ground the decisions that suppliers must make 
in the course of product development and distribution?  
 
Outlined in more detail below are the concerns that were raised during the 
consultations: 251   
 
• Acceptable Standards, Regulations, Risk Assessment Process.  
Suppliers have asked for clarification with respect to which standards, 
regulations, conformity assessment systems or risk assessment 
processes will be acceptable to demonstrate compliance with a GSR, and 
how these will be identified by Health Canada.   
 
                                            
250  National Consultations on the Renewal of the Federal Health Protection Legislation, Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services Canada 1999, ISBN: 0-662-27596-9 
251  National Consultations on the Renewal of the Federal Health Protection Legislation, Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services Canada 1999, ISBN: 0-662-27596-9 
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• Absence of an Acceptable Standard or Regulation.  Where, as is often 
the case, particularly regarding products that are new to the market or 
products for which no problem has previously been identified, suppliers 
would like to know how they will be able to demonstrate compliance with 
the GSR. Will it be necessary to develop a new standard?  Will a detailed 
risk assessment be required, and, if so, according to which methodology?   
 
• Meaning of the Term “unsafe”.  The definition of the expected level of 
safety appears to be one of the key issues among those supplying 
consumer products to the Canadian market, for the meaning of the term 
“unsafe” is critical to understanding how to comply with a GSR.  
 
• Criteria for Reporting an Adverse Incident.   Suppliers have called for 
clarification with regard to their obligations to report adverse incidents. Will 
all incidents, however low their risks, be subject to reporting obligations, or 
will HC develop criteria and guidelines in this area, possibly along lines 
formulated in the United States and Europe.  
 
• Meaning of Exercising “Reasonable Care.” Both manufacturing and 
retail sectors identified the concept of “reasonable care” as problematic. If 
steps are taken to choose an appropriate existing standard or regulation 
and to ensure that the product complies with the standard/regulation, 
suppliers believe that they will have exercised “reasonable care” to place a 
safe product on the market.  However, they are concerned about their 
criminal liability if, after taking these steps, the product is associated, for 
any reason, with an adverse incident. 
 
• Overlap With Provincial/Territorial Legislation.   In certain product 
areas such as household electrical products and some foods, overlap will 
exist between provincial/territorial legal instruments and a GSR252.  As a 
result, it will most likely be necessary to develop a consensus among a 
number of government agencies and levels of government on such 
questions as the following:   
o How will the provinces/territories work with the federal agencies to 
implement a GSR?   
o Will the provinces/territories be able to draw on the provisions of 
the GSR and enforcement authorities provided under federal 
legislation to deal with importation, reporting and recalls? 
o To whom will reports of adverse incidents be made? 
 
• Absence of Injury Data and Research.   Suppliers point to the sheer 
volume of products available on the market and the lack of national injury 
data on product-related injury and death as factors that make the 
assessment of risks very difficult. Compounding the difficulty is the limited 
                                            
252     Case  Studies 2 and 3, Annex 1 
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nature of product safety research.  As a result, it will be difficult for both 
suppliers and government to determine the actual cause of the problem 
and the interventions that will be necessary to address it.  
 
• Accessibility of the Standards Making Process.  Concerns have also been 
raised about the standards making process including: the resourcing of 
the process; about the ability of all stakeholders, particularly small 
enterprises and consumer representatives, to participate; and about the 
possible domination of the process by large industry organizations. 
 
Promoting Consumer Product Safety: Academic Perspectives 
Academic interest in issues surrounding consumer product safety has grown 
significantly in recent years, in part as a consequence of trade-related 
considerations, and stimulating attempts to formulate a framework for 
comparative analysis.253  While the global marketplace presents substantial 
challenges on the basis of its complexity alone, it is still useful to consider the 
most basic elements of a generic product safety system.  
 
In European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, Christopher Hodges 
identifies five general techniques for controlling product safety.254    
 
• Control of the design process; 
• Pre-marketing assessment requirements; 
• Control of the manufacturing environment and process;  
• Post-marketing requirements on producers, distributors and the 
authorities; and  
• Requirements of users. 
 
As previously explained in this report, the GSR is a form of performance-based 
regulation relying heavily on industry self-regulation at the pre-marketing phase 
(i.e. the first three control techniques).255 Accordingly, government faces 
distinctive implementation challenges under a GSR regime in developing 
effective post-marketing compliance and enforcement measures. In several 
respects, of course, government’s post-marketing responsibilities coincide with 
the ongoing responsibilities of manufacturers and distributors, but government 
responsibilities are extensive nevertheless. Hodges256 sets out a suggested 
framework for the post-marketing activities of authorities, namely:   
 
                                            
253 Mathias Reimann, “Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?” (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751; Geraint G. Howells, “The 
Relationship Between Product Liability and Product Safety – Understanding a Necessary Element in 
European Product Liability through a  Comparison with the U.S. Position” (2000) 39 Washburn L.J. 305 
254 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, (Oxford University Press, 
2005)85 
255 For an analysis that heavily features the contribution of the design stage to consumer and environmental 
protection, see Professor Ashford’s paper accompanying this report. 
256 Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety 
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• Verification: checking that economic operators have correctly and 
adequately carried out their functions and obligations, both pre-marketing 
and post-marketing; 
• Market surveillance: identifying those products that have been placed on 
the market and are in use that are unsafe, so that steps can be taken to 
avoid or minimize any injury that they may cause; 
• Taking action; ensuring that appropriate action is taken when safety 
issues are identified, so that the safety of users is subsequently 
maximized;  
• Collaboration; sharing information with other regulatory authorities, 
economic operators, and consumers/users; 
• Enforcement; imposing sanctions, or proposing to courts the imposition of 
sanctions on economic operators for non-compliance with legal 
obligations, and 
• Providing public information such as through vigilance, information 
databases, answering questions from stakeholders about reporting 
thresholds, and possibly providing rulings on whether particular products 
meet the general safety requirement. 
 
It is evident from the foregoing that a legislatively-mandated General Safety 
Requirement applicable to designated participants in the private sector network 
of product developers, manufacturers and distributors is not a self-administering 
regime. A substantial role remains for government to exercise responsibilities 
that are central, rather than merely residual to the success of the overall 
framework. Indeed, it is apparent that enhanced consumer safety will be the 
result of the cumulative effect and inter-action of efforts by both suppliers and 
regulators. 
 
Not only are the responsibilities of government under a GSR vital to its effective 
operation, they will require the allocation of significant resources. Accordingly, 
before turning to the series of issues that are likely to arise in connection with the 
implementation of a GSR, we review in general terms the administrative tasks 
and resources that the GSR entails. 
 
 
Administrative Tasks and Resource Implications 
 
One illustration, drawing upon Hodges’ discussion of government’s 
responsibilities for verification, will serve to suggest the scope and nature of the 
implementation commitment that may arise. 
 
To perform the verification activities required under a post-marketing GSR 
regime, public authorities must be equipped to assess risks (or to assess the 
suppliers’ assessment of those risks) associated with potentially “dangerous 
products” on a case-by-case basis as they emerge. This will involve an ability to 
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address at least the following questions associated with the prior conduct of the 
producer or supplier.  
 
• Has the producer assembled the technical documentation on the product’s 
design, manufacture and accompanying documentation (labeling, 
assembly and operating instructions).  Does this include a risk 
assessment, and has this material been kept up to date and available? 
 
• Did the producer collect, record and collate safety information from users, 
retailers, distributors, regulators, or any other source, including scientific 
and technical literature, on how safe the product is in practice and whether 
it continues to conform to the standards of safety as these evolve in the 
light of new scientific and technical information? 
 
• Where appropriate, did the producer adequately investigate negative 
(harmful) incident information? 
 
• Did the producer undertake an adequate assessment of the information 
thus garnered?  Did the producer make appropriate use of external 
technical, regulatory, medical, or legal advice? Has the product’s 
assessment been suitably updated where warranted? 
 
• Was information required in law to be reported to a regulatory authority 
adequately reported and on a timely basis? 
 
• Did the producer respond appropriately to the results an original or 
updated product assessment? In particular did the producer (i) make 
changes in the design, manufacture, labeling, or packaging in relation to 
products not yet placed on the market, or (ii) take action such as informing 
users, distributors, regulators, or others of changes in potential risks with 
the product, or instituting a recall of products already on the market?257  
 
In addition to a post-marketing verification role, generally conducted on the basis 
of audits or inspections, government authorities may be expected to perform a 
significant testing and advisory function and to develop extensive guidance 
material, especially for small business, to address multiple layers of uncertainty 
under the GSR. These uncertainties, and other matters to be resolved, include: 
 
• What conditions of a product’s use are ‘normal’ or ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’? 
• Which is the correct risk assessment methodology?   
• According to designated thresholds or categorization framework, is a 
particular risk ‘minimal’, ‘acceptable’ or ‘serious’? Should it be reported? 
                                            
257 Hodges, 132 
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• What are the appropriate measures to be taken in recalling a product, or in 
rendering it ‘safe?’ 
 
We make no attempt here to provide a comprehensive assessment of personnel, 
financial or systems resource requirements associated with verification, testing, 
advisory support or other governmental responsibilities under a GSR. It is 
possible, however, to summarize the tasks that must be addressed by Health 
Canada. 
 
To ensure that the transition from the existing legislation to new legislation or 
regulations is smooth and seamless and that the Department will be able to deal 
with the new provisions and products that will be covered, it will be necessary for 
Health Canada to identify, develop and/or implement: 
• Changes and/or additions to its management processes and knowledge 
management systems to meet new and changed provisions and 
authorities in new GSR legislation such as the adverse event reporting 
system.  The impact will be significant for those parts of the organization 
or other organizations responsible for unregulated consumer products or 
foods where systems or processes for reporting of adverse events or 
dealing with mandatory recalls have not been established.  
• Tools, information and training for employees who will need to administer 
and enforce new provisions applicable to many products not previously 
dealt with;  
• Training, information and guidance documents (including web-based 
access) to provide previously unregulated suppliers with an understanding 
of how to comply with any new provisions; 
• Functions of staff and the skills, expertise that staff will require to 
administer the new provisions in areas previously unregulated and to 
evaluate the various instruments that suppliers could use;   
• Financial resources to develop and implement new systems for reporting, 
tools or training within Heath Canada and other responsible government 
agencies e.g. Canadian Food Inspection Agency or Provinces/Territories 
and to hire expert analytical staff258,259;   
• A dispute resolution system;  
• Personal information privacy protection arrangements; and 
• Processes to ensure consistency in administration and enforcement for 
many new products across federal or provincial/territorial organizations 
that share responsibility. 
 
                                            
258  The initial cost of establishing the Marketed Health Products Directorate in the Health Products 
and Food Branch for post market surveillance of drugs, biologics and natural health Products was 
$10 million and 50 staff members.  Health Canada press release 02-105156-410, April 2, 2002. 
259  Annual cost for post market surveillance by PMRA of the 7-8 thousand registered pest control 
products is approximately $7 million dollars and 83 staff members. PMRA Progress Report, 2003 
at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/pmra-arla/ 
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In addition, Health Canada will be required to provide Cabinet with accurate, 
complete and up-to-date information on the results of: 
• An analysis of the proposal and the alternative solutions considered; 
• Consultations with those who have an interest in the matter, including 
other departments that may be affected by the proposed solution; 
• An analysis of the impact of the proposed solution on the operating 
environment and costs to small, medium and large suppliers;  and 
• An analysis of the resources that the proposed solution would require, 
including those needed to implement or enforce it.260 
 
 
Specific Implementation Issues 
 
The scope of potential resource requirements is further illuminated by a review of 
the principal implementation challenges, operational considerations and 
compliance issues that may be expected to arise. We turn now to the following 
aspects of the GSR: 
 
Standard-setting 
The Nature of Standards  
In its most basic form, a standard is a “document, established by consensus and 
approved by a recognized body that provides for common and repeated use, 
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context.”261,262  There are 
four main types of standards which include: product standards which define 
safety requirements, performance criteria, design criteria and tests to follow for 
specific products; process standards outlining production processes; 
management standards which set out requirements for organizational quality 
management practices; and conformity assessment standards which describe 
how to monitor and verify compliance with the requirements of a standard. 
 
The Role of Standards 
Standards, in one form or another, are critical to protecting the health and safety 
of Canadians, providing consumers with greater certainty about the quality and 
safety of products, and ensuring the efficient operation of national and 
international trade. Standards provide benefits such as defining accurate and 
necessary measurements, improving product safety and performance and 
addressing market failures such as risks to health, imperfect information and 
environmental degradation.   
                                            
260  Justice Canada, Cabinet Directive on Lawmaking, 2003-07-08. Privy Council Office, Regulatory 
Policy, June 2000. 
261  ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, Standardization and related activities, General vocabulary, definition 
3.2.1.1 
262  Professor Ashford’s paper accompanying this report (Annex 12) contains further discussion of 
more varied meanings of standards in different jurisdictions, and including standards understood to be 
voluntary in nature. 
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The general public and voluntary organizations are concerned that the GSR 
might weaken regulations and that dependence on standards and voluntary 
codes could place the public at risk.  Suppliers, on the other hand, would like to 
know what standards or voluntary codes would be considered acceptable to 
demonstrate compliance with a GSR.  For example, they would like to know: 
whether voluntary codes or quality management systems adopted by industry or 
a retailer fall under the definition of a generally accepted standard; what criteria 
Health Canada will use to determine whether or not a standard is acceptable; 
and, whether or not Health Canada will identify the standards or instruments that 
are generally acceptable or provide a list of the standards that would confer an 
absolute defence of compliance similar to Europe.   
 
The Standard-setting Process 
A standard can be produced through the formal national and/or international 
standards system or through a more informal process by industry or 
organizations outside the formal standard-setting system.  In the latter case, the 
document may or may not be subject to full public enquiry or established 
acceptance criteria that are required by the formal standards system.  Although 
private and public interests may coincide in standard-setting, often they diverge 
where, for example, there are spillover costs such as health, safety or 
environmental impacts. Under such circumstances greater government 
involvement to ensure standards are written in the public interest may be 
required.   
 
Other questions also arise: whether it is necessary for standards that are used to 
fulfill the policy requirements of a GSR to meet certain principles or criteria as 
outlined in the following table;263 would standards be lowered if harmonization 
was pursued; and would Health Canada be abandoning its responsibility to 
protect Canadians from hazards to their health.264   
                                            
263  Australian Government Productivity Commission,  The Review of the Australian Consumer 
Product Safety System, July 2005. 
264  National Consultations on the Renewal of the Federal Health Protection Legislation, Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services Canada 1999, ISBN: 0-662-27596-9 
Checklist for assessing the acceptability of a standard/or instrument 
 
Standards or instruments that conform to legislative and best design requirements must 
comply with the following criteria to ensure that:  
• The standard, voluntary code or other instrument applies to the product or to similar 
products;  
• The standard or instrument was meant to address all the risks and/or categories of 
risk associated with the product including the particular risk or hazard of concern; 
• The standard or instrument does not contravene or conflict with requirements 
established in federal or provincial/territorial legislation or regulations; 
• The standard or instrument is recognized as the norm by a significant number of 
suppliers in this segment of the industry;  
• The standard or instrument setting process follows established recognized 
approaches and offers sufficient guarantees of integrity, objectivity, thoroughness, 
and sensitivity to con umer int rests, to nsure that health and safety issues are 
adequately addressed;  
• The provisions of the standard or instrument ensures a level of safety that is 
acceptable to the consumer;  
• The standard is performance and outcomes based;  
• The results of complying with the standard are measurable;  
• The standard is based on available, current technology and is reviewed regularly to
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Another common problem regarding the use of standards to meet policy 
objectives is the cost and ease of accessing them.  This both increases the costs 
to business of complying with legal requirements and limits the capacity of 
consumers to keep track of their legal entitlements.   
 
Harmonization of standards and the adoption of international standards are not 
always considered to be suitable in Canada or acceptable to the public.  For 
example, international standards may be inappropriate due to the Canadian 
climate and/or infrastructure, or they may be out of date, or not widely 
implemented around the world. Any decision to align with an international  
 
Harmonization of Standards 
During consultations, participants articulated a number of criteria for Health 
Canada to follow should it pursue harmonization of standards. These included 
ensuring that: 
• The standards in the other countries are based on sound science; 
•  The mutually recognized standards are at least as high as our own; 
•  The agreements do not limit Health Canada's capacity to regulate 
products within Canada; 
• The agreements do not limit Health Canada's capacity to conduct its 
own risk assessment and risk management; and 
•  The legislation should favor our official partners in international accords 
such as NAFTA, when global harmonization is not yet achieved. 
 
It was also suggested that while Health Canada explores opportunities to pursue 
its mandate for health and safety through suitable international accords, the 
department might also work to ensure a comparable harmonization of standards 
across Canada.265 
 
The reliance on standards will require substantial participation by government 
officials at the national and international levels to ensure that the standards 
developed address the health and safety concerns of Canadians.  Moreover, the 
fact that many standards reference other standards increases the workload.  
Nevertheless, Health Canada’s experience in other sectors (pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices and pesticides) has demonstrated that the criteria listed above 
can be met when the parties are prepared to work together to achieve them.   
 
Assessment: Standard-setting in the Context of Core Principles of Regulation 
and Compliance Factors 
The many and varied ways in which standard-setting might be undertaken to 
produce standards in any one of several forms clearly engage many of the core 
principles of regulation and the compliance factors previously identified. Given 
such variations it is impossible to do than to underline basic relationships such 
as: 
                                            
265  National Consultations on the Renewal of the Federal Health Protection Legislation, Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services Canada 1999, ISBN: 0-662-27596-9 
                                                                                             124
 
• The principle of transparency requires appropriate opportunities for 
participation in a process leading to understandable and accessible 
standards; 
• The principle of consistency calls for a significant degree of similarity 
between and among standards for products presenting comparable or 
equivalent risks, however that equivalency is determined; 
• The principle of evidence requires that standards be formulated with 
reference to available scientific and technical information, and, indeed, 
that efforts be made to enhance the availability of such evidence; and 
• The principle of accountability suggests the importance of ensuring that 
mechanisms are in place to monitor the effectiveness of such standards 
as are set to provide for adjustments and refinements where the need is 
identified. 
 
The manner in which standard-setting takes place has various implications, from 
the perspective of compliance, that affect the resulting levels of understanding. 
Opportunities for participation, or their absence, are among factors influencing 
the legitimacy or acceptability of standards, and hence the willingness of those 
subject to them to comply.  
 
Industry Self-Regulation and Voluntary Codes 
Introduction to Voluntary Codes 
As previously noted, the GSR model encourages those responsible for 
products266 within the defined scope of the instrument to contribute to health 
protection in the course of business operations. While it is by definition a 
“requirement” and thus an instrument entailing the possibility of sanctions for 
non-compliance, its objective of promoting a “culture of safety” results in 
elements of its actual operation falling within the general realm of self-regulation.  
 
Many factors in contemporary society encourage self-regulation. A sense of 
moral obligation may combine with the desire to preserve one’s reputation in the 
community or in the company of one’s peers. Appropriate self-regulation also 
constitutes what might be described as a form of insurance. For example, where 
an injury has occurred, a suitable program of self-regulation may offer some 
assurance against liability in tort. Or, where conduct amounting to a breach of 
certain statutory requirements has occurred, self-regulatory measures may 
provide a defense in criminal proceedings. In the context of these examples, a 
standard for self-regulation must be met. In the former circumstance, the degree 
of self-regulation must exceed the degree of care associated with negligence, 
while in the latter, the degree of self-regulation must meet or exceed a level of 
performance otherwise known as due diligence. In either situation, (and we 
                                            
266  This includes primary suppliers/producers and secondary suppliers/distributors as described in Fig 
1 Annex 1                                                               
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consider them to be roughly equivalent,) therefore, so-called self-regulation is 
subject to assessment against some independent legal standard. 267 
 
Responsible parties seeking to conduct their operations in a manner that will 
avoid liability or conviction reasonably inquire about the standard or benchmark 
of performance they should seek to achieve. On the assumption that they have 
met that standard, they then expect to avoid liability or conviction if an injury or 
statutory violation should arise despite the care they have taken.  
 
The precise nature of voluntary codes remains the subject of academic debate. It 
is useful for introductory purposes here to include one formulation, simply to 
benchmark the concept under consideration: 
 
Voluntary codes are one example of a private regulatory instrument – a system 
involving a set of non-legislatively required commitments agreed to by one or 
more private firms that are designed to influence firm behaviour, and are to be 
applied in a consistent manner by all signatories.268 
 
In discussion of voluntary measures as a source of standards, it has been 
observed that: 
 
Voluntary standards can be particularly effective benchmarks, because they are 
specifically intended to establish a level of ‘good practice.’ The more widely such 
standards are used, within and across industries, the greater their weight in the 
courts.269 
 
It was noted, however, that there are variations in the legitimacy or credibility of 
such standards. Credibility is enhanced, “if they are developed through an 
inclusive, open and transparent process, with input from all relevant 
stakeholders, including government, industry and non-governmental 
organizations.”270 
 
Oversight and Procedure for Self-Regulation and Voluntary Standards 
On the subject of voluntary standards, the Canadian government has regarded 
such codes as appropriate as internal standards for industry, but remained 
concerned about its own ongoing obligations to monitor and report to Canadians 
about what is going on. There are potential liabilities - legal and political - 
associated with voluntary codes.271  
                                            
267 Voluntary Codes: A Guide for Their Development and Use (Industry Canada, March 1998). For a 
discussion of the equivalence of the due diligence and negligence standards, see Diane Saxe, ISO 14001 
and Compliance in Canada, (CSA Special Publication, PLUS 1162, July 2001) 2-3 
268 David Cohen, “The Role of the State in a Privatized Regulatory Environment” in Kernaghan Webb ed. 
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 35 
269  
270 Saxe, 7. See also, Voluntary Codes: A Guide for Their Development and Use (Industry Canada, March 
1998) 
271  Voluntary Codes: A Guide for their Development and Use (Industry Canada, March 1998) 
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Canadians, when consulted on a GSR, were divided on the question of allowing 
industry to regulate itself.272  The view was expressed that industry has a 
responsibility, as a good corporate citizen, to regulate itself and that self-
regulation is in industry’s interest, since harming the consumer is never good 
business.  On the other hand, industry self-regulation, without appropriate checks 
and balances, was not felt to provide an acceptable level of proof that the 
requirements were followed, particularly for products that can impact significantly 
on the health of the public.  It was concluded that Health Canada needed to be 
involved and not surrender its responsibilities or its decision-making authority.   
 
Voluntary codes, a type of industry self-regulation, provide an example where 
government oversight can be incorporated.  Voluntary codes or codes of 
conduct, if well designed and properly implemented, can be very effective tools in 
demonstrating compliance with the GSR.  The advantage of a voluntary code is 
that it can include elements that are not always possible for inclusion in a 
regulation such as purchasing and process controls, or qualifications of staff that 
can be audited by an independent third party.273  The safety requirements can 
also significantly exceed those specified in a regulation or a national standard.  In 
considering a voluntary code to demonstrate conformity with the GSR, 
preference should be given to those that are certified or audited by independent 
third parties or that are joint government/industry initiatives monitored by the 
government.  These types of voluntary codes that are monitored or audited could 
provide the public with proof that the code was in fact followed. 
 
The challenge for government officials and suppliers is to know when a voluntary 
code or code of conduct will be successful and which elements will contribute to 
its success.   The same criteria as outlined above for choosing an appropriate 
standard will apply and, in addition, the following general requirements for an 
effective voluntary code or initiative should be considered:   
 
• The leaders of the organization promote the use of the codes; 
• The employees of the organization understand the code, its objectives and 
their role; 
• The aims, roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated; 
• The objectives and results are measurable and are verified; 
• The development and implementation is open and transparent with the 
participation of stakeholders; 
• Regular monitoring and public feedback on how the code is working, are 
obtained; 
                                            
272 Health Canada Working Document, National Consultations 2004, Renewal of Federal Health 
Protection Legislation. 
273 ISO standards, for example, provide for external certification and may involve regular verification and 
review procedures. It is also possible for insurance arrangements to call for disclosure and verification in 
ways that amount to independent external monitoring. See for purposes of illustration, Larry Reynolds, 
“New Directions for Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance in Canada,” (1996) 6 J.E.L.P. 89. 
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• An effective and transparent dispute resolution system is in place; 
• A mature industry or an industry association is able to ensure compliance 
of its members to the code; and  
• There are meaningful inducements to participate or businesses have  self-
interest in changing their behavior with negative repercussions for failure 
to join or comply.274 
 
Research into best practices for the Corporate Executive Board provides 
discussion of a range of corporate experience for managing product safety and 
quality.275 
 
Criteria for Choice: Regulation or Voluntary Standards? 
Bearing in mind the potential attractions of voluntary measures when properly 
formulated and effectively put into operation, it is still necessary to determine 
when reliance on voluntary measures is or is not a suitable alternative to 
regulation. We must therefore ask when voluntary standards are likely to be 
inappropriate as an alternative to regulation.  Or, to reverse the perspective, 
“When to regulate?” is a question that is closely related to the issue of choices 
about the utilization of voluntary standards in promoting the safety of consumer 
products.   
 
The UK Consumer Safety Review in the mid 1970’s considered when formal 
regulation was appropriate and developed a series of factors to be taken into 
account in determining whether to regulate or not, or to adopt some alternative 
approach to dealing with a consumer safety issue.  The criteria developed by the 
Review as to the proper use of prescriptive regulations are instructive in that they 
help identify the scope of operation of a general safety requirement.    
 
The factors that the Review Committee suggested be taken into account in 
considering proposals for UK regulations were: 
• Evidence whether the goods in question are being widely sold; 
the degree of risk which they present and the cost to manufacturers 
ultimately to consumers, of eliminating or reducing the hazard; 
• Whether a British Standard, or other suitable specification on which 
regulations can be based, exists; 
• Any proposals for harmonization of safety requirements under 
consideration within the EEC; and 
• Whether voluntary action the trade itself is prepared to take is likely to be 
effective in reducing or removing the hazards and the risk of such action 
being undermined by lack of co-operation from a minority of 
manufacturers or importers.[Para 30] 
 
                                            
274  Industry Canada and Treasury Board Secretariat, Voluntary Codes: A Guide for their Development 
and Use, March 1998 
275  Corporate Executive Board 
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Assessment: Voluntary Standards in the Context of Core Principles of Regulation 
and Compliance Factors 
Somewhat ironically, voluntary standards may be considered in the context of 
core principles of regulation as well as in relation to compliance factors. Some of 
the issues to arise from this include: 
• To ensure transparency, voluntary standard-making procedures should 
provide for some form of public or third party involvement; 
• Consistency may be promoted within the context of voluntary standards by 
adopting procedures and incentives that encourage comprehensive 
participation across the relevant industry sector or product category; 
• The involvement of external reviewers or expert public interest participants 
alongside verifiable assessment procedures may increase the extent to 
which evidence-based decision-making is achieved; and 
• Challenges surrounding accountability may be addressed even in 
voluntary schemes through community involvement, the use of 
performance targets, and public reporting. 
 
In principle, compliance may be facilitated through the use of voluntary standards 
on the basis that they ought to be understandable by those subject to them; and 
that their willingness to comply should be largely assumed on the basis of their 
adoption by consent, which is most likely to rest upon a self-assessed ability to 
perform according to expectations. Yet all of this must be cautiously approached 
with reference to the appropriateness of the regulator’s independent 
determination about whether to regulate or not. 
 
Risk-based Decision Making  
One of the core elements in the implementation of a GSR or similar regulatory 
instruments in the context of consumer product safety is the formulation of 
effective frameworks to identify and address risk, including risk assessment, risk 
management, and risk communication procedures.276  While these arrangements 
will vary somewhat in relation to the particular product and context for 
manufacture, distribution and use, it is possible to identify general characteristics 
in the overall framework that are expected to be found.  
 
On the basis of a detailed and comparative review of twelve major risk 
frameworks currently utilized in the areas of human health, ecological and 
occupational health risk, a recent publication provides an overall guide to what 
might be considered key elements and a checklist of best practices. The key 
elements include: 
• Problem formulation stage; 
• Stakeholder involvement; 
• Communication; 
• Quantitative risk assessment components; 
                                            
276 Cindy G. Jardine et al, “Risk Management Frameworks for Human Health and Environmental Risks,” 
(2003) Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health 569. William Leiss, In the Chamber of Risks 
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• Iteration and evaluation; 
• Informed decision-making; and 
• Flexibility. 
 
A proposed checklist, possibly characterized as a best practices approach would 
involve the following: 
• Make sure you are solving the right problem; 
• Consider the problem and the risk within the full context of the situation, 
using a broad perspective; 
• Acknowledge, incorporate, and balance the multiple dimensions of risk; 
• Ensure the highest degree of reliability for all components of the risk 
management process; 
• Involve interested and affected parties from the outset of the process; 
• Commit to honest and open communication between all parties; 
• Employ continuous evaluation throughout the process (formative, 
process, and outcome evaluation), and be prepared to change the 
decision if new information becomes available.277 
  
Information is an essential ingredient of any risk framework. It is, in effect, the 
foundation of an evidence-based approach that provides the basis for the 
selection of appropriate instruments to reduce risks, the determination of an 
unsafe product, the identification of effective interventions and the reporting of 
adverse health effects.  The type of information needed to identify any hazards 
and assess the risk includes the following: 
• Any accident, incident or malfunction data related to the product or 
similar products; 
• Design drawings or other means of establishing the nature of the 
product; 
• Limits of the product such as durability, life span of parts or deterioration 
due to weather; 
• Identification of all intended or possible users and anyone who may 
come into contact with the product; 
• Vulnerability of the users - the age and physical and psychological 
characteristics of the users such as strength, motor skills, experience, 
anthropometrical characteristics; and 
• Information on the environment in which the product will be used, 
exposure of other persons and impact on non-users. 
 
These information elements can have a more important role to play when no 
regulations, standards or codes exist to address the problems identified.   
 
The knowledge obtained about the hazards and risks associated with a product 
make it possible for the supplier to establish measures such as design changes, 
manufacturing or distribution controls, or improved consumer information that will 
                                            
277 Jardine et al 
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reduce the risk.  In this way, one can imagine progress towards a “culture of 
safety,” while suppliers will be in a better position to demonstrate that all 
“reasonable care” has been taken to market a safe product and thus to support a 
successful due diligence defence should the need arise to do so.  
 
Indeed, potential proposals outlined within the framework of Health Canada’s 
Legislative Renewal Paper specifically cited “guiding principles on risk decision-
making” for their relevance to “reasonable care.” As summarized in the Renewal 
Paper: 
 
the assessment of risk should be based solely on science and objective 
observation; potential positive and negative effects for the people must be 
weighed; the concept of precaution will be applied; the desire of individual 
Canadians to make informed decisions concerning their own health will be 
recognized; consideration will be given to the fact that the same measure may 
impact differentially on various people; and the connection between human health 
and the environment must be acknowledged. 
 
In many cases, however, there are gaps in the evidence needed to carry out a 
risk assessment, making it difficult for those responsible to comply with new 
provisions. In the case of new products, in particular, significant information gaps 
must be explored through testing and experimentation, on the basis of 
comparisons with related, if not identical experience, and so on. Yet many 
companies, even large ones, do not have the expertise or capacity to assess 
risks in products. For example, manufacturers in other countries do not always 
make information about product design, component materials or manufacturing 
processes available to importers, and there is a lack of product related injury data 
within Canada. Not only does this make it difficult for a supplier to determine 
whether a product is safe, but it also makes it difficult to identify the inventions 
that will correct any problems.  The need for increasing the data available and 
the knowledge of suppliers about hazard identification and risk assessment is 
central to the successful implementation of the GSR or similar regulatory 
provisions. Data limitations will continue to limit the ability of independent risk 
assessment specialists to provide professional services in this area that will be of 
particular relevance to small and medium-sized ventures that will less-readily be 
able to provide in-house capacity in this area.    
 
Assessment: Risk-based Decision-making in the Context of Core Principles of 
Regulation and Compliance Factors  
The acknowledgement of risk and of the need for effective management 
responses in regulatory settings has become sufficiently widespread that a 
significant literature has emerged.278 For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
                                            
278 Archibald, Judd and Roach Regulatory and Corporate Liability: From Due Diligence to Risk 
Management; W. Leiss, In the Chamber of Risks: Understanding Risk Controversies (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2001); J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory; C. Hood ed. The Government of Risk; E. 
Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism; J. Fraiberg and M.J. Trebilcock, “Risk 
Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform,” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 835 
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remark that risk-based decision-making may be assessed with reference to the 
core principle of regulation previously identified: 
• Even the forms of stakeholder participation encouraged as elements of 
best practices will not, in and of themselves, contribute in any significant 
degree to transparency and consultation as those concepts are 
understood as core principles of regulation;  
• For risk-based decision making carried out in the pre-market stage by 
manufacturers and suppliers to operate in a consistent manner, certain 
important external influences will be required; these might include a clear 
statement of expectations from regulators, firmly understood 
professional standards within the ranks of risk management advisors 
and consultants, and effective insistence of the reasonable care 
standard through civil or regulatory enforcement; 
• Risk-based decision-making offers important opportunities to incorporate 
and take account of all available evidence, thereby attaching the 
procedure firmly within the realm of evidence-based approaches; 
• Elements of best practices for risk management, notably appropriate 
problem identification, information-based decision-making, and flexibility 
in response to changing assessments would contribute to effectiveness; 
and 
• Accountability for pre-market risk management procedures undertaken 
by manufacturers and suppliers is unlikely to arise apart from civil or 
regulatory proceedings in the aftermath of injuries, at which point 
compliance with the standard of reasonable care or due diligence may 
be formally tested. 
 
Information Management: Reporting, Monitoring, and Surveillance 
In contrast with pre-market assessment and approval schemes where 
government regulators have advance opportunities to assess the risks 
associated with the proposed introduction of a product or substance, the GSR - 
from a government perspective - is largely a post-marketing regime. Accordingly, 
the availability of ongoing information and the capacity to respond appropriately 
to emerging risks revealed by that flow of information are essential components 
of the GSR approach to enhancing consumer product safety. The effective 
implementation of a GSR calls for integration of supplier and regulatory 
operations. 
 
Reporting Obligations of Suppliers 
Legislative commentary prepared by the department anticipates that suppliers279 
(any person who manufactures, imports, distributes, promotes or markets a 
product or an activity) would be responsible for “reporting adverse health 
incidents, as prescribed by regulation”. (B3.2.3)  In addressing offences or 
prohibitions, the legislation is expected to establish that “no person shall fail to 
report adverse health incidents, as prescribed by regulation.”(B2.7) 
                                            
279 A more complete definition is found in Fig 1, Annex 1  
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An initial observation with regard to the reporting requirement is that it serves, 
even within the context of a general safety requirement, as a residual safety net. 
It exists to provide a systematic basis to identify and where appropriate to 
respond to situations in which an unsafe consumer product may have entered 
the market-place either because pre-market assessment failed to identify or 
effectively assess some form of risk, under-estimated the likelihood or severity of 
a risk, or because such assessment was not, in fact, ever undertaken.  
 
No regulations, standards or codes exist that specify how a report should be 
made, the criteria or the level of safety that would initiate a report of an adverse 
health incident, the content of the notification or to whom the report should be 
made.   In order to establish the mechanisms necessary to collect and report 
these data, guidance in terms of establishing criteria for reporting and reporting 
procedures is required. 
 
In general, we can identify several components of the reporting obligation: 
• The threshold or trigger: What degree of severity is required to constitute 
an adverse incident of a reportable nature? 
• Form of reporting: What information is required in a report? In what 
manner is it to be presented? To whom is it to be provided? 
• Timeliness: Within what period of time from the moment a supplier has 
knowledge of an adverse incident should the report be provided? 
 
There is clearly room for variation in relation to each of these elements. If the 
threshold is set too low, there is a risk that minor or trivial incidents might over-
whelm the capacity of officials to perform review functions effectively. The 
information provided needs to be responsive to the nature of the hazard while 
respecting victim privacy and other elements of the legal process. With regard to 
the latter, it may be worth highlighting that suppliers are required to report 
adverse incidents; they are not required to report that they have or may have 
committed an offence relating to an unsafe product or products. As noted and 
explained in the Case Study Report, it must also be determined whether reports 
would be submitted to Health Canada in Ottawa, to regional offices, or to 
provincial or territorial officials.280  
 
Reports should be provided in a timely manner, but requirements must permit 
some reasonable compliance period, bearing in mind the varied capacities of 
those subject to the reporting requirement and the existence of a penalty for 
failure to comply. In connection with timing, for example, several options would 
appear to be available. Reports might be required on a uniformly fixed delivery 
schedule, either at fixed intervals, or within a fixed number of days of a reportable 
incident. Or, reporting requirements might vary depending upon the severity of 
the incident, with injury reporting allowing for a longer delay than in 
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circumstances involving death. Generic or notional requirements are also 
possible, taking the form of “forthwith,” “immediately,” or “without delay.” 
 
While each of these matters remains to be determined, we can nonetheless look 
to experience in other settings for some guidance as to what might be involved. 
Sources of such guidance include the European and American contexts where 
similar issues have already been addressed and other Canadian legislation 
where adverse incident reporting requirements presently exist. This information is 
consolidated in  Annex 8.   
 
Monitoring and Surveillance Measures 
In addition to the administrative requirements associated with providing guidance 
to suppliers in connection with the reporting obligations that form a vital part of 
the GSR model, public authorities will be expected to implement a significant 
number of additional measures. These include: 
 
• Verification measures of the kind noted above to confirm information 
provided by suppliers;281  
• Monitoring and surveillance activities that may be undertaken 
independently by departmental officials in connection with a compliance 
program, e.g. inspection, testing, data gathering from other sources (inter-
governmental exchange; consumer groups; medical and hospital reports); 
and 
• Follow-up measures that may be undertaken in response to adverse 
incident reports or the results of monitoring and surveillance activity: e.g. if 
one retailer reports an adverse incident or incidents, does this trigger 
interest on the part of HC to make more active inquiries with other retailers 
for confirmation or otherwise of the unsafe product risk? 
 
Reporting, monitoring and surveillance measures in a post-marketing context 
such as that presented by the GSR will often become the initial point of inter-
action between suppliers and regulators. This is in contrast, for example, with 
other models of regulatory supervision in which pre-market product approvals are 
required (pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food additives, pesticides, and so 
on,) or where market entry itself is subject to prior authorization (broadcasting, 
commercial fishing, and so on.)  
 
How regulatory officials will manage this initial interface in relation to post-
marketing reporting and surveillance therefore remains to be determined. We 
note only that the manner in which this is done will be extremely important from 
the perspective of compliance and enforcement, and thus to the effectiveness of 
the GSR. The OECD has, on occasion, addressed some of the associated 
challenges. Given limited regulatory resources, how should they best be 
deployed to promote regulatory goals? One approach involves so-called tiering: 
                                            
281 See above, for Professor Hodges’ description of verification tasks. 
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A significant development is to use risk analysis to identify targets of possible low 
compliance. Enforcement agencies are beginning to decide when and where to 
do inspections by analysis of data on where risks of non-compliance are likely to 
be highest. Tiering is an important tool for this task since not all regulated entities 
can be monitored or inspected all the time. It is very important to have a rational 
system for deciding which to target. 
 
Those regulated can be tiered according to size – ranked according to the 
number of employees, operating revenues, assets or market share. This may be 
useful because larger enterprises may be judged to present a greater risk 
because of the pure quantity of breaches they can produce, for example, the 
quantity of pollution or employee injuries or customer dissatisfaction. … Other 
risk analysis-based factors for targeting inspections include geographic location 
(e.g. whether a manufacturing plant is close to where people live or to 
environmentally sensitive areas), previous violations (whether those with a 
history of recidivism should be targeted), and the age of the facility (older plants 
may be judged more risky than newer ones). 
 
Another useful way for regulators to target enforcement efforts in such a way that 
resources are used most efficiently is to tailor inspections according to the risk 
represented by individual firms determined by their own ability to comply, 
including their own attempts to meet those risks. For example, if an enterprise 
has conducted its own risk analysis and put in place its own compliance system, 
then it may warrant lower priority for inspection, than one that has not. When that 
enterprise is inspected, then the inspector may only check the functions and 
outcomes of the enterprise’s own compliance system, rather than conduct 
various inspections to determine whether specific rules have been violated.282 
 
 
 
Assessment: Reporting, Monitoring and Surveillance in the Context of Core 
Principles of Regulation and Compliance Factors 
Although initial reporting is largely a responsibility of private sector suppliers, the 
manner in which government responds to adverse incidents and the manner in 
which it proceeds with arrangements for inspection and surveillance may be 
considered with reference to core principles of regulation and compliance factors: 
• Transparency is clearly relevant to the criteria government might establish 
in terms of reporting obligations; 
• Consistency in the manner in which inspections and surveillance and 
follow-up measures are implemented in relation to comparable degrees of 
risk will also be an objective; and  
• Opportunities to increase the effectiveness of GSR monitoring 
arrangements may arise from the regulator’s ability to learn from 
experience with the regime and to adapt it in a flexible manner where 
improvements can be identified. 
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Reporting is one dimension of the GSR regime where the level of compliance will 
be very closely associated with both clarity of understanding around what is to be 
reported, when and to whom, as well as with the ability to regulators to 
encourage high levels of performance through their own investment in inspection 
procedures and follow-up monitoring.   
 
Current Situation 
It is appropriate to appreciate the nature of existing arrangements, for as the 
Case Studies on Implementation accompanying this report indicate, forms of 
recall are presently available under other pieces of legislation along with authority 
to issue interim orders which may perform similar or analogous functions. 
Illustrations of their use are also provided in the Case Studies paper. For present 
purposes, one example will serve.  
 
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, based upon concurrent federal 
regulatory authority over Agriculture, authorizes recall under conditions set out 
below:283 
 
Recall order 
19. (1) Where the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a product 
regulated under an Act or provision that the Agency enforces or 
administers by virtue of section 11 poses a risk to public, animal or plant 
health, the Minister may, by notice served on any person selling, 
marketing or distributing the product, order that the product be recalled or 
sent to a place designated by the Minister. 
Contravention of recall order 
(2) Any person who contravenes a recall order referred to in subsection 
(1) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding $50,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six 
months or to both. 
Notification of order 
(3) For greater certainty, a recall order is not a statutory instrument for the 
purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act, but no person shall be 
convicted of an offence under subsection (2) unless the person was 
notified of the order. 
 
Recalls pursuant to section 19 which involve a ministerial recall order are 
“mandatory” in nature and are announced formally under the heading “Health 
Hazard Alert – Minister Orders Mandatory Recall.” More commonly, however, it is 
understood that the CFIA encourages “voluntary” recalls, which are then 
announced simply as “Health Hazard Alert.”   
 
Ministerial recall orders under section 19 are rare. Among these, the Aylmer 
Meat Packers case (Fall 2003) is comparatively well-known. The Konjac Mini 
                                            
283 Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, S.C. 1997, c. 6, s. 19. 
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Cup Jelly Products experience of November 2001284 has been described in the 
Case Studies accompanying this report. Other examples of where mandatory 
recalls were ordered: 
•  Labonté brand Natural Honey from Blueberry Blossoms (April 2004);285 
• Janes brand Battered Mozzarella Sticks (March 2002);286 
• Rajah brand Tandoori Masala (October 2003);287 and 
• kid3.com Capsules (June 2003);288 
 
Although there was litigation in relation to Aylmer,289 the most relevant judicial 
discussion of the recall power for present purposes arose in the aftermath of 
Labonté where the impugned party sought judicial review of the order.290  In 
Labonté the manufacturer sought three declarations to quash the order, to review 
the grounds on which it had been issued and to affirm that its entitlement to 
procedural fairness had not been satisfied: 
 
D'annuler l'ordonnance du Ministre; 
De déclarer que l'ACIA et le Ministre n'avaient aucun motif raisonnable de 
croire que le miel naturel liquide de fleurs de bleuet portant le code de 
production 033196 ("le miel de la demanderesse") représentait un risque 
pour la santé publique; 
De déclarer que l'ACIA et le Ministre ont violé leur devoir d'équité en ne 
permettant pas à la demanderesse de connaître au préalable les raisons 
invoquées par l'ACIA, les données scientifiques dont elle disposait et la 
méthode d'analyse qu'elle appliquait, et de présenter ses contre-
expertises.291 
 
The application for judicial review was rejected. 
 
In issuing his very thorough reasons Justice Noël, noted that the recall power 
could be asserted on the basis of reasonable grounds for believing that a product 
presented a risk to public health: 
 
À mon avis, il ne faut pas voir cette question comme une question de 
compétence. La LACIA dit que le rappel peut être ordonné s'il y a des 
motifs raisonnables de croire qu'un produit présente un risque pour la 
santé publique.292 
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Thus, the only criterion is the reasonable belief of CFIA that the product 
represents a public health risk.  In delivering his reasons Justice Noël points to 
research on which CFIA was entitled to, and obviously eventually did, rely 
concerning the health effects of nitrofurans, which in turn CFIA could reasonably 
believe were contained in the manufacturer’s honey.293 
 
In carrying out the “pragmatic and functional analysis” to determine the standard 
of judicial review, Noël noted that the decisions of the Minister (or Agents thereof) 
are discretionary, and therefore subject to a heightened degree of judicial 
deference.294  After completing the entire analysis, His Honour decided that 
section 19 decisions were reviewable by a court solely on the “patently 
unreasonable” standard.”295  
 
In deciding whether or not the manufacturer had received the “procedural 
fairness” to which it was entitled in the context of the recall order, Justice Noël 
concluded that where public health was involved, procedural entitlements would 
be limited: 
 
De toutes ces considérations, je conclus que l'obligation d'équité 
procédurale est très limitée en l'espèce, et que la démarche suivie par 
l'ACIA est correcte. Dans un contexte où la santé publique est en jeu, on 
devrait donner à la personne intéressée l'occasion de collaborer, 
l'informer de la nature de la décision envisagée et lui transmettre le 
résultat des analyses et des raisons justifiant cette décision.296 
 
In concluding that the recall order was legal, Noel J. noted the reasonable risk 
that CFIA was attempting to avoid.  That risk, coupled with the fact that the 
product was widely available to consumers on store shelves justified the use of 
the recall power. On these grounds, the recall order was upheld, and the 
application for declarations quashing the order, was rejected. 
 
It is also important to appreciate the circumstances in which “voluntary” recalls 
may be encouraged. These voluntary actions in fact take place against the 
backdrop of a “government-imposed” recall.  The so-called ‘gorilla in the closet’ in 
the form of the section 19 authority serves as an effective inducement for 
voluntary product withdrawals. An example of the mandatory recall power being 
reserved is the following: 
 
                                            
293 See ibid., at para 44: L'expression "motifs raisonnables" signifie à mon avis, comme le dit le juge 
Mackay dans l'affaire Friends of Point Pleasant Park, précitée, au para. 49, qu'"une certaine preuve [...] 
doit exister à l'appui de [la] décision". En l'espèce, le Ministre disposait d'une preuve abondante de nature 
à le convaincre qu'existait un risque pour la santé publique.  [Emphasis added.] 
294 See ibid., at para. 31. 
295 See ibid., at para. 37.  “L'analyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle me mène donc à la conclusion que la 
norme de contrôle applicable à une décision rendue par le Ministre en vertu du paragraphe 19(1) de la 
LACIA est celle de la décision manifestement déraisonnable.” 
296 Ibid., at para. 68.  [Emphasis added.] 
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OTTAWA, February 1, 2005 - The Canadian Food Inspection Agency and 
Natrel are warning the public not to consume Sealtest brand 1 % 
Chocolate Milk described below. This product may be contaminated with 
a chemical sanitizer. 
The affected product, Sealtest brand 1 % Chocolate Milk, is sold in a 1 L 
carton bearing UPC 0 64420 00170 2. The affected code FE 07 appears 
on the carton near the spout. No other codes are affected. 
The manufacturer, Natrel, Don Mills, Ontario, is voluntarily recalling the 
affected product from the marketplace. The product has been distributed 
in Ontario.297 
 
It is assumed by observers that had Natrel not “voluntarily” recalled the product, 
CFIA would have proceeded with section 19 authority. 
 
Countervailing Considerations 
Notwithstanding an outcome favourable to the exercise of the recall power in 
Labonté, the case alerts us to important underlying considerations. The recall 
power is a forceful tool in the enforcement arsenal for consumer protection. Its 
utilization entails the exercise of administrative discretion, which must not only be 
defensible in substantive terms, but must also accord with the requirements of 
procedural fairness. As well, precipitous or unreasonable use of a recall power in 
Canada might result in a Charter challenge on the basis that it is an 
unreasonable seizure, or to a claim for civil damages associated with allegations 
of negligent over-enforcement. 
  
Safeguards 
When the UK expanded the powers of administrative officials to halt the sale of 
goods suspected to be dangerous under the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, the 
Government also took care to balance the new powers with additional 
safeguards, including providing compensation for errors of preliminary judgment 
about the safety of goods. 
 
Bearing in mind that potential damage to life and limb can be permanent, there is 
a strong case for authorities to have wider powers to halt the sale of consumer 
goods where there are grounds for believing them to be dangerous.  In the event 
that the initial suspicions cannot subsequently be confirmed it would be fair that 
the trader concerned should receive compensation for the loss from the 
authorities.  Wider discretion to authorities to protect the general public should 
not, therefore, involve penalizing accidentally suppliers whose goods are safe.298  
 
The GSR, however, broadens administrative discretion exponentially because 
uncertainty in defining which products are ‘safe” or ‘unsafe’ leaves administrative 
officials with an ultimate discretion to act against goods they consider to be 
                                            
297 http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/recarapp/2005/20050201e.shtml.  [Emphasis added.] 
298 The Safety of Goods, A Report presented to the UK Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, July 1984, Cmnd. 9302, para. 24 
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unsafe even where they conform, presumptively, to an approved or published 
standard.   Some commentators in the U.S. regard such reliance on voluntary 
standards as a form of ‘back-door Regulation by administrative officials.   This 
also helps to explain the evolution of the European principle of ‘proportionality’ as 
a check on administrative action.299   
 
The limitations placed on the recall power in Europe well illustrate the application 
of the proportionality principle to the recall power.  An administrative recall order 
(one made by administrative officials intended to have immediate effect, based 
on findings of fact made by enforcement officials) is a highly intrusive and 
extraordinary measure to be used where no other suitable remedy is available, 
and only in the face of serious risks to public health or safety.  It is an injunctive 
remedy not to be used as a colorable means of circumventing the judicial 
process for obtaining mandatory injunctions, or as a simple alternative to 
prosecution.  Its purpose is to achieve the (safety) objective where there are no 
reasonable alternative remedies.  
 
The preamble of the revised GPSD recites the need for additional obligations to 
be placed on producers including, “as a last resort” the duty “to recall (dangerous 
products) when necessary, which may involve (depending on the provisions 
applicable in Member States) an appropriate form of compensation, for example 
exchange or reimbursement.”300  The Preamble of the GPSD goes on to provide 
that, where producers fail to act, Member States are to be provided with the 
power  
 
To order or organize, immediately and efficiently, the withdrawal of dangerous 
products already placed on the market and as a last resort to order, coordinate or 
organize the recall from consumers of dangerous products already supplied to 
them.  Those powers should be applied when producers and distributors fail to 
prevent risks to consumers in accordance with their obligations.  Where 
necessary, the appropriate powers and procedures should be available to the 
authorities to decide and apply any necessary measures rapidly.301  
 
The operative provisions of the GPSD provide for producers to undertake 
‘voluntary’ recalls at the request of a competent authority. Article 5 1(b), provides 
that:  
 
Recall shall take place as a last resort where other measures would not suffice to 
prevent the risks involved, in instances where the producers consider it 
                                            
299 The ‘Proportionality Principle’ enables the European Court of Justice to review not only the procedural 
fairness of administrative decisions (the main focus of Canadian administrative law), but also to review the 
substantive policy or enforcement decisions (including decisions of a legislative nature) where the actions 
taken by an authority are ‘disproportionate’ to the risk being addressed.  Under a GSR regime, uncertainties 
surrounding the definition of ‘safe product” and the residual discretion left to officials in this regard, blur 
the distinction between legislative and administrative decisions.     
 
300 2001/95/EC, Preamble, para (19) 
301 Ibid., para 23 
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necessary or where they are obliged to do so further to a measure taken by a 
competent authority.  It may be effected within the framework of codes of good 
practice on the matter in the Member State concerned, where such codes exist.  
 
Under Article 8 (f), Member States are empowered, in relation to any dangerous 
product still on the market:  
 
(ii) to order or coordinate  or, if appropriate, to organize together with producers 
and distributors its recall from consumers and its destruction in suitable 
conditions. 
 
In undertaking powers of direct action, competent authorities are expressly 
bound by Article 8 (2) to adhere to the ‘Proportionality Principle’:  
 
When the competent authorities of the Member States take measures such as 
those provided for in paragraph 1, in particular those referred to in (d) to (f), they 
shall act in accordance with the Treaty, and in particular Articles 28 and 30 
thereof, in such a way as to implement the measures in a manner proportional to 
the seriousness of the risk and taking due account of the precautionary principle.   
 
In this context, they shall encourage and promote voluntary action by producers 
and distributors, in accordance with the obligations incumbent on them under this 
directive, and in particular Chapter III thereof, including where applicable by the 
development of codes of good practice.   
 
If necessary, they shall organize or order the measures provided for in paragraph 
1 (f) if the action under taken by the producers and distributors in fulfillment of 
their obligations is unsatisfactory or insufficient.  Recall shall take place as a last 
resort.  It may be effected within the framework of codes of good practice on the 
matter in the Member State concerned, where such codes exist.  
 
The United Kingdom strenuously resisted the recall power in the consumer 
products area for many years, fearing excessive and disproportionate use by 
officials.  When Europe finally mandated the recall power under Europe’s 
‘revised’ GPSD, the UK delayed transposing the revised Directive until 
appropriate safeguards were developed as a check on administrative discretion 
in using this draconian power.  The recall power was the most controversial 
element of the transposition process.302 
   
In the Regulatory Impact Statement accompanying the UK regulation transposing 
the revised GPSD, four options were considered to allay the concerns of the 
business community about the introduction of the recall power, namely:  
 
• Option 1 – Make no special provisions; let the Trading Standards Officers 
administer the new power; 
                                            
302 Final Regulatory Impact Assessment on the Implementation of Directive 2001/95/ EC, General Product 
Safety, July, 2005, para. 7.2 
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• Option 2 - Create a National Decision-Making Body to make consistent 
and binding decisions and to address Business concerns about over use 
of the new power; 
• Option 3 – Establish an Advisory Process which would provide non-
binding advice on recalls; and  
• Option 4 – Make recall subject to an application to a Court for an order.303 
 
Option 1 was rejected as being unresponsive to business concerns.  Option 2 
was viewed as too costly, given the limited use likely to be made of such a body 
since most recalls are undertaken on a voluntary basis.  Option 4 was rejected 
owing to the delays anticipated in the Court process (six or more months) and the 
likelihood of inconsistent decisions by different courts. 
 
Option 3 – creating an advice-based mechanism – became the preferred option 
because:  
  
Discussions with the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) developed a strong 
case for developing a bespoke form of Early Neutral Evaluation. (ENE) that 
would deliver a reasoned opinion by a former member of the Judiciary on a recall 
case based on the evidence presented by the parties.  The benefits included an 
independent if non-binding review of the facts, relative speed and simplicity 
(requiring no more than two to four weeks per case) and the scheme’s 
adaptability to ad hoc and infrequent use.304    
 
The UK transposed the revised General Product Safety Directive in the General 
Product Safety Regulations, 2005305.  The recall provisions, including provision 
for referring factual issues on a recall to an evaluator appointed by the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators, are contained in section 15 of the Regulation.  The 
advisory scheme for Product Recall under the General Product Safety 
Regulations, 2005 is described in detail in Annex B to Guidance Notes prepared 
by the Department of Trade and Industry styled Guidance for businesses, 
consumers and enforcement authorities.306 
 
Assessment: Remedies in the Context of Core Principles of Regulation and 
Compliance Factors 
Experience elsewhere suggests the need for a range or remedial responses, 
including, typically as a last resort, the use of the power to recall consumer 
products that are considered to be unsafe. This approach may be assessed with 
reference to several principles of regulation and from the perspective of 
compliance. 
• A significant theme in the discussion of remedies is the importance of 
proportionality to ensure that measures suitable to a variable range of 
                                            
303 Ibid., para. 7. 
304 Ibid., para. 7.19 
305 Statutory Instrument 2005, No. 1803 
306 Accessed on July 13, 2006 at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file22713.pdf  
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concerns around different degrees of product safety and supplier 
behaviour are available to enforcement officials; and  
• Although the Labonté decision suggests that, at least in the context of a 
potentially harmful food product already in circulation, the procedural 
obligations of decision-makers contemplating a recall may be modest; 
nevertheless procedural obligations reinforce the principle of 
transparency. 
 
It is equally worthwhile noting that effective remedial measures to promote 
compliance are central elements of the GSR approach. Notwithstanding that this 
approach is intended to promote or strengthen a culture of safety within the ranks 
of suppliers, it will be necessary to have an enforcement capacity in place. 
 
9. Product Liability Legislation, Negligence and Statutory Due 
Diligence   
 
Expectations for a GSR and their Relationship to Existing Law 
 
The suggestion is made in Health Canada’s issue paper on GSR that 
“(r)esponsible makers of products are already exercising due diligence and 
addressing the health or safety risks in their products, thus conforming with the 
General Safety Requirement.”  As quoted elsewhere in this report, in the context 
of introducing a GSR requirement to the consumer setting, the UK DTI expressed 
one of its objectives as follows: “The Government’s intention is to encourage 
more efficient use of existing resources by facilitating better identification of 
unsafe goods before they are distributed and streamlining the procedures for 
halting their supply.”  
 
By implication, the Health Canada comment suggests that those who currently 
meet the standard of due diligence are essentially in conformity with the GSR as 
proposed, while the DTI observation focuses on improvements to be made in the 
“better identification of unsafe goods before they are distributed.” Whether these 
two government perceptions are inconsistent, and, if so, whether they can be 
reconciled is of some importance.  
 
If some significant element of Canadian businesses potentially subject to the 
GSR are essentially in conformity already, it might be assumed that behaviour 
changes and adjustment costs on their part will be modest, but so, presumably, 
will any overall improvement in the safety of consumer goods for which they are 
responsible; that is, the job is already (largely) being done. The DTI objective, on 
the other hand, does appear to focus quite explicitly on a problem – unsafe 
goods – with the intention of identifying them in advance and curtailing their 
distribution, a task that is to be accomplished on the basis of using existing 
resources more efficiently. Taken together, admittedly in isolation from their own 
broader contexts, the two departmental observations do highlight the importance 
of conclusions articulated by the OECD in connection with considerations that 
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can reduce the risk of policy failure. In particular, government objectives (other 
than more regulation) must be precisely defined; the targets of regulation need to 
be clearly identified (everyone, some sectors only, particular problem areas); 
expectations should be communicated in a fully understandable way and 
measures of success/failure determined. [OECD]  
 
Existing Legal Requirements to Exercise Care Regarding Consumer 
Product Safety 
Because this report is particularly concerned with some of the implications – for 
industry and government - of introducing a GSR, it is worthwhile to consider 
briefly the status quo. An understanding of how the current legal framework 
encourages or supports actions to ensure consumer product safety is a pre-
condition for understanding how a GSR might alter that framework, and in so 
doing, alter the behaviour of those who would be subject to its obligations in such 
a way as to produce better outcomes. 
 
Apart from several specific areas where regulations applicable to consumer 
products have already been introduced, (for example, in relation to children’s 
safety,) two general fields of law have the potential to promote consumer safety. 
The first of these is the statutory law of product liability. The second is tort 
liability, notably the law of negligence, (les delits) and corresponding dimensions 
of Quebec’s civil law regime. Each is briefly considered here in turn. 
 
Product Liability Legislation 
Consumer protection legislation is widely understood to address issues 
associated with financing and credit transactions or the quality of items 
purchased from a sale of goods perspective. However, certain provincial 
jurisdictions have introduced provisions dealing with issues around product 
liability. 
 
In New Brunswick, section 27(1) of the Consumer Product Warranty and Liability 
Act states: 
 
A supplier of a consumer product that is unreasonably dangerous to person or 
property because of a defect in design, materials or workmanship is liable to any 
person who suffers a consumer in the loss because of the defect, if the loss was 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of his supply as liable to result from the 
defect. 
 
It is of further interest in connection with this report to observe that section 
27(1)(c) refers explicitly to the significance of federal standards. Thus, liability 
under the provincial statute might arise where: 
 
…the defect arose in whole or in part because of (the supplier’s) failure to comply 
with any mandatory federal standards in relation to health or safety, or the defect 
caused the consumer product to fail to comply with any such standards. 
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Suppliers are understood to be strictly liable under the legislation on the basis of 
section 27 (4), which indicates that “the liability of a person under this section 
does not depend on any contract or negligence.” 
  
The Consumer Protection Act of Quebec as expressed in the Civil Code is also 
relevant to the existence of liability for failing to meet product safety 
requirements. Articles 1468 and 1469 state: 
 
1468. The manufacturer of a movable property is liable to reparation for injury 
caused to a third person by reason of a safety defect in the thing, even if it is 
incorporated with or placed in an immovable for the service or operation of the 
immovable. 
  
1469.  A thing has a safety defect where, having regard to all the circumstances, 
it does not afford the safety which a person is normally entitled to expect, 
particularly by reason of a defect in the design or manufacture of the thing, poor 
preservation or presentation of the thing, or the lack of sufficient indications as to 
the risks and dangers it involves or as to safety precautions. 
 
Other related provisions refer to circumstances in which a manufacturer or 
supplier is exempt from liability. In addition to the influence of “superior force,” or 
the victim’s knowledge of the defect, according to Article 1473: 
 
... Nor is (the manufacturer, distributor or supplier) liable to reparation if he 
proves that, according to the state of knowledge at the time that he 
manufactured, distributed or supplied the property, the existence of the defect 
could not have been known, and that he was not neglectful of his duty to provide 
information when he became aware of the defect. 
 
Should the decision be taken to proceed with the introduction of a GSR at the 
federal level, attention will need to be directed to inter-action between federal and 
existing standards and requirements in a legal and operational sense. Some 
indication of the necessary co-ordination is illustrated in the Case Studies 
accompanying this report. For present purposes, product liability provisions of the 
kind noted here are simply set out to indicate that, along with general principles 
of negligence law, they constitute elements of the existing legal framework that is 
intended in some respects to encourage the safety of consumer products in 
Canada. 
 
Negligence: Liability for Unsafe Consumer Products 
In turning to negligence law, we may note as a point of departure the 
foundational decision of Donoghue v Stevenson where Lord Atkin observed:  
 
A manufacturer of products, which he sells in such form as to show that he 
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him 
with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the 
knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up 
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of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property owes a 
duty to the consumer to take reasonable care.307  
 
From this basis Canadian negligence law in relation to consumer protection has 
evolved to the point that a recent doctrinal summary expresses the situation this 
way: 
 
The duty of care may now be restated as a duty to take all reasonable steps 
necessary in the design, manufacture, distribution, advertising and sale of 
products to protect the public from unreasonable risk of harm, including the duty 
to provide adequate warnings and to recall products subsequently found to have 
any defect in their design, manufacture or warnings.308  
 
In addition to manufacturers, parties now subject to a duty of care in relation to 
consumers also include those responsible for product assembly and repair, as 
well as persons involved in the distribution of products. The rationale for this 
extension was addressed in Phillips v Ford Motor Co. of Canada, where the court 
explained that a distributor places itself in a relationship – for profit – with the 
consumer and is accordingly responsible to that consumer for defects that ought 
to have been discovered by a distributor exercising reasonable care.309   In the 
words of Dean F. Edgell, distributors owe a duty to “use reasonable care in 
selecting, inspecting, testing, packaging and handling products.” 310 
 
As previously suggested, the scope of potentially-harmful activity for which a 
defendant might be held responsible in the event of injury is broad. It 
encompasses three general categories: design defects, manufacturing defects or 
failures to provide adequate or appropriate warnings. Each of these may be 
briefly described. 
 
The existence of a design defect, as explained by Lewis Klar, is generally 
determined with reference to a series of factors considered relevant in 
establishing whether a product creates an unreasonable risk: 
• The utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the consumer; 
• The likelihood of harm; 
• The availability of a safer design; 
• The costs, both in terms of functionality and the price of the safe design; 
• The ability of the consumer to avoid harm by careful use of the product; 
• The ability of the consumer to become aware of the risks; and 
• The manufacturer’s ability to spread the costs related to improving the 
safety of the design. 
 
                                            
307 [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) at 599 
308 L.G. Theall et al., Product Liability: Canadian Law and Practice (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2005 at 
L1-7) 
309 [1970] 2 O.R. 714 
310 Edgell, Product Liability Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) 62 
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A detailed examination of case law and commentary would be necessary to 
demonstrate in a more comprehensive and nuanced way the manner in which 
these considerations figure into the judicial assessment of alleged design 
defects. Some basic elements of analysis must suffice. Firstly, inherently 
dangerous products may nevertheless by valuable to consumers.311  Although 
the consumer’s unintended use of a product might still result in liability for injuries 
from a design defect where the use was foreseeable, this is not considered likely 
where the consumer used a product “in flagrant disregard of the manufacturer’s 
express instructions or recommendations.”312  Failure to adopt a safer design 
may well be determinative, however, unless the less satisfactory design creates 
some benefit that outweighs the risk.313  Courts may also refer to industry 
standards to determine whether a defect exists, bearing in mind the conduct of 
competitors and the risks associated with other products of similar kind.314   In 
connection with an underlying objective of the GSR to promote a culture of 
safety, it is also worthwhile to observe that manufacturers may be found 
negligent for failing to test adequately for potential defects.315 
 
In addition to potential liability for defects in design, situations may arise in which 
the alleged negligence is associated with the manufacturing process. In the case 
of a manufacturing defect, potential liability arises where a discrete unit of the 
product in question fails to meet the specifications called for in relation to 
products of that kind. As explained by Denis Boivin, the defect is attributable to 
poor production or manufacture rather than to poor design. In other words, even 
when the design, blueprint or conceptualization of a product is not defective, 
specific or discrete units may nevertheless be defective as a consequence of 
manufacturing deficiencies, even while other units do not exhibit similar 
deficiencies.  
 
Boivin further observes that a manufacturing defect, by comparison with a defect 
in design, is relatively easy to establish where a plaintiff can point to the 
difference between the impeached unit and other examples of the same product, 
and indicate how the difference renders the defective product dangerous or 
unsafe.  
 
Other elements of a negligence action in relation to manufacturing defects 
remain to be established. Did the manufacturer’s performance fall below the 
standard of care required in the circumstances? Factors relevant to this 
determination (that is, whether a manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the 
course of production) will be considered again shortly in relation to due diligence, 
but include: 
                                            
311 Edgell, 56   
312 Theall, L2-5 
313 Nicholson v John Deere Ltd. (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 53 at 56 
314 Theall, L2-9,L 2-10 
315 Edgell, 55 
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• The manufacturer’s knowledge of the deviation, or its foreseeability; 
• The probability of the deviation occurring; and 
• The costs of prevention. 
 
As a matter of practice, however, Klar indicates that where a plaintiff can 
establish that a particular product contained a manufacturing defect when it left 
the plant, and that defect was the cause of his damages or injuries, “the 
inference of negligence is practically irresistible.” 
 
Manufacturers’ liability may arise in a third respect, that is, in relation to the duty 
to warn consumers of known dangers in the foreseeable use of the product. The 
rationale for this obligation was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp. where it was stated that “[t]he duty to warn serves to 
correct the knowledge imbalance between manufacturers and consumers by 
alerting consumers to any dangers and allowing them to make informed choices 
concerning the safe use of the product.”  
 
When ‘failure to warn’ cases arise, courts are called upon to assess the 
adequacy of any warning provided by the manufacturer. They do so in relation to 
the level of risk associated with normal product use. Again, as stated in Hollis:  
 
The nature and scope of the manufacturer’s duty to warn varies with the level of 
danger entailed by the ordinary use of the product. Where significant dangers are 
entailed by the ordinary use of the product, it will rarely be sufficient for 
manufacturers to give general warnings concerning these dangers; the warnings 
must be sufficiently detailed to give the consumer a full indication of each of the 
specific dangers arising from use of the product. 
 
Not only must the warnings address “specific dangers” associated with the 
product, but the duty to warn is a continuous one which does not cease at the 
point the product has left the manufacturer’s premises. A manufacturer who 
learns after a product is on the market of a risk associated with that product has 
a continuing duty to communicate to consumers about that risk. Particularly high 
standards in respect of warnings apply to inherently dangerous goods and in 
relation to drugs and medical products.  When these cases come forward, the 
burden rests with plaintiffs to demonstrate that the manufacturer’s warning was 
not effective, and that, had they been warned effectively, the injury would not 
have occurred. 
 
In respect of each of these areas – design, manufacture, and warnings – the 
existence of potential liability in negligence is understood to provide incentive or 
encouragement for reasonable care to be taken to ensure consumer safety. In so 
far as this is equally a stated objective of the GSR proposal, it is worthwhile to 
observe that considerations of foreseeability, of product testing, of effective 
communication about risks, including “new” risks are already part of the law of 
negligence relating to consumer products. 
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What Does the GSR Change? 
Returning to the previous discussion of remarks by Health Canada and the 
British DTI concerning expectations for a GSR, it is important to consider 
particular objectives in light of present circumstances. The rationale for adding a 
GSR to the incentives for safety found in existing product liability statutes or tort 
law, may take one or more of several forms. A GSR will certainly be intended to 
alter the framework in some manner. Perhaps the existing set of incentives does 
not operate entirely effectively,316 or perhaps there are distinct gaps in its 
applicability. Thus, for whatever reason, it is understood that some 
manufacturers of consumer products are insufficiently motivated by the current 
tort regime.  
 
In the minds of some observers, it might be thought that even if the 
compensatory goal of tort law is realized through the existing negligence regime, 
a firmer preventive thrust is called for than tort alone can deliver. From this 
perspective, it might be assumed that the GSR can provide a more effective 
stimulus to take care because as a statutory principle its existence may be more 
readily communicated to industry, or that because the GSR establishes a 
framework for responsibility anchored (in the Canadian context) in the criminal 
law power, obstacles to tort law enforcement such as the rules on legal fees, or 
access to class actions will not apply. For the moment we defer discussion of this 
latter possibility, apart from noting that the effective operation of a GSR scheme 
will require resources to support compliance and to pursue enforcement. 
 
 
Reasonable Care and Due Diligence 
 
We turn next to a matter still closely linked to the form of behaviour encouraged 
by negligence law where it is presumed to operate effectively. To avoid liability in 
tort, a defendant manufacturer must be found to have performed at a level that is 
non-negligent. In other words, the manufacturer will not be liable where its 
behaviour satisfies the standard of reasonable care. It is therefore appropriate to 
recall essential features of reasonable care in the tort context as further 
background to a consideration of how a GSR might affect the conduct or level of 
performance and consequently of safety in relevant industry. 
 
In determining whether the standard of care has been met, courts will inquire 
into, (in addition to the range of factors mentioned above in discussion of 
different aspects of product liability negligence):  “… the risk of potential harm… 
and where that potential harm is great, the reasonable manufacturer acting 
prudently will be expected to consider (foresee) even a small risk of that harm 
occurring and to take reasonable steps to avoid it.” 317 
 
                                            
316 Dewees and Trebilcock, 1992 
317 Edgell, 18 
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In order to consider whether a GSR regime would call for a greater or different 
level of care, some transitional remarks are in order. Firstly, we may note that in 
the context of GSR, in particular in the context of possible conviction for an 
offence, the defendant will have available a defence of ‘due diligence.’ It is 
therefore of interest to inquire (speculate?) as matters of law and as matters of 
practice affecting the substantive level of safety that might be expected in 
consumer products in Canada how reasonable care and due diligence compare 
one with the other. 
 
Proving Reasonable Care and Due Diligence 
A brief procedural point can be noted. In negligence litigation, the burden rests 
on the plaintiff to establish according to the civil standard of proof (balance of 
probabilities) and in addition to all other elements of the tort, that the defendant 
has not acted with reasonable care. Should the defendant wish to introduce 
evidence on its behalf it will do so for the purpose of casting doubt on the 
plaintiff’s case, but the defendant in negligence does not have to establish 
affirmatively that it did, indeed exercise reasonable care in the circumstances. On 
the other hand, where an offence under the GSR regime is alleged and reaches 
trial where “unsafeness” is proven according to the criminal standard (beyond a 
reasonable doubt), the accused will have the opportunity to establish a defence 
of due diligence, an evidentiary burden that rests upon it and must be met 
according to the civil standard of proof. We do not, at this point, consider it 
necessary to elaborate upon this procedural issue for the reason that we assume 
actual prosecutions will be rare events and the GSR regime is fundamentally 
oriented towards the challenge of encouraging a culture of safety more generally 
for preventive purposes. 
 
Are Negligence and Due Diligence Equivalent? 
A conceptual matter also arises: whether negligence and due diligence are 
equivalent. Some indication of current thinking is provided by Archibald, Judd 
and Roach in their new loose-leaf service on Regulatory and Corporate Liability: 
From Due Diligence to Risk Management.  In addition to stating that the 
negligence standard is “central to due diligence,” they observe: 
 
A violation of a regulatory statute by itself may be some evidence of  
 negligence, but is not determinative of the issue.  In the same way,  
 a violation of the actus reus of a regulatory statute may be proven 
 by the prosecution, but is not determinative without the  
 consideration of due diligence.318 
 
Another way of explaining the relationship between the concepts is to observe 
that:  
The reasonable person is negligent if his or her conduct creates an  
unreasonable risk of harm.  Due diligence turns this concept on its  
                                            
318 Ibid. at 4-16. 
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head by requiring the defendant to show that he or she was not negligent, and 
that he or she took appropriate steps to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm.319 
 
In the recent regulatory decision in R. v Petro-Canada, Justice Smith of the BC 
Court of Appeal further explains due diligence by remarking that: 
 
in principle the defence is that all reasonable care was taken.   
In other circumstances, the issue will be whether the accused’s  
behaviour was negligent in bringing about the forbidden even  
when he knew the relevant facts.320 
 
For present purposes, we conclude that the conduct that might be encouraged 
on the part of potential tortfeasors in order to avoid liability for negligence is 
substantially equivalent to the level of care that might be undertaken by the same 
parties in order to ensure themselves of the availability of a due diligence 
defence under a GSR. 
 
It is still worthwhile to describe further some of the factors that would be relevant 
to judicial determination of due diligence, should the need for such a 
determination arise in connection with the GSR.  Although particular variations in 
the statutory language might raise issues around how due diligence would 
actually apply under the GSR, we can usefully report a range of observations on 
what is expected by those who may be called upon to present a due diligence 
defence, for this is – in general terms - the standard of behaviour one would 
ordinarily expect responsible manufacturers, distributors and suppliers of 
consumer products to strive for in regular operations. Professional and judicial 
commentary helps to highlight the role of industry standards, variations between 
large operations and the situations of SMEs, reliance on third parties (including 
expert consultants) and so on, in meeting a due diligence test. 
 
“Due diligence” was introduced to Canadian law by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v Sault Ste. Marie321 where Dickson J explained that, in order to 
invoke the defence, a defendant must prove that it took all reasonable care to 
avoid committing the regulatory offence. This it was explained: 
 
involves consideration of what a reasonable [person] would have  
done in the circumstances.  The defence will be available if the accused 
reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would 
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps 
to avoid the particular event.322   
 
Stranz, writing in 1992, credits the Sault Ste. Marie decision with changing the 
legal landscape by “changing the legal and business considerations necessary 
                                            
319 4-17. 
320 From R v. Petro-Canada, reproduced at page 4-3 of Archibald.   
321 …and expanded upon in Wholesale Travel. 
322 R v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 SCR 1299. 
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for proper risk analysis.”323  This two-part analysis exercise consisting of the 
assessment and management of risks is very closely related to expectations for a 
culture of safety that might be engendered by a GSR. Risk assessment refers to 
identifying potential harm or risk while risk management is associated with 
responses to those risks, once identified. Due diligence, certainly in the context 
of consumer products would appear to entail both phases or stages, that is, both 
the identification of risks and responses to them.324    
 
Due diligence is factually contingent or context sensitive.  Courts will look at the 
“facts of each case, and the particular industry or activity involved”.325  Archibald, 
Judd and Roach remark that: 
 
The assessment of due diligence by way of a defence…incorporates  
industry standards, technological standards, and choices about the  
management of risks.  The analysis may be one of risk analysis in  
reverse since a prohibited event has occurred.  The exercise may be  
one of looking backwards to estimate whether the mishap could have  
been prevented with appropriate risk management.   
 
How then might one, looking backwards, go about demonstrating that due 
diligence was exercised. Otherwise put, what might courts take into account in 
evaluating a due diligence defence? As one court has emphasized: “it is the 
employer’s specific reasonable care or non-negligence in relation to the 
statutorily-defined actus reus of the particular offence that is determinative and 
not a general state of reasonable care or non-negligence.”326 
 
Archibald et al, offer the following list of factors that might be taken into account.  
No ranking has emerged in the jurisprudence, and in some instances, the factors 
defeat each other.327  
 
• The nature and gravity of the adverse effect 
The nature and gravity of the adverse effect is understood to refer to “the 
scope of the defendant’s preventative efforts [is] in proportion to the 
potential gravity of the adverse effects that may occur”.328 
 
R v. Ontario (MOE)329 stands for the proposition that a corporate 
defendant might rank the source of harm or injury as a lesser priority than 
other concerns and still avail itself of the due diligence defence. In that 
case, the defendant allowed a damaging substance to seep into a 
waterway from a leaky pipe.  The leaky pipe was a low priority relative to 
                                            
323 Stranz, supra. 
324 See e.g. Archibald, 4-2, 4-15, 4-31. 
325 Stranz, supra.  
326 R v. Cancoil Thermal (1988), 1 COHSC 169 (Ont Prov Ct), cited in Modern Niagara, infra, at para 134. 
327 4-53 
328 4-27. 
329 Unreported: June 27, 2001, Ont. Court of Justice 
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the mining company’s other concerns, such as dangerous mine shafts. 
The court accepted as valid the argument that the pipe was a lower priority 
than life threatening conditions in the mine.  Yet Archibald et al point out 
that the leaky pipe could not be set aside indefinitely.  Rather, in looking at 
due diligence, “[t]he relative priority and timing of the remediation of the 
seep is the issue.”330 
 
• The foreseeability of the effect, including abnormal sensitivities  
The “foreseeability of the effect,” is a consideration that can be traced to 
the 1988 Rio Algom case, which explained, “the issue is whether a 
reasonable person would have foreseen the danger of the event occurring, 
and not merely whether this defendant in fact foresaw it.”331 The more 
recent case of R v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.332 affirmed that the “foresight 
required will vary with the level of expertise generally acceptable in a given 
industry, and a link can be made to the factor of industry standards.”   
 
• The alternative solutions available 
The due diligence assessment may also entail asking whether any 
alternative solutions were available to the defendant other than those it 
chose to employ.  As explained by Archibald et al, “[c]ourts have found 
that reasonableness of care is often best measured by comparing what 
was done against what could have been done.” The defendant must 
establish on the civil standard that no feasible alternatives existed that 
might have avoided this harm.333 
 
• Legislative or regulatory compliance 
Legislative or regulatory compliance is the fourth factor listed by Archibald 
et al:334   “The focus of the due diligence test is the conduct which was or 
was not exercised in relation to the ‘particular event’ giving rise to the 
charge, and not a more general standard of care.” 
 
• Industry standards 
In relation to the role of industry standards in due diligence, Stranz notes 
that the standard of due diligence may change with time: the defence 
evolves with our scientific and technological knowledge.335  Archibald et al 
urge caution with regard to industry standards, for these:  
 
 May serve to perpetuate old practices that are not necessarily  
the best practices.  A related concern is that industry may well  
                                            
330 4-27, 28. 
331 R v Rio Algom, (1988) 3 CELR (NS) 171 OCA 
332 2002) 220 DLR (4th) 173 (OCA) 
333 4-29.  Referring to R v Gonder (1981), 62 CCC (2d) 326 (Yukon Territorial Ct.) 
334 4-31: R v Imperial Oil Ltd. (2000), 148 CCC (3d) 367 (BCCA 
335 Having reproduced this quote, I realize that Stranz wrote in 1992.  I have supplemented her writing with 
more current cases and doctrine and have only cited her assertions that are not outdated.  She does, 
however, provide a useful framework in which to analyze the defence.   
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set standards that are lower than the regulatory scheme contemplated  
and, through the operation of due diligence, the ultimate standards  
would be lowered.336 
 
In discussing R v. Modern Niagara Toronto Inc, Mary Beth Currie337 
explains that 
“the courts rejected the defence that compliance with industry standards 
automatically provides a due diligence defence in a regulatory 
prosecution.  In fact, the prevailing view was that industry standards are 
irrelevant if they do not meet the minimum statutory requirements.” 
 
Under the rubric of industry standards, here are some specific measures 
courts have viewed favourably in the context of the due diligence defence:  
o The hiring of a chemist to offer a peer review of technological 
solutions; and  
o Reliance on comparative data if the information in Canadian 
industry is not wide enough to develop proper standards.338 
 
• The character of the neighborhood 
Courts will also look at the efforts made by a defendant to address the 
problem. Pointing to Amoco Fabrics, the authors note two bases of liability 
leading to a possible due diligence defence: the initial spill and an 
inadequate response to the incident.339  The authors note that actions of 
the accused after the charge period should not be relevant to the due 
diligence defence unless they fall within a narrow rule of evidence.340 
 
• What efforts have been made to address the problem 
The next factor to assess under due diligence is the period of time in 
which the event occurred and the promptness of the defendant’s 
response.  The authors explain that the essence of the defence requires 
the accused to lead evidence regarding pre-charge steps they took to 
avoid the incident.341  In environmental cases where the damage is 
ongoing, (possibly analogous to continuing consumer exposure to unsafe 
products that have entered the marketplace,) the authors explain that, “a 
defendant will be liable for the continuing discharge up until the time when 
the defendant intervenes in a reasonable manner.”342 
 
                                            
336 4-32. 
337 “Due Diligence more than standard” http://www.ohscanada.com/LawFile/dueDil.asp (Accessed: May 2, 
2006). 
338In R v. Amoco Fabrics and Fibres Ltd., (1992), 73 CCC (3d) 558 (Ont Prov Div.) cited at 4-33, the court 
approvingly considered the sequential steps taken by the defendant to remediate a contaminated site in the 
context of standard American practice.. 
339 Ibid. 
340 4-36. 
341 4-37. 
342 4-38. 
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• Over what period of time, and promptness of the response 
Courts will also consider “matters beyond the control of the accused.”  
This factor considers what possible solutions the defendant can carry out 
given “technological limits.”  Archibald explains that this consideration 
speaks to technology during the charge period.343   
 
• Matters beyond the control of the accused, including technological 
limitations 
A further factor on the list is the “skill level expected of the defendant.”   It 
is understood that higher standards of conduct are required of 
“sophisticated” defendants, although the inexperience of a less developed 
firm will generally not constitute a defence.  That both of these principles 
seem to work against the defendant, speaks to a concern that reliance on 
the skill of the defendant will undercut regulatory standards or lower 
standards.344,345   
 
• Skill level expected of the accused 
Reliance on consultants is also singled out as a common issue in due 
diligence.  The authors explain: “[t]he extent to which courts will permit a 
due diligence defence based on reliance on consultants is directly 
proportional to the degree of experience of such consultants.”346  In this 
context, courts will assess whether a particular consultant was 
appropriately qualified.347 
 
• The complexities involved 
The “complexities involved” are also taken into account.  If a defendant, in 
good faith, takes a great deal of time to deal with a matter in order to find 
the best solution, courts might take this into account in considering due 
diligence.  This must be distinguished from instances where a defendant is 
“dawdling” to avoid spending money to rectify the problem.348 
 
• Preventative systems 
Courts may also have regard to preventative systems put in place by the 
defendant.  More specifically, courts consider “whether a given violation is 
an anomaly within a legitimate prevention program, or whether it is 
symptomatic of a larger failure in the organization.”349 
                                            
343 Archibald points to R v. Hen-Sieg Holdings Ltd. (1996) 21 CELR (NS) 57 (Ont. CJ), where the 
defendant remediated a contaminated site to the best of anyone’s efforts or knowledge in the field.   
344 4-42, 43. 
345 4-42. In R v. Imperial Oil, (2000), 148 CCC (3d) 367 (BCCA) the “sophisticated” defendant was not 
allowed to rely on testing of a harmful substance done by a third party which did not deem it toxic; given 
its stature, Imperial Oil ought to have carried out its own tests.  Imperial Oil ought to have been familiar 
with the substances used in its operations..   
346 4-44. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 4-46. 
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• Economic considerations 
“Economic considerations” speak to economic factors that courts will 
weigh in assessing whether a defendant behaved reasonably; these are 
one group of factors that the court will examine.350  While courts are 
mindful of the reality of economic circumstances, they are also reluctant to 
allow defendants to use lack of resources as a justification for 
environmental or occupational offences.351   
 
• Actions of officials. 
The final item on the due diligence inventory is “Actions of government 
officials”: “the advice, actions or lack thereof, and opinions of government 
officials are factors in considering the defendant’s knowledge of the 
problem and solutions.”  The authors suggest that this is a difficult factor to 
establish, as the defendant will still be expected to act diligently, advice 
notwithstanding. 
 
 
Regulatory Liability of Public Authorities 
 
In general, lawsuits against governments are on the rise, especially in areas of 
environmental and health regulation.  The reasons for this include: 
 
• Changing societal demographics calling for greater demands on the health 
care system; 
• Progress in medical science making a wider variety of more expensive 
pharmaceuticals and technologies available;  
• The desire of aggrieved plaintiffs to seek redress from responsible parties 
with adequate resources to pay damages, and, when such defendants are 
not available, to avail themselves of the perceived “deep pockets” of 
government; 
• The desire of aggrieved plaintiffs to prod government officials into taking a 
particular course of administrative action; 
• The desire of aggrieved plaintiffs to make a ‘political statement’; 
• The availability of class actions; and  
• The fact that Canada has become a more litigious society generally, in 
which there are higher public expectations of a duty of care on 
government. 352 
 
                                            
350 4-46, 47. 
351 4-48, citing R v. International Graphite (unreported, Feb 28, 2003 ON Ct. (Prov. Div.))  Archibald et al 
also include a subsection on “Economic Considerations and Government Defendants”, explaining how 
economic considerations affect public bodies, such as Crown Corporations.  See pp. 4-49 ff.  
352 Jack Coop, Public Law Liabilities and Litigation: The Latest and Most Significant Issues, February 3, 
2005, Ontario Bar Association Institute of Continuing Legal Education, p. 2 
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The enactment of a general safety requirement as part of a new Canada Health 
Protection Act (CHPA) raises a number of regulatory liability issues for Health 
Canada.  These include: 
 
• The Government’s private law duty of care under the proposed CHPA  
Will the new Canada Health Protection Act (in particular, the GSR 
provision) be construed by the Courts as a statute envisaging that 
decisions made by officials will be of the type that raise a private law duty 
of care353 to individuals or particular segments of the public, on the one 
hand, or only to the public-at-large, on the other? 
 
• Immediate increase in scope of regulatory responsibility under the 
GSR  
How can Health Canada manage its policy and operational decisions 
effectively to minimize the Government’s increased exposure to regulatory 
liability resulting from an immediate, exponential increase in its regulatory 
authority for all currently unregulated products and unforeseen product 
risks following the enactment of a GSR? 
 
• Greatly expanded advisory functions under the GSR / Negligent 
Misrepresentation  
How far will Health Canada’s extensive advisory functions under the GSR 
lead to increased exposure to claims against government based on 
negligent misrepresentation, as officials try to help industry deal with the 
multiple uncertainties associated with administering a GSR regime?  
(Which standards apply? What constitutes compliance? Etc.) 
 
• Implementing risk-based strategies – Reporting Requirements / 
Enhanced Risk Assessment / Duty to Warn or to Act 
Will Health Canada be under an enhanced duty to warn consumers of 
products risk, or to act more expeditiously against non-compliers based on 
better information about dangerous products under more effective 
reporting requirements and complaints programs instituted under a new 
GSR regime, that is, where producers fail to discharge their primary duty 
to warn under the GSR? Having better identified specific product risks 
through enhanced risk assessment strategies and better injury data 
collection, will Health Canada have the capacity (resources and skills) to 
deal with those risks under its compliance and enforcement policies where 
industry has failed to act responsibly? 
 
• Proper use of significantly increased official discretion under GSR –        
‘Over-enforcement’  
                                            
353 For example, to effectively supervise the self-regulatory responsibilities of industry; to warn the public 
when industry fails to meet their responsibilities and place members of the public in danger, or to act to 
mitigate or remediate the danger when industry fails to do so. 
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How will Health Canada manage the greatly increased enforcement 
discretion Health Canada’s officials have to proceed with ‘general safety 
violations’ under a GSR to minimize damage claims based on negligence 
resulting from over-enforcement? 
 
It is well established in Canada that a public authority’s private law duty of care 
toward individuals is determined in accordance with the two-step analysis first 
enunciated by the House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council: 
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person 
who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or 
neighborhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter — in which 
case a prima facie duty of care arises.  Secondly, if the first question is answered 
affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations 
which ought to negate, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise. 
354 
Much of the recent case law under this test has focused on the requirement that 
there be the “requisite proximity of relationship” between government and 
individuals adversely affected by government action to found a private law duty of 
care.  “Proximity” is established by three methods: a) by establishing that the 
case falls within categories of proximity already recognized by the courts;355 b) by 
showing an actual proximate relationship on the facts of the particular case, or c) 
by showing that the governing statute establishes the proximity necessary upon 
which to found an actionable private law duty of care.356 
 
Private Law Duty Emanating from the Governing Statute(s) 
In the case of Mitchell Estate v. Ontario357, the plaintiff alleged that the Ontario 
Government had been negligent in its under funding and restructuring of the of 
the health care system resulting in delayed emergency room treatment and the 
consequent death of an infant.  While the court might have dismissed this case 
on the basis that it involved an attack on a traditional ‘policy’ decision concerning 
the allocation of funds to health care and health care institutions, instead, the 
Court closely examined the duties implied under the legislative scheme to 
determine whether it contemplated the creation of a private law duty of care 
toward individuals.  The Court concluded it did not. 
 
                                            
354 [1978] A.C. 728, at pp. 751-52:  
 
355 For example, an act foreseeably causing physical harm, negligent misstatements, where a duty to warn 
has been recognized, misfeasance in public office, road maintenance cases, and municipal inspection cases. 
356 Cooper v Hobart (2001) S.C.C. 79, at para’s. 36 and 41-43 
357 [2004] 242 D.L.R. (4th) 560 (Div. Ct.) 
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These provisions show that the Minister has a public duty to ‘promote and assist 
in the development of adequate health resources, both human and material, in 
Ontario’.  Nothing in the Act gives the Premier of the Minister of health or any 
Ministry official authority to supervise the day-to-day operations of a hospital or 
medical and nursing staff. 
 
Thus, the governing statues make it clear that the Minister has a wide discretion 
to make policy decisions with respect to the funding of hospitals.  The legislative 
framework gives the Minister the power to act in the public interest, and in 
exercising her powers, she must balance a myriad of competing interests.  The 
terms of the legislation make it clear that her duty is to the public as a whole not 
to a particular individual.358 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the case of Health Canada under a GSR regime, however, the department is 
likely to have day-to-day responsibility for overseeing the effectiveness of self-
regulatory activities of producers, suppliers and importers of consumer products.  
One of the effects of increased litigation against government is the “continuing 
pressure by plaintiffs to strain the boundaries of conventional tort law in their 
quest for a ruling in favour of regulatory liability. 359   The law in this area is in flux, 
and merits close monitoring by Health Canada.”  
One line of recent cases in which negligence has been alleged in the federal and 
provincial governments handling of the SARS crises and the West Nile Virus 
disease merits special monitoring by the Department.360  Most of these decisions 
arose before trial in the context of a ‘motion to strike,’ that is an argument by the 
defendant that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the Government owed a 
prima facie duty of care to the plaintiff and that there was, therefore, no cause of 
action. Since Courts are careful not to end disputes prematurely on such 
motions, the defendant must usually establish that it is ‘plain and obvious’ that 
there is no chance of success at trial from the outset. 
In Williams v. Canada (Attorney General),361 the plaintiff alleged that the Ontario 
Minister of Health acted prematurely in announcing that the SARS outbreak was 
under control and in relaxing hospital safety measures in order to have a travel 
advisory against the City of Toronto lifted by the World Health Organization.     
 The announcements by the provincial officials were said to be premature 
because a second wave of SARS commenced at North York General Hospital. 
As a result of the position taken by the defendants and pressure they exerted to 
have the hospital deny that further cases had been discovered, a number of 
SARS patients were mis-diagnosed and transferred the disease to other patients 
                                            
358 Ibid. 
359 Jack Coop, Public Law Liabilities and Litigation: The Latest and Most Significant Issues, February 3, 
2005, Ontario Bar Association Institute of Continuing Legal Education, p. 2 
 
360 See, in particular, Williams v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 CanLII 29502 (ON S.C.); Eliopoulos v. 
Ontario (Minister of Health and Long Term Care), 2004 CanLII 4030 (ON S.C.) and amal v. Scarborough 
Hospital, 2005 CanLII 29500 (ON S.C.) 
361 2005 CanLII 29502 (ON S.C.); 
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and staff of the hospital. Subsequently, the government officials announced that, 
contrary to their previous statements, the outbreak had not been contained. 
In Williams, the Court considered whether the defendant government’s duties 
under the relevant Health Statutes placed them in a position that was sufficiently 
‘proximate’ to the injured plaintiffs as to support a private duty of care in favour of 
the plaintiffs to avoid the foreseeable harm that occurred to them.  In searching 
for a relationship of proximity outside the standard categories of negligence, the 
Court stated that the following factors were to be taken into account.  
 (a) Does the legislation expressly, or by implication, disclose a legislative 
intention to confer- or to exclude - private law rights of compensation on 
individuals who suffered damages caused by the breach? In many cases, 
the search for an implication either way in the guise of an exercise in 
statutory interpretation will involve "looking for what is not there"362; 
 
(b) Were the duties imposed in the interests of the public or in those of 
discrete classes, or groups, of individuals that include the plaintiff ? In this 
connection, it will be relevant to ask whether decisions to perform such 
duties – or to perform them in some manner or to some extent - "require 
the exercise of legislatively delegated discretion and involve pursuing a 
myriad of objectives consistent with public rather than private law 
duties":363  If the existence of a private law duty would potentially conflict 
with overarching duties owed to the public, this will tend to preclude a 
finding of a private law duty; 
 
(c) Did the alleged breach of duty consist of a failure to exercise the 
statutory duties, or of a purported exercise of them, that specifically 
affected a discrete class, or group, of individuals that included the 
plaintiff?364  
  
(d) How close is the causal connection between the alleged breach of 
duty and the damages allegedly suffered? 
  
(e) What, if any, representations were made by the defendant and did the 
plaintiff reasonably rely on them or otherwise on the performance of 
powers and duties conferred, or imposed, for the protection of the 
public?365  
  
(f) What, if any, were the plaintiff’s other reasonable expectations? and 
  
(g) Were the relevant statutory duties imposed on officials to whom 
political sanctions will be potentially applicable ? (emphasis added) 
 
                                            
362 Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, at page 226, but inferences may be drawn from the purpose and 
overall scheme of the legislation –Cooper, at para 49 
363 Edwards, at page 572; Cooper at page 559. 
364 see Air India, at pages 138-9; Jane Doe v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Commissioners of Police , 
[1989] O.J. No. 471 (G.D.), (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (Div. Ct.), at pages 230-1 
365 Cooper, at page 552 
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In Williams, the allegations pleaded against Health Canada, that it had failed in 
its duty under section 4 of the Department of Health Act,366 were disallowed by 
the Court because the duties under that Act were clearly owed to the “People of 
Canada” collectively, and not individually. Accordingly, no relationship of 
proximity was established with individual defendants such as would support any 
private cause of action. 
 
The relationship between the government and the governed is not one of 
individual proximity. Any, perhaps most, government actions are likely to cause 
harm to some members of the public. That is why government is not an easy 
matter. Of course, the government owes a duty to the public but it is a duty owed 
to the public collectively and not individually. The remedy for those who think that 
duty has not been fulfilled is at the polls and not before the Courts.367 
 
Despite finding that the federal Department of Health Act provided inadequate 
support for the existence of a private law duty of care owed to the plaintiffs in the 
class action, the Court stated that it was still possible that, having decided to 
perform its statutory duties in a particular manner, proximity may be established 
by the conduct of a Minister, or employees of a Ministry, vis a vis particular 
individuals or classes of individuals in the course of such performance.  The 
allegations against the Provincial government, went beyond references to 
statutory duties.  The Plaintiffs alleged that the Provincial Minister breached 
duties or abused discretionary powers provided for in the legislation directed 
specifically at health care precautions to be taken to prevent the transmission of 
SARS at public hospitals in, or near, the City of Toronto. These included: 
• A directive by the Minister that hospitals were to offer only essential 
services; 
• A series of directives to hospitals regulating the admission of patients and 
visitors, and the use of protective clothing and equipment; 
• The premature lifting of the emergency, dismantling of the SARS 
operations centre, public statements that the outbreak had been contained 
                                            
366 Section 4 of the Department of Health Act, S.C. 1996 c. 8, provides: that. 
4. (1) the powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters 
over which Parliament has jurisdiction relating to the promotion and preservation of the 
health of the people of Canada not by law assigned to any other department, board or 
agency of the Government of Canada.  (2) Without restricting the generality of subsection 
(1), the Minister's powers, duties and functions relating to health include the following 
matters: …(b) the protection of the people of Canada against risks to health and the 
spreading of diseases; (c) investigation and research into public health, including the 
monitoring of diseases; …(h) subject to the Statistics Act, the collection, analysis, 
interpretation, publication and distribution of information relating to public health; and (i) 
cooperation with provincial authorities with a view to the coordination of efforts made or 
proposed for preserving and improving public health. 
 
367 Per Hugessen J. in  A.O. Farms Inc v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1771 (F.C.T.D.), at para 11: 
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- notwithstanding information that further cases continued to be 
diagnosed; and 
• Advising hospitals to ease their infection control procedures. 
 
In the face of these allegations, and the allegations of the motivation behind the 
decisions that led to (c) and (d) above, it was not ‘plain and obvious’ to the Court 
that the plaintiff would be unable to establish proximity between the Provincial 
Crown and class members and the issues were left to the trial judge.  The 
allegations were allowed to proceed to trial. 
 
In Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health and Long Term Care), 368 a group of 
approximately 40 actions were launched against the government of Ontario by 
plaintiffs who were infected by West Nile Virus (“WNV”) in 2002. The plaintiffs 
alleged that they were infected with or affected by WNV as a result of the 
defendant’s negligence resulting from its failure to meet a private law duty of care 
emanating under Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act.369    
 
The duties in Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act (HPPA) resemble 
more closely those likely contemplated by Health Canada under the proposed 
Canada Health Protection Act.  In Eliopoulos, the Court found that the HPPA 
conferred wide powers on the government and local boards to make policy 
decisions and to make and implement operational decisions, sufficient to find a 
private law duty of care if the Anns test were met and if it could be held that the 
alleged negligent acts and omissions of the government arose as a result of the 
government implementing policy at the operational level.370  
                                            
368 2004 CanLII 4030 (ON S.C.) 
369 , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7   
370  Section 86(1) of Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7 states: 
 86(1) if the Minister is of the opinion that a situation exists anywhere in Ontario that constitutes 
or may constitute a risk to the health of any person, he or she may investigate the situation and 
take such action as he considers appropriate to prevent, eliminate or decrease the risk  
Section 6(2) of the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M 26 states 
 6(2) the Minister in exercising his or her powers in carrying out his or her duties under this Act      
 (b) shall promote and assist in the development of adequate health resources both human and 
material in Ontario.  
 Section 2 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act (“HPPA”) reads. 
  2. The purpose of this Act is to provide for the organization and delivery of public health 
programs and services, the prevention of the spread of disease and the promotion and protection of 
the health of the people of Ontario.  
 Part VII of the HPPA contains many of the Minister’s powers. Under sections 78 and 80, the Minister has 
the power to conduct investigations and to appoint inspectors to carry out the Act. Under sections 81 and 
82, the Minister is required to appoint a Chief Medical Officer of Health and assessors.  
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The Court also found that there was a sufficient ‘proximity’ of relationship with the 
plaintiffs to satisfy the first branch of the Anns test.   
 The plaintiffs allege that, in our case, a duty was owed to a special group in a 
special area. They argue that they need not show, as the defendant suggested, 
that the defendant could have predicted which mosquito was going to bite which 
person. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant’s acts and omissions closely and 
directly affected the persons infected with WNV. They allege that the 
government's surveillance of birds indicated that the government knew where the 
WNV “hotspots” would be. Most cases of WNV were centered in Toronto and 
Mississauga. I find that if the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are true, the plaintiffs 
were in sufficient proximity to satisfy the first branch of the Anns test.371  
(emphasis added) 
The Court then canvassed whether the decisions of Ontario officials complained 
of in this case were policy or operational decisions.   A private law duty of care 
may only arise when a government is carrying out its policy decisions at the 
operational level.  As with many principles of law, however, it is easier to state 
the principle than to actually draw the line between policy and operations, 
especially where the alleged negligence is based on an omission to do 
something that perhaps ought to have been done.  In this case, the Court found 
that many of the decisions taken under Ontario’s Health Protection and 
Promotion Act could be construed as operational decisions and thus were 
remitted to the trial judge for consideration.   
(Note:  On November 3, 2006, after the completion of this Report, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal allowed the Ontario Government’s appeal in the Eliopoulos 
(West Nile Virus) case.372  The court found that the generalized risk presented by 
West Nile Virus was not the type of risk whose management raised a private law 
duty of care under Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act.   The Court 
concluded that the powers and duties the Act prescribes did not create a 
relationship of proximity between Ontario and Eliopoulos sufficient to ground a 
private law duty of care.  
 
In my view, these important and extensive statutory provisions create 
discretionary powers that are not capable of creating a private law duty.  The 
discretionary powers created by the HPPA are to be exercised, if the Minister 
chooses to exercise them, in the general public interest.  They are not aimed at 
or geared to the protection of the private interests of specific individuals.  From 
the statement of purpose in s. 2 and by implication from the overall scheme of 
                                                                                                                                  
The HPPA gives considerable power and responsibility to local boards of health and medical officers of 
health. The defendant submits that this indicates that it is the local boards, if anyone, who would be subject 
to duties under the Act. However, I find that it is apparent from the statutory scheme that the Minister 
retains control over the enforcement of the HPPA, either personally or through his delegates.  
 
371 Eliopoulos decision, supra, para. 28. 
372 Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health and Long Term Care, decision rendered November 3, 2006, 
Docket C44577, accessed on November 7, 2006 at 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2006/november/C44577.htm  
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the HPPA, no doubt there is a general public law duty that requires the Minister 
to endeavour to promote, safeguard, and protect the health of Ontario residents 
and prevent the spread of infectious diseases.  However, a general public law 
duty of that nature does not give rise to a private law duty sufficient to ground an 
action in negligence.  I fail to see how it could be possible to convert any of the 
Minister’s public law discretionary powers, to be exercised in the general public 
interest, into private law duties owed to specific individuals.  Although Mitchell 
(Litigation Administrator of) v. Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 571 (Div. Ct.), was 
concerned with a different statute, I agree with and adopt Swinton J.’s analysis at 
paras. 28 and 30 as applicable to the present case.373 
 
 The respondents also submitted that the even if the HPPA by itself imposed no 
private law duty, by issuing the Plan, Ontario made a policy decision to act and 
therefore triggered a private law duty to use due care to implement the Plan at 
the operational level:  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the view 
that the Ministry undertook to do very little under the surveillance plan, if anything 
at all, beyond providing information and encouraging coordination.  The 
implementation of specific measures was essentially left to the discretion of 
members of the public, local authorities, and local boards of health. 
 
To summarize, the Plan provided information about WNV and encouraged 
members of the public and local authorities, in cooperation with various 
governmental and non-governmental agencies, to undertake surveillance and 
preventative measures.  The Ministry did not undertake to collect infected birds, 
conduct inspections, or take measures to reduce or eliminate the mosquito 
population, nor did it mandate such measures.  The Ministry merely provided 
others with information and recommendations.  In my view, the Plan falls well 
short of the sort of policy decision to do something about a particular risk that 
triggers a private law duty of care to implement such policy at the operational 
level in a non-negligent manner.374  
 
As of the date of this addendum to our Report, no decision had been taken about 
a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Health Canada should, 
therefore, carefully monitor developments in this case, and in the SARS cases, 
since they may have important implications for Health Canada’s exposure to 
regulatory liability under a GSR regime in the consumer product safety area.  The 
most recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, however, suggests great 
hesitation on the part of the judiciary to find a private law duty of care on the part 
of governments attempting to prevent injury to the public at large from 
generalized risks.)   
 
Importance of Ensuring that Operational Plans are Adequately Resourced 
Health Canada’s compliance and enforcement resources may be severely 
strained under the sweeping, and somewhat indeterminate, scope of regulatory 
responsibility brought in with the enactment of a general safety requirement.  
                                            
373 Ibid., para. 17 
374 Ibid., para 25. 
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Health Canada will have to be particularly careful to ensure that its operational 
plans for implementing the GSR are sufficiently resourced before they are 
finalized; otherwise the Department will be unreasonably exposed to claims in 
negligence based on the failure to act in accordance with their own policy. 
 
Normally, the Courts consider the allocation of funds in compliance and 
enforcement programs to involve pure policy decisions, but this does not mean a 
Court will not review any decision involving money, or accept the fact that an 
approved enforcement plan is under-resourced as a defence to evade liability.   
 
The defendant argued that courts have held that one of the hallmarks of a policy 
decision is that it considers economic factors. It is partly on this basis that the 
defendant has argued that the government’s action or inaction in response to 
West Nile Virus was a matter of policy. The defendant is correct that policy 
decisions are political decisions largely based on allocation of funds and that it is 
not the role of the courts to dictate how public funds should be spent. The 
appropriate check on governmental spending policies is the ballot box.  
This does not mean, however, that the courts may not review any decision 
involving money. In our case, the government at the policy level decided to 
address WNV. The defendant cannot suggest that the government would create 
a detailed operational manual for dealing with WNV without having made the 
necessary budgetary decisions for the implementation of the Plan. Indeed, the 
defendant stated in its factum that the decisions outlined in the Plan clearly take 
into account economic, social, and political factors. If the government has 
committed to and planned for the taking of certain steps, it cannot sidestep 
liability by claiming that implementation involves money.  
Cory J. in Just made it clear that the courts may scrutinize expenditures, or the 
lack of them, when looking at the operational aspects of government action or 
decisions. Part of the consideration of whether actions and decisions were 
reasonable may entail an examination of the budgetary circumstances that were 
set out in the policy decisions that mandated the operational aspect of the 
impugned conduct. This acknowledges that the broad budgetary issues and 
allotment of funds took place at the policy level. The reasonableness of 
operational actions may be judged in light of how that money was used and if it 
was used in a way consistent with the underlying policy and statutory obligations. 
At this early stage, we do not have all the facts about what role, if any, money 
played in the impugned decisions of the government. These are details that may 
only come to light at trial.  (Emphasis added)375 
 
To summarize, therefore:  
 
What each of the cases underscore is the importance of a careful analysis of the 
statutory scheme under the second stage of the Anns test, when dealing with an 
action for regulatory negligence.  When members of the public seek to hold 
particular public officials accountable in negligence for making a decision in their 
                                            
375 Eliopoulos decision, supra, para’s 51-52  
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official capacity, the issue quickly devolves into one of whether the statute 
creates proximity and a private duty of care to the individual plaintiff.  The courts 
consider such factors as whether the decision requires the exercise of a broad 
statutory discretion, is a policy decision, is made in the public interest and for the 
benefit of the public generally (as opposed to for the plaintiff personally), requires 
the balancing of competing interests, creates a proximate relationship to the 
particular plaintiff, or is otherwise protected by a statutory immunity provision.” 
376 
 
 
Negligent Misrepresentation - Health Canada’s Advisory Function 
under the GSR 
 
Given the multiple layers of uncertainty associated with the GSR in the definition 
of “safe” or “unsafe” consumer products, inconsistency in the results produced by 
risk assessment methodologies and uncertainty in the methods of establishing 
conformity with the GSR, it is to be expected that industry will rely heavily on 
Health Canada for advice to clarify the requirements under the law for general 
‘comfort’, possibly on a product-by-product basis.  The Government’s advisory 
function will take many forms, including: oral advice from officials, published 
policies and guidelines, rulings, warnings, exemptions, compliance orders, 
operational manuals or sharing research conducted within the Department upon 
which producers might be expected to rely (for example, in relation to the 
availability of standards raising a presumption of conformity with the GSR). 
 
The potential for negligent misrepresentation by officials therefore looms large 
under the GSR.   Tort liability will attach to the government’s advisory function 
where officials provide false or misleading information on which producers or 
others in the supply chain may be expected to rely and, in consequence of that 
advice suffer damage, usually in the form of financial loss. 
 
….if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely 
upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person 
takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or 
advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will 
place reliance on it, then a duty of care will arise.377  
 
Federal officials will likely be asked frequently for ‘interpretations’ of elements of 
the GSR given the vagueness of some of its terms, and doubts surrounding the 
Government’s conformity assessment requirements.  In H.L. & M. Shoppers Ltd. 
V. Town of Berwick378 a municipal employee failed to correctly interpret a 
                                            
376 Jack Coop, Public Law Liabilities and Litigation: The Latest and Most Significant Issues, February 3, 
2005, Ontario Bar Association Institute of Continuing Legal Education, p. 15 
 
377 Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, per dictum of Lord Morris of Borth-y-
Gest 
378 (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 23 (N.S.S.C.) 
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building bylaw that had already been definitively interpreted by the Courts in 
another decision.  The Municipality was found vicariously liable for damages 
caused to the plaintiff for issuing a building permit in error and then having to 
revoke it.  Financial loss awards are of particular concern to governments 
because of their potential enormity.  It is not difficult to foresee the potential for 
large awards in the consumer product area if producers were make costly, but 
unnecessary, changes in their production process on the basis of false or 
misleading information supplied by government officials about safety 
requirements.  
 
In addition, the law may impose a duty to provide complete information on 
officials of government who are represented as subject experts or professionals 
for the purpose of providing clarifying advice to industry on the operation of the 
GSR.  Providing less than complete advice has been found to constitute 
negligent representation where it is given by “experts”, or professionals. 379   
 
In Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation,380 the plaintiff, a purchaser 
of car insurance from the public automobile insurer, was not told of the various 
types of insurance policies that were available and chose the least expensive 
package, one that failed to cover all of his expenses arising from an out-of-
province accident.  The court found a duty of care relating to provide complete 
information about the various options based upon the fact that such information 
was in the nature of professional advice.   
 
Spinks v. Canada381 also demonstrates how foreseeable reliance on advice may 
create a special relationship between the advisor and the recipient of the advice 
such as to create a private law duty of care. In Spinks, the plaintiff was an 
employee of Atomic Energy Canada Ltd.  At his ‘signing on interview with 
personnel officers of AECL, he was not informed of his right under the applicable 
regulations to buy back his prior pensionable service with the government of 
Australia for the purpose of augmenting his subsequent pensionable service with 
AECL.  After 13 years with AECL, he became aware of the buy back option, at 
which time the cost of the buy back was $210,000.  If he had been advised of the 
option on hiring, the cost would have been $68, 000.  He claimed the difference 
as damages arising from the alleged misrepresentation on the part of AECL’s 
personnel employee on the ground that he had failed to advise him fully and 
correctly of his buy-back options. 
 
While the Trial Judge dismissed the claim on the view that the staffing officer did 
not owe the employee any duty of care, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed the 
                                            
379 In R v. Inco Ltd., (2006) 80 O.R. (3d) 594 the Court held that an employee of the Investigations and 
Enforcement Branch of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment was an “expert” witness in the 
circumstances of this case notwithstanding that his independence might appear to be impaired by the fact of 
his employment by one of the parties. 
380 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191 
381 [1996] 2 F.C. 563 (C.A.). 
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finding.  The Appellate Court held that a special relationship between representor 
and representee is usually created where reliance on the representations is 
clearly foreseeable.    The Court required no proof that the plaintiff actually relied 
on the misrepresentation.  In this case, AECL had also created a manual, which 
explicitly required staffing officers to advise new employees of pension rights and 
found that AECL had breached the standard of care that could reasonably be 
expected of employers when advising new employees in such circumstances. 
 
Duty to Warn – Reporting Requirements / Complaints / Injury Data 
Collection 
 
The law recognizes that a duty of care may take the form of a ‘duty to warn’ 
particular individuals or classes of persons of potential harm.  In some factual 
circumstances, therefore, the failure to notify or warn will constitute actionable 
negligence where harm occurs that might otherwise have been avoided or 
mitigated had the warning been given.  In the Eliopoulos decision mentioned 
above (The West Nile Virus case) for example, the plaintiffs alleged that, “the 
government's surveillance of birds indicated that the government knew where the 
WNV “hotspots” would be. Most cases of WNV were centered in Toronto and 
Mississauga.”  Such circumstances might raise a duty to warn individuals visiting 
or working in Toronto hospitals (or a residents of Toronto generally) of special 
vulnerability to contracting the disease based on local data about infections. 
 
In Teachers Investment and Housing v. Jennings382 the court refused to strike 
out a statement of claim in a negligence action brought against provincial 
regulatory authorities for failing to warn a regulated investment cooperative that 
its investment activities were imprudent or possibly unauthorized by governing 
legislation.  The court found that the statutory powers and duties of the official in 
question, the Superintendent, included protection of a cooperative association.   
  
If reporting responsibilities under a GSR produce much more complete 
information about risk of injury from unregulated dangerous products and about 
the population vulnerable to such risks, the government’s exposure to liability 
flowing from the failure to meet a duty to warn, or to act in accordance with its 
compliance policies, where the producer (who has the primary duty to warn of 
defective products) fails to do so, could increase significantly.  The government’s 
exposure to liability will be influenced greatly by whether or not government might 
be fixed with a secondary duty of care (i.e.: arising on the producers failing to 
warn) under the proposed CHPA, or establishes an enforcement policy calling for 
warning the public and then negligently fails to carry it out. 
 
 
 
                                            
382 (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 203 (S.C.), affid, 56 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (C.A.),  
 
                                                                                             168
10. Other Legal Considerations 
 
Legal Framework Issues / Recall Orders 
 
In Europe, most of the Member States have direct regulatory authority for 
consumer product safety legislation.  As a consequence, Member States are able 
to employ a full range of administrative, civil and criminal remedies in furtherance 
of the product safety schemes. 
 
Under Canada’s Constitution383, “health” is not assigned as an exclusive head of 
power to either the provincial or federal governments.384  Apart from exceptional 
use of the Peace, Order and Good Government power385, the federal 
government’s authority to legislate in the area of health is based on its authority, 
under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act to punish conduct that is dangerous 
to health.386  In terms of designing a GSR for the proposed Canada Health 
Protection Act, two important consequences flow from this basis of authority, 
namely:  
 
• A more limited range of remedies (perhaps not including administrative 
recall) is available under the scheme; and 
 
• While there is a broad scope for the federal government to “regulate” for 
criminal law purposes (e.g. to protect public health), there is no bright line 
between regulating for criminal law purposes and federal regulation that 
may interfere unduly with provincial responsibility for “property and civil 
rights.”  Accordingly, additional care must be taken in designing a GSR to 
ensure that the regulatory aspect of the scheme is closely linked to the 
                                            
383 The Constitution Act, 1867 
384 See RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 
32: “As Estey J. observed in Schneider v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, at p. 142 "health" is not a 
matter which is subject to specific constitutional assignment but instead is an amorphous topic which can 
be addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in the circumstances of each case on the 
nature or scope of the health problem in question. 
 
     Given the "amorphous" nature of health as a constitutional matter, and the resulting fact that Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures may both validly legislate in this area, it is important to emphasize once 
again the plenary nature of the criminal law power. In the Margarine Reference, supra, at pp. 49-50, Rand 
J. made it clear that the protection of "health" is one of the "ordinary ends" served by the criminal law, and 
that the criminal law power may validly be used to safeguard the public from any "injurious or undesirable 
effect". The scope of the federal power to create criminal legislation with respect to health matters is broad, 
and is circumscribed only by the requirements that the legislation must contain a prohibition accompanied 
by a penal sanction and must be directed at a legitimate public health evil. If a given piece of federal 
legislation contains these features, and if that legislation is not otherwise a "colourable" intrusion upon 
provincial jurisdiction, then it is valid as criminal law..” 
 
385 The POGG power may be invoked to deal with problems that have attained a “national dimension”, or 
to deal with national health emergencies. 
386 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Student Edition, 2005, at p. 484 
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protection of health and not, “in pith and substance”, for some other 
purpose – for example, to promote the international harmonization of 
product regulations to enhance international trade.387 
 
The ordinary, though not exclusive purposes served by the criminal law are 
public peace, order, security, health and morality.388  Sections 91(27) and 92(14) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 spell out he precise distribution of powers between 
the federal and provincial governments. The Federal Parliament has power under 
section 91(27) to make laws in relation to: “the criminal law, except the 
constitution of the courts of criminal liability, but including the procedure in 
criminal matters.” 
 
Provincial legislatures have power to make laws in relation to:  “the 
administration of justice in the provinces, including the constitution, maintenance 
and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and 
including procedure in civil matters in those courts.” 
 
If Health Canada considers that a recall power is essential for the effectiveness 
of a general safety requirement, the Department should require an early legal 
opinion to confirm that this remedy is constitutionally available under the 
proposed GSR scheme.  There are reasons to believe that it might not be.   
 
A recall order is civil remedy in the nature of a mandatory injunction.389   In 1986 
the Competition Tribunal was established with adjudicative authority to make a 
variety of orders including the cessation of certain anti-competitive trade 
practices, the prohibition of mergers or their approval subject to conditions, the 
divestiture of assets or shares, the dissolution of amalgamations and consent 
orders.  While many of these powers were subsequently upheld under federal 
authority over “Trade and Commerce,” Professor Peter Hogg, in his text on 
Constitutional Law of Canada, in commenting on these powers, noted:390  
 
These powers cannot be upheld as criminal law, because the Tribunal is not a 
court of criminal jurisdiction, and the orders can be made without any prior 
conviction for a criminal offence. 
 
                                            
387 See RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 and the cases cited 
thereunder.  See also Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, supra, pp. 499-503 under the heading The 
Criminal Law and Regulatory Authority. 
388 Hogg, supra at p. 477, citing the Margarine Reference, [1949] S.C.R. 1, per Rand J. at p. 50. 
389 Sharpe, Mr. Justice Robert I. J., Injunctions and Specific Performance, loose-leaf ed. (Aurora, Ont: 
Canada Law Book, 1998), at paras. 1.10, 1.60; See also R. v. Mills [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at para. 43, per 
Lamer J. and Pinet v. Administrator, Mental Health Centre, Penetanguishene et al. (2006) (80) O.R. (3d) 
139 at 159. 
390 At p. 489.  See also pages 495-503, under the headings the federal power to create civil remedies; the 
Criminal law power to create remedies and Criminal law and regulatory authority.  See also  
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Currently, only three federal statutes provide for product recalls, all of which are 
constitutionally supported under heads of federal authority other than the criminal 
law power.  The federal statutes with recall powers include:  
• The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, S.C. 1997 c. 6, s. 19391; 
• The Pest Control Products Act, 2002, c. 28, s. 21 (5) 392; and  
• The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, S.C. 1992, c. 34, s. 9 (2).393 
 
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act and the Pest Control Products Act 
are constitutionally based, at least in part, on the Federal Government’s authority 
to enact laws in relation to “Agriculture.”  Under section 95 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 both levels of government may make laws in relation to ‘agriculture.’  
 
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the 
Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the 
Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation to 
Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the 
Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or 
to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as 
it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada. 
                                            
391 The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act provides:  
19. (1) Where the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a product regulated under an Act or 
provision that the Agency enforces or administers by virtue of section 11 poses a risk to public, animal or 
plant health, the Minister may, by notice served on any person selling, marketing or distributing the 
product, order that the product be recalled or sent to a place designated by the Minister.  
 (2) Any person who contravenes a recall order referred to in subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 
six months or to both. 
 (3) For greater certainty, a recall order is not a statutory instrument for the purposes of the Statutory 
Instruments Act, but no person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) unless the person was 
notified of the order. 
392 The Pest Control Products Act, 2002, c. 28 provides, in section  21. (5) that:  
When cancelling the registration of a pest control product under this section or any other provision of 
this Act, the Minister may 
(a) allow the continued possession, handling, storage, distribution and use of stocks of the product in 
Canada at the time of cancellation, subject to any conditions, including disposal procedures, that the 
Minister considers necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act;(b) require the registrant to recall 
and dispose of the product in a manner specified by the Minister; or (c) seize and dispose of the product. 
393 The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act provides, in section 9 (2) that ..”Where the Minister or 
a person designated for the purposes of this section believes on reasonable grounds that any standardized 
means of containment are unsafe for handling or transporting dangerous goods, the Minister or the 
designated person may direct the manufacturer or importer who supplied them to issue notices of defective 
construction or recall to the persons to whom they were supplied. 
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The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act is founded not only upon federal 
legislative authority in relation to criminal law (i.e. protection of public health and 
safety) but also rests upon federal constitutional authority over inter-provincial or 
international transport.394   
 
 
Delegation of Legislative Authority – Back-Door Rulemaking? 
 
The principle of the rule of regulatory law known as the rule against sub-
delegation provides that, in the absence of express authority, a delegate of 
legislative powers may not further delegate those powers to another.   
 
The rule against sub-delegation is rooted in the rule of law – the set of overriding 
principles on which the operation of all legislative regimes is premised.  These 
principles operate as a constraint on the exercise of governmental power and 
serve as a guide to fair and effective law-making.  One objective of the rule of law 
is to ensure that laws are produced in a manner that permits a citizen to be 
effectively governed by them.  This requires, among other things, that 
governance must be effected by rules: 
 
1. That are made in advance of when they are to be applied; 
2. That operate prospectively; and,  
3. That have been publicized or otherwise made available to those whom 
they are to govern. 
 
Subdelegation undermines each of these objectives.395 
 
In the unique circumstances of the European Community, sub-delegation of 
legislative authority is a rather more common practice than in North America, 
where it is more likely to be viewed as a form of ‘back-door’ rulemaking. 
 
It is a primary function of Parliament to determine the guidelines of legislative 
policy.  Parliament should not, therefore, delegate to Ministers power to make 
regulations on matters of general principle unless it lays down in the enabling Act 
standards delimiting the boundaries of the delegate’s discretion.  Skeleton 
legislation is justifiable only in order to deal with a state of dire emergency (such 
as the Northern Ireland situation since 1972) or a quite exceptional situation, 
such as has been created by Britain’s accession to the European Communities.  
(emphasis added)396 
 
Quite apart from Community regulations which are directly applicable of their own 
force, further regulations have been and will have to be made in this country 
under powers delegated by the (European Communities) Act, 1972,  (s. 2(2)) to 
give effect to Community directives and decisions and also to implement in fuller 
                                            
394 Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, supra at p. 554, et seq. 
395 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, Butterworths, 2004, at p. 248 
396 de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Pelican Books, 5th ed. at p. 351 
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detail some Community regulations.  Orders in Council and departmental 
regulations made under these delegated powers have the effect of Acts of 
Parliament and can include any provision that might be made in an Act of 
Parliament, except that they are not to impose or increase taxation or have 
retroactive effect or sub-delegate legislative powers (other than the power to 
make procedural rules for the courts and tribunals) or create a new criminal 
offence punishable with more than two year’s imprisonment or a fine more than 
2000 pounds.  This is probably the most sweeping grant of delegated legislative 
powers to the Executive in modern times except under emergency conditions.397 
 
The General Product Safety Directive in Europe, and the  New Approach to 
Regulation of which it is an integral part, establishes a form of, ‘authorized’ 
delegation of legislative authority.  Essential product safety requirements are set 
out in the governing legislation (or Directive), which provides that voluntary 
technical standards developed by third-party ‘experts’ are to be substituted for 
regulations for the purpose of determining presumptive conformity with the 
governing legislation. 
 
An important question, therefore, is whether the GSR approach to regulation 
effectively ensures the ‘rule of law’ in regulating product safety.  Or are the 
uncertainties involved in defining what is ‘safe’, or the risk assessment processes 
for determining what is ‘unsafe’, so imprecise and inconsistent that issues of 
‘safety’ are, in practice, being determined on a more subjective, case by case, 
basis by individuals or committees of ‘experts’?   
 
“A more insidious form of sub-delegation can occur when vague terminology is 
employed in drafting regulatory rules.  Consider the example: 
 
No person operating a truck shall carry a load in an unsafe manner. 
 
If we assume that no consensus exists, either within the regulated industry or the 
public at large, as to the meaning of ‘unsafe’, then the breadth of possible 
meanings that can be given to that term gives an enforcement officer the 
discretion not as to whether a stated fact situation exists, but rather what the rule 
actually is.  While an enforcement official could interpret this rule as a simple 
prohibition against carrying an insecurely fastened load, he or she might also 
consider it to confer the right to decide (by choosing to ticket or not) what the 
maximum speed should be for transporting a given load, what type of safety 
equipment a given truck must carry for a given load, or even on what highways 
particular loads ca or cannot be carried.  The vagueness inherent in this type of 
drafting gives the enforcement officer the ability not simply to enforce the rule, 
but in effect to decide what the substance of the rule is. (final emphasis added)398 
 
Possible vagueness in the definition of the term ‘safe product’, and uncertainty 
about which standards suitably raise a presumption of conformity with the 
‘General Safety Requirement’ are potentially vexatious issues for the GSR.   The 
                                            
397 Ibid., pp. 352-53 
398 Ibid., at p. 267 
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General Safety Requirement was designed as a form of regulatory safety net for 
dealing with unregulated dangerous products and emerging (possibly 
unforeseen) risks, so there may well be no domestic standards available for 
determining whether a particular product conforms, presumptively, to the 
essential safety requirement.  In Europe, very few standards have been 
established specifically to facilitate the operation of the GPSD.399  The fact that 
foreign standards may be employed to establish (a presumption of) conformity 
with the GSR is neither conclusive; nor is it necessarily conducive to consistent 
interpretive results.  
 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances that import ‘a certain amount of inherent 
uncertainty’, where courts have recognized that a high degree of precision is 
simply not attainable and rules which are ‘acceptably vague’ may stand.  
 
Rules with some inherent uncertainty can be used without crossing over into sub-
delegation where the expression used to delimit the key criterion:  
 
1. Have a core meaning generally accepted by the public at large; or 
2. Have a meaning generally accepted within the regulated industry.400 
 
For example, Courts have found the term ‘beverage’ clearly included ‘water’ 
within its scope within the custom of beverage manufacturers.  “Generally 
accepted accounting principles,” while unclear in its meaning to the general 
public, has a clear meaning in accounting practice.  Similarly, a Quebec Court 
held that there was no uncertainty as to the meaning of “current information in 
medical science” used in a statutory prohibition against medical practitioners 
undertaking action contrary to such information, on the grounds that practitioners 
are obliged to stay abreast of such information as a requirement of professional 
competence.401 
 
Whether a rule is so imprecise as to sub-delegate a discretion to the official 
enforcing it will in each case be a question to be determined by reference to 
context and, where applicable, industry practice.402 
 
 
Uncertainty 
 
The law of sub-delegation is closely related to challenges of regulations based on 
the fact that they are uncertain to the point of being unintelligible and therefore 
offend the principles of fundamental justice under the Canadian charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. 
 
                                            
399  (Insert reference to material forwarded by Elizabeth in this regard.) 
400 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, Butterworths, 2004, at p. 268, and cases cited 
under footnotes 83 and 84. 
401 Ibid. See Windish-Laroche .v. Biron, [1992] R.J.Q. 1343 (C.S.), affd J.E. 97-323 (C.A.). 
402 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, supra, at p. 269. 
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A law must not be so devoid of precision in its content that a conviction will 
automatically flow from the decision to prosecute…When the power to decide 
whether a charge will lead to conviction or acquittal, normally the preserve of the 
judiciary, becomes fused with the power to prosecute because of the wording of 
the law, then a law will be unconstitutionally vague.403 (Emphasis added) 
 
In short, the vagueness must be so serious that a judge would conclude that a 
reasonably intelligent man sufficiently well informed would be unable to 
determine the meaning of the law and govern his actions accordingly.404  Health 
Canada’s consultations with stakeholders disclosed widespread concern about 
what precisely would be required of them to comply with the proposed new law.  
Addressing these concerns will undoubtedly be a major preoccupation of Health 
Canada as it moves forward with the policy proposal. 
 
In Canada, the sole basis for invalidating a statute for vagueness is a failure to 
accord with the principles of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms – that is, if “it so lacks precision as not to give sufficient guidance for 
legal debate.”405  The Supreme Court of Canada summed up the doctrine of 
vagueness (uncertainty) in the leading case of R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
Society,406 as follows: 
 
The doctrine of vagueness can be summed up in one proposition: a law will be 
found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient 
guidance for legal debate -- that is, for reaching a conclusion as to its meaning by 
reasoned analysis applying legal criteria. The term "legal debate" is not used to 
express a new standard, or one departing from that previously outlined by this 
Court. It is rather intended to reflect and encompass the same standard and 
criteria of fair notice and limitation of enforcement discretion viewed in the fuller 
context of an analysis of the quality and limits of human knowledge and 
understanding in the operation of the law. The criterion of absence of legal 
debate relates well to the rule of law principles that form the backbone of our 
polity. Legal provisions by stating certain propositions outline permissible and 
impermissible areas, and they also provide some guidance to ascertain the 
boundaries of these areas. They provide a framework, a guide as to how one 
may behave, but certainty is only reached in instant cases, where law is 
actualized by a competent authority. By setting out the boundaries of permissible 
and non-permissible conduct, these norms give rise to legal debate. They bear 
substance, and they allow for a discussion as to their actualization. They 
therefore limit enforcement discretion by introducing boundaries, and they also 
sufficiently delineate an area of risk to allow for substantive notice to citizens. No 
higher requirement as to certainty can be imposed on law in our modern State. 
The modern State intervenes today in fields where some generality in the 
enactments is inevitable. The substance of these enactments must remain 
                                            
403 R v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at p. 636.  Regulations and bylaws that 
fail to meet this standard will also be unconstitutionally vague.  See Salembier, Regulatory Law and 
Practice in Canada, supra, at p. 341, including the cases cited in footnote 163.   
404 City of Montreal v. Arcade Amusements Inc., (1985) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.) 
405 R v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at pp. 638-39 
406 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, 1992 CanLII 72 (S.C.C.) 
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nonetheless intelligible. The standard of "absence of legal debate" applies to all 
enactments, irrespective of whether they are civil, criminal, administrative or 
other. (Emphasis added) 
 
Prior to the Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society decision, numerous bylaws and 
regulations were held invalid by reason of uncertainty.  The following cases 
illustrate some of the circumstances where by-laws or regulations have been 
held void for uncertainty:  
 
• A closing by-law purporting to exclude shops that specialized in the sale of 
“small articles of small value”407  (How small is small?  Or, in the case of 
consumer products: How safe is safe?); 
• A by-law requiring all persons attending dance halls to be “attired in a 
costume usual and seemly for such occasions;”408 
• A by-law that purported to regulate stores selling “erotic magazines,” that 
is, those “appealing to or designed to appeal to erotic or sexual appetites 
or inclinations;”409 and 
• Charges were dismissed against a nursing home for contravening a 
provision stating that “every nursing hope shall be free from anything that 
might be hazardous to the health or safety of the residents” 
 
The use of the term “reasonably foreseeable conditions of use” in the definition of 
a ‘safe product’ under the GPSD may also raise vagueness concerns with a 
Court.  In Weir v. R., the court held a City of Toronto anti-smoking bylaw to be 
invalid on the ground that it imposed an uncertain duty and a vague obligation 
upon proprietors of retail shops to make “reasonable efforts” to prevent smoking 
in violation of the by-law.  
 
The key word to take note of here is “reasonable,” which is almost always the 
hallmark of vagueness in delegated legislation.  It is virtually always capable of at 
least two, and usually three, different meanings: 
1. Reasonable in the opinion of the enforcement officer; 
2. Reasonable in the opinion of the regulated person; and  
3. Reasonable in the opinion of the court.410 (emphasis added) 
 
The UK refused to make failure to meet many of the duties prescribed under the 
original General Product Safety Directive (92/59/EEC) a criminal offence on the 
grounds of imprecision and uncertainty.411  In the revised GPSD, (2001/95/EC) 
                                            
407 Bunce v. Cobourg (Town) [1963] 2 O.R. 343   
408 Clarke v. Wawkwn (Rural Municipality), (1930), 1 W.W.R. 319 (Sask. C.A.) 
409 (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 498 (Ont. C.A.). 
410 Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, supra, at p. 344. 
411 See Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, Oxford University Press, 
2005, at p. 180, footnote 121.  “As an example of the variations in enforcement sanctions that can 
occur, contravention of the producers’ duties 2, 3, or 4 (provide consumers with relevant 
information, adopt remedial ‘measures’, inform authorities about dangerous products) or 
distributors’ duty 3 (act with ‘due care’ to ensure compliance) under the UK General Product 
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additional criteria were added to help a court determine when a product was 
‘deemed’ to be safe.  In cases where there were no specific rules of national law 
from which to infer conformity with the GPSD, Member States (and Courts) may 
now assess conformity of a product by taking into account the following elements 
in particular, where they exist: 
 
• Voluntary national standards transposing relevant European standards…. 
• The standards drawn up in the Member State in which the product is 
marketed; 
• Commission recommendations setting guidelines on product safety 
assessment; 
• Product safety codes of good practice in force in the sector concerned; 
• The state of the art and technology; and 
• Reasonable consumer expectations concerning safety.412 
 
Additional precision was also added to the producers’ duty to “adopt measures” 
commensurate with the characteristics of the products which they supply to 
remain informed of product risks and to take “appropriate” action to remediate or 
eliminate the risks.  The measures referred to include, for example: 
• An indication, by means of the product or its packaging, of the identity 
and details of the producer and the product reference or, where 
applicable, the batch of products to which it belongs, except where not 
to give such indication is justified; and 
• In all cases where appropriate, the carrying out of sample testing of 
marketed products, investigating and, if necessary, keeping a register 
of complaints and keeping distributors informed of such monitoring.413 
 
Failure to meet any of the above-mentioned duties now constitutes the specific 
offence under the UK legislation transposing the revised GPSD, along with the 
additional criteria set out in 2001/95/EC in relation to the performance of those 
duties.414  The revised GPSD is very recent (in force, January 2004) but there do 
not appear to be any cases on record yet challenging the revised provisions on 
                                                                                                                                  
Safety Regulations, 1994, Regulation 12, was not an offence.  This is a surprising omission.  The 
UK Government took the position that the nature of these obligations was not sufficiently 
prescriptive or clearly defined to be made subject to criminal penalties and that the goals of 
product safety and consumer protection could be adequately achieved by use of the product-
directed (as opposed to person-directed) powers contained in Part II of the Consumer Protection 
Act, 1987, such as suspension notices, forfeiture orders, prohibition notices, and notices to warn.  
This is a curious state of affairs but has not been the subject of objection by the Commission.  It is 
true that the definition of these duties is general and imprecise, but no more so than the only other 
relevant method of quasi-enforcement by means of civil liability for negligence, which is defined 
in similarly wide terms as breach of a reasonable standard of conduct.  The failure to provide for 
what might be regarded as the normal enforcement sanction by one Member State, when such a 
sanction exists in others, is not satisfactory.” 
412 2001/95/EC, Article 3 (3) 
413 Ibid., article 5 (b) 
414 The General Product Safety Regulations, UK, 2005, S.I. 2005, No. 1803, s. 20 
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the grounds of vagueness.  Nevertheless, there remains considerable disquiet 
amongst some businesses (particularly small business) about what, precisely, is 
required for compliance with the GSR. 
 
While the Courts, since the Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society decision, have 
shown increased deference to regulators on issues of uncertainty – and a 
tendency to treat regulations more like statutes for the purpose of assessing 
uncertainty - there is no ‘bright line’ between what is certain and what is 
vague.415  
 
Vagueness concerns will also often arise where administrative officials have a 
very broad discretion to levy charges under a regulatory scheme, as is the case 
under the GSR.  European officials may charge a defendant with the breach of a 
GSR even where the defendant’s product presumptively conforms to a 
community standard where a particular product presents dangers to the public in 
the enforcement official’s opinion. 
 
 The "doctrine of vagueness" is founded on the rule of law, particularly on the 
principles of fair notice to citizens and limitation of enforcement discretion. Fair 
notice to the citizen comprises a formal aspect -- an acquaintance with the actual 
text of a statute -- and a substantive aspect -- an understanding that certain 
conduct is the subject of legal restrictions. The crux of the concern for limitation 
of enforcement discretion is that a law must not be so devoid of precision in its 
content that a conviction will automatically flow from the decision to prosecute. 
The threshold for finding a law vague is relatively high. The factors to be 
considered include (a) the need for flexibility and the interpretative role of the 
courts; (b) the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty, a standard of 
intelligibility being more appropriate, and (c) the possibility that many varying 
judicial interpretations of a given disposition may exist and perhaps coexist. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Even where a regulation is sustained under the more forgiving criteria outlined in 
the Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society decision, a Court (and particularly a 
Criminal Court) may be reluctant to enforce a law lacking in precision.  Greater 
precision is likely to be required by a Criminal Court where the object is 
penalization. 
 
It may be a poor or meaningless order.  It may well be so lacking in clarity that it 
is incapable of enforcement.  Presumably, if a Provincial Judge so finds, he will 
acquit.  Nonetheless, there is nothing to suggest that the determination made by 
the Commission in pronouncing para. (3) was in excess of its jurisdiction.  This 
Court cannot quash that paragraph of the order. (Emphasis added)416 
 
                                            
415 415 Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada, supra, at pp. 346-47 and 349. 
 
416 Ibid., p. 349, citing Mid-west By-Products co. v. Manitoba (Clean Environment Commission, (1979) 102 
D.LR.  (3d) 208 (Man. Q.B.) 
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The multiple layers of uncertainty referred to throughout this Paper in defining 
and administering the GSR, therefore, will have an important impact on the public 
authority’s ability to successfully prosecute GSR cases.  If prosecutors have not 
yet been consulted as part of the policy development process, Health Canada 
might wish to do so before finalizing its policy proposals.   
 
 
Protection Against Self-Incrimination: Mandatory Reporting 
Requirements 
 
Some care will be required in drafting and administering the mandatory reporting 
requirements under any GSR regime given the legal protection against 
compelling self-incriminatory evidence in penal proceedings.417  The principle 
against self-incrimination is “a general organizing principle of criminal law” that an 
accused is not required to respond to an allegation of wrongdoing made by the 
state until the state has succeeded in making out a prima facie case against him 
or her.  It is a basic tenet of criminal justice that the Crown must establish a “case 
to meet” before there can be any expectation that the accused should 
respond.418 
 
Officials in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, both of which employ penal 
sanctions in their consumer protection legislation, were concerned that the 
mandatory GPSD requirement that producers’ and distributors’ report to 
competent authorities about potentially dangerous products which they had 
placed on the market might infringe the legal protection against self-incrimination   
The Netherlands initially resisted implementing the reporting obligations under 
the GPSD on this ground. 
 
The wording of the duty to report under Article 5 (3) of the GPSD419 is not framed 
in terms of requiring a report on “dangerous products placed on the market”.  
Those facts would amount to an admission of the general duty violation.  Rather, 
producers are required to report when “a product they have placed on the market 
poses risks to the consumer that are incompatible with the general safety 
requirement….”420 
                                            
417 This could occur, for example, by committing a breach of fundamental justice under sections 7, 8, 11(c) 
or 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
418 R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 41. 
419 2001/95/E.C. 
420 The UK transposed the GPSD reporting obligation of producers and distributors into section 9 (1) of its 
General Product Safety Regulations, 2005, 420 in the following terms:  
 9. —(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where a producer or a distributor knows that a product he has 
placed on the market or supplied poses risks to the consumer that are incompatible with the 
general safety requirement, he shall forthwith notify an enforcement authority in writing of that 
information and— (a) the action taken to prevent risk to the consumer; and (b) where the product 
is being or has been marketed or otherwise supplied to consumers outside the United Kingdom, of 
the identity of each Member State in which, to the best of his knowledge, it is being or has been so 
marketed or supplied. 
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The wording of the mandatory reporting requirement under the GSR, and the 
manner in which it is to be employed, are significant because the legal protection 
against self-incrimination in Canada depends greatly on the context and 
circumstances of each case.421  A Court will be more, or less, inclined to extend 
legal immunity against the use of such a report in subsequent penal proceedings 
depending upon whether or not the report was made for strictly regulatory 
purposes, or as a known condition of licensing activities in which the accused 
could choose to participate in or not;422 upon the extent of any adversarial or 
inquisitorial relationship between the State and the individual at the time the 
report is made,423 and whether or not the public authority was acting for auditing 
or investigative purposes at the time the information in the report was 
compelled.424   
 
For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Fitzpatrick425 admitted 
mandatory fishing logs and hail reports (which indicate the estimated poundage of 
the catch by species, and the date, time and location of catch during each trip) as 
evidence of the accused person’s guilt in a regulatory prosecution for exceeding 
fish quotas.  In Fitzpatrick, the Court concluded that the report was made for the 
strictly regulatory purpose of managing the offshore fishery. At the time the report 
was made, there was no “adversarial or even inquisitorial” relationship between the 
accused and the State.426 
 
The essential purpose of this requirement is not to accumulate information that can 
later be used against the fishers who supply it.  It is not compiled during the course 
of any investigation into wrongdoing.  Instead, the purpose of the self-reporting 
                                                                                                                                  
    (3) In the event of a serious risk the notification under paragraph (1) shall include the 
following—information enabling a precise identification of the product or batch of products in 
question,(b) a full description of the risks that the product presents,(c) all available information 
relevant for racing the product, and(d) a description of the action undertaken to prevent risks to the 
consumer. 
421 See, for example, R. v. White, supra, at para.45.  “The residual protections provided by the principle 
against self-incrimination as contained in s. 7 are specific, and contextually-sensitive.  This point was made 
in Jones, supra, at p. 257, per Lamer C.J., and in S. (R.J.), supra, at paras. 96-100, per Iacobucci J., where 
it was explained that the parameters of the right to liberty can be affected by the context in which the right 
is asserted.  The principle against self-incrimination demands different things at different times, with the 
task in every case being to determine exactly what the principle demands, if anything, within the particular 
context at issue.  See also R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at p. 361, per La Forest J. 
  
422 R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154 (mandatory reporting of fish logs and hail reports- fishing quotas) 
423 R. v. White, supra.( mandatory statement to police following an accident,  required under the B.C. 
Motor Vehicles Act.)   
424 R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 
425 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154 
426 Ibid., at para 34: “First, the information provided in this case was not provided "in a proceeding in which 
the individual and the state are adversaries".  Instead, it was provided in response to a reasonable regulatory 
requirement relating to fishery management.  Second, the "coercion" imposed on the appellant is at best 
indirect, for it arose only after he had made a conscious choice to participate in a regulated area, with its 
attendant obligations.”  
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obligation is to provide fisheries officials with up-to-date information necessary for 
the effective regulation of the fishery.  The establishment of quotas depends on 
accurate information about the size of catches, as well as about their particular 
location, and the fishers themselves are in the best position to provide this 
information.  Enforcement of the quotas, in turn, is of benefit to commercial fishers 
as a group, for it ensures the continuing survival of the fishery and the fair 
distribution of its profits, which provide commercial fishers with their employment 
and income.427 
 
The Fitzpatrick decision also illustrates the balancing process between public 
and private interests that the Court undertook to determine whether to apply the 
principle against self-incrimination to a fisher making mandatory reports in a 
licensed industry.  . 
 
At issue in this case is the ability of the government to enforce important regulatory 
objectives relating to the conservation and management of the groundfish fishery.  
To suggest that s. 7 of the Charter protects individuals who voluntary participate in 
this fishery from being "conscripted" against themselves, by having information 
used against them that they were knowingly required to provide as a condition of 
obtaining their fishing licences, would in my view be to overshoot the purposes of 
the Charter.  The right against self-incrimination has never yet been extended that 
far; nor should it be.  The Charter was not meant to tie the hands of the regulatory 
state.  (emphasis added) 
 
The General Safety Requirement, however, is rarely applied to regulatory 
regimes involving pre-licensing approvals or pre-marketing certification.  It was 
developed primarily as a post-marketing regulatory technique for unregulated 
hazardous products with mandatory reporting of dangerous products that have 
slipped through to market as a form of market surveillance.   Such a report is 
likely to raise at least an “inquisitorial” relationship with Health Canada.  
Moreover, Health Canada officials may, simultaneously, begin to “investigate” a 
producer or distributor known to have a poor compliance history, or press for 
more particulars in a producer’s report.   Clearly, a Court could view this in a 
somewhat different context than did the Court in the Fitzpatrick case. 
 
In R. v. White, for example, the issue was whether a statement that a declarant 
was required to make to a police officer preparing an accident report under 
section 61 of the B.C. Motor Vehicles Act could be used as evidence of the 
declarant’s guilt in a subsequent prosecution under the Criminal Code.428  In 
                                            
427 Ibid., para. 35. 
428 Section 61 provided as follows: 
 
 (1) Where a vehicle driven or operated on a highway, either directly or indirectly, causes death or 
injury to a person or damage to property causing aggregate damage apparently exceeding the 
amount set out in subsection (1.1), the person driving or in charge of the vehicle shall report the 
accident to a police officer or to a person designated by the superintendent to receive those reports, 
and shall furnish the information respecting the accident required by the police officer or 
designated person. 
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White, the Supreme Court concluded that a driver who provides an accident 
report under s. 61 is not in the same situation as the commercial fisher who 
radios in or documents the quantity of the day’s catch. 
 The provincial decision to vest the responsibility for taking accident reports in the 
police has the effect of transforming what might otherwise be a partnership 
relationship (aimed at securing safe roads for the benefit of all citizens) into one 
that is potentially adversarial.  Very often, the police officer who is receiving the 
accident report is simultaneously investigating a possible crime, in relation to 
which the driver is a suspect.  At the same time that the officer is required by s. 
61(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act to obtain information about the accident from the 
driver, the officer may equally be required or inclined to inform the driver of 
possible criminal charges and of the driver’s legal rights under the Charter, 
including the right to remain silent.  The result is seemingly contradictory 
instructions from police.  Importantly, also, the driver is generally in the officer’s 
immediate physical presence.  The result is, quite unlike the situation in 
Fitzpatrick, a context of pronounced psychological and emotional pressure.429 
R. v. Jarvis,430 illustrates how the purpose for which the information is collected 
affects the context in which the protection against self-incrimination may arise.  
The Jarvis case involved a prosecution for income tax evasion premised largely 
on information that the defendant was statutorily required to surrender to 
auditors.  The protection against self-incrimination in that case turned on the 
distinction between “audit” and “investigation.”  
 
In our view, where the predominant purpose of a particular inquiry is the 
determination of penal liability, CCRA officials must relinquish the authority to use 
the inspection and requirement powers under ss. 231.1(1) and 231.2(1).  In 
essence, officials “cross the Rubicon” when the inquiry in question engages the 
adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the state.  There is no clear 
formula that can answer whether or not this is the case.  Rather, to determine 
whether the predominant purpose of the inquiry in question is the determination 
of penal liability, one must look to all factors that bear upon the nature of that 
inquiry.431 
                                                                                                                                  
(4) The person receiving a report under this section shall secure from the person making it, or by 
other inquiries where necessary, the particulars of the accident, the persons involved, the extent of 
the personal injury or property damage and other information necessary to complete a written 
report of the accident, and shall forward the written report to the superintendent within 10 days 
after being advised of the accident.  
429 R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 58  The admissibility of statements given under compulsion 
pursuant to provincial motor vehicle accident legislation is governed by the same principles as those laid 
down in California v. Byers,  (1971) 402 U.S. 424.  If a statute has a non-criminal purpose, is not directed 
at an inherently suspect group, and is essential to the fulfilment of a valid regulatory purpose, such statutory 
compulsion does not violate constitutional protections:  Sydholm v. The Queen, (B.C. Cty. Ct., February 2, 
1983); leave to appeal refused (B.C.C.A., May 9, 1983). Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms only applies to a "witness in any proceedings", not to a person who is interviewed by the police 
in the course of an investigation:  Prousky v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 565 
(Ont. S.C.); leave to appeal refused (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 224 (Ont. C.A.). 
 
430 [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 
431 Ibid., para 88 
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An inspection or administrative inquiry becomes an “investigation” at the point 
where officials begin to collect evidence of intent (or negligence) in the 
commission of an offence. 
 
The other pole of the continuum is no more attractive.  It would be a fiction to say 
that the adversarial relationship only comes into being when charges are laid.  
Logically, this will only happen once the investigators believe that they have 
obtained evidence that indicates wrongdoing.  Because the s. 239 offences 
contain an element of mental culpability, the state will, one must presume, 
usually have some evidence that the accused satisfied the mens rea 
requirements before laying an information or preferring an indictment.  The active 
collection of such evidence indicates that the adversarial relationship has been 
engaged, since it is irrelevant to the determination of tax liability.  Moreover, 
although there are judicial controls on the unauthorized exercise of power 
(Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121; Babcock v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 57, at para. 25), we believe that allowing 
CCRA officials to employ ss. 231.1(1) and 231.2(1) until the point where charges 
are laid, might promote bad faith on the part of the prosecutors.  Quite 
conceivably, situations may arise in which charges are delayed in order to 
compel the taxpayer to provide evidence against himself or herself for the 
purposes of a s. 239 prosecution.  Although the respondent argued that such 
situations could be remedied by the courts, we view it as preferable that such 
situations be avoided rather than remedied.  It is for this reason that the test is as 
set out above.432    
 
Whether or not the self-incrimination issue is raised as a legal concern in relation 
to the GSR reporting requirement, it will be a practical concern to producers and 
distributors and could adversely affect the reporting scheme as an effective 
preventive measure.  If the purpose is to be primarily regulatory and preventive, 
the Department may wish to consider introducing a use immunity provision along 
the lines of section 61(7) of the British Columbia Motor Vehicles Act.433 Section 
61(7) of that Act supplements the reporting scheme by creating use immunity for 
a declarant in relation to the information provided pursuant to s. 61(1).  The 
declarant is protected against self-incrimination by a statutory guarantee that, 
with two exceptions, neither the report nor any information contained in it is 
admissible in a trial or proceeding arising out of the accident:  
(7) The fact a report has been made under this section is admissible in        
evidence solely to prove compliance with this section, and the report is 
admissible in evidence on the prosecution of any person for the offence of 
making a false statement therein, but neither the report nor any statement 
contained in it is admissible in evidence for any other purpose in a trial or 
proceeding arising out of the accident referred to in the report. 
                                            
432 Ibid., para. 91 See also, Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, 2005, Student edition, at pages 
1069-1073 (Right to Silence) 
433 RSBC [1996] Chapter 318 
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Alternatively, the Department could ‘remain silent’ on the issue of use immunity 
for mandatory dangerous product reports, perhaps on the European view that the 
quid pro quo to be exacted from industry in return for self-regulation is precisely 
this form of accountability.  If so, the Department might wish to have its Legal 
Services Unit provide an opinion on whether, or to what an extent, Canadian 
courts would support that view on the line of cases mentioned above.  
 
Case Law Related to the General Product Safety Directive 
 
There is little reported case law dealing with General Product Safety Provisions.  
In the UK, there is also little experience in the Criminal Courts with the GPSD 
because so few cases go to prosecution; those that do are often heard in 
Magistrate’s Court and unreported.  Miles Alexander, of Simmons and Simmons, 
identified a number of disincentives to prosecution in the UK, namely: 
 
• Expense - It is very costly to prosecute cases in the UK.  The costs usually 
run into the thousands of pounds when opportunity costs, including 
salaries, are taken into account;434 
• Exposure to product liability – A successful prosecution can have product 
liability consequences far greater than any fine imposed; 
• Orientation of the regulations – The regulations under the General Product 
Safety Directive are drafted in a way to  facilitate discussion and 
settlement and to discourage confrontation, which can be injurious to 
trade; and 
• Enforcement posture – The United Kingdom’s Regulatory Policy and 
Enforcement Concordat435 encourage a “light touch” approach to 
enforcement, with formal enforcement in the background if the company is 
disinclined to comply.  “Voluntary” compliance may, however, be a bit of a 
euphemism given the tension present in settlement or remediation 
discussions. 
 
Notwithstanding a paucity of case law related to the GSPD, there are a few 
noteworthy decisions concerning:  
 
• The jurisdictional underpinnings of the GPSD in Europe;436   
                                            
434 The BBC News reported on one private prosecution against a cell phone manufacturer under the General 
Product Safety Provision alleging that the phones produced cancer producing waves.  This action was 
reported as costing the complainant over 20,000 pounds to prosecute.  In dismissing the prosecution, the 
Court reportedly tendered the view that the subject matter was better left to science than the courts to 
resolve. 
435 See UK Cabinet Office, The Enforcement Concordat, PDF accessed on October 27, 2006, at: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/REGULATION/documents/pst/pdf/concord.pdf  
436 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union, Case C-359/92. 
European Court reports 1994 Page I-03681; accessed on September, 17, 2006, at: http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=eu/cases/EUECJ/1994/C35992.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%20%
22  
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• The scope of the European Commission’s ‘direct’ authority to act against 
specific products and  hazards;437 
• The jurisdictional constraints against enacting directives for the sole, or 
primary, purpose of protecting public health and safety (Challenge to EU’s 
Tobacco Directive);438 
• The interface between the GPSD and Member State legislation dealing 
with similar products or hazards (Second-hand car); 439 
• The exercise of the public authority’s power to warn the public of 
dangerous products  (Baby Walkers); 440 
• The extent to which the element of ‘causation’ in tort law is relevant, if at 
all, under a general product safety provision in assigning responsibility for 
successive failures to meet obligations imposed by the GPSD throughout 
the supply chain (for example, as an excuse for retailers seeking to 
escape their obligations under the GPSD where producers and distributors 
failed earlier to meet their own product testing obligations).  (Claw 
hammers imported form China); 441 
• The application of the defence of due diligence in a UK Criminal Court (toy 
caps for cap pistols); 442 
• An approach to dealing with an alleged regulatory gap in the context of an 
application to amend pleadings (Felt Pen caps – children’s’ choking 
hazard); 443  
• The importance of leading evidence as to the degree of hazard presented 
by a product in a prosecution under GPSD regulations, (Shaggy Dog soft 
toy);444 and  
• The application of different and competing limitation periods for bringing 
actions under general product safety provisions (Laser Pointer).445  
 
                                            
437 Ibid., see also ECJ, Case C-376-98 dealing with directive 98/43/EC, banning tobacco advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products., European Court reports 1994 Page I-03681 
438 Ibid. 
439 Caerphilly County Borough v. Stripp [2000] E.W.J. No. 1779.  
440 Baby Products Assn. V. Liverpool City Council, [1999] E.W.J. No. 6012; Case No: CO/3733/99, Also 
reported at: [2000] L.G.R. 171  
441 See, Padgett Brothers (A-Z) Limited vs The Coventry City Council, CO/3892/97, H.C.J. (Queen’s 
Bench, Divisional Court); accessed on September, 17, 2006 at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/1998/20.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%2
0%22  
442 Powys County Council v. David Halsall International Limited, CO/9162/2005 
[2006] EWHC 613 (Admin), High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Divisional Court 
443 R. v. Newcastleupon Tyne Magistrate’s Court (Ex parte Poundstretcher Limited,) [1998] EWHC Admin 
251 (3rd March, 1998), accessed on September, 17, 2006, at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/1998/251.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%
20%22  
 
444 The Queen v. The West Midlands Magistrates, Ex Parte PMS International  Group PLC, [1993] E.W.J. 
No. 3485, CO 1446/92  
445 R. v. Thames Magistrates Court (Ex Parte Academy International PLC), H.C.J. C.O. C.).-293-99, [1999] 
EWHC Admin 548 (June 14, 1999) 
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These decisions are summarized in Annex 7.  Of particular note, is the recent UK 
decision Powys County Council v. David Halsall International Limited, 446 
dealing with the defence of due diligence under a GPSD regime.  
 
The very limited case law under the GPSD makes it difficult to assess the impact 
of evolving UK standards on the standard of care required to be shown to 
establish a due diligence defence.  There is a presumption that the natural result 
of new and improving standards will raise the bar on a due diligence defence, but 
the same might have been true no matter the reason standards were improved. 
 
Section 29(1) of the UK regulation transposing the revised General Product 
Safety Directive provides for a ‘due diligence defence’ in the following terms:   
 
29. —(1) Subject to the following provisions of this regulation, in proceedings 
against a person for an offence under these Regulations it shall be a defence for 
that person to show that he took all reasonable steps and exercised all due 
diligence to avoid committing the offence.  (emphasis added) 
 
Mr. Mark Dewar (of Simmons and Simmons, London, UK)447 stated that the 
words “took all the necessary steps” which precede the words “exercised all due 
diligence to avoid committing the offence” makes the due diligence defence very 
difficult to advance, especially in view of the absolute liability thrust of the 
Directive.  The “all reasonable steps” terminology may be used to refer to 
improving standards of risk assessment and advanced process requirements in 
relation to new products.   The UK is thought to be the only country in the EU to 
insist upon the due diligence defence – which fits uncomfortably with  the 
absolute liability posture of Europe’s GPSD..    
 
Mr Alexander (also of Simmons and Simmons) considered that the main use of 
the due diligence defence, likely, was to illustrate to clients what they may/must 
do to position themselves well to avoid a successful prosecution. (ie: by 
demonstrating that risk assessment has taken place, compliance plans have 
been drawn up, etc.)  To that extent, the defence has some preventive value 
where clients may be expected to consult lawyers. 
 
Christopher Hodges (Oxford University)448 noted that similar wording has 
prevailed for some time in the UK Health and Safety at Work Act and in the 
Consumer Protection Act, Part II.  It was carried over into the General Product 
Safety Directives of 1995 and 2004.  He agreed that it was very difficult for that 
defence to succeed:  
 
You’ve got to show not just that you were reasonably competent; you have to 
show that you have taken “all the necessary steps”, and the courts have said that 
                                            
446 CO/9162/2005 
[2006] EWHC 613 (Admin), High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Divisional Court 
447 Interviewed, December, 2005 
448 Interviewed December, 2005 
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‘all’ means ‘pretty high’.  So if you are unlucky enough to be prosecuted, or 
deserve to be prosecuted, you are not going to ‘wriggle off’ the hook.  That is 
entirely consistent with having a generally low-key regulatory approach.  The 
perception is, that U.S. regulatory authorities are much more aggressive, in 
which case you might want a different balance, for constitutional reasons, that is, 
a broader defence.   
 
In accountability terms, therefore, some opinion leaders argue that the quid pro 
quo for the high degree of self-regulation allowed industry under the GPSD 
should be higher penalties and a higher burden on the defence.449    
 
While the value of the Powys decision (see Annex 7 - Case Law) on due 
diligence suffers from some procedural defects, it does provide an excellent, 
albeit isolated, example of just how difficult it is for a defendant to establish a 
defence of due diligence in the U.K under the General Product Safety regime.  
Notwithstanding the elaborate efforts made by the Company in that case through 
its in-house testing program, and the absence of any independent testing 
laboratories in the UK to undertake the relevant testing in that case, the 
Company’s successful due diligence defence has to be qualified as a ‘close call.’  
Had a question been posed on the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the 
comparability of the Company’s in-house tests with those of the relevant British 
standard for such tests, the decision might easily have gone the other way. 
 
 
 
11. Canadian Case Study Issues and Summary  
 
Three Case Studies 
 
The Case Studies were developed on the basis that a GSR could be 
implemented in Canada. That is a decision to be taken by the Government, and it 
may be informed by the information presented in this report. If implemented, a 
GSR that basically prohibits unsafe products from being placed on the Canadian 
market will impose many new responsibilities on suppliers and government.   
There will be operational and financial implications for the suppliers who must 
comply with it and for government agencies responsible for implementing and 
enforcing it.  
 
The three case studies included in this report in Annex 1 provide details of the 
impact of a GSR. The first case study examines the impact on suppliers of 
products that are not currently regulated and for which there are no national 
standards. The second case looks at products that that are inadequately 
                                            
449 Some firmly believe that the penalties should be higher under the GPS regulation.  In the UK, there is an 
ongoing debate as to whether they should have a “corporate manslaughter” offence, that is, whether the 
Directors should also be prosecuted along with the company.   That has been a fiercely fought issue for a 
very long time and the Government is said to have only made a few tentative steps into that direction for 
the moment.   
                                                                                             187
regulated, and the third case at products that are subject to Federal and 
Provincial/Territorial regulation. The potential to establish regulations under 
existing legislation as an alternative approach is also examined. 
 
These case studies are based on the following assumptions: 
 
• The GSR would complement any regulations by acting as a 'safety net' in 
the absence of a regulation that addresses the health risk or hazard in 
question.   
• A GSR would make it illegal for a supplier to manufacture, promote or 
market a product that may pose a risk to the health or safety of consumers 
when used under intended or reasonably foreseeable conditions. 
• In trying to demonstrate conformity to a GSR in response to the 
occurrence of non compliance, a supplier would be required to 
demonstrate that all reasonable care was taken to comply with the 
provisions of a GSR including identifying any associated product hazards, 
assessing the related risks and managing these risks.  
• Like the obligations on business in Europe and the US, the GSR would 
require suppliers to monitor the safety of their products and notify a 
government regulator of any unsafe or potentially unsafe products that 
have been placed on the market. Government on receiving a notification 
would be obligated to take relevant certain action based on its legal 
obligations and the seriousness of the problem. and 
• Unlike the US system, the GSR would not contain a provision that the 
government must consider the development of voluntary standards before 
considering the development of regulations.  Nor like the European 
system would Canadian standards be developed that would confer a 
presumption of conformity with the GSR.  Conformity with voluntary 
standards developed through a recognized system could, however, be 
used to demonstrate conformity where no regulations exist or where the 
standard addresses a risk not covered by an existing regulation. 
 
Regulatory requirements for the provision of safety information prior to marketing 
and for mandatory reporting of adverse incidents to Health Canada already exist 
for drugs, natural health products, biologics and medical devices under the Food 
and Drugs Act (F&DA).  Similar requirements do not exist for all foods regulated 
under the F&DA or for consumer products under the Hazardous Products Act 
(HPA) or Radiation Emitting Devices Act (REDA).  As a result, the impact on 
suppliers of these products and those responsible in Health Canada will be 
greater than in the areas where these provisions have existed for a number of 
years.  
 
The impact on suppliers could also vary depending on their role in the supply 
chain. The supply chain for consumer products is presented in Figure 1 in the 
Case Studies.  Producers are primary suppliers who have the ability to influence 
the safety of consumer products or first to place a product on the Canadian 
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market. Distributors are secondary suppliers who have limited ability to influence 
the safety of consumer products.  
 
Case Study 1, using the example of bicycles, the situation where no Canadian 
standards or regulations exist is examined. Here, the supplier would be required 
to identify the product hazards and their source, assess the risks from the 
perspective of both intended and reasonable foreseeable use, implement 
procedures or processes to mitigate the risks, monitor them and report any 
adverse health effects to the responsible government agency.   Unfortunately, 
many importers and importer/retailers do not have the same level of knowledge 
about a bicycle as a manufacturer and might have significant difficulty in 
responding in a similar manner. The situation is further complicated because 
some foreign manufacturers are not always willing to provide the information 
required to identify and assess potential risks associated with their bicycles. 
 
Case Study 2, using the example of Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, the situation is 
examined where the existing regulatory framework does not provide the authority 
to address: all hazards related to the regulated product; changes in the product 
due to technical advancements; or usage of the product in a manner that was not 
contemplated when the regulation was developed.   
 
The safety of food is more complex than many other product areas since it 
involves more than 30 different government departments, agencies (federal, 
provincial/territorial and/or municipal) depending on the product or problem.  At 
the Federal level, Health Canada is responsible for developing the food safety 
regulations under the F&DA and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is 
responsible for enforcing these regulations.  The provinces/territories also 
develop and enforce statutes to minimize food safety risks in various 
commodities produced and sold within the province/territory.  Municipal public 
health officials, who are often the first to be notified of food safety problems, also 
play an integral role in the food safety system.  They can set food safety 
standards and policies for food premises and have the power to condemn food. 
The challenge is for governments at all levels to work cooperatively to reduce the 
risks and to streamline and enhance the system.   
 
Konjac Jelly Mini-cup products are food products covered by the Food and Drugs 
Act and Regulations (FDA&R). Unfortunately, the Act does not prohibit food that 
due to its physical or mechanical properties adversely affects the health or safety 
of a consumer.   As a result, it was not possible for CFIA to use the F&DA to 
address the problem of the Konjac Jelly Mini cups. The Hazardous Products Act, 
which provides Health Canada with the authority to deal with mechanical choking 
hazards in consumer products, could not be used either since food is specifically 
exempted from this Act.  Ultimately, a mandatory recall was issued under the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (CFIA Act).  
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If a GSR were considered to address situations such as this, steps similar to 
those discussed in Case Study 1 would be involved for both suppliers and 
government. There would be significant challenges due to the lack of data and 
research on adverse events caused by the mechanical properties of food making 
it difficult for a producer to assess the risk associated with the Konjac Jelly Mini-
cups.  In addition, it will have to be determined whether the HACCP-based 
Quality Management System adopted by CFIA as well as internationally as a 
code of practice in the food trade will be accepted as a way to demonstrate 
compliance with a GSR.  
  
Case Study 3, using the example of household electrical products, examines the 
situation where two levels of government have the authority to deal with the 
same product and the requirements may or may not be consistent across the 
country.  Although Health Canada has the authority to regulate these products 
under the Hazardous Products Act450 (HPA) no regulations for these products 
have been developed. All the provinces and territories have enacted legislation 
and regulations to deal with the installation and safety of electrical equipment 
connected to the electrical system including equipment used in and around the 
home. These regulations mandate the Canadian Electrical Code (CEC) and 
require that all household electrical products are approved by provincial/territorial 
authorities or are certified to the product standards referenced in the CEC.  
However, no level of government has the authority to order a mandatory recall of 
a dangerous household electrical product or to require suppliers to monitor their 
products and report adverse incidents.  
  
Normally, the provisions included in a GSR or similar regulatory initiatives require 
a producer to assess and manage all risks associated with a product, monitor the 
product in the marketplace and report any adverse incidents.  As a result, a 
producer could comply with all the standards under the CEC mandated by 
provincial/territorial regulations and still be at risk of Health Canada taking action 
against him/her under the criminal code if a hazard not addressed by the 
standards was identified.   
 
Summary of the Key Findings in the Case Studies 
 
Using three different case studies, the implications for suppliers and government 
of implementing such provisions under a GSR or through regulatory amendments 
under existing legislation were investigated and a number of key findings were 
identified and are described below: 
 
• The costs for suppliers in complying and government agencies in 
administering and enforcing the reporting provisions will vary significantly 
depending on what systems and reporting mechanisms are already in 
place and on the criteria that will be used to trigger a report.  In the case of 
consumer products like bicycles and household electrical products, 
                                            
450  Justice Canada, Hazardous Products Act, Paragraphs 6.1 (a) and (b), March 3, 2006 
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harmonization with the systems in Europe and the United States could 
help maximize the usefulness of the data collected and minimize the 
costs. 
 
• There are a number of policy issues that will need to be resolved in order to 
successfully implement a GSR or similar regulatory provisions.  Many of 
the issues are common to all three case studies included in this report and 
are related to the need for guidance and clarity around new requirements. 
For example, suppliers and government staff who provide advice need to 
know: 
 
o What standards, regulations, conformity assessment systems or risk 
assessment process will be acceptable to demonstrate conformity 
with a GSR; 
o What level of safety will be required to demonstrate compliance with 
a GSR; 
o What type of adverse incident or level of injury will trigger a report of 
a problem product or a recall; and  
o To whom and what system will be used to report adverse incidents.  
 
•  One of the core elements in the implementation of a GSR or similar 
regulatory amendments is hazard identification and risk assessment.  Such 
an approach based on evidence provides the basis for the selection of 
appropriate instruments to reduce risks, the determination of an unsafe 
product, the identification of effective interventions and the reporting of 
adverse health effects.  In many cases, there are gaps in the information 
that suppliers need to carry out a risk assessment making it difficult for them 
to comply with new provisions.  Moreover, many suppliers, even large 
companies, do not have the expertise or capacity to assess risks in 
products. For example, manufacturers in other countries do not always 
make information about product design, component materials or 
manufacturing processes available and there is a lack of product related 
injury data within Canada.  The need for increasing the data available and 
the knowledge of suppliers about hazard identification and risk assessment 
is core to the successful implementation of the GSR or similar regulatory 
provisions.  
 
• To ensure that the transition from the existing legislation to new legislation 
or regulations is smooth and seamless and that the Department will be able 
to deal with the new provisions and products that will be covered, it will be 
necessary for Health Canada to identify, develop and/or implement: 
  
o Changes and/or additions to its management processes and 
knowledge management systems to meet new and changed 
provisions and authorities in new legislation such as the adverse 
event reporting system.  The impact will be greatest for those parts 
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of the organization or other organizations responsible for 
unregulated consumer products or foods where systems or 
processes for reporting of adverse events or dealing with 
mandatory recalls have not been established; 
o Tools, information and training that the employees will need to 
administer and enforce the new provisions that will apply to many 
products not previously dealt with;  
o Training, information and guidance documents to provide previously 
unregulated suppliers with an understanding of how to comply with 
any new provisions; 
o Functions of staff and the skills, expertise that staff will require to 
administer the new provisions in areas previously unregulated and 
to evaluate the various instruments that suppliers could use;   
o Financial resources to develop and implement new systems, to hire 
expert analytical staff,  tools or training within Heath Canada and 
other responsible government agencies e.g. Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency or Provinces/Territories; 
o A dispute resolution system;  
o Protection of personal information; and 
o Processes to ensure consistency in administration and enforcement 
for many new products across federal or provincial/territorial 
organizations that share responsibility. 
 
• In certain product areas such as household electrical products and some 
foods, overlap will exist between provincial/territorial legal instruments and 
a GSR.  As a result, it will most likely be necessary to develop a 
consensus among a number of government agencies and levels of 
government on the following questions:   
 
o How the provinces/territories will work with the federal agencies to 
implement a GSR or new regulatory provisions?   
o Will the provinces/territories be able to draw on the provisions of the 
GSR and enforcement authorities under federal legislation to deal 
with importation, reporting and recalls? 
o What level of safety will be considered unacceptable and will trigger 
enforcement action or reporting of an adverse incident? 
o To whom will reports of adverse incidents be made? 
o What type of information manuals and/or training will need to be 
developed to assist suppliers and government officials in 
understanding the new requirements? 
 
 The policies and the form of any working arrangements developed with the 
provinces and territories will have a significant impact on whether or not any 
overlap that exists between them has a negative or positive benefit.  
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• The reliance on standards will require substantial participation by 
government officials to ensure that the standards developed address the 
health and safety concerns of Canadians.  Moreover, the fact that many 
standards reference other standards increases the workload. 
 
• In order for cabinet to make a decision on new legislation or regulatory 
changes, it will be necessary for Health Canada to obtain accurate, 
complete and up to date information based on the results of: 
o An analysis of any proposed changes and the alternative solutions 
considered; 
o The consultation with those who have an interest in the matter, 
including other departments that may be affected by the proposed 
solution; 
o An analysis of the impact of the proposed solution on the operating 
environment and costs to small, medium and large suppliers; and  
o An analysis of the resources that the proposed solution would require, 
including those needed to implement or enforce it. 
 
• The legal implications of a government agency being informed of a safety 
hazard in a product needs to be addressed, particularly, if it means that all 
reports cannot be investigated. 
 
 
 
12. ‘Outcome Oriented’ Legislation 
 
Introduction 
 
One of Health Canada’s objectives under the Legislative Renewal Initiative is to 
foster an ‘outcome oriented’ (or performance-based) product safety regime that 
facilitates both technical innovation and continuously improving safety standards 
in the public interest.   
 
The GSR, as mentioned earlier in this Paper, is a form of performance-based 
regulation, albeit a somewhat extreme form given that voluntary standards 
effectively substitute for technical regulations.  From a policy development 
perspective, the GSR’s advantages and limitations closely parallel those of a 
performance-based regime.  As in the case of performance-based regulation, 
Europe’s  ‘General Safety Requirement’ is given operational effect through a 
series of directives in the nature of framework legislation, essential requirements 
expressed as performance standards, supplementary legislated duties and 
obligations, voluntary specification standards, guidelines, codes of practice and 
related guidance documents, ever increasing in their operational detail. 
 
In a globalized economy, the role of government vis a vis the regulated 
community has been reconsidered over the last twenty years.  Where 
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government must regulate to protect public health and safety and the 
environment, or to regulate the economy, it now seeks to use the least intrusive 
measure that is effective.  Using voluntary standards or codes in lieu of 
regulation, or in conjunction with goal-oriented regulation, are methods of limiting 
government's intrusiveness.  Performance and instrument choice are priority 
issues with most Western governments today. 
 
Canada's budgeting process is performance-based.  Parliament requires goal-
based reporting as the new measure of public accountability, linking government 
action and expenditures to previously announced regulatory objectives.   
Government is committed to "business plans," to results-oriented accountability,  
to demonstrating "operational" efficiency and to reporting the  "bottom line" to  
Parliament.   
 
In most western democratic countries, including Canada, there is a growing 
convergence between industry and business practices, management theory and 
approaches to public administration.  Management by objectives, performance-
based expenditures, risk assessment, risk management, quality assurance, 
knowledge management, information systems and performance measurement -- 
are mutual preoccupations of the public and private sectors.   
 
Outcome oriented (performance-based) regulation - though largely untested by 
time and the courts - is viewed by both sectors as a promising vehicle for better 
meeting regulatory objectives and advancing the growing convergence between 
business and regulatory practices.  Yet the benefits and limitations of 
performance-based regulation, in which law, business, industry and the 
stakeholders relying on regulatory protection, interface, remain the subject of 
continuing debate and some controversy. 
 
 
Uncertainty, Information Needs, Risk Assessment, Performance 
Measurement   
 
In May 2001, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (The 
Regulatory Policy Program) sponsored a workshop entitled Performance-based 
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations.  The title of this Workshop, considering its 
venue and recentness, underscores the persistent controversy about this 
regulatory technique. 
 
Harvard professor Cary Coglianese and a team of researchers were investigating 
"how to implement performance-based approaches to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of health and safety regulation across a variety of regulatory 
domains."451    The conundrum to be addressed by this work was that the 
                                            
451 The Federal Railroad Administration of the United States Transportation Department sponsored this 
project. 
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theoretical benefits of performance-based regulation had been long recognized, 
but more prescriptive approaches to regulation still tend to dominate many fields 
of regulation.  The purpose of the initiative was to learn when and how to 
implement performance-based regulation, in order to exploit its theoretical 
advantages. 
 
Participants at the Harvard Workshop on Performance-based Regulation noted 
that uncertainty, access to reliable information and performance assessment are 
persistent problems under GSR regimes. 
 
Performance-based regulation raises a number of issues relating to uncertainty, 
information, and the role of experts in regulatory decision-making.  Perhaps the 
biggest uncertainty of all is the performance of performance-based standards.  
Participants noted a general absence of empirical studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of performance-based standards, let alone systematic work 
showing when, where, and how well performance-based standards work in 
various regulatory settings. 
 
In Europe, uncertainty, monitoring, surveillance, enforcement and securing 
reliable information under the GSPD regime clearly remain issues of concern 
despite a decade of experience with the initiative.   
 
The Harvard Workshop considered a number of the elements of performance-
based regulation previously touched on by Canada’s Office of the Auditor 
General.  In 1997, the Auditor General summarized the essential components of 
an effective performance-based regime from an auditing perspective.  Auditing 
for effectiveness is an important perspective on performance-based regulation, 
given the critical importance of relevant and reliable data in determining whether 
performance goals are in fact met.  The Auditor General looks for the following 
essential elements in a PBR regime when assessing its effectiveness: 
.  
1. Clear and comprehensive performance objectives or goals for each of the 
areas subject to regulation;  
2. Formal risk analysis leading to the identification of the key performance goals 
for which data are to be gathered to monitor performance;  
3. The specifications of the measurement procedures and data to be used to 
monitor performance;  
4. Procedures to ensure timely and unimpeded access to all necessary data; 
and 
5. Assessment of the data quality, and procedures to carry out independent 
verification of the data.452 
                                            
452 Paragraph19.109, Annual Report of the Auditor General, 1997.  These essential components of a PBR 
regime are very close to those identified by Transport Canada (Safety Review Committee) which included: 
• identification of regulatory goals;  
• general reliance on standards of quality and performance measurement;  
• determination of the most effective means of mitigating and monitoring air navigation system-related 
risks; and  
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The Harvard Workshop proceedings, the material developed by the Auditor 
General in 1997 in its audit of a Transport Canada program and related studies 
of performance-based regulation in other countries illustrate some of the 
limitations of performance-based regulation:   
 
• Non-quantified performance objectives do not always meet the "clear and 
comprehensive performance objectives" requirement of the federal Auditor 
General; 
• Risk analysis, while a useful management tool, is an evolving discipline.453  
It is particularly problematic under the GPSD regime in Europe, where one 
hypothetical test of the risk formula for establishing whether a product was 
safe or unsafe involving several Member States led to a split decision on 
the result.  As indicated earlier in this Paper, Europe has a major 
reassessment of risk assessment methodology under way in an effort to 
achieve greater consistency;  
• Predictive risk analysis models often contain many hidden value 
judgments and, despite their scientific cloak, can be quite unreliable.  This 
is especially so with computer-generated models, as the unreliability of the 
Weatherman's five-day predictions often confirm; 
• Performance-based approaches rely heavily on "experts" in risk analysis, 
risk management and performance measurement.   As participants at the 
Harvard Workshop noted, "many people lack the training to understand 
these models.   "As a result, the number of people who can 
knowledgeably participate in regulatory decision making declines as the 
complexity of the analysis increases;"  
• The Commission of European Communities, in a White Paper on 
European Governance (2001) commented on the use of experts in the 
legislative and regulatory process.  The Commission intends to "publish 
guidelines on collection and use of expert advice, so that it is clear what 
advice is given, where it is coming from, how it is used and what 
alternative views are available;454 
                                                                                                                                  
development of extensive feedback mechanisms to sample, analyze, and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
risk mitigation. 
453 Some approaches to risk analysis, however, are in common use and quite effective. (E.g. HACCP 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points methodology, commonly adopted in food safety regulations. 
454 See  A White Paper on European Governance, Commission of The European Communities, Brussels, 
25.7.2001. The full excerpt, from which the quote was drawn is:  
"When legislating, the Union needs to find ways of speeding up the legislative process.  It must find the 
right mix between imposing a uniform approach when and where it is needed and allowing greater 
flexibility in the way that rules are implemented on the ground.  It must boost confidence in the way expert 
advice influences policy decisions.   
The Commission will: 
• Promote greater use of different policy tools (regulations, "framework directives", co-regulatory 
mechanisms).  
• Simplify further existing EU law and encourage Member States to simplify the national rules 
which give effect to EU provisions. 
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• The development of performance measures and performance evaluation 
are complex undertakings, and providing the information required can be 
extremely burdensome on industry and business.  Participants at the 
Harvard Workshop on PBR noted the irony that government policies 
favour performance-based regulation, on the one hand, and the reduction 
of red tape (paper burden), on the other; and 
• Performance indicators should reflect a preventive regulatory strategy to 
the extent practicable, that is performance indicators should be embedded 
well below the level of the ultimate objective to give regulators enough 
time to prevent bad performance."  Performance measures based only on 
accident, or incident reporting, for example, are inappropriate to regulated 
sectors where the adverse events are rare, but serious or catastrophic 
when they occur. (E.g. nuclear reactors, airline safety).  
 
Risk assessment of product hazards is a critical feature of Europe’s General 
Product Safety regime.  In Europe, there are two initiatives underway to improve 
risk assessment methodology and guidelines. One group was established by the 
European Union to assist enforcement authorities who need a better risk 
assessment tool in their daily work.  This group is entitled the EU Working Group 
Improvement of Risk Assessment Guidelines (IRAG).  It was formed to review 
and improve the risk assessment guidelines that are used with the RAPEX 
system.  
 
The Working Group started by following a practical approach, starting from the 
already published RAPEX Guidelines. The aim is to amend the method in order 
to achieve more consistency and less variation between assessors.  Several 
proposals have been made to improve the scales of severity and probability used 
in the method. For example, four levels of severity have been proposed and eight 
levels of probability (the lowest being ‘less than 1 in 1.000.000’ and from there 
increasing by factors of 10).  The Working Group anticipates that all factors, like 
exposure and vulnerability, will ultimately be included in the probability of harm.  
  
A second group, the Eurosafe Working Group on Risk Assessment, was 
established around the same time to determine a good scientific basis for risk 
assessment, listing all essential steps and relevant factors. Theoretically, its 
product should form the basis of the revisions carried out by the EU IRAG to 
improve the RAPEX model and the EU IRAG has agreed to consider this 
approach.  At this stage, however, no decision has been made with respect to 
which model will eventually be recommended to the EC. 455 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Publish guidelines on collection and use of expert advice, so that it is clear what advice is given, where it is 
coming from, how it is used and what alternative views are available." 
455 Information provided by Elizabeth Nielsen.  Euro-Safe is a new initiative of the European Consumer 
Safety Association. (ECOSA), and has been established as a working group that operates under the legal 
and financial responsibility of ECOSA.  Its objective is to facilitate partnering for joint proposals for 
research and action, involving dedicated research and safety promotion institutes around Europe. 
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Given the importance of effective risk assessment to the functioning of a general 
safety requirement and the controversy still surrounding the question of 
acceptable risk assessment methodologies, an important policy question facing 
Health Canada, is whether the GSR is likely to be an acceptable instrument of 
choice for Health Protection legislation, especially when that legislation would 
necessarily be based on a criminal law (penal) model demanding a high degree 
of certainty for dispute resolution purposes. 
 
Australian Experience with Grey-Letter Law” – Standards, 
Guidelines, Codes of Practice 
 
Australia has had many years of experience with the innovative use of standards 
in regulation and in the use of performance-based regulation generally.  In 
Australia, as in other Western democratic countries, the search for regulatory 
flexibility has shifted to the search for less intrusive methods than prescriptive 
regulation for accomplishing regulatory objectives. In 1997, a Report of the 
Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-Regulation in Australia 
entitled Grey-Letter Law canvassed the use of standards and other non-
prescriptive methods for achieving regulatory goals:  
 
Regulation can usefully be considered as a spectrum ranging from self-regulation 
where there is no government involvement, through various regulatory 
arrangements with increasing degrees of government influence and involvement, 
to explicit government regulation (often referred to as "black-letter law"). 
 
In this report, the term "quasi-regulation refers to the range of rules, instruments 
and standards where government influences businesses to comply, but which 
does not form part of explicit government regulations.  Quasi-regulation can take 
many forms such as codes of practice, advisory notes, guidelines, and rules of 
conduct issued by either non-government or government bodies.  In the context 
of a regulatory spectrum, quasi-regulation might be considered as "grey-letter 
law" (p. ix) 
 
The boundaries between self-regulation, quasi-regulation and prescriptive 
regulation are frequently indistinct. Parliament may, for example, require that 
industry codes be made mandatory, resulting in prescriptive regulation.  Or 
government may indirectly influence business practices through official 
endorsement, representation on monitoring committees, provision of guidelines, 
or voluntary agreements with industry.  Government involvement in quasi-
regulation, however, is often perceived by industry as requiring compliance with 
the particular code, standard or arrangement and therefore may have 
considerable impact on industry.456 
 
The Advantages of Alternatives to Prescriptive Regulation  
                                            
456 Grey Letter Law, Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-Regulation 
(Australia), p. 409   
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Alternatives to regulation (Quasi-regulation) have advantages and 
disadvantages.  The advantages were summarized in the Australian Report, 
Grey Letter Law: 
 
Compared to black-letter law, quasi-regulation, as with self regulation, can offer 
the advantages of flexibility, responsiveness, less cost to government and 
greater collaboration with industry, particularly with industry initiated schemes.  
Greater compliance is possible if the rules are clear and designed in 
collaboration with industry experts.  Quasi-regulation can also make use of 
innovative compliance mechanisms and quicker, cheaper, dispute resolution 
schemes and, due to greater involvement and ownership, industry may also be 
willing to contribute resources to developing, implementing and enforcing this 
type of regulation.457 
 
The Disadvantages - A Hidden Regulatory Burden?  
 
The disadvantages associated with the use of standards, codes of practice and 
other alternatives (or, instruments of quasi-regulation) set out in the Australian 
Report included:  
• Increased regulatory burden due to administrative costs shifting to 
business; 
• Information on particular codes and rules is often less accessible than for 
laws; 
• Private standards and codes may overlap with other codes and standards 
or with regulatory standards; and 
• Compliance obligations are often unclear under quasi-regulation 
 
Quasi-regulation can result in a form of "regulatory creep."  It is not subject to the 
same vetting process as regulations.  It can be introduced without formal 
assessment of its net benefit, compliance costs, economy wide impacts, or its 
impact on small business, or international competitiveness..  The concern, 
essentially, is "backdoor regulation" without formal justification or risk 
assessment - leading to inappropriate quasi-regulation with which industry feels 
obliged to comply.458 
 
In a Paper released by the OECD entitled Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: 
Challenges for Regulatory Compliance,459 the concept of ‘regulatory inflation’ is 
discussed.  In this Paper, the term regulatory inflation is used to describe the 
cumulative impact of multiple regulations that individually serve logical purposes, 
but combine to produce an overwhelming incomprehensible whole. 
                                            
457 Ibid., P. 40 
458 One of the principle reasons for the Grey-Letter Law study (supra) in Australia, was concern raised in 
the 1996 National Small Business Summit and in the report of the Small Business Deregulation Task Force 
that can affect the behaviour of businesses and impose a burden similar to explicit government regulation 
without any assessment of net public benefit. 
459 PUMA (2000) 4,  distributed on March 24, 2000 for the 21st Session of the Public Management 
Committee held in Paris, April 6 and 7, 2000. 
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Unfortunately, performance-based regimes, over time, suffer from a similar 
shortcoming.  Earlier in this Paper we noted the striking similarities between the 
(‘New”) performance-based approach to regulation adopted by Europe under the 
GPSD and similar reforms in the UK in the occupational health and safety sector 
in the early 1970’s.   The OECD paper makes clear that both prescriptive and 
performance-based regimes may face identical problems of regulatory ‘inflation’ 
as they mature. 
 
Even where an effort is made to reform regulation to make it simpler, easy to 
understand, and to include the private sector in drafting rules, a “regulatory 
ratchet” takes effect.  This means that, without vigilance, the overall regulatory 
structure tends to become more technical and unworkable as details are added 
and loopholes are closed.  For example, reforms to occupational health and 
safety regulation initiated in England and modelled in many other countries were 
intended to replace many technical rules with a few easy to understand, flexible, 
general rules.  The aim was to facilitate employer self-regulation of occupational 
health and safety on an individualized site-by –site basis.  However, over time 
many technical and detailed ‘codes of practice’ have developed under the 
general provisions of the occupational safety and health regulation to address 
specific hazards and make the law more certain for employers.  The proliferation 
of these codes of practice which have the effect of law means that now many 
businesses in Britain find them too complex and voluminous to be easily 
comprehensible.460 (Emphasis added) 
 
 
Making Choices:  Prescriptive Regulation?  Or Non-Prescriptive 
Alternatives? 
 
The Australian Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee Report developed a 
template that may be helpful to Health Canada in determining whether 
prescriptive regulation or voluntary or other non-prescriptive regulatory 
approaches are appropriate for dealing with health protection issues under its 
Legislative Renewal Initiative. 
 
 
Criteria Suggested for Choosing Prescriptive Regulation  
 
The Report of the 1999 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee Report on 
Quasi-Regulation sets out the following criteria for choosing prescriptive 
regulation:461 
• The problem is high risk, of high impact / significance, for example a major 
public health and safety issue; 
                                            
460 Ibid. p. 12 under the heading Non-compliance related to lack of regulatory knowledge or comprehension 
by the target group. 
461 Chapter 3 Choosing From the Regulatory Spectrum 
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• The government requires the certainty provided by legal sanctions; 
• Universal application is required (or at least where the coverage of an 
entire industry sector, or more than one industry sector) is judged as 
necessary; 
• There is a systematic compliance problem with a history of intractable 
disputes or flagrant breaches of fair trading principles and no possibility of 
effective sanctions being applied; and 
• Existing industry bodies lack adequate coverage of industry participants, 
are inadequately resourced, or do not have a strong regulatory 
commitment. 
 
 
Criteria for Choosing External Standards (Quasi-Regulation) 
Quasi-regulation in the Australian Report on Grey Letter Law includes the use of 
voluntary performance standards promoted by government for regulatory 
purposes, but not incorporated into regulations, similar to Europe’s GPSD 
regime.   The Australian Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-
regulation recommends that Quasi-regulation be considered where: 
 
• There is a public interest in some government involvement in regulatory 
arrangements and the issue is unlikely to be addressed by self regulation; 
• There is a need for an urgent, interim response to a problem in the short 
term, while a long term regulatory solution is being developed; 
• Government is not convinced of the need to develop or mandate a code 
for the whole industry; 
• There are cost advantages from flexible, tailor made solutions and less 
formal mechanisms such as access to a speedy, low cost complaints 
handling and redress mechanism; and 
• There are advantages in the Government engaging in a collaborative 
approach with industry, with industry having substantial ownership in the 
scheme.  For this to be successful, the following conditions need to apply: 
• A specific industry solution is required rather than regulation of general 
application; 
• There Is a cohesive industry, with like-minded participants, motivated to 
achieve the goals; 
• A viable industry association exists with the necessary resources to 
develop and/or enforce the scheme; 
• Effective sanctions or incentives can be applied to achieve the required 
level of compliance, with low scope for benefits being shared by non-
participants; and 
• There is effective external pressure from industry itself (survival factors), 
or threat of consumer or government action."462 
                                            
462 See The Report of the 1999 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee Report on Quasi-Regulation: 
Grey-Letter Law (Chapter 3 Choosing From the Regulatory Spectrum), 
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A Canadian Example 
 
In Canada, the Offshore Oil and Gas sector is a leading proponent of 
performance-based regulation. (PBR)   In October 2000, the Canadian Oil and 
Gas Administrative Advisory Council held an international workshop on 
Performance-based versus Prescriptive Regulation.  The themes were similar to 
those discussed in the Harvard Workshop and also motivated by an apparent 
disconnect between government policies on the use of PBR and legislative 
practice.  While the conference attendees were largely drawn from government 
and industry, a number of generic ‘lessons-learned’ emerged from those 
proceedings, including: 
 
• Performance-based regulations form part of a spectrum of approaches to 
regulation between pure goal setting and prescription.  These forms of 
regulation complement one another and are often employed in the same 
regulation; they should not be conceptually polarized; 
• The Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas Regime, like many other regulatory 
regimes, is a "mixed" regime and, while essentially prescriptive, has many 
performance-based features, including frequent reference to standards; 
• The criteria for determining an appropriate "mix" between prescriptive and 
performance-based approaches are unclear; 
• Not all stakeholders agree on the merits of the "flexibility" provided by the 
performance-based approach to regulation; 
• There is a significant disconnect between regulatory policy and legislative 
practices regarding the use of performance-based approaches to 
regulation; 
• Broad agreement is needed amongst affected stakeholders on the 
objectives, principles and overall vision for a major overhaul of a 
regulatory regime; and 
• Regulators, and some stakeholders, harbour significant doubts about the 
enforceability of performance standards. 
 
A number of the Workshop participants rightfully challenged the premise that 
performance-based and prescriptive approaches to regulation were polarized 
concepts.  One participant - echoing the lessons learned from the Australian 
Grey-Letter Law study - questioned whether there was any practical distinction 
between the two concepts – at least from an industry perspective.     
 
This whole discussion of performance versus prescriptive regulation may be a bit 
of a red herring. At the end of the day you have prescription.    
 
Under (the performance-based approach, the regulator) asks the duty holder how 
they will address a particular health and safety issue.  The regulator has a 
responsibility to review it and (if satisfactory) to authorize it.  Then, at that point, 
the operator has to follow the prescriptive operation or procedure, or what have 
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you, they have outlined.  It is a responsibility for the regulator to monitor audits 
and have inspections to see that it is being followed. 
 
Under the prescriptive approach, the regulator either makes reference to 
standards, or sets them, and proceeds in that fashion.  Perhaps we end up at the 
same point (prescription) at the end of the day.  One could argue that this 
(debate about performance versus prescriptive regulation) is simply about the 
best way to get there.463 
 
During the Workshop, breakout sessions were held.  All of the breakout groups 
experienced difficulty analyzing the Offshore Oil and Gas regime issues on the 
narrow basis of prescriptive versus performance-based regulation.  Some 
abandoned the debate, turning their attention to a broader, more practical, 
question - "What do we want the regulatory regime to look like?"    
 
The breakout sessions concluded with a number of essential elements being 
advanced as important attributes in a regulatory regime with a balanced mix of 
regulatory instruments.  Many of the essential elements developed in this 
Workshop would clearly be desirable attributes of any regulatory regime that 
relies heavily on industry self-regulation, including a GSR regime, namely: 
• Clear identification of the responsible duty holders; 
• An operating philosophy of continuous improvement, rather than a strict 
compliance attitude; 
• Regulatory processes which minimize adversarial relations between 
government and stakeholders; 
• Goals that translate into a definitive plan, but a plan that is flexible in 
circumstances where flexibility is required; 
• Due attention is given by the regulator to the circumstances of the 
operator; 
• Avoiding undue reliance on exemption provisions as a mechanism for 
achieving flexibility; 
• Adequate training of the work force on safety issues throughout the 
industry; 
• A single window approach to dealing with the industry; 
• Better delineated responsibilities of multiple regulators; 
• Provision for evaluating the regulators' performance in relation to goal-
setting and continuous improvement on the same basis as industry; 
• Clear regulatory policy objectives, clearer linkages between policies and 
regulations; 
• Regulations which effectively balance the need for a good fit with local 
social, cultural, political and geographic requirements, yet which are 
harmonized optimally with national or international standards;  
• Effective benchmarks and measures to ensure that performance 
objectives are being met; 
                                            
463 Proceedings of international Workshop on Performance-based versus Prescriptive Regulation, October, 
2000, sponsored by the Canadian Oil and Gas Administrative Council 
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• Rational, effective compliance and enforcement measures by the 
regulator; and 
• Adequate resources consistent with the needs of a goal-based regime, 
including the resources needed for new skill sets required under such a 
regime (i.e. including, auditing, performance measurement, risk 
management expertise). 
 
In this Paper, we have commented on the enormous discretion left to 
enforcement officials under Europe’s GSR regime – a discretion greatly amplified 
by uncertainty about conformity requirements and even risk assessment 
methodologies.  This has led many commentators to conclude that the exercise 
of such a broad discretion by enforcement officials constitutes “back door 
rulemaking.” 
 
Canadian experience with the failed "Regulatory Efficiency Act", tabled as Bill C 
62 in Parliament in 1994, also demonstrated the pitfalls involved with alternatives 
to regulation, which are not sufficiently accountable to Parliament or to the needs 
of the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory regime.  In reviewing similar 
legislation proposed in Australia, the Law Reform Committee of the Parliament of 
Victoria commented on the failure of the proposed Canadian legislation following 
the "fairly scathing report by the (Canadian) Standing Joint Committee for the 
Scrutiny of Regulations."  The concerns raised by the Joint Committee to the 
proposed Regulatory Efficiency Act resonate with the “back-door rulemaking” 
criticisms of the GSR.  (See Annex 9) 
 
Since the GSR uses voluntary standards as quasi –regulatory instruments to 
replace regulations, Health Canada officials should, in advancing any GSR 
proposals, be prepared to address considerations of the type usually addressed 
by legislative drafters and/or the Standing Joint Committee, including whether the 
proposal constitutes: 
 
• A law or structure of a law that will promote disrespect for the law or the  
legal system; 
• A law that is not capable of being fairly applied in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice; 
• Laws that circumvent or render inapplicable procedures that are normally 
applicable to the examination, registration and publication of regulations; 
• Laws in which substantive legal matters are absent from the law and are 
left to be determined by regulations or in some other way; 
• Policy statement provisions that have no meaning in law; 
• Provisions that allow a substantive law to be amended outside the 
parliamentary process; 
• Provisions that provide uncircumscribed power to make exemptions from 
the law; 
• Provisions saying that treaties, conventions or agreements, etc. have the 
force of law; 
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• The need to make the language of the law as clear as possible; and 
• Other policy issues, as for example, whether a new law is needed (can the 
policy objective be accomplished without another Act or regulation? 
 
 
Instrument Choice 
 
There is surely no single answer to the question of whether regulatory agencies 
should use performance- based regulation… performance-based regulation is 
not a "magic bullet" or "one size fits all" approach applicable in all situations…  In 
determining whether to use a performance standard, and if so, the specific type 
of standard to adopt (e.g. loosely vs tightly specified), decision makers need to 
consider the conditions under which the standard will be applied.464 
 
Under its Legislative Renewal Initiative, Health Canada proposes to include a 
GSR provision that would apply to all constituent Acts to be included in the 
proposed new Canada Health Protection Act.  However, the constituent Acts and 
Regulations under the proposed CHPA are not all on the same footing.  For 
example, a general safety requirement may be superfluous for product lines that 
are already closely controlled at the pre-marketing stage under licensing or 
certification schemes, such as drugs, medical devices and natural products.  The 
GSR in Europe was developed as a post-marketing mechanism implemented to 
provide a common safety ‘floor’ for hazardous products that were not yet 
integrated into Community harmonized standards or, if regulated, involved 
emerging, unforeseen risks. 
 
Moreover, some of the regulations enacted under the Food and Drugs Act 
dealing with medical devices and natural products have established virtual GSR 
regimes as conditions of licencing.465  
  
While there is no "formula" for deciding when to choose performance-based 
regulation, it is possible to identify specific factors influencing the choice of this 
instrument on a program-by-program basis.  Many of the jurisdictions considering 
performance-based regulation have adopted a “cautious and incremental” 
strategy for introducing this regulatory technique.  The key factors to be 
considered in whether or not to adopt a performance-based approach to 
regulation include: 
 
• The choice of any regulatory instrument depends upon on a variety of 
local circumstances, including the nature of the matter being regulated, 
the number and type of stakeholders affected by the regime, legal and 
constitutional requirements, the sophistication of the regulated community, 
                                            
464 Harvard Workshop on Performance-based regulation, supra, under the heading "Conditions for 
Performance-based Regulation. 
465 See, for example, Medical Devices Regulations, SOR / 98- 282, sections 10 to 20 and the Natural 
Health Products Regulations SOR/ 2003 –196 
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and their willingness to provide data required to support a PBR approach, 
among other factors; 
• Performance-based regulation increases the discretion given to the 
regulator and the regulated industry or business, sometimes significantly.  
The degree of stakeholder trust in the regulator(s) and industries in 
question is therefore a key factor in deciding whether a proposed 
performance-based regulation has any chance of becoming law; 
• Historical experience in the community with self-regulation techniques, or 
internal responsibility systems, can have a major impact on when it is 
feasible or timely to propose a performance-based regulation.  For 
example, a notorious regulatory failure, such as the Westray mining 
disaster or the series of securities frauds in Canada and the United States, 
may have a significant impact on the timeliness and feasibility of extending 
the performance-based approaches in the occupational health and safety 
or securities areas.  Such failures can result in pressure to retrench toward 
more prescription and more severe sanctions; 
• Where public health and safety is concerned, there is usually strong 
resistance in the public to relaxing the precision of prescriptive regulations.  
This is the case even where the risk of an adverse event is low, if serious 
or catastrophic consequences may follow. The Australian Radiation and 
Nuclear Protection Safety Agency recently rejected a proposed significant 
shift performance-based regulation on these grounds;466  
• The Australian Radiation and Nuclear Protection Safety Agency 
recommended a cautionary, incremental, approach to introducing 
performance-based approaches into an essentially prescriptive regime 
where public health and safety is a major concern.  It also emphasized the 
key role industry would have to play in educating the industry on risk 
analysis and management in making such a shift.  
 
The performance-based approach is also inappropriate to regulate 
activities that require a high level of safety and for which the risk of a 
breach would have very serious consequences.  As such, activities of 
even large firms or corporations which can afford to conduct their own risk 
assessment and management, may need to be regulated through the 
prescriptive approach if their activities of high level of safety and may 
cause externalities that can adversely affect public health or safety…. 
 
There is still a general reluctance in Australia to accept performance-
based approaches in the area of radiation protection. This was well 
illustrated in the submissions to the Issues Paper.  The general view was 
that leaving it to the industry to demonstrate compliance would not work 
as private firms are profit motivated and would invariably select low cost 
control systems and compromise on safety standards.  
 
                                            
466 See Australian Radiation and Nuclear Protection Safety Agency, Draft Final Report on National 
Competition Policy Review of Radiation Protection Legislation, February 2001: accessed on September 25, 
2006, at (http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/dft_fnl_rpt.pdf) 
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The Council of Australian Governments calls on regulators to move away 
from overly prescriptive standards towards performance-based standards.  
However, COAG also cautions regulators that prescriptive requirements 
may be needed to ensure public safety.   In particular, COAG makes 
several references in its guidelines to the fact that a prescriptive approach 
may be unavoidable in regulations that deal with public health and 
safety.467    
 
• The U.S. Mines and Minerals Service representative at the Offshore 
Oil and Gas Workshop in 2001 supported the cautious, incremental 
approach to performance-based regulation: 
 
We will add more performance-based rules to the mix when it makes 
good sense.  We will look for opportunities to align our domestic 
requirements with international standards so long as it protects the 
integrity of our regulatory program and improves efficiency for 
government or industry.  Finally, we will continue to promote and support 
non-regulatory initiatives like SEMP and EMS, whenever they will 
enhance safe and clean offshore operations without creating regulatory 
conflicts. 
 
• The Australian Radiation and Nuclear Protection Safety Agency 
recommended two techniques for introducing a performance-based 
approach progressively into a regulatory regime, that is, either through 
use of the "safe harbour" approach, or through the innovative use of 
exemption provisions in the governing statute. 
 
Agencies can introduce a performance-based approach to radiation 
protection legislation gradually without immediately exposing the 
regulatory regime to the risks that could arise from a performance-based 
approach.  The transition to a performance-based approach could be 
aided by using a "dual track" method with either "safe harbour" or "waiver 
/ variance" provisions in regulations. 
 
                                            
467 Ibid., (p29)    "Even if a performance-based approach is to be adopted for particular activities in 
radiation safety administration, this has to be gradual and only after a thorough risk analysis to determine 
which activities may be regulated by an outcome based approach. 
The Review Team acknowledges that a shift to performance-based regulations to achieve radiation 
protection objectives has to be approached very cautiously mainly because of the assessment above that 
although the likelihood of a radiation risk causing event may be low, the consequences of such an 
event could be serious to catastrophic. 
 
Even if a performance-based approach is to be adopted for particular activities in radiation safety 
administration, this has to be gradual and only after a thorough risk analysis to determine which activities 
may be regulated through an outcome-based approach. 
Where performance-based approaches are to be adopted, the implementation has to be accompanied by 
substantial industry efforts to educate the industry on risk analysis and management.  Experience in some 
jurisdictions (such as marine safety) demonstrate that a well-designed transition plan is required to 
overcome the resistance to performance-based approaches." 
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Safe harbour provisions in performance-based regulations enable firms 
that do not have the resources to comply with the outcomes-based 
approach to elect certain prescribed rules or specified standards.  This 
enables firms that prefer to comply with prescribed rules to have the 
option to do so while others use the performance-based approach. 
 
Alternatively, regulations may continue to be prescriptive but may contain 
provisions that empower agencies to grant waivers or variances on a 
case-by-case basis to firms that demonstrate compliance through 
alternative means. 
 
Since the Community Standards under Europe’s  New Approach to Regulation 
are treated as ‘voluntary’ standards, they could be viewed as a form of ‘safe 
harbour’ quasi-legislation.  However, the Community standards only offer a 
presumption of conformity and thus enforcement authorities may, in their 
discretion, act against specific consumer products they consider to present 
‘unacceptable’ risks.  Alternatively, enforcement authorities may fail to act against 
an industry that has developed its own standards, even though consumer 
interests contest the adequacy of such standards. The result, frequently, may be 
uncertainty about what the ‘law’ is.  
 
 
 
13. Summary of Advantages and Limitations of a GSR 
 
As noted earlier in this Report, the General Safety Requirement constitutes a 
form of performance-based regulation.  From a policy development perspective, 
its advantages and limitations closely parallel those of any performance-based 
regulatory regime.  The perceived advantages and limitations of the GSR are 
summarized below.  The ‘advantages’ are expressed as perceived advantages 
because they are sometimes illusory and sometimes offset by key 
disadvantages. 
 
 
The Perceived Advantages  
 
The perceived advantages of a General Safety Requirement include:  
 
• Immediate extension of Health Canada’s regulatory reach to include 
all new unregulated dangerous products, and to emerging, unforeseen 
risks in regulated products; 
 
• More timely, preventive inspection and enforcement action against 
such products and risks; 
 
• Earlier detection of product risks due to enhanced reporting and data 
requirements under a GSR; 
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• An enhanced culture of safety within industry by reason of improved 
self-regulatory practices, more effective risk assessment by industry and 
improved management practices in developing and marketing products; 
 
• A perceived reduction in the need for government intervention to 
achieve regulatory goals resulting in possible resource savings from 
less Government involvement in pre-marketing approvals, formal 
inspections, seizure of products, etc. under a command and control 
regulatory model; 
• Better use of compliance and enforcement resources due to the shift 
in emphasis from routine formal inspections to auditing for problems in 
industry quality management systems, self-regulatory processes and 
conformity assessment practices; 
 
• Increased product safety innovation by reason of the increased 
flexibility Industry is given in achieving regulatory goals under a voluntary, 
standards-based GSR regime; 
 
• Minimal market distortion compared with prescriptive regulation 
because the GSR is so closely integrated with industry and business 
practices; 
 
• Potential for reduced compliance costs for industry, again because of 
the greater flexibility afforded to industry in choosing less costly methods 
for achieving compliance with the General Safety Requirement; 
 
• Enhanced global competitiveness when performance standards are 
more closely harmonized with domestic and international standards than 
regulations developed on a ‘top down’ basis; 
 
• More targeted enforcement measures made possible under a GSR 
regime once effective reporting requirements and injury data systems are 
in place; 
 
• Due diligence defences in regulatory prosecutions are more easily 
established by producers and suppliers that have effective risk 
assessment and quality management and production processes in place 
that meet GSR expectations; 
 
• Reduced regulatory burden on industry through the use of voluntary 
performance standards designed to coincide more closely with industry 
practices, in contrast with ‘top down’ regulation; 
 
• Enhanced voluntary compliance through the use of ‘consensus 
standards’ developed by all key stakeholders resulting enhanced 
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stakeholder 'buy-in' promoted during effective consensus-based 
processes; 
 
• Enhanced international harmonization of product standards flowing 
from the participation of formal standard setting bodies in developing 
approved consensus standards under the GSR;468  
• ‘Approved’ voluntary standards provide an operational basis for 
third-party quality assurance certification programs; 
 
• Quicker, cheaper and less formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
may be developed under a standards-based approach to regulation than 
is normally the possible under the Criminal Justice system; and 
 
• Industry may contribute resources to developing, implementing and 
enforcing voluntary standards.   
 
 
The Limitations of a GSR 
 
• Multiple layers of uncertainty are evident under the General Safety 
Requirement making implementation difficult. (Uncertainty concerning the 
definition of a ‘safe’ product, the meaning of ‘serious’ risks that trigger 
reporting responsibilities, the inconsistent results of various risk-
assessment methodologies, and the means of establishing conformity with 
‘essential requirements’, among other uncertainties); 
 
• Tendency to undermine the ‘rule of law’ and legal certainty when 
voluntary standards are treated as quasi-mandatory rules.  (See note 
above); 
 
• Heavy implementation burden on officials to ‘fill in the blanks’ to 
provide a higher degree of certainty and comfort for industry about 
compliance on a product- by- product basis, through Government advisory 
services, policies, guidelines, rulings, etc; 
 
• Increased exposure to Court challenges and judicial review as 
officials, attempting to deal with the regime’s uncertainties, are ‘second-
guessed’ by the Courts under various causes of action such as regulatory 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, official misdirection, lack of 
authority to impose conditions or recall orders, the nature of ‘due 
diligence’, unreasonable exercise of enforcement discretion  fettering 
official discretion through overly-detailed guidelines, or Court challenges to 
                                            
468 For example, 27% of Europe’s CEN standards correspond with international standards and 65% of 
standards produced by the national Australian standard-setting agency are harmonized with ISO or IEC 
international standards for those subjects where an international standard exists. 
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the legislative scheme itself based on vagueness, or the imprecise 
formulation of quasi-criminal offences; 
 
• Poor Political Optics resulting from substituting voluntary standards for 
regulations in the public health and safety area.  This practice tends to be 
viewed by the beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme as de-regulation or 
capture by industry.  In Europe, the  New Approach is often described as 
the ‘privatization of regulation;’ 
 
•  Anticipated savings for Government may be illusory given the need 
for new auditing skills, to settle risk assessment methodologies, 
heightened monitoring and surveillance to verify that the self-regulatory 
activities of industry are effective; government contributions to the 
standard-setting process to ensure relevant standards are developed on a 
timely basis, the enhanced duty to take enforcement action against a 
much broader array of potentially dangerous products reported more 
frequently under the GSR, the need to develop guidelines, codes of 
practice, sanctions policy and other collateral documentation to make the 
scheme operationally effective.  The potential cost of court challenges and 
judgments for civil damages flowing from increased exposure to regulatory 
negligence is difficult to estimate before the legislation (the CHPA) is 
settled, but could be significant; 
 
• Potential, adverse impact on industry competitiveness - A GSR 
adversely affects the ‘level playing field’ for industry competition if it is 
inadequately or unevenly enforced.469  There is extensive pressure from 
industry in Europe for more effective government surveillance and 
enforcement of  New Approach regulations and the GSR for this reason; 
 
• Adverse impact on small business and industry - Some medium-sized 
industries and most small businesses prefer to be told what to do; often 
they do not consider the regulatory flexibility afforded under the GSR an 
advantage.  While alternative approaches to meeting an ‘approved’ 
standard may be advantageous to large firms with in-house research and 
development capabilities, small businesses have little choice but to follow 
the standard since they would be vulnerable to civil damages if they did 
not.  If product standards are developed under the predominant influence 
of big industry, an indeterminate number of small businesses may be 
driven out of business.  (There was some anecdotal evidence in the 
interviews that this occurred in Europe); 
 
• Government challenge function weakened – Over-reliance on industry 
self-regulation can lead to Government neglecting or disabling its 
                                            
469 In Europe, the pressure on Governments to enforce the GSR more effectively is coming mainly from big 
business and industry concerned about the anti-competitive effects of uneven enforcement against smaller 
enterprises and importers. 
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challenge function, or to undermining its capacity to undertake 
enforcement responsibilities.  This occurs where the Authority has 
misconceptions about the extent of potential resource savings for 
Government under a self-regulatory regime and, sometimes, because the 
expert-reliant GSR regime has led to industry hiring most of the available 
‘experts’ concerned with risk or conformity assessment, product testing, 
safety auditing, etc. thus weakening the Government’s capability to mount 
an effective challenge to industry ‘experts;’ 
 
• Inconsistent Results under different risk assessment methodologies 
- Risk assessment techniques, while appearing to be ‘scientific’, are often 
laden with value judgments and thus may lead to dramatically different 
conclusions on the same facts;470  
 
• Inconsistent quality of standards - Standards-development processes 
by private agencies or industries may not be as consistent or as effective 
as the formal processes adopted by national standard development 
agencies. Under a voluntary standards-based regulatory regime, private 
standards and codes may overlap with national codes and standards, or 
with standards incorporated into regulations, making it important for 
government to develop a scheme for ‘approving’ standards for conformity 
assessment purposes.  This can be a resource-intensive activity for 
Government, especially under the GSR where standards are least likely to 
be available, given the focus of the GSR on unregulated products and 
risks.  Neither does Canada have a standard-setting infrastructure as 
extensive as that which has evolved in Europe over the past 30 years; 
 
• Standards development can be as time consuming as enacting 
regulations when done properly by involving all interested stake holders; 
 
• Potential for industry ‘capture’ of the standards-development 
process. There is a tendency for the standards-development process to 
be captured by vested interests seeking competitive advantage, or 
otherwise seeking to minimize production costs.  Unintentional capture 
may occur simply due to the unequal resources available to industry and 
consumers wishing to participate in the standard-setting process. 
Subsidizing consumer participation in standards development proceedings 
is a potentially significant area of indirect cost to Government; 
 
• Regulatory offences under a GSR are difficult to prosecute and likely 
to lead to inconsistent results, given the difficulty in defining ‘safety’, the 
"flexibility" afforded to the defendant under a voluntary standards regime 
to advance alternative standards of safety, the uncertain scope of the due 
                                            
470 As, in fact, was the case in Europe under a trial assessment as to whether a hypothetical product was 
‘safe’ or not.  The results of the trial, involving a number of Member States, led to a virtually polarized split 
on whether the product was ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’. 
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diligence defence under a GSR regime and the relative lack of regulatory 
expertise in the Criminal Courts.  Prosecutors will have difficulty 
establishing that products are ‘unsafe’ beyond a reasonable doubt under 
the general duty violation;  
 
• Standards developed on a "best practices” basis tend to result in 
"liability creep" especially if such standards are relied upon by courts to 
fix the legal standard of care in private negligence actions or where they 
have the effect of raising the standard of proof required to make a due 
diligence defence in regulatory prosecutions;471  
 
• Accountability to the public and to Parliament is weakened under a 
GSR regime based mainly on voluntary standards because it is a form of 
‘back-door rule-making’ analogous to a sub-delegation of legislative power 
outside the regulatory process overseen by Parliament.  Even the concept 
of incorporation by reference of standards ‘as amended from time to time” 
remains somewhat controversial in Canada and is still somewhat unevenly 
applied.   Reliance on voluntary standards as a form of ‘quasi-law’ 
developed and amended outside the regulatory process is therefore an 
approach likely to be vigorously challenged if Canada’s experience under 
the Regulatory Efficiency Act initiative is any indication;472 
 
• Performance measurement can be particularly difficult under a 
performance-based approach to regulation..   Performance auditing is 
a relatively new venture; few auditors have the experience required to 
assess performance-based schemes and performance measurement is 
still often viewed as an iterative process.  The Harvard Workshop on the 
Advantages and Limitations of Performance-based Regulation observed 
that ‘performance’ evaluation (the key to accountability) remains a 
complex and unsettled component of performance-based regulation; 
 
• Data requirements can be onerous for industry (and Government) 
under performance-based regimes such as under the General Safety 
Requirement.  Timely receipt of reliable information about industry 
performance, production and supply processes, product defects, recalls, 
complaints, etc is the quid pro quo for permitting a higher degree of 
industry self-regulation and for reducing ‘routine’ inspections to undertake 
more targeted, evidence-based, compliance and enforcement initiatives.  
Government can expect to receive a vast amount of information from 
industry requiring careful sifting and analysis - another important element 
of Government cost; and 
 
• The Exponential growth of ‘Grey-Letter law’ - Industry, particularly 
small industry, tends to regard approved standards, codes of practice, 
                                            
471 Regulations are usually based on minimum acceptable standards 
472 See Annex 9 
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policies, guidelines as ‘law’, or at least to be unclear about their 
compliance obligations in relation to such documents.  The result, often, is 
a complex overlay of documentation (or ‘Grey-letter law’) to address 
operational uncertainties under a GSR regime without the essential 
checks and balances found in the regulatory process.  This leads some 
industry players to conclude that the end result under performance-based 
and prescriptive regulation is the same, that is, prescription.   Under 
performance-based regulation, there is a conflict between policies 
increasing regulatory ‘flexibility’ for industry, on the one hand, and policies 
purporting to reduce industry’s ‘paper burden’, on the other. 
 
 
14. Broad Options for Health Canada   
  
The purpose of this Paper was to consider the suitability of the GSR as a 
regulatory instrument for achieving Health Canada’s objectives under the 
Legislative Renewal Initiative.  Our research has led us to question the suitability 
of employing a GSR under the proposed Canada Health Protection Act.   While 
reaching that conclusion might have been sufficient for the purposes of our 
mandate under this Project, we are outlining five broad options for Health 
Canada to consider for addressing its regulatory goals and objectives.  
 
Revisiting the Case for Reform 
 
There are a number of reasons mentioned throughout this Report indicating why 
Health Canada may wish to reconsider including a general safety requirement as 
a major element of the proposed new Canada Health Protection Act. The GSR is 
difficult to implement under a criminal law model and some of the remedies, such 
as administrative recall orders, may not be available to the Department.  The 
need for a ‘safety net’ is not the same under the CPHA’s constituent Acts and 
Regulations; the Department has much closer control over emerging risks under 
the pre-marketing licensing and certification regimes in the Food and Drugs Act 
than it does under the Hazardous Products Act. 
 
While the ‘ New Approach’ to regulation (which provides the regulatory backdrop 
for the General Product Safety Directive) may have been inevitable in the 
European context, the multiple layers of uncertainty under the  New Approach 
and GPSD regimes have made for complex and difficult implementation of the 
concept.  This uncertainty would make it even more difficult to implement in 
Canada under a Criminal law model.   Moreover, the introduction of standards 
into Europe’s revised GPSD as a method of conformity assessment is relatively 
recent; it was implemented only as of January 2004.  Both the “ New Approach to 
Regulation and the General Product Safety regime are clearly still ‘works-in-
progress’; both are undergoing continuous review and modification.  
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In Canada and the United States, voluntary standards form part of a spectrum of 
regulatory mechanisms ranging from simple goal setting to outright prescription.  
They complement formal regulation by encouraging performance to a best 
practices level, that is, beyond minimum legal requirements.  When incorporated 
by reference into regulations, voluntary standards also help to define the law.  
Voluntary standards can help prevent excessive regulation where they effectively 
remove the need for regulation when they serve to meet the same regulatory 
objective.  Outside of formal incorporation by reference into a regulation, 
however, voluntary standards developed outside of the democratic regulatory 
process rarely serve as a form of ‘law’ in Canada or in the United States. 
 
The United States has resisted using voluntary standards as quasi-law on the 
grounds that this practice constitutes ‘backdoor rulemaking’ by non-elected third 
parties outside of the democratic process.  U.S. consumer product legislation 
does vigorously promote the development and promulgation of voluntary product 
safety standards, even as a preferred approach to regulation where such 
standards demonstrably meet the Government’s regulatory goals, but it does so  
to eliminate the need for mandatory rules.  In the United States, though, voluntary 
standards do not operate as ‘quasi-law’ as they do in Europe under the GSR and 
New Approach to Regulation.’ 
 
In Europe, voluntary standards adopted as Community (harmonization) 
standards substitute for technical regulation of product requirements.  Though 
expressed to be voluntary, they operate as a quasi-mandatory requirement.  
Large industry may treat the standards as truly voluntary by developing 
alternative, equivalent standards, but most have little practical choice but to treat 
the approved standards as ‘law’.  This is especially true for small manufacturing 
enterprises that do not normally have the necessary in-house expertise to 
develop alternative standards, or the funds to engage third parties to do so on 
their behalf. 
 
Europe’s use of quasi-mandatory ‘voluntary’ standards was a practical response 
to the regulatory gridlock that occurred in Europe in the 1980’s due to the inability 
of diverse Member States to agree on the technical details of European laws, and 
sometimes even on ‘essential product requirements’.  This situation presented a 
dangerous obstacle to the establishment of The European Common Market, 
which required the harmonization of Community standards and, as such, 
threatened the welfare of the European Community at large.  
 
The cost/benefit considerations of Europe’s ‘ New Approach’ to regulation were, 
therefore, unique.  While the regulatory costs to government and industry 
inherent under the European GPSD regime are significant, the potential financial 
benefits associated with achieving an effective European Common Market are 
enormous.  The precise contribution of a General Product Safety Directive to 
ensuring safe products in Europe, however, is far from established.  Much of the 
effectiveness of the European regime seems attributable to the formidable 
market sanctions that may be imposed on producers, suppliers and exporters 
within the Common Market, and the producers’ absolute liability for defective 
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products under the European Product Liability Directive. The resource savings 
that Health Canada might have been anticipated receiving from simply reinforcing 
the producers’ common law obligation to avoid producing unsafe products by 
enacting a GSR may also be largely illusory.    
 
While Canada’s regulatory policy encourages the use of voluntary standards to 
achieve regulatory goals, it does not go so far as to encourage the sub-
delegation of quasi-regulation-making power to domestic or international 
standard-setting bodies operating outside of the domestic regulatory process. In 
Canada, even the concept of incorporating standards by reference into 
regulations remains somewhat unsettled. 
 
The GSR is difficult to contain in the role of a ‘safety net’; it tends to evolve into a 
horizontal form of regulation for unregulated products and ‘orphaned’ risks and is 
characterized by multiple layers of uncertainty.  Health Canada officials would be 
placed in the day-to-day position of clarifying these uncertainties for industry on a 
‘product-by-product basis. In some cases, officials would be placed in the 
position of explaining what, in effect, the law is where no product standards exist 
for new products. The Department’s potential exposure to regulatory liability, 
particularly from negligent misrepresentations made under the extensive advisory 
program likely required to make the scheme work, could also increase 
significantly. 
 
Finally, standards-based regimes are not a panacea.  As they mature, they begin 
to face criticisms similar to those of the prescriptive regime they purported to 
replace.  In Europe, the  New Approach to Regulation marked its Twentieth 
Anniversary at a conference in Brussels in November of 2005.  In addition to 
familiar concerns about delays in ‘time to market’ resulting from delays in the 
development of new product standards, concerns persist about inconsistencies in 
the interpretation and application of  New Approach directives (including under 
the General Product Safety Directive); about effectiveness and performance 
measurement, the reliability of risk assessment methodologies, about the general 
complexity and growing number of guidance documents, the competence of 
some accreditation agencies, the impartiality of notifying bodies, and about the 
relative lack of influence which consumers have in the standards development 
process. 
   
 
Summary of Policy Options  
 
Five broad options are available to Health Canada, four of which are alternatives 
to the GSR, namely: 
 
1. The European Model – Attempt to adapt the European model of the 
GSR to the Canadian legal context for inclusion in the proposed 
Canada Health Protection Act. (This was the principle subject of this 
Report)  
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2. Incremental Reform – Import only needed elements from the GSR 
into the constituent Acts originally intended for consolidation under the 
CHPA should the Department decide not to proceed with a 
consolidation. (i.e. reporting requirements, data-based detection 
system, missing enforcement powers, etc.)  This is the approach 
adopted by Australia following an extensive review of its consumer 
protection legislation completed in 2005. 
 
3. Modified American Approach (HPA Only) – Under the Hazardous 
Products Act, Health Canada would enact a general prohibition against 
advertising, selling, importing etc. consumer products which present an 
unreasonable risk of injury.  “Risk of injury” would be defined on a 
basis consistent with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act, to mean 
“a risk of death, personal injury, or serious or frequent illness”.  ‘Risk of 
injury’ is an issue that can be determined with much greater certainty, 
including by criminal courts, than the question as to whether particular 
products are “safe” or “unsafe”.  This Option would be designed to 
promote closer harmonization of North American consumer product 
standards, injury data collection and enforcement practice. 
 
This Option would apply only to the Hazardous Products Act on the 
assumption that there is no real need for a general prohibition of this 
kind under the Food and Drugs Act and related regulations where 
closely controlled licensing and certification schemes with pre-
marketing and adverse incident reporting requirements are already in 
place.  The GSR is a post-marketing mechanism that assumes little to 
no government oversight at the pre-marketing stages of product 
design, development and production. Moreover, an incremental reform 
approach is already evident under the Medical Devices and Natural 
Products Regulations, which now include a virtual GSR regime linked 
to conditions of licensing. 
 
4. Modified American Approach (All Constituent Acts) – If Health 
Canada wishes to extend the general prohibition outlined beyond the 
Hazardous Products Act, the scope of the HPA (which is already a 
form of generic ‘catch-all’, legislation) could be extended to apply to 
dangerous unregulated products and serious unforeseen risks in 
product areas covered by the other Acts administered by Health 
Canada.  While the general duty violation and related powers might be 
situated in the HPA, the authority would be accessible to enforcement 
officials administering the other enumerated Acts, as needed, likely 
without requiring significant changes to the Department’s internal 
organization. 
 
While the HPA is mentioned as a possible ‘home’ for the general 
prohibition based on American ‘risk of injury” terminology, it might be 
located in some other generic statute administered by the Department 
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such as the Department of Health Act,473 or the proposed CHPA if the 
Department proceeds with the consolidation of constituent Acts under 
the Legislative Renewal Initiative. 
 
5. Status Quo with Administrative Reform - Under t his Option, the 
Department would rely on the existing provisions for Ministerial Interim 
Orders in the Hazardous Products Act or the Department of Health Act 
as the main safety net for dealing with unregulated dangerous 
products, and unforeseen, emerging and serious risks in regulated 
products. 
 
In this case, however, the focus would be on making the Minister’s 
existing remedy more efficient by developing internal policies for 
triggering the use of this power together with a fast-track process for 
exercising it - all in collaboration with the Minister’s Office and relevant 
Central Agencies of Government.  The policy and fast-track process 
would then become a routine element of briefing for new Ministers of 
Health so they would be familiar with the emergency measure in 
advance of the need for urgent intervention against a particularly 
hazardous product. 
 
Options two to five (i.e. the ‘alternative’ options) might be accompanied by a 
Health Canada program to encourage the development and use of effective 
voluntary product standards with a view to achieving levels of product safety that 
routinely exceed minimum legal requirements.  For example, on July 10, 2006, 
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission published a final rule on 
Commission Involvement in voluntary Standards indicating how the Commission 
intends to promote improved voluntary product standards in collaboration with the 
private sector without compromising the public authority’s institutional 
independence or oversight role.474   
 
 
Option 1.  The European (GPSD) Model – Revisiting the Case for 
Reform 
 
This Option is the principle subject of this Paper.  Under this option, Health 
Canada would attempt to adapt the European General Product Safety to a 
Canadian model of health protection based on the federal government’s 
constitutional authority for the substantive criminal law.  Under this approach a 
GSR would be legislated as an enforceable, legal obligation in the form of a 
general prohibition against supplying ‘unsafe’ consumer products. 
 
The Case Studies included with this Report illustrate how, in practice, the 
European model of the GSR might operate in Canada and identify the major 
administrative and resource requirements to implement a GSR effectively. 
                                            
473 S.C.  1996, c. 8 
474 Federal Register, July 10, 2006, Vol. 71, No. 131 
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The European approach to regulation is clearly performance-based, but involves 
a form of authorized sub-delegation of quasi-legislative authority over technical 
product requirements to private standard setting bodies.  Canadian regulatory 
policy, while quite supportive of voluntary standards, has not evolved to the point 
of approving the substitution of voluntary technical standards to masquerade as 
‘law’ in the place of regulations.  As noted earlier in this Report, the case for 
Europe’s ‘ New Approach’ to regulation was unique, compelling and linked almost 
exclusively to Common Market trade considerations.  
 
 The European general product safety regime is ill-suited to administration under 
Canadian criminal law and procedure.  The Europeans continue to address a 
number of important problems with the GSR, including a significant lack of 
transparency and consistency in its application.  The extensive flexibility available 
to defendants in choosing standards that raise a presumption of conformity with 
the GSR, coupled with built-in uncertainty in the definition of ‘safe’ products under 
the GSR, would make it very difficult to enforce under Canadian criminal and 
regulatory (penal) law. 
 
The costs associated with adapting a European model of the GSR to the 
Canadian context may well outstrip the benefits to be expected from importing 
this regulatory technique and force Health Canada to take an earnest look at 
alternatives.  The GSR cost elements are detailed throughout this Report. The 
mere enactment of a GSR has little effect on industry behaviour without 
aggressive complementary programming along the lines of safety campaigns in 
the occupational health and safety area.  The GSR is difficult to explain to 
regulation-centric industries and there is generally a low awareness of the GSR 
in small and medium sized enterprises.   
 
Notwithstanding these observations, the more mature consumer product safety 
programs in Europe are quite effective - to the point where product safety is not 
regarded as a significant problem in several jurisdictions.  Many of these 
schemes have a full range of civil, administrative and criminal sanctions.  But 
Europe’s Product Liability laws, coupled with the potential enormity of the loss of 
market share following a Rapex Report on a dangerous product, and the fear of 
damage to corporate reputations remain the main compliance incentives for 
industry.   The contribution of the General duty violation to enhanced product 
safety remains unclear.  There is little case law and Europe has had only minimal 
experience with the GSR in its present form (The revised GPSD came into force 
only in January of 2004). 
 
The regulatory authority of the EU Member states and the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission differ from that of the federal Government in Canada 
in that they have direct regulatory authority for consumer product safety.  This 
enables these jurisdictions to employ civil and administrative remedies, such as 
administrative monetary penalties and administrative recall orders that are not 
available to Health Canada under statutes based exclusively on the federal 
constitutional authority for substantive criminal law and procedure. 
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There is little evidence that the mere enactment of a GSR has any significant 
effect on altering risk assessment practices or contributing toward a ‘culture of 
safety’.  There appears to be little awareness of the general safety requirement in 
Europe outside of big business and industry.  It is a difficult concept to explain to 
‘regulation-centric’ industries and has thus proven to be a challenging 
communications exercise in the European experience.   Policy and program 
measures adopted under existing authorities to encourage a ‘culture of safety’ in 
industry should prove to be equally effective with, or without, a GSR regime.  
Lessons learned by officials in the Occupational Health and Safety area in 
promoting safe practices in the workplace over the past several decades have, 
despite the different legal framework, important significance for officials 
concerned with promoting a ‘culture’ of consumer product safety. 
 
For these and other reasons detailed throughout the Report, we have concluded 
that Health Canada may wish to reconsider adapting the European model of the 
GSR to its health protection regime. 
 
 
Option 2 - Incremental Reform 
 
Under an ‘Incremental Reform Option”, Health Canada would import only 
‘needed elements’ of the General Safety Requirement, or powers associated with 
it, into its constituent Acts and regulations.  In fact, this process of incremental 
reform has already begun under the Medical Devices and Natural Health 
Products Regulations, both of which have incorporated key elements of the GSR 
as conditions of licensing or certification.475 
                                            
475 The Medical Devices Regulations under the Food and Drugs Act provide for a closely controlled 
licensing regime, including a reasonably complete general product safety regime developed as a condition 
of licensing under sections 10 to 20 of the regulations dealing with Safety and Effectiveness Requirements.  
Sections 9, 10 and 11 set out the general safety requirement as follows: 
9. (1) A manufacturer shall ensure that the medical device meets the safety and effectiveness 
requirements; .(2) A manufacturer shall keep objective evidence to establish that the medical device 
meets those requirements. 
10. A medical device shall be designed and manufactured to be safe, and to this end the manufacturer 
shall, in particular, take reasonable measures to 
(a) identify the risks inherent in the device; (b) if the risks can be eliminated, eliminate them;(c) if 
the risks cannot be eliminated ,(i) reduce the risks to the extent possible  (ii) provide for 
protection appropriate to those risks, including the provision of alarms, and (iii) provide, with the 
device, information relative to the risks that remain; and (d) minimize the hazard from potential 
failures during the projected useful life of the device 
11. A medical device shall not, when used for the medical conditions, purposes or uses for which it is 
manufactured, sold or represented, adversely affect the health or safety of a patient, user or other 
person, except to the extent that a possible adverse effect of the device constitutes an acceptable risk 
when weighed against the benefits to the patient and the risk is compatible with a high level of 
protection of health and safety. 475  (emphasis added) 
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Many of the constituent acts and regulations to be integrated into a proposed 
Canada Health Protection Act already contain general prohibitions that implicitly 
constitute general safety requirements for the specific product lines (e.g. drugs, 
medical devices, food).  Because the existing prohibitions target specific product 
lines, they provide a narrower context for legal interpretation of generic terms and 
may be worded with a degree of precision that more readily satisfies the 
exigencies of the criminal justice process.   
 
The following prohibitions under the Food and Drugs Act already constitute 
implicit general safety duties for drugs, medical devices and food. 
 
Drugs:  
No person shall sell any drug that 
(a) was manufactured, prepared, preserved, packaged or stored under 
unsanitary conditions; or 
(b) is adulterated.476 
 
Devices 
No person shall sell any device that, when used according to directions or under 
such conditions as are customary or usual, may cause injury to the health of the 
purchaser or user thereof.477 
 
Food: 
No person shall sell an article of food that 
(a) has in or on it any poisonous or harmful substance; 
(b) is unfit for human consumption; 
(c) consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, 
decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance; 
(d) is adulterated; or 
(e) was manufactured, prepared, preserved, packaged or stored under 
unsanitary conditions478 
A similar approach is adopted under the more recently enacted Natural Health 
Products Regulations,479 which includes many GSR elements under Part 3 on  
“Good Manufacturing Practices” (sections 43-62) along with reporting 
                                                                                                                                  
The elements of a virtually self-contained GSR regime (excepting the recall power) are found in the 
Medical Devices Regulations under the following sections: 12. (device to perform as intended), 13. (safety 
during the entire useful life of the device), 14..(safety throughout storage and shipping), 15. (obligation to 
take reasonable measures to ensure compatibility with other materials into which it may come in 
contact)16. (packaging in such a manner as to minimize enumerated risks)17. (validation of sterilization 
methods)18. (ensure compatibility with any other components or parts of a ‘system’19. (compliance with 
measuring tolerances)20. (validation of software performance)21 (Labelling requirements)52-56 (Product 
tracing information)59-62 (Mandatory Problem Reporting Responsibilities) 
476 R.S., c. F-27, s. 8. 
477 R.S., c. F-27, s. 19. 
478 R.S., c. F-27, s. 4. 
479 S.O.R./ 2003-196 
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requirements that include, in section 25, mandatory reporting on product 
recalls:480  
Accordingly, the various Acts and Regulations administered by Health Canada 
are not all on the same footing.  An overarching general safety requirement is 
largely superfluous for product lines already closely controlled at the pre-
marketing stage under licensing or certification schemes, such as drugs, medical 
devices and natural products.  The GSR in Europe is a post-marketing 
mechanism originally designed to provide a common safety ‘floor’ for a broad 
range of non-specific hazardous products and risks not otherwise covered by 
National or Community standards, or regulations. 
 
Criteria Conducive to a ‘Licensing’ Approach 
The licensing and certification schemes under the Food and Drugs Act provide 
close control by the public authority, even over emerging risks.  This is 
appropriate for ingested products, which, if unsafe, could lead to serious injury or 
death.  The Robens Inquiry set out the policy considerations that demonstrate not 
only why licensing-type schemes are appropriate for products like drugs, medical 
devices and radiation emitting devices, on the one hand, but also why they are 
not appropriate for generic consumer products under a statute like Canada’s 
Hazardous Products Act.481 
 
Licensing systems provide enforcing authorities with a powerful sanction.  
Conditions of licence can be imposed, with various penalties for non-observance.  
These can include withdrawal or non-renewal of the licence. 
 
Many of those submitting evidence to us suggested a considerable extension of 
licensing to a wide variety of premises, processes and individuals.  For example, 
some urged that all works managers should be licensed to ensure that they 
possess minimum qualifications of knowledge and expertise in occupational 
safety and health.  We do not regard this as a practical proposition.  In the first 
place there is seldom much practical value in general licensing criteria applicable 
to a wide variety of circumstances.  If they are to have real significance, licensing 
criteria must be related to needs and circumstances which can be closely 
defined.  Secondly, the administration of licensing systems is expensive in 
manpower, and can easily become excessively bureaucratic when applied to 
large numbers of undertakings or individuals.  Finally, too much reliance on 
licensing might tend to encourage the notion that the primary responsibility for 
exercising control lies with the licensing authorities rather than with those who 
created the risks. 
 
Our view, then, is that whilst licensing provides a tight means of control and a 
powerful sanction against abuse, licensing systems should be used very 
selectively.  We have in mind that the licensing approach should be adopted 
mainly for the control of high-hazard installations such as bulk storages of 
                                            
480 Section 25 provides that: “ Every licensee who commences a recall of a natural health product shall 
provide the Minister with the information referred to in section 62 within three days after the day on which 
the recall is commenced. “ 
 
481 Robens Inquiry, supra at paras. 280-82 
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intrinsically dangerous chemicals; or for particularly hazardous activities such as 
demolition work.  …. (Emphases added) 
 
The Incremental Reform Option, therefore, would require Health Canada to 
examine the regulatory gaps in the authorities and powers of each of the 
constituent Acts and consider importing targeted elements of the GSR to deal 
with those gaps, such as appropriate reporting, tracking, labelling or warning 
requirements and, perhaps, upgraded sanctions and sentencing criteria to 
prevent fines from being treated as the ‘cost of doing business.’    
 
We understand that the process of examining regulatory gaps in the constituent 
statutes underpinning the proposed Canada Health Protection Act is already 
under way within Health Canada.  That process might well continue, but with an 
Incremental Reform focus. 
 
 
Option 3 - Modified American Approach  (HPA only) 
 
Under this Option, the Department would add to the Hazardous Products Act a 
general prohibition against advertising, selling, importing, etc. of a product which 
presents an ‘unreasonable risk of injury’. Under a criminal law model, the GSR 
general duty of care must be worded in the form of a prohibition.  The phrase 
‘unreasonable risk of injury’ is significant in that it describes the principle mischief 
addressed by the United States Consumer Product Safety Act. (CPSA) 482    
 
The U.S. CPSA defines a ‘risk of injury’ to mean ‘a risk of death, personal injury, 
or serious or frequent illness.’483  That degree of gravity seems sufficient to 
warrant engaging federal criminal law authority in the interest of protecting public 
health and safety.484   Health Canada might have to bring greater precision to the 
                                            
482 In the Congressional findings and declaration of purpose for the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act, first 
purpose is stated as being: “to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with 
consumer products.”, U.S. Code, Title 15, c. 47, s. 2051.   
483 See U.S. Code, Title 15, c. 47, s. 2052 (a) (1) (I) (3).  ‘Risk of injury’ is defined under the U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Act to mean “a risk of death, personal injury, or serious or frequent illness”.   See 
U.S. Code, Title 15, c. 47, s. 2052 (a) (1) (I) (3).  Unreasonable ‘risk of injury, imminent product hazard 
and substantial product hazard’ are all separately defined for different purposes under the CPSA.. 
484 Ibid., section 2064  Under the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act, ‘unreasonable risk of injury’, 
‘imminent product hazard’ and ‘substantial product hazard’ are terms separately employed for different 
purposes under the Act. 
• An ‘unreasonable risk of injury’ constitutes grounds for banning a product484 
• An “imminently hazardous consumer product’ constitutes grounds for “product condemnation and 
seizure” (quasi-criminal remedies)484 
• A ‘substantial product hazard’ triggers the manufacturers’ responsibility to report the hazard to the 
Commission and, in turn, the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s authority to order public 
notification of the hazard, repair or replacement of the product, a refund of the purchase price, the 
development of a proposed action plan for dealing with the hazard, and/or a prohibition order 
against sale and distribution. 
 
Under the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act, a ‘substantial product hazard means:  
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule which creates a substantial 
risk of injury to the public, or  
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meaning of ‘risk of injury’ for administrative purposes but U.S practices and 
American case law would likely be of assistance in this regard. 
 
The intent of this approach would be to:  
• Lend greater certainty to the general prohibition provision, that is, the 
general duty violation; 
• Access American case law on similar definitions where Canadian courts 
have to address any residual uncertainty; and  
• Promote greater harmonization of North American product safety 
standards, as well as administrative and enforcement practices. 
 
Under the federal Hazardous Products Act (HPA), it is currently an offence to 
advertise, sell or import a ‘prohibited product’ or a ‘restricted product,’ except as 
authorized under the HPA regulations.  ‘Prohibited’, ‘restricted’ and ‘controlled’ 
products are defined as individual classes of products under section 2 of the Act 
with precise reference to individual products, materials or substances explicitly 
scheduled under the HPA that have been determined to fall within each class.  
The HPA applies to goods and substances not specifically regulated under other 
federal statutes.  A new general prohibition would apply to all unregulated 
products not covered by the HPA and could be extended to include serious, 
unforeseen risks emerging from otherwise regulated health products currently 
outside the scope of the HPA. (Option B, below) 
However, no policy decision to adopt a modified American approach should be 
taken without carefully reconsidering the viability of Health Canada’s existing 
‘safety net’ remedy for dealing with emerging product hazards, that is, the 
Ministerial Interim Order.  In particular, the Department should consider whether 
a new general prohibition is required in light of that provision and whether it could 
be rendered more effective with administrative reform. (Option 5).  Would a 
general prohibition provision render the Ministerial interim order redundant, or 
should be retained for some complementary purpose?  The utility of this type of 
order, which also exists in the UK Consumer Protection Act, 1987 should not be 
underestimated.  Option 5 proposes a closer look at ways of enhancing the 
efficiency of this regulatory mechanism.   
A general prohibition under the HPA against products presenting a risk of injury 
would, like the GSR, provide a trigger for immediate enforcement action.  
However, a legal framework for timely settlement or remedial discussions within 
the context of a criminal process would have to be crafted for the remedy to be 
effective.  Like the GSR, a general prohibition under the HPA would extend the 
reach of Health Canada’s enforcement authority to all products not otherwise 
regulated that present a serious risk of injury.  Health Canada would have to 
separately consider the administrative and resource requirements necessary to 
make the general prohibition effective in terms of its day-to-day operations.  In 
                                                                                                                                  
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective products 
distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury 
to the public. 
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this regard, it would face some of the same challenges outlined in relation to the 
GSR. 
In particular, Health Canada would have to develop a legal and practical 
framework within the criminal justice process for resolving disputes about the 
degree of risk, the requirements of due diligence and the proportionality of 
remedial actions and sanctions. In this regard, Health Canada might consider 
adopting the approach under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 
(CEPA) to replicate - within a criminal justice process - many of the civil and 
administrative remedies and dispute resolution techniques employed by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, for example:   
 
• Environmental Protection Compliance Orders under which an 
enforcement officer may issue under section 235 of CEPA (before 
prosecution) “directing any person described...to take any of the measures 
… that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the 
protection of the environment and public safety, in order to cease or refrain 
from committing the alleged contravention;” 
 
• Environmental Protection Alternative Measures under section 296 of 
CEPA which provides a legal framework for discussing compliance 
problems and undertaking corrective measures (after a prosecution has 
commenced) in return for a stay of prosecution and which, if successfully 
completed, result in eventual dismissal of the charges in question;  
 
• Strategic Sentencing Criteria under section 287 of CEPA which include 
reference to many elements of regulatory due diligence as mitigating 
factors in sentencing; and 
 
•  Orders of the Court that may be made under section 291 of CEPA, 
which include an extensive array of corrective and preventive measures. 
 
 
Option 4 - Modified American Approach (All Constituent Acts)  
 
Option 4 is a variation of the Modified American Approach described in the 
preceding section.  It differs only in its scope of application.  Instead of applying 
the general prohibition against advertising, marketing, importing, etc of products 
that present an “unreasonable risk of injury” only to the Hazardous Products Act, 
it would be extended to all of the constituent acts Health Canada had identified 
for incorporation into the Canada Health Protection Act.   
 
As noted above, while the HPA is mentioned as a possible ‘home’ for a general 
prohibition based on American ‘risk of injury’ terminology, it might equally be 
located in some other generic statute administered by the Department such as 
the Department of Health Act485, or the proposed CHPA if the Department 
                                            
485 S.C.  1996, c. 8 
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proceeds with the consolidation of constituent Acts under the Legislative 
Renewal Initiative. 
 
Extending the scope of the general prohibition to health protection statutes that 
closely control pre-marketing activities, however, would involve a different and 
broader range of implementation issues for the Department to consider.   The 
case for extending a general prohibition to statutes already containing general 
prohibitions specific to enumerated product lines is, at best, unclear. 
 
 
Option 5 – ‘Status Quo’ with Administrative Reform 
 
Under the ‘Status Quo’ Option, Health Canada would rely on existing statutory 
authorities for dealing with unregulated dangerous products or orphaned risks in 
regulated products and focus on administrative reforms to make the exercise of 
existing powers more timely and effective.  To the extent feasible, policy and 
program measures available under the existing legislation would be enhanced to 
encourage a general culture of product safety and the promulgation of high 
quality voluntary standards as a complement to regulation. 
Health Canada has current authority to temporarily regulate products falling 
outside the HPA through Ministerial Interim Orders where “immediate action is 
required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to health or safety.”  The 
Interim Order provision under the HPA is the principle ‘safety net’ mechanism for 
dealing with unregulated hazardous products or emerging risks requiring 
immediate action by the public authority.  It provides that: 
5.1 (1) The Minister may make an interim order that contains any provision that 
may be contained in a regulation made under this Part if the Minister believes 
that immediate action is required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, 
to health or safety. 
(2) The Minister may make an interim order in which any power referred to in 
section 6 is deemed to be exercised, if the Minister believes that immediate 
action is required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to health or 
safety.486 
An interim order is effective for fourteen days, unless it is repealed or approved 
by the Governor in Council within that time.  However, the interim order may be 
enforced as if it were a regulation.487 
In the case of the pre-market control licensing regimes (drugs, medical devices, 
radiation emitting devices), Health Canada would revisit (under this option) its 
methods for employing license conditions, sanctions or certifications to achieve 
                                            
486 S.C. 2004, c. 15, s. 67  The interim order is, of course, temporary and subject to a number of important 
safeguards.  The entire ‘interim order provision” is set out in Annex 9. 
487 Section 5(6) “ For the purpose of any provision of this Part other than this section, any reference to 
regulations made under this Act is deemed to include interim orders, and any reference to a regulation made 
under a specified provision of this Act is deemed to include a reference to the portion of an interim order 
containing any provision that may be contained in a regulation made under the specified provision.” 
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timely responses to emerging product risks, more effective risk assessment, an 
enhanced culture of safety, increased use of high quality voluntary standards and 
the expedited detection, remediation and removal of unsafe products.  As the 
Robens Inquiry noted, licensing authorities have the most powerful remedies for 
altering undesirable behaviour, including the power to require license conditions, 
the suspension or cancellation of licenses, and varying administrative 
requirements with performance results.  Some, perhaps much, of the reform 
needed under Health Canada’s licensing-type regimes might, therefore, be met 
by administrative changes. 
  
Under the Hazardous Products regime (which has a post-marketing focus), 
Health Canada would continue to rely on Ministerial interim orders as the 
principle means of addressing unregulated products or risks.  In this case, 
however, the focus would be on making the Minister’s interim order remedy more 
efficient by developing internal policies for triggering the use of this power, 
together with a fast-track process for exercising it - all in collaboration with the 
Minister’s Office and relevant Central Agencies of Government.  The policy and 
fast-track process would become a routine element of briefing for new Ministers 
of Health so they could be familiar with this emergency measure in advance of 
the need for urgent intervention against a hazardous product.  Any policies 
developed with the Ministers Office or Central Agencies to this end, however, 
should be careful not to unduly ‘fetter’ the Minister’s discretion. 
 
In both its pre and post-marketing regimes, Health Canada officials are better 
placed than the authors of this paper to identify potential areas for administrative 
reform of existing practices.  The purpose of outlining this option is simply to 
indicate that administrative reform of existing practices could be a productive line 
of inquiry. 
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Annex 1 – The Case Studies Report  
 
  
Executive Summary/Key Findings 
 
The network of legislation, regulations and standards at the federal and 
provincial/territorial levels of government addressing the safety of consumer 
products has served Canadians well over the years.  However, many new 
products are entering the market and many of these are manufactured in other 
countries.  Responsible government agencies are finding it difficult to deal with 
this influx.  In addition, many products used by consumers are not regulated, are 
regulated inadequately or the responsible government does not have the 
authority or the tools to protect the public.  In response to the limitations of 
existing legislation and regulation, Health Canada is considering modernizing its 
legislative framework.  Many new responsibilities for suppliers have been 
proposed including provisions for a General Safety Requirement (GSR) that 
basically prohibits a supplier from placing unsafe products on the Canadian 
Market.  Using three different case studies the implications for suppliers and 
government of implementing such provisions either in legislation or through 
regulatory amendments were investigated and a number of key findings were 
identified and are described below. 
 
The costs for suppliers in complying and government agencies in administering 
and enforcing the reporting provisions will vary significantly depending on what 
systems and reporting mechanisms are already in place and on the criteria that 
will be used to trigger a report.  In the case of consumer products like bicycles 
and household electrical products, harmonization with the systems in Europe and 
the United States could help maximize the usefulness of the data collected and 
minimize the costs. 
 
There are a number of policy issues that will need to be resolved in order to 
successfully implement a GSR or similar regulatory provisions.  Many of the 
issues are common to all three case studies included in this report and are 
related to the need for guidance and clarity around new requirements. For 
example, suppliers and government staff who provide advice to them need to 
know: 
• What standards, regulations, conformity assessment systems or risk 
assessment process will be acceptable to demonstrate conformity with a 
GSR;   
• What level of safety will be required to demonstrate compliance with a 
GSR; 
• What type of adverse incident or level of injury will trigger a report of a 
problem product or a recall; and  
• To whom and what system will be used to report adverse incidents.  
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One of the core elements in the implementation of a GSR or similar regulatory 
amendments is hazard identification and risk assessment.  Such an approach 
based on evidence provides the basis for the selection of appropriate instruments 
to reduce risks, the determination of an unsafe product, the identification of 
effective interventions and the reporting of adverse health effects.  In many 
cases, there are gaps in the information needed to carry out a risk assessment 
making it difficult for responsible to comply with new provisions.  Moreover, many 
companies even large ones, do not have the expertise or capacity to assess risks 
in products. For example, manufacturers in other countries do not always make 
information about product design, component materials or manufacturing 
processes available to importers and there is a lack of product related injury data 
within Canada.  The need for increasing the data available and the knowledge of 
suppliers about hazard identification and risk assessment is core to the 
successful implementation of the GSR or similar regulatory provisions.  
 
To ensure that the transition from the existing legislation to new legislation or 
regulations is smooth and seamless and that the Department will be able to deal 
with the new provisions and products that will be covered, it will be necessary for 
Health Canada to identify, develop and/or implement: 
• Changes and/or additions to its management processes and knowledge 
management systems to meet new and changed provisions and 
authorities in new legislation such as the adverse event reporting system.  
The impact will be greatest for those parts of the organization or other 
organizations responsible for unregulated consumer products or foods 
where systems or processes for reporting of adverse events or dealing 
with mandatory recalls have not been established;  
• Tools, information and training that the employees will need to administer 
and enforce the new provisions that will apply to many products not 
previously dealt with;  
• Training, information and guidance documents to provide previously 
unregulated suppliers with an understanding of how to comply with any 
new provisions; 
• Functions of staff and the skills, expertise that staff will require to 
administer the new provisions in areas previously unregulated and to 
evaluate the various instruments that suppliers could use;   
• Financial resources to develop and implement new systems, to hire expert 
analytical staff, tools or training within Heath Canada and other 
responsible government agencies e.g. Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
or Provinces/Territories; 
• A dispute resolution system;  
• Protection of personal information; and 
• Processes to ensure consistency in administration and enforcement for 
many new products across federal or provincial/territorial organizations 
that share responsibility. 
 
 In certain product areas such as household electrical products and some foods, 
overlap will exist between provincial/territorial legal instruments and a GSR.  As a 
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result, it will most likely be necessary to develop a consensus among a number 
of government agencies and levels of government on the following questions:   
 
• How the provinces/territories will work with the federal agencies to 
implement a GSR or new regulatory provisions?   
• Will the provinces/territories be able to draw on the provisions of the GSR 
and enforcement authorities provided under federal legislation to deal with 
importation, reporting and recalls? 
• What level of safety will be considered unacceptable and will trigger 
enforcement action or reporting of an adverse incident? 
• To whom will reports of adverse incidents be made? 
• What type of information manuals and/or training will need to be 
developed to assist suppliers and government officials in understanding 
the new requirements? 
 
The policies and the form of any working arrangements developed with the 
provinces and territories will have a significant impact on whether or not any 
overlap that exists between them has a negative or positive benefit.  
 
The reliance on standards will require substantial participation by government 
officials to ensure that the standards developed address the health and safety 
concerns of Canadians.  Moreover, the fact that many standards reference other 
standards increases the workload. 
 
In order for cabinet to make a decision on new legislation or regulatory changes, 
it will be necessary for Health Canada to obtain accurate, complete and up to 
date information based on the results of  
• An analysis of any proposed changes and the alternative solutions 
considered; 
• Consultation of those who have an interest in the matter, including other 
departments that may be affected by the proposed solution; 
• An analysis of the impact of the proposed solution on the operating 
environment and costs to small, medium and large suppliers;  and  
• An analysis of the resources that the proposed solution would require, 
including those needed to implement or enforce it. 
 
The legal implications of a government agency being informed of a safety hazard 
in a product needs to be addressed, particularly, if it means that all reports 
cannot be investigated. 
 
Background 
 
The purpose of the three case studies included in this report is to examine the 
implications for suppliers and government officials of implementing a General 
Safety Requirement (GSR) in Canada.  In applying a GSR to the real world of the 
Canadian marketplace and global trade, there will be operational and financial 
implications both for the suppliers who must comply with it and the government 
agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing it.   
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It is assumed that, if a GSR were implemented, it would complement existing 
regulations by acting as a “safety net” to address any unregulated product or an 
identified risk that is not covered by the existing regulation.  On the other hand, it 
may be possible to provide the authority to address any unanticipated risks 
through regulatory amendments.   
 
The implications presented in the case studies of this report are based on a 
number of assumptions about the provisions that would be included in a GSR if it 
were to be implemented in Canada. These assumptions are derived primarily 
from: 
• The provisions outlined in Health Canada’s Legislative Proposal;488 
• The General Safety Provisions of Europe’s General Product Safety 
Directive;489 and  
• Elements similar to a GSR that are included in the US Consumer Product 
Safety Act.490 
 
The assumptions about the requirements normally included in a GSR are as 
follows: 
• Health Canada would continue to establish in regulations health and 
safety requirements and specifications for specific products or groups of 
products when required. The GSR would complement any regulations by 
acting as a 'safety net' in the absence of a regulation or a regulation that 
does not address the health risk or hazard in question; 
• A GSR would make it illegal for a supplier to manufacture, promote or 
market a product that may pose a risk to the health or safety of consumers 
when used under-intended or reasonably forseeable conditions; 
• In trying to demonstrate conformity to a GSR in response to the 
occurrence of non compliance, a supplier will be required to show that all 
reasonable care was taken to comply with the provisions of a GSR that 
are applicable including identifying any associated product hazards, 
assessing the related risks and managing these risks; 
•   Like the obligations on business in Europe and the US, the GSR would 
require suppliers to monitor the safety of their products and notify a 
government regulator of any unsafe or potentially unsafe products that 
have been placed on the market. Government on receiving a notification 
would be obligated to take relevant action based on its legal obligations 
and the seriousness of the problem; 
•   Unlike the US system, the GSR would not contain a provision that the 
government must consider the development of voluntary standards before 
considering the development of regulations.  Nor like the European system 
would Canadian standards be developed that would confer a presumption 
                                            
488  Health Canada, Health Protection Legislative Renewal Proposal, 2003. 
489  European Commission, General Product Safety Directive, (2001./95/EC), Dec 3, 2001. 
490  United States, Consumer Product Safety Act, [Public Law 92-573; Oct. 27, 1972, as amended], 
www.cpsc.gov/BUSINFO/cpsa.pdf 
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of conformity with the GSR.  Conformity with voluntary standards 
developed through a recognized system could, however, be used to 
demonstrate conformity where no regulations exist or where the standard 
addresses a risk not covered by an existing regulation. 
 
The impact on Health Canada and suppliers of a GSR will vary considerably 
depending on the obligations under existing regulations.  For example, regulatory 
requirements for the provision of safety information prior to marketing and for 
mandatory reporting of adverse incidents to Health Canada already exists for 
drugs, natural health products, biologics and medical devices under the Food and 
Drugs Act (F&DA).  Similar requirements do not exist for all foods or for 
consumer products under the Hazardous Products Act (HPA) or Radiation 
Emitting Devices Act (REDA).  As a result, the impact on suppliers of these 
products and those responsible in Health Canada will be greater than in the 
areas where these provisions have existed for a number of years.  
 
The impact on a supplier could also vary depending on their role in the supply 
chain and their legal obligations established under a GSR or regulatory 
amendment.  In Europe, for example, suppliers are divided into producers and 
distributors depending on their ability to influence the safety of a product491.  In 
other countries such as the United States492 and Australia493, no differentiation 
has been made between the various members of the supply chain.   
 
For the purpose of the case studies in this report, it is assumed that the 
obligations of those supplying consumer products would differ depending on their 
ability to influence the safety of the product.  It is, therefore, assumed that two 
types of obligations would exist one for primary suppliers known as producers 
and another for secondary suppliers known commonly as distributors.    
Producers are those who either first place the product on the Canadian market or 
whose activities may affect the safety of the product.  Distributors, in contrast, are 
those in the supply chain whose activities do not affect the safety of a product or 
who have limited influence.  Figure 1 illustrates the supply chain for consumer 
products and those who are included in the two groups of suppliers. 
 
                                            
491  European Commission, General Product Safety Directive, (2001/95/EC), Dec 3, 2001. 
492  Consumer Product Safety Commission, Consumer Product Safety Act, Section 19. 
493  Australian Government, Trade Practices Act 197.,  
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Figure 1:  Consumer Product Supply Chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Study 1 Bicycles – Unregulated Products and No     National 
Standards 
 
The purpose of this case study is to identify the implications for suppliers and 
Health Canada of complying with or administering a GSR when a product is not 
regulated and for which no national standard exists.  There are many consumer 
products on the Canadian market that fall into this category.  Everything from 
assistive devices such as grab bars and bath seats that are not considered to be 
medical devices and are not regulated under the HPA to consumer products such 
as bunk beds or battery operated tools for which regulations do not exist. 
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Examples are provided in Appendix 2. Among the many consumer products on 
the market that are not regulated for safety, bicycles have been chosen to 
illustrate what suppliers and Health Canada will have to do where no Canadian 
regulation or national standard exists.   
  
Practically, the obligations that are normally included in a GSR would mean that 
the producer would be required to identify any hazards associated with the 
bicycle, assess the related risks, determine how the risks can be addressed and 
select an instrument from another jurisdiction that addresses the risk either 
directly or indirectly.  If no such instrument exists, the producer would have to 
develop his own standard and institute a compliance program to ensure that any 
risks are systematically and continuously addressed.  This would have to be 
done before the product is marketed to demonstrate that all reasonable care was 
taken to market a product that is safe.  In addition, both producers and 
distributors would be required to establish a monitoring and recall system so that 
any problems that occur after the product enters the market are identified, 
reported to Health Canada and corrective actions or recalls are taken and 
monitored.   
 
An alternative to the implementation of a GSR is the adoption of similar 
provisions to those that would be included in a GSR in regulations under the 
HPA. The general safety provisions could be added to individual product-specific 
regulations using the authority of paragraph 5(a)494 of the HPA or as hazard 
based regulations using the authority provided by paragraph 6(3)495.   Under 
paragraph 5 (a), it would appear to be possible to include in either regulatory 
approach requirements for suppliers to monitor the market, report any adverse 
incidents and correct any problems.  The Medical Device Regulations under the 
Food and Drug Act provide an example of what could be done.  Although it would 
be a difficult and lengthy process to develop a similar regulatory framework for 
general consumer products like bicycles, it may be worth considering.  The 
implications would be very similar to those described here for a GSR. 
 
 
Current Situation 
Internationally 
Many countries such as Australia, the European Union, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States have enacted mandatory requirements and/or 
standards for pedal bicycles in response to the number of associated injuries. In 
fact, over 200 national and international standards exist world wide covering the 
general safety of bicycles or their components.  A list of the regulations and 
                                            
494  “authorizes the advertising, sale or importation of any restricted product and prescribing the 
circumstances and conditions under which and the persons by whom the restricted product may be 
advertised, sold or imported”. 
495  “may describe a product, material or substance or by reference to any other criteria and any 
product, material or substance that has those properties or characteristics or meets those criteria 
shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have been added by the order of Part I or  , as the 
case may be of Schedule I.” 
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standards that would be of particular interest to Canadian policy makers is 
provided in Appendix 4.   
 
In Australia, a revised mandatory safety standard for pedal bicycles became 
effective November 1999 and requires that all suppliers of pedal bicycles — 
including manufacturers, importers, wholesalers and retailers — must ensure 
their bicycles comply with Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 1927:1998 
Pedal bicycles — Safety requirements.  The standard covers everything from 
design requirements such as sharp edges and braking systems to performance 
requirements such as steering stability and strength of seat pillars to instructions 
for use and assembly.496    The New Zealand Government also revised its 
Product Safety Standards (Pedal Bicycles) Regulations in 1999 by referring to 
the same standard.497  
 
The European Union requires conformity to the European standards for bicycles 
listed in Appendix 4.   Conformity to these voluntary standards can assist 
suppliers of bicycles to comply with the GSR included in Europe’s General 
Product Safety Directive. This Directive also contains a requirement for 
producers and distributors to notify the competent authorities in the Member 
States when a product available on the market reveals itself to be dangerous.498  
 
The United Kingdom established regulations under the Consumer Safety Act in 
1984 and these were revised in 2002499.  The regulations refer to British 
Standard BS6102 and to the corresponding ISO standard.  
 
In the United States, the U.S. CPSC under the Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CPSA) developed requirements for Bicycles500 in 1976 in response to the 
number of injuries that were taking place.  The regulation covers all types of 
pedal bicycles and establishes, among other things, requirements for assembly, 
braking, structural integrity and reflectors.  The CPSC also requires suppliers to 
monitor the market and to report products that do not comply with a rule issued 
under the CPSA, or contain a defect, which could create a substantial risk of 
injury to the public. 
 
In Canada 
Bicycle riding is one of the most popular activities in Canada for both recreational 
purposes and transportation.  In fact, over 52 percent of Canadian households 
own at least one bicycle, and 42 percent of Canadians participate in biking as an 
activity. Although biking is somewhat seasonal, over 1.3 million units are sold 
                                            
496  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Product Information A mandatory standard 
guide:  Pedal Bicycles, January 2000,  http://www.accc.gov.au 
497  Ministry of Consumer Affairs, New Zealand Government, The Product Safety Standards (Pedal 
Bicycles) Regulations 2000. www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/productsafety/standards/st-
pedalbicycles.html 
498  General Product Safety Directive (2001/95/EC) 
499  Department for Transport, The Pedal Bicycles (Safety) Regulations 2003 – Regulatory Impact 
Assessment. April 2003. 
500  Code of Federal Regulations Title 16, Part 1512 – Requirements for Bicycles, www.cpsc.gov 
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every year.  Imports accounted for 75 percent of the market in 2000501.  Those 
producing bicycles can be broadly categorized into three groups:  Canadian 
manufacturers, importer-retailers who import directly for sale at retail and 
importer/distributors who import and re-sell bicycles to retailers. If as assumed 
importers would have the same status as Canadian manufacturers, they would 
be held responsible for anything within their control that could affect the safety of 
a product and for monitoring and addressing any adverse health effects 
identified.  
 
In Canada, no regulations or standards exist that deal with the safety of bicycles, 
the reporting of associated adverse incidents or the corrective actions to be 
followed.  Some provinces/territories under Traffic or Highway legislation specify 
certain use conditions for bicycles as vehicles on roadways such as requiring the 
use of bicycle helmets, lights between sunset and sunrise and bells or warning 
devices.  These requirements vary from province to province and do not set 
specifications for the actual safety of the bicycle itself.  As a result, there are no 
rules or protocols for manufacturers or importers to follow in order to demonstrate 
that the bicycles they sell are safe, to monitor the market or to guide them if 
corrective action is required. 
 
Like many consumer products, there is no nationwide data on bicycle related 
injuries and deaths.  However, research projects and policy analysis502, 503,504 
that have been carried out for specific purposes show that, there are many 
causal factors affecting injury patterns including mechanical failure and 
malfunction of bicycle parts.  These mechanical failures have the potential of 
causing significant injuries.  The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the 
consumer is generally unable to assess the safety and roadworthiness of a 
bicycle at the time of purchase given the technical nature of bicycle design and 
construction. Examples of reported mechanical problems or failures that can 
affect the safety of a bicycle and have resulted in recalls include: 
• Inaccurate assembly instructions leading to incorrect assembly of brake 
wheels; 
• Breakage or deformation of the forks, steering column or frame;505 
• Looseness or breakage of handlebar assemblies;506 
• Wheels or chains coming off; or breaking;507  
• Brakes locking, failing to stop bicycle or defective brake cable;508  
                                            
501  U.S. & FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2002 
502  Consumer Affairs Division, Australian Government, Regulation Impact Statement on Pedal 
Bicycles:  Safety Requirements, July 1999. 
503  Public Health Agency, Bicycle Injuries – analysis of 1998 hospital admissions with a focus on 
injury hazard associated with handlebars, CHIRRP News, June 2000 
504  CPSC, Bicycle Study, Part V. Role of Mechanical Design and Performance in Selected Bicycling 
Incidents, 1992, p. 95-103 
505  Recall by Quality Bicycle Products, March 11, 2004, CPSC, VisionTech USA, Inc. Announce 
Recall of Bicycle Aero Bars, Ban of child bicycle Domino by Czech Republic, May 2005. 
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• Failure of welds509 or pedals;  
• Lack of reflectors; 
• Clothing caught in the bicycle; and  
• Substandard materials in components.510 
 
Potential Options to Resolve the Issue  
Under these circumstances, a producer would be faced with the prospect of 
either developing a standard and assessing the risks internally or purchasing the 
scientific, engineering and/or risk assessment expertise required.   
 
Assessment and Management of Risk 
In the Canadian situation, where no standards or regulations exist, it is assumed 
that a GSR or similar regulatory provisions would require that a risk assessment 
be carried out and that appropriate action be taken to mitigate any risks identified 
before the product is marketed.   It is also assumed that a GSR or regulatory 
provisions would require suppliers to monitor their products and report any 
adverse health effects to the responsible government agency.  An example of 
what a producer would need to do is the action that was undertaken a number of 
years ago by a major Canadian importer/retailer in response to a safety problem 
that resulted in the expensive recall of thousands of bicycles.  
  
 Identification of the Problem and its Cause  
The first challenge the company faced was to define the problem and its cause 
so that appropriate action could be taken to correct it and to reduce the likelihood 
of a similar recall from occurring in the future.   Since neither injury data nor 
relevant data from the manufacturer existed, the company was forced to evaluate 
and test the product and its components.  The laboratory analysis indicated that 
the hazard was caused by the weakness of the welds and the sub-standard 
grade of steel used in the steering column and bicycle forks.  This analysis, 
particularly the metallurgical part, required specialized engineering knowledge 
and laboratory equipment. 
 
Choice of a Standard or Regulation 
Since no standard or regulation existed in Canada for bicycles, the company 
decided to identify a standard or regulation that it and its manufacturers could 
follow to address the general safety of bicycles and the specific risks identified.  
The company reviewed bicycle regulations and standards from other jurisdictions 
to determine whether or not any of them were suitable.  After extensive 
investigation and analysis, it was found that no existing standard or regulation 
dealt with the particular metallurgical defects identified.  The company concluded 
that, in order to protect the safety of its customers and prevent expensive recalls 
                                                                                                                                  
506  CPSC, Quality Bicycle Products Announce Recall of Bicycle Handlebar Stems, May 2005; CPSC, 
Huffy Bicycle Company Announce Recall of “Cranbrook” Bicycles Sold at Wal-Mart, June 2004 
507  CPSC and Rocky Mountain Bicycles Recall, May 9, 2002, CPSC, Torelli Imports Announce 
Recall of Bicycle Tires, Aug 17, 2005. 
508  Recall of BMX bicycle ordered by Norway, Rapex system Nov 2005. 
509  CPSC, World Wide Cycle Supply Inc Recall, Sept 2, 2004 
510  Product Recalls Australia, Dec 12, 2004, 
  237
that damaged its reputation, it would have to develop its own standard.  
Therefore, the company decided to use the U.S. rule as a base, since it more 
closely resembled the Canadian situation, and to add requirements to deal with 
the associated metallurgical safety issues not addressed in the rule. 
 
Development of a Standard and Compliance System 
After deciding on the specifications to be included in its standard, the company 
then had to take steps to ensure that the bicycles they purchased and sold 
complied with the new standard.  Since no testing and certification program 
existed in Canada for bicycles, the company established its own quality system 
for bicycles.  The establishment of this program and the implementation of the 
new standard involved the development and establishment of the following: 
• Detailed product specifications; 
• Information for manufacturers who had to comply with the standard; 
• Test protocols, certification type program to approve overseas test 
laboratories to evaluate bicycles against the standard; and 
• A program to monitor compliance and potential adverse effects after 
marketing. 
 
Analysis of Complaints and Returns 
To systematically monitor the effectiveness of the program over the long term, 
the company now collects and analyses customer complaints, any available 
injury data and the reasons for product returns.  This information is then used to 
improve the test and certification program, amend the standard or identify 
production, material or component problems to be corrected. 
 
The actions undertaken by this Canadian importer/retailer illustrates what a 
Canadian producer will have to do in order to comply with a GSR or risk based 
regulation.    Like the company in question, a producer would be required to 
identify the product hazards and their source, assess the risks from the 
perspective of both intended and reasonable forseeable use and implement 
procedures or processes to mitigate the risks and to monitor them.   
Unfortunately, many importers and importer/retailers do not have the same level 
of knowledge about a bicycle as a manufacturer and might have significant 
difficulty in responding in a similar manner. Adding to the challenge is 
• The lack of national bicycle related injury data and research on 
interventions to reduce risks;  
• The fact that foreign manufacturers are not always willing to provide the 
information required to identify and assess potential risks associated with 
their bicycles; and 
• The fact that most importers do not have the scientific or engineering 
expertise or the facilities to carry out a detailed evaluation of a bicycle 
 
Standards  
Having identified a hazard that may arise from either intended or reasonably 
foreseeable use, the producer will need to determine what, if anything, he must 
do to protect users and third parties against injury from the identified hazard.  In 
the case of reasonably foreseeable use like riding a mountain bicycle over very 
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rough trails, the answer is clear.  The forks and steering mechanism must be 
made from higher quality steel that has greater load bearing properties and can 
withstand repeated severe impacts. In addition, instructions for the correct 
maintenance of the bicycle could reduce the risk of failures due to loose bolts, 
chains or brake cables.  These measures would reduce the risk of exposure to 
mechanical failures. 
 
For any category of bicycle producer, applying the provisions of an existing 
standard or regulation that addresses all the potential hazards would be the 
easiest way to demonstrate compliance with the GSR.  Since no such Canadian 
regulations or standards exist, it would be necessary for them to identify an 
appropriate standard/regulation from another jurisdiction.  This can be a time 
consuming and expensive process as there can be hundreds of 
standards/regulations establishing technical specifications that may be 
appropriate.  To review these instruments successfully, scientific and engineering 
expertise in a number of disciplines would be required.   In the case of bicycles, 
for example, there are over 200 standards or regulations that exist for bicycles 
and/or their components.  The cost of purchasing the standards ranges from 
$100 to $300 each.  For those who do not have the technical or financial 
resources, it is possible to access services from the Standards Council of 
Canada (SCC).  The Council houses full text collections for standards and 
standards-related documents from key international organizations and 
jurisdictions and the collections are open to the public by appointment.  The 
Council is also tasked with providing the business sector, government and other 
stakeholders with technical information on standards and can assist in identifying 
applicable standards for products on a cost recovery basis511. 
 
Testing and Certification 
Needless to say, the establishment of an elaborate testing, auditing and 
certification program as illustrated in the example would be beyond the 
capabilities and financial resources of most small to medium sized businesses.  
To do this a company would be required to have engineering and risk 
assessment expertise either internally or have the financial capacity to access 
the necessary expertise externally.  
  
At the present time, a number of internationally recognized standard and 
certification bodies such as the Canadian Standards Association’s On SpeX512 
initiative, Intertek513 and TUV Rheinland Group514 have developed or are starting 
to offer comprehensive services to assist importers and retailers in assessing and 
controlling risks, monitoring at all stages in the life cycle of the product from 
design to production to post market and designing recall initiatives. As an 
example, the services offered by On SpeX515 are listed in Box 1 below.     
                                            
511  The Standards Council of Canada provides the first hour of research free of charge and then 
charges $100/hour for research time after that. 
512  www.onspex.com/services/index.htm 
513  www.intertek-etlsemko.com 
514  www.de.tuv.com/en/products_and_services/product_safety_and _quality/ 
515  On SpeX charges $1000-1200 per day plus travel.  Eli Szamosi On Spex. 
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The cost of the services offered could be paid for either by the importer or retailer 
or be a contract requirement that the manufacturer must carry out and pay for in 
order to sell his product.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications of a GSR for Suppliers 
 
Compliance 
The consequences of failing to comply with a GSR or new regulatory 
requirements could result not only injury  to consumers but also financial 
penalties, product recalls, damage to brand reputation even in some cases 
reduction in share prices on the stock market.   
 
An example of a mechanism that a company could use to identify and reduce the 
risks of breaching the provisions of a GSR or similar provisions in regulations, is 
the compliance program developed by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission516.  An effective compliance program would contain: 
• An up to date list of legislative or regulatory requirements; 
• Identification and reassessment of its compliance risks at regular intervals 
and before supplying new products; 
• Management of the risks at critical control points which may be very 
different for manufacturers and importers; 
• Training of staff so that they understand the legal requirements and have 
the skill and knowledge about compliance management; 
• Complaints handling to provide feedback on its products and an early 
warning mechanism; 
• Documentation of compliance efforts, steps to measure compliance and 
auditing of the program; and 
                                            
516  Quinane Mark and Justin Lucas, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, The ACCC’s 
approach to trade practices compliance programs, Presentation to the Australasian Compliance 
Institute, November 2005. 
Box 1:  Services offered by On SpeX to its Clients 
 
- Consumer product test protocol development 
- Product design reviews and analyses 
- Performance and Reliability 
- Package Testing 
- Factory evaluation and inspection 
- Data collection and analysis 
- Product return/recall support 
- Safety analyses 
- Pre-certification assessment 
- Social accountability audits 
- Review of requirements for certification and compliance with 
standards
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• Mechanisms for review and continuous improvement; and 
reporting system of results that is transparent to regulators and interested 
parties.  
 
According to Australian researchers and government officials, the courts have 
recognized that a substantial and successfully implemented compliance program 
to be a mitigating factor when assessing penalties in the event of non 
compliance.517,518 Such a program could be audited by a third party or 
government. 
 
Needless to say, there will be operational and financial consequences of 
establishing new processes and procedures that any new provisions will require.  
It will be necessary for a supplier to identify the gaps that exist in the skill set of 
staff, management processes and IT systems and attempt to fill the gaps either 
internally or externally.    
 
Monitoring and Reporting 
To comply with any reporting requirements normally incorporated in a GSR or 
which could be incorporated into regulations, all types of suppliers must have in 
place a process to monitor the market, collect and analyze complaints and 
provide reports as required.  Unlike suppliers of health products or veterinary 
drugs where reporting of adverse incidents is mandatory,519 520 521 suppliers of 
bicycles have not had to report adverse events in Canada and, therefore, have 
not established the processes and systems to monitor the market, collect data on 
adverse events and report them to Health Canada.  If a company also supplies 
the US or European markets which have mandatory reporting, it will have in 
place a system to report adverse incidents and the new requirement will have a 
lower impact.  
 
When setting up any system to collect data, suppliers will have to comply with the 
provisions of the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents 
Act,522 which governs the manner in which personal information is managed by 
the private sector.   It sets out ground rules for how a private sector organization 
may collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of commercial 
activities. The law gives individuals the right to access and request correction of 
the personal information these organizations may have collected about them.  
The provision in this case would be obtaining the consent from people to collect, 
use and disclose personal information.  
 
 
                                            
517  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Corporate Trade Practices Compliance 
Programs, November 2005. 
518  Parker Christine, Law Faculty, University of Melbourne, Is there a Reliable Way to Evaluate 
Organisational Compliance Programs, Australian Institute of Criminology and Reg Net 
Conference, Melbourne, September 2-3, 2002. 
519  Justice Canada, Food and Drugs Act, Medical Device Regulations, Section 59, 1998. 
520  Justice Canada, Food and Drug Regulations, Section C 01.016. 
521  Justice Canada, Food and Drugs Act, Natural Health Products Regulations, 2004. 
522  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, www.privcom.gc.ca 
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Summary 
In summary, a supplier who is attempting to sell a product for which no 
regulations  or national standards would be required to put in place the processes 
and procedures presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Risk Assessment and Mitigation Process 
 
 
 
Implications of a GSR for Health Canada  
With a product like bicycles where no national regulations or standards exist, it is 
critical that there is transparency and consistency in terms of what suppliers are 
expected to do to demonstrate compliance with a GSR and how it will be 
enforced   the same applies if regulatory amendments similar to a GSR were 
made.  Transparency and consistency are core principles of efficient regulation 
that have been articulated by the OECD,523 the External Committee on Smart 
Regulations524 and the draft Government Directive on Regulations.525  Therefore, 
bicycle suppliers will need clarification from Health Canada in terms of:  
• Which standards or other similar instruments would be considered 
acceptable as a defence since no Canadian regulations or standards exist; 
• What criteria would be used to determine the benchmark level of safety for 
this product to demonstrate compliance or to  trigger a report of an 
adverse health incident; and  
                                            
523  OECD, OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance, Adopted, April 2005. 
524  External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulations, Smart Regulation: A Regulatory Strategy for 
Canada, Report to the Government of Canada, September 2004. 
525  Government of Canada, Draft Government Directive on Regulating, November 2005. 
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• What enforcement actions will be taken and will they be consistent across 
the country.   
 
The need for clarification is an indication that the provisions proposed under a 
GSR are not well understood by suppliers.  The OECD526 in its research into 
regulatory reform and compliance concluded that one of the main factors that 
affects the private sector’s ability to comply with regulatory requirements is the 
degree to which it knows the rules and is capable of complying with them.  To 
achieve a high level of compliance, it will be important for suppliers not only to 
receive the guidance and information necessary to understand what is being 
proposed but to be consulted on the policies, regulations or documents that are 
developed. 
 
Policies to be Developed or Implemented 
Acceptable Level of Safety   
The basic element included in any GSR is the requirement that a supplier not 
manufacture, import or market unsafe products.  The meaning of the term 
“unsafe” is not clear and appears to be one of the key issues that needs to be 
resolved for those producing bicycles for the Canadian market. This is particularly 
the case where no regulations or standards exist and the producer must 
determine whether or not a product is safe. The first step would be to define the 
term and identify a process that a producer can follow when making decisions on 
safety.   
 
There are some good examples of decisions that have been made related to 
safety levels and guidelines that have been published for suppliers.   The HPFB’s 
Inspectorate’s527 guidance document on problem reporting for medical devices 
defines for producers the meaning of “serious deterioration of health” which 
triggers a problem report and explains how to make a report.  In Europe, 
guidance in the form of a procedure to assist companies when deciding whether 
a specific problem caused by a consumer product is serious enough to warrant 
corrective action or notification to the authorities has been developed and 
published.528   The estimation of risk and the grading of the risk are illustrated 
below in Figure 3.   
 
                                            
526  OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance, 2000. 
527  Health Product and Food Branch’s Inspectorate, Guidance Document on Mandatory and 
Voluntary Problem Reporting for Medical Devices, July 6, 2001. 
528  European Commission, Guidelines for he Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to the 
Competent Authorities of the Member States by Producers and Distributors in Accordance with 
the Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/95/EC. 
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Figure 3.  European Risk Estimation and Grading of Risk 
Table A is used to determine the gravity of the outcome of a hazard depending 
on the severity of health/safety damage and the probability of the possible 
health damage/ safety occurring. 
Once the gravity of the outcome has been determined, then Table B is used to 
determine the rating of the gravity of risk depending on the type of user, 
whether the product has adequate warnings and safeguards, and whether the 
hazard is sufficiently obvious.  Then it is decided whether a serious risk 
situation exists and rapid action is required. The following is an example as to 
how this table may be used. The user of a chain saw suffered a severe cut to 
his hand because the guard on the blade did not prevent his hand from sliding 
forward into the blade. Using Table A, the enforcement officer determined that 
probability of the injury is high because the hazard is present all of these chain 
saws. The severity of the health/safety assessment is serious. Therefore the 
overall gravity outcome is high. Now using Table B, the chain saw is for use by 
normal adults and it has an obvious hazard but inadequate guards. Thus, the 
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risk rating is moderate. Using the chart, it is determined that there is a serious 
risk and rapid action is required.529 
    
 
Compliance    
In order for a bicycle producer to assess the safety of a bicycle and choose an 
appropriate instrument to demonstrate that reasonable care was taken, they will 
need to know which instruments are acceptable.  For example, it will be important 
for them to know whether or not voluntary codes or compliance programs would 
be considered to be acceptable; what criteria Health Canada will use to 
determine this; and whether or not Health Canada will identify the standards or 
instruments that are acceptable and would confer a presumption of conformity 
similar to what is being done in Europe.   
 
Normally, a GSR includes provisions that any regulation, standard or code 
selected must address all identified risks and be developed through a recognized 
process that has balanced representation, expertise, objectivity and public 
review.  As a result, evaluation of the suitability of an instrument to demonstrate 
conformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.  Unfortunately, this only 
increases the confusion and uncertainty for many producers, particularly small 
and medium sized enterprises, which do not have the knowledge and expertise 
to carry out a risk assessment.    
 
With respect to some unregulated products particularly those new to the market, 
there may be no regulations or standards for the product in other jurisdictions like 
there are for bicycles.  Like the situation in Europe, it is anticipated that producers 
will raise concerns about how they will be able to demonstrate compliance with 
the GSR or similar regulatory amendments under such a situation.  Will it be 
necessary for them to develop a new standard?  Will they have to carry out a 
detailed risk assessment similar to the European process illustrated in Figure 
3?530  Will the establishment of a quality system or compliance program, similar 
to Good Manufacturing Practices or the ISO 9000 series, be sufficient? 
 
Prior to a proposal for a GSR going forward it will be important for Health Canada 
to develop policies on standards and provide technical assistance for producers 
in the area of hazard identification, risk assessment and risk management.  This 
may be in the form of fact sheets, training, manuals or guidelines.  A number of 
examples that could form the basis of guidance on what has to be considered 
when identifying hazards, assessing risks and managing risks have been 
developed.  These models are referenced in Appendix 3, which illustrates a 
typical process that could be used by suppliers of bicycles or any other 
unregulated product.   
 
If compliance with standards is identified in any GSR as a way to demonstrate 
that all reasonable was taken to market a safe product, Health Canada may need 
                                            
529 Delogu,B. Best Practice Risk Assessment in Consumer Safety, ECOSA European Conference, 
Edinburgh, 21-22 April 2005 
530  The European Risk Assessment process is currently under review. 
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to adapt to the changing standards environment and revise its approach.  This 
could include increasing its participation in the development of national and 
international standards and encouraging Canadian stakeholders to do so as well.   
It may also be necessary to influence the Standard Developers to ensure that 
standards for certain products are developed.  This may have financial 
implications, as Standard Developers will not undertake the expense of 
developing a standard unless the finances to carry out the process are made 
available.  The average range of cost for developing a standard is $100,000 to 
$150,000 according to CSA.531 
 
Reporting of Adverse Health Incidents.   
As with the European GSR and similar US legislation, it is assumed that a GSR 
would require suppliers to report any adverse health incidents to Health Canada.  
Such provisions could also be included in regulations.  No regulation or 
information exists that explains what would be required, what criteria would be 
used to trigger a report or what reporting procedures would be established.  
Bicycle suppliers will need to know whether they should report everything that 
happens or will government want the incidents to be prioritized so that only the 
most severe ones are reported.  Health Canada will be required to establish 
these elements and provide guidance to suppliers similar to those developed by 
Health Canada’s Therapeutic Products Directorate,532 the US Consumer Product 
Safety Commission,533 and the European Commission.534  Moreover, it will be 
necessary for Health Canada to establish the capacity and expertise to analyze 
the data for consumer products and radiation emitting devices; to determine what 
type and level of response is required; and to take appropriate action.  This could 
be similar to what the Marketing Health Products Directorate has done for 
mandatory reports on adverse health incidents related to drugs, biologics, and 
natural health products or the US CPSC requires for consumer products.  
 
The costs for suppliers in complying and Health Canada in administering and 
enforcing the reporting provisions could be significant and will vary depending on 
the provisions that are specified in a GSR or regulatory amendment.   For 
example, the US CPSC, over a twelve-month period, received 3000 reports of 
incidents involving consumer products from Wal-Mart alone.535  The CPSC’s 
Office of Compliance, which reviews the reports, developed criteria to ensure that 
only essential reports and information were provided in order to reduce the 
number of reports to a manageable level.  It is anticipated that, since many 
Canadian retail outlets are owned by American retailers and carry the same 
                                            
531  Personal communication with Jeanne Bank, Manager of Member Program at CSA, June 2006. 
532  Health Canada’s Therapeutic Products Directorate, Guidelines for the Canadian Pharmaceutical 
Industry on Reporting Adverse Reactions to Market Drugs (Vaccines Excluded), Revised July 
2001. 
533  US Consumer Product Safety Commission, Regulated Products Handbook, 3rd Edition, January 
2005, Washington, DC 
534  European Commission, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to the 
Competent Authorities of the Member States by Producers and Distributors in Accordance with 
Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/95/EC, December 2004. 
535  Mullan John Gibson, Director of Compliance CPSC, A Working Model for Retailer Reporting 
under Section 15, ICPSO Annual Meeting, Orlando, February 23, 2005. 
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products, the number of reports made in Canada could be very similar.  
Harmonization with existing reporting systems in the United States could help in 
the sharing of information, the eventual integration of the systems, maximize the 
usefulness of the data collected and minimize the costs for industry and 
government. 
 
The principle of proportionality needs to be applied with respect to reporting 
requirements for products that exhibit different levels of adverse health effects.  
In particular, policy decisions could be made with respect to adopting a threshold 
level of safety below which no notification would be required.  This would help to 
ensure that limited resources are focused on addressing the most serious 
problems and that the government is not overwhelmed by problem reports.  Legal 
questions with respect to Health Canada’s responsibilities to take action when a 
problem product is reported will also have to be considered. 
 
Essential to an effective monitoring program is being aware of products coming 
into the market and their performance.  Knowledge regarding products can come 
from pre-market submissions where they are required; but for bicycles, where no 
pre-market evaluation is carried out, Health Canada will be required to depend on 
other sources of information.  This could include reporting from injury data, 
coroners, medical and other professionals and reports of incidents from other 
jurisdictions.  
 
Recall    
The Consumer Product Safety Bureau of Health Canada has provided general 
guidance to suppliers about when and how to carry out a recall.  However, it does 
not provide advice on what it considers to be the safety level or type of defect 
that would trigger a recall.  The US CPSC, on the other hand, has attempted to 
define in detail what it considers to be a “substantial product hazard” that would 
trigger a report or a product recall.536   CPSC’s grading of risk is very similar to 
the European model presented previously in Figure 2.   
 
If Health Canada was to use a risk rating system that was compatible with the US 
and Europe, it could be possible to share information on defective bicycles, and 
reduce the cost to suppliers who sell products and possibly recall them in many 
different countries.  The revision of the guidance document and the development 
of manuals and/or training for suppliers and staff will ensure that they understand 
what is required to comply with any GSR provisions.  Moreover, Health Canada 
officials will be able to provide advice and enforce the new provisions consistently 
across the country.  Transparency and consistency, which are essential to 
efficient regulation, will also be enhanced, if Health Canada consults suppliers 
and interested parties on its policy decisions and the tools being developed to 
provide guidance to suppliers.  
 
 
 
                                            
536  US. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook, May 1999. 
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Impact Assessment      
In the area of unregulated products where it has never been required to carry out 
a risk assessment, monitor the market or report adverse health incidents, the 
costs of developing new processes and obtaining the necessary expertise could 
be considerable.  A cost benefit analysis to obtain the information that is required 
by Cabinet to make a decision on any new legislative or regulatory initiative 
would have to be carried out.  This analysis is must be carried out in order to 
comply with Justice Canada’s Directive on Lawmaking537 and the Government’s 
Regulatory Policy.538  In fact, depending on the number of suppliers that will be 
affected, it may be necessary to carry out a Business Impact Test. 
 
Privacy Impact Assessment 
The establishment of any new data collection system such as the collection of 
information on adverse health incidents must respect the Privacy Act539.  
According to Treasury Board policy a Privacy Impact Assessment will need to be 
carried out.540 
 
Operational Changes 
On the one hand, moving towards a GSR or a regulatory equivalent will place 
significant pressure on the financial, technological and human resources of that 
part of the organization that primarily will be dealing with unregulated products 
while providing modern tools to increase transparency and efficiency.  These new 
tools may translate into a significant shift in the choice of instruments that are 
used to achieve policy objectives.  It could include the use of foreign bicycle 
regulations or standards instead of Canadian regulations or standards and 
change the role the Department plays.  Instead of enforcing regulations, it may 
find that a more effective role in dealing with the multitude of unregulated 
products is to provide advice on risk assessment, the development of compliance 
programs and auditing suppliers programs.  Such changes would require greater 
staff knowledge of risk assessment, standards, and standards setting processes 
and auditing procedures and could affect both human and financial resource 
requirements. 
 
In order to determine the changes to be made, it will necessary to identify the gap 
between the processes imposed by the current legislation and what will be 
imposed if a new Act is passed.  This type of analysis will also assist in meeting 
the requirements included in the proposed Government Directive on 
Regulation541 for Compliance and Implementation Plans which identify the 
human and financial resources that are needed to administer any new initiatives 
including resources for compliance and enforcement and to ensure that those 
responsible have the necessary skills and abilities 
                                            
537  Justice Canada, Directive on Lawmaking, 2003-07-08 
538  Privy Council Office, Regulatory Policy, June 2000. 
539  Justice Canada, Privacy Act, 1985. 
540  Treasury Board, Privacy Impact Assessment Policy, May 2002. 
541  Government of Canada, Draft Government Directive on Regulating, Consultation Document, 
November 2005. 
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One of the major challenges facing the Department will be the need to ensure 
consistency in the administration and enforcement of any new provisions by a 
number of Branches and a minimum of three inspection authorities including the 
HPFB Inspectorate, the Healthy Environment and Consumer Safety Branch’s 
(HECSB) Inspectorate and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). 
 
The department will also have to carry out consultations internally with staff and 
externally with a wide range of interested parties on different aspects of the legislative 
proposal, on any regulations being developed or amended, and on the tools, training and 
information initiatives.  The initiative will involve a significant number of different types 
and levels of consultations in which HC staff from the various affected programs and 
from CFIA will be asked to participate in or be required to plan, organize and deliver.   
 
 
Case Study 2: Konjac Jelly Mini-cups – Product Inadequately 
Regulated 
 
In some cases, an existing regulation does not address all the hazards 
associated with a consumer product.  This situation can occur where: 
• The regulatory framework does not provide the authority to address 
certain types of hazards such as the Food and Drugs Act  (F&DA) Food 
Regulations which does not provide the authority to address mechanical 
hazards related to food;542    
• A product has changed due to technical advancements; or 
• The product is being used in a manner that was not contemplated when 
the regulation was developed.   
 
To illustrate this situation and to identify the implications of a GSR for both 
suppliers and government Konjac Jelly Mini-cup products will be used.   These 
are food products that are covered by the F&DA Food Regulations.   
 
The safety of food is more complex than many other product areas since it 
involves more than 30 different government departments, agencies (federal, 
provincial/territorial and/or municipal) depending on the product or problem.  At 
the Federal level, Health Canada is responsible for developing the food safety 
regulations under the F&DA and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is 
responsible for enforcing these regulations.  The provinces/territories also 
develop and enforce statutes to minimize food safety risks in various 
commodities produced within the province/territory.  For example, Ontario 
administers and enforces standards for the production, safety, labelling, 
advertising and sale of such products as dairy products, fruits, vegetables, eggs 
and honey.  Municipal Public Health Officials who are often the first to be notified 
of food safety problems also play an integral role in the food safety system.  They 
can set food safety standards and policies for food premises and have the power 
to condemn food.    
                                            
542  Department of Justice, Food and Drugs Act, Part 1, 4, Sept 2005. 
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The challenge is for governments at all levels to work cooperatively to reduce the 
risks and to streamline and enhance the system.  CFIA is currently negotiating 
with provincial and territorial governments a number of federal-provincial 
agreements to integrate the food safety system.  This includes sharing 
information and expertise and co-coordinating enforcement and inspection 
activities and emergency response services (e.g., food recalls).  CFIA and the 
provinces/territories promote the use of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP)-based Quality Management Systems to improve the safety of food. 
 
Current Situation 
The Konjac Jelly Mini-cup Jelly products are candies that are traditionally 
manufactured in South-east Asia and imported into many countries under various 
brand names. The jellies contain the additive Konjac as the gelling agent in place 
of gelatine to maintain their shape and firmness.  The mini cups are about the 
size of a coffee creamer with rounded edges. They usually contain a flavoured or 
fruit centre enclosed in the shell of Konjac jelly.   Although no warnings appeared 
on individual jellies, the outside package often carried a warning such as:  
 
Keep out of the reach of children.  Seniors and children should be supervised when 
consuming the fibre jelly.  Make sure to chew slowly and thoroughly.  Do not 
swallow whole.  Children under 3 are advised not to eat this product.543  
 
Internationally 
During 2001 and 2002, the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups were associated with the 
choking deaths or near fatalities of a number of children and elderly persons in 
Japan, Australia544, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Canada545 and the United States.546 547  
Due to the fact that these products were slippery and maintained their shape and 
firmness when placed in the mouth, they could become lodged in the throat and 
were very difficult to remove due to their size, shape and consistency. 
 
The US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in response to a request 
from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evaluated the potential choking 
hazard associated with Konjac Jelly Mini-cups.  Due to its legislative 
responsibilities, the CPSC has developed extensive expertise in the physiology 
and anatomy of the airway and the characteristics of objects involved in fatal 
choking events among children.  These experts concluded that the physical 
characteristics of the small cup like candies pose a serious choking risk due to 
their size, shape, texture and consistency.548 
                                            
543  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Safety Hazard Alert, Choking Hazard Posed by Mini-Cup Jelly 
Products, August 16, 2000 
544  Australia New Zealand Food Authority, ANZFA Urges Recall on Jelly Cups with Konjac, 
November 16, 2001. 
545  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Safety Hazard Alert, Choking Hazard Posed by Mini-Cup Jelly 
Products, August 16, 2000. 
546  United States Food and Drug Administration, Import Alert #33-15, November 16, 2002. 
547  Public Health Seattle and King County, Alert, Jelly-fruit cup poses chocking hazard, July 28, 
2000. 
548  United States Food and Drug Administration, Import Alert #33-15, November 16, 2002 
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Under the Food Chemical Codex, Konjac is an additive that is considered to be 
safe549 for human consumption and is used in food in the form of flour, gum/gel 
or soluble fibre.  The same situation applies under Codex Alimentarius standards. 
 
In Canada. 
Konjac, a food additive, falls under the purview of the F&DA, which covers 
“any ingredient that may be mixed with food for any purpose whatever.”550  
Konjac’s use as an additive is not restricted under the F&DA’s Food 
Regulations.  These regulations prohibit the sale of food that is poisonous, 
harmful, unfit for human consumption, adulterated or exposed to unsanitary 
conditions from manufacture to sale.551  The Act does not prohibit food that 
due to its physical or mechanical properties adversely affects the health or 
safety of a consumer.   As a result, it was not possible for CFIA to use the 
F&DA authorities to address the problem of the Konjac Jelly Mini cups. 
 
The size and shape of these jelly candies pose a mechanical choking hazard 
as defined by regulations under the Hazardous Products Act (HPA)552.   
Although the HPA provides Health Canada with the authority to deal with 
mechanical choking hazards in consumer products, food is specifically 
exempted from this Act.  This meant that the HPA also could not be used to 
address the problem of the Konjac Jelly Mini cups obstructing a child’s airway.  
 
Since the serious risk associated with the jelly mini-cups could not be 
addressed by either the F&DA or the HPA, CFIA was forced to explore other 
options.  Initially, CFIA published safety alerts553 in 2000 and 2001.  These 
alerts provided information to consumers about the choking hazard posed by 
the mini cups and warned against serving them to children and seniors.  The 
alerts were followed by further action in November 2001, when the Minister of 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada announced a mandatory recall of the 
Konjac Jelly Mini-cups by using the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act 
(CFIA Act).554  The CFIA Act provides the authority to deal with a broader 
range of risks than is possible under the F&DA.  For example, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada under the CFIA Act may initiate a 
mandatory recall of a product regulated under an Act for which CFIA is 
responsible if  “the Minister believes on reasonable grounds poses a risk to 
public, animal or plant health.”555  Risk is not specifically defined under the 
CFIA Act and it was determined that the term covered physical risks. 
 
                                            
549  Food Chemical Codex, Fourth Edition, 1996, published by the National Academy of Sciences, 
Washington, D.C., United States. 
550  Department of Justice, Food and Drugs Act, Section 2.  
551  Department of Justice, Foods and Drug Act, Section 4 Food. 
552  Department of Justice, Hazardous Products (Toy) Regulations Section 7c, Carriages and Strollers 
Regulations, section 12, 2004. 
553  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Safety Hazard Alerts, August 2001, October 2001 
554  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Safety Hazard Alert, Minister Orders Mandatory Recall of 
Konjac Mini Cup Jelly Products, November 21, 2001. 
555  Department of Justice, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, Article 19, March 1997. 
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There are significant gaps in the regulation of food and the onus is on the 
government to identify hazards and establish standards for each type of 
product.  This reactive approach as occurred with the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups 
results in significant time delays in addressing adverse health events.   
 
Potential Options to Resolve the Issue 
There are a number of options that could be considered to address the problem 
Konjac Jelly Mini-cups.  For example, consideration could be given to revising the  
F&DA food regulations so that it prohibits not only biological and chemical 
contamination but also physical characteristics that may cause harm.  The 
European General Food Law556 contains such a broad prohibition.  This new food 
law provides the EC with the clear authority to take action against a food causing 
harm due to its physical characteristics.  Moreover, the new European law 
includes the elements of a General Safety Requirement since it provides the 
authority to take action against a food conforming to community regulations or 
standards where it is suspected that the food is unsafe.557  The inclusion of 
physical hazards as a prohibition under the F&DA Food Regulations would also 
be consistent with the international food standards, guidelines and codes of 
practice for producers and suppliers developed by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme.558  Under 
these standards and codes, the definition of hazard includes physical hazards in 
addition to biological and chemical hazards.559 
 
It also could be possible to establish a system that addresses all risks by 
changing the regulatory framework to a risk based system similar to the Medical 
Device Regulations560.  However, this would be a difficult and lengthy process 
due to the complexity of developing such a system for the wide range of food 
products.   The additional provisions incorporated in a GSR such as mandatory 
reporting and recall could also be added through regulatory amendment as was 
done with the F&DA’s Medical Device and Natural Health Products 
Regulations.561 
 
Another option to be considered, where the existing regulation does not address 
the hazard in question, is the establishment of a GSR similar to the one in 
Europe.  It is assumed that a GSR would provide the authority to take action 
against any product that presents a risk to consumers irrespective of whether or 
not the product meets existing regulations.  A GSR containing such a provision 
would have allowed CFIA to take immediate action to remove the Konjac Jelly 
Mini-cups from the market although the product complied with the existing 
                                            
556  European Parliament, Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 on General Food Law Article 3, Definition 
14, January 28, 2002 
557  European Parliament, Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 on General Food Law Article 14, No. 8., and 
Article 53, January 28, 2002 
558  Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2006. www.codexalimentarius.net 
559  Codex Alimentarius Commission, Recommended International Code of Practice: General 
Principles of Food Hygiene, CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 4-20031 
560  Department of Justice, Medical Device Regulations, Dec 2005. 
561  Department of Justice, Natural Health Products Regulations, June 2004. 
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regulation.  A GSR in legislation would ensure consistency across all the product 
areas and cover all products without continual updating or a complex and lengthy 
amendment. Moreover, the GSR would capture any new innovative product 
entering the market that posed an adverse health risk.  By establishing a general 
GSR the goal of Health Canada’s Legislative Renewal Initiative to better protect 
consumers by strengthening existing legislation would be met.   
 
Implications of a GSR for Suppliers  
From the perspective of a supplier of Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, a GSR would mean 
that: 
• He/she would have to ensure that the product complies not only with any 
existing regulations but also with the obligations specified by a GSR; and 
• The obligations that are normally included in a GSR such as assessing 
and managing the risks associated with a product, monitoring any 
problems in the marketplace and reporting problems to the enforcement 
agency have the potential of significantly impacting on suppliers.   It is 
also assumed that the obligations will be different for producers and 
distributors since their ability to influence the safety of a product is very 
different.  
 
If a regulatory option is followed that is based on risk, mandatory reporting could 
be included and the impact would be similar to the implementation of a GSR 
 
Compliance 
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis 
To demonstrate that all reasonable care has been taken to market a safe product 
and comply with a GSR, a producer would normally be required to assess the 
product prior to production or importation and take steps to address any 
problems identified.  The procedure to identify hazards and assess risks basically 
involves responding to four simple questions. 
• What can go wrong? 
• How likely is it? 
• What are the consequences? 
• How can it be prevented? 
 
Responding to these questions, however, is not as straightforward as it would 
appear.  The lack of data and research on adverse events caused by the 
mechanical properties of food makes it difficult for a producer to assess the risk 
associated with the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups.  Moreover, standards, methods for 
evaluation and available expertise are limited or do not exist.  For these reasons, 
many producers, particularly small and medium sized enterprises are concerned 
about how they will be able to assess the risks associated with a product like the 
Konjac mini-cups and to comply with the GSR.  Even large companies such as 
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Nike must rely on external consultants to assess innovative products, which are 
outside their knowledge base and expertise.562 
 
The risk assessment process that a producer of the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups could 
follow would be very similar to the process outlined in section 4.3 for bicycles and 
in Appendix 3.  However, in the food area, there are differences due to the 
involvement of CFIA and its policies related to importation and the enhancement 
of Canadian food safety.  Both policies promote the implementation of Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP)-based Quality Management Systems to 
control the safety of a food product.  This approach is consistent with that of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission’s standards and codes for food are accepted 
internationally and form the basis of international trade requirements.   
 
There are a number of data sources that a producer can use to help identify 
hazards and assess associated risks.  Information can be obtained from the 
scientific literature, from databases such as those in the food industry, 
government agencies, and relevant international organizations and through 
solicitation of opinions of experts.  To access this information and analyze it, a 
producer would require very specialized scientific expertise internally or have the 
financial ability to purchase the expertise externally. 
 
Standards or Codes 
No specific test procedures or standards currently exist to evaluate hazards 
associated with the physical characteristics of Konjac Jelly Mini cups and other 
food products.  Therefore, it would be necessary for a producer to review 
standards for other products exhibiting similar physical characteristics and either 
adapt a standard to the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups or develop a new standard to 
evaluate the mini-cups and to comply with the GSR provisions. 
 
The process of identifying an appropriate standard is not easy since it often 
requires very specialized expertise to evaluate the applicability of a standard563.  
Moreover, the number of standards that would need to be reviewed could be 
extensive and the process time consuming and expensive. 
 
Conformity Assessment 
Once a mechanism is found that addresses the hazard identified in the Konjac 
Jelly Mini-cups the producer should put in place procedures to ensure that the 
solution is followed during production, distribution and sale.   This could take the 
form of a conformity assessment procedure to determine whether a product, 
service or system meets the requirements of a particular standard.”564  There are 
                                            
562  Guy La Salle, Product Safety Director, Nike Europe, Internalizing the EU Product Safety Agenda 
in an International Company, International Workshop on Accident/Injury Data Collection for 
Non-Food Product and Service Assessment, Feb 20, 2006. 
563  See Case Study 1 Section 4.4.1.  For additional information on choosing an appropriate standard. 
564  Standards Council of Canada, National Conformity Assessment Principles for Canada, 
www.scc.ca/en/publications/index.shtml  
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many conformity assessment procedures565 that could be used.  In the food area 
the one that is being promoted nationally and internationally is the HACCP 
System. 
CFIA through its Food Safety Enhancement Program (FSEP)566 and Import 
Policy 567 expects all federally inspected processing establishments and 
importers to implement a HACCP-based Quality Management System. The CFIA 
uses this to assess domestic and imported food commodities. Where applicable 
and appropriate, the CFIA will take enforcement action based on the authorities 
provided by the CFIA Act, the food regulations under the F&D Act or the 
Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act. In the area of federally inspected meat 
and poultry establishments the HACCP system is mandatory.568  
To help both food producers and distributors control risks and meet regulatory 
requirments, CFIA has published a FSEP implementation manual that includes a 
detailed guide for developing a HACCP program569.  In addition, it has published 
a voluntary guideline entitled "Good Importing Practices"570 (GIP) based on the 
Recommended International Code of Practice - General Principles of Food 
Hygiene adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.  The GIP describes 
the key controls necessary for importers to control safety, suitability, labelling and 
fraud in imported foods sold in Canada. Since it is generic in nature, it can be 
applied to importers of Konjac Jelly Mini-cups.  Elements of the GIP are 
considered to be the foundation for the development of a system based on 
HACCP principles for ensuring food safety.  
For non-federally registered food processors, the provinces and territories are 
responsible and many have put in place voluntary HACCP programs.  For 
example, after extensive research, stakeholder discussions, and in-plant testing, 
the Ontario Government adapted CFIA’s FSEP approach to HACCP so it is 
feasible and practical for Ontario’s small and medium-sized enterprises to 
implement.571  If Konjac Mini-cups were to be manufactured it Ontario, the 
producers would be expected to voluntarily implement this program.  
A supplier of a Konjac Jelly Mini-cup who establishes a HACCP system would be 
considered by CFIA, the provinces/territories, and foreign governments to have 
taken all reasonable care to ensure that the product is safe and complies with 
                                            
565  Information on conformity assessment processes accepted internationally can be found at 
www.iso.org/iso/en/comms-markets/conformity/iso%2Bconformity.html  
566  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Food Safety Enhancement Program, 2003. 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/polstrat/haccp/manu/vol1/vol1e.shtml  
567  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, CFIA Import Policy, 2001 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/polstrat/import/appenae.shtml   
568  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Implementation of Mandatory Food Safety Enhancement 
Program (FSEP), Meat Inspection Regulations, Dec. 15, 2004. 
569  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, FSEP Implementation Manual, 2001. 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/polstrat/haccp/manu/manue.shtml 
570  Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Good Importing Practices:  Code of Practice for use by 
Canadian Food Importers, 1998.  Revised version due to be published April 2006. 
571  Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, HACCP Advantage, 
www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/food/inspection/haccp/index.html 
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existing regulations.   The question being asked by producers and distributors is 
whether or not such a system will be accepted as a way to demonstrate 
compliance with a GSR or new regulatory provisions. 
Monitoring and Reporting  
Currently, there are no mandatory monitoring and reporting requirements in place 
for Konjac Jelly Mini-cups or other food products.  If Health Canada established 
such provisions in Canada, a supplier of Konjac Jelly Mini-cups would be 
required to report any incidents to CFIA.  The establishment of a monitoring and 
reporting system could result in significant financial costs to establish such a 
system and to hire additional personnel to maintain the system and analyze the 
data.  Moreover, like in the case of bicycles, the provisions of the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act would have to be 
respected.  
 
Provision of Information 
Most products such as the Konjac Mini-cups are not 100% safe and how it is 
used can contribute to managing the associated risks.  Consumers need and 
have a right to information about how to assemble, use or maintain a product 
correctly.  Therefore, it is assumed that a GSR or equivalent regulatory 
amendment will require suppliers to provide consumers with sufficient information 
to assess the potential product risks and be capable of protecting themselves.  
The effectiveness of warnings and safety information depends on many factors 
such as an individual’s ability to understand and read the information, their 
attitude to risk, the quantity of information presented and easy access to the 
information at the time of use or maintenance.  In the case of the Konjac Jelly 
Mini-cups, where information did exist to warn against feeding this product to 
children, it was on the outer packing and not on the individual mini-cups 
themselves.  The effectiveness of the warnings on the outer package of these 
products is in question since a number of children did die due to eating the 
product.  In some cases, the children found the Jelly Mini-cups and ate them 
without their parents’ knowledge. 
 
From the perspective of the producer concerned about complying with a GSR or 
amended regulation questions arise about how much safety information should 
be provided, how should it be provided and whether or not it is appropriate to use 
information to manage residual product risks.     
 
Implications of Failure to Comply 
The implications of failing to comply with a GSR or equivalent regulatory 
amendment could mean fines, product recalls, seizures or a complete ban of the 
product from the market similar to what occurred with the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups.  
Moreover, brand images may be tarnished and a producer may be sued for 
damages.  
 
If a GSR or similar regulatory provisions had been in place when the problem 
with the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups was identified, it would have been possible for 
CFIA to take immediate action to remove the product from the market.   
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Summary 
The establishment of a GSR or new regulatory obligations could result in 
operational and financial impacts for a company producing Konjac Jelly Mini-
cups.  It would depend on what had already been established in the way of 
technical expertise to identify and evaluate risks, conformity assessment systems 
and monitoring and reporting systems.  The producer of a product where not all 
hazards are covered by existing regulations will need to identify any gaps that 
exist in the skills set of staff, management processes and systems and fill these 
gaps either internally or externally.  If the producer of the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups 
had carried out such an evaluation and taken steps, for example, to change the 
size and/or shape of the product so it did not present a suffocation hazard, the 
product would not have been banned from the market.    
 
Implications of a GSR for Health Canada and Other Government 
Departments 
The implications on government of a GSR or similar regulatory provision for 
Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, which is regulated but exhibits a hazard not covered by 
the regulation, will be very similar to that identified for unregulated products.  The 
main difference relates to the fact that the safety of food involves not only Health 
Canada but also CFIA and other levels of government.  CFIA enforces the 
federal legislation and the provinces/territories have the responsibility for food 
manufactured and sold within their borders.  As a result, there are a number of 
issues and policies with respect to the implementation of a GSR or new 
regulatory obligations that will need to be resolved and agreed upon by the 
different government agencies with responsibilities in this area. 
 
As in the case of bicycles and unregulated products, suppliers will need 
clarification from Health Canada and the other government agencies involved 
about: 
• Which standards or codes are acceptable as a due diligence defense? 
• What role will the establishment of a HACCP- quality management system 
by a food supplier play as a due diligence defense? 
• What process should be used to assess the risks and what level of certainty 
is expected? 
• What level of safety will be considered acceptable or will trigger a report of 
an adverse health incident? 
• What type of safety information, method of presentation and level of detail 
would be considered to be acceptable?  
• What enforcement actions will be taken and will they be consistent across 
the country and among the different government agencies involved? 
 
The better informed producers and distributors are, about what is expected from 
them by the various government agencies involved, the more likely they will be 
able to comply with a GSR or regulatory amendments. 
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Policies to be Developed and Implemented 
Acceptable Level of Safety 
ISO/IEC Guide 51, developed to be used by those developing consumer product 
standards, defines safety as “freedom from unacceptable risk.572  As indicated in 
this guide, there is no absolutely safe product but only different degrees of safety 
that are acceptable.  This lack of clarity with respect to what is considered a safe 
or unsafe product could lead to confusion and disagreement between suppliers, 
consumers and the various governments and/or agencies involved in 
enforcement of a GSR or similar regulatory framework.  Defining the level of 
safety is one of the key concerns that have been raised by professionals who 
complain about the vague nature of the GSR in the absence of binding 
standards.573  
 
With Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, it is important for responsible authorities to provide 
guidance to suppliers and those responsible for enforcing any new provisions on 
the meaning of the term unsafe.  Such guidance will help suppliers determine 
whether or not the mini-cups are safe and can be marketed, and whether or not 
an incident needs to be reported.  From the perspective of the regulators, 
clarification of the term unsafe will assist them in providing advice to suppliers 
and, more importantly, facilitate consistency in enforcement across the country 
and among the various government agencies involved.  This is particularly critical 
with Konjac Jelly Mini-cups where it is necessary to develop a consensus among 
a number of government agencies and levels of government.  Agreement on the 
following questions will have to be reached:   
• How the provinces/territories will work with the federal agencies to 
implement the GSR?   
• Whether or not the provinces/territories will be able to draw on the 
provisions of the GSR for food production and sale within their borders? 
• What level of safety will be considered unacceptable and will trigger 
enforcement action or reporting of an adverse incident? 
• What type of information manuals and/or training will need to be 
developed to assist suppliers and government officials in understanding 
the policy? 
 
Compliance 
In order to comply with the requirement that all reasonable care is taken to 
ensure the safety of the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, a supplier must know which 
instruments or mechanisms are acceptable to demonstrate this.  In the case of 
the Konjac Jelly Mini-cups and other foods, there will be questions about the 
status of the HACCP – based quality management system as a defence.  Not 
only is HACCP being promoted by CFIA and the provinces/territories as a 
voluntary initiative, but it has been mandated by CFIA under the Meat Inspection 
Regulations574 and is accepted as an international code of practice in the food 
trade.  
                                            
572  ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC Guide 51: Safety Aspects Guidelines for their Inclusion in Standards, 1999. 
573  Centre de Droit de la Consommation, The practical application of Council Directive 92/59/EEC 
on General Product Safety, 2000. 
574  Justice Canada, Meat Inspection Regulations, Meat Inspection Act, February 21, 2006. 
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Normally, where a regulation does not cover a specific product hazard, it is 
possible to identify a standard or code for the product or similar product that 
does.  The implementation of the requirements of that standard or code, if 
deemed to be acceptable, could then demonstrate that all reasonable steps were 
taken to market a safe product.  However, in the case of Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, 
no standards or codes exist to address the particular hazard in question.  
Producers will want to know how they will be able to demonstrate compliance 
under such circumstances, whether or not it will be necessary to develop a new 
standard or carry out a detailed risk assessment and whether or not a quality 
management system similar to HACCP or ISO 9000 will be sufficient. 
 
The implication for Health Canada will be the need to develop policies and 
suitable means of technical assistance in conjunction with the other agencies that 
share responsibility.  CFIA has developed a number of good examples of what 
will be needed such as its training and manuals on HACCP that were developed 
by CFIA to assist producers with the implementation of HACCP and CFIA staff in 
auditing producers’ systems.575  
 
Monitoring and Reporting 
One of the basic elements of any risk assessment and risk management system 
is: 
the element of constant monitoring, analysis of the data obtained and action being 
taken to address any problems identified.  This obligation is normally included in a 
GSR and could have a significant impact not only on suppliers but also on Health 
Canada and its partners.  The same situation would apply to inclusion of such 
provisions in regulation.   For Konjac Jelly Mini-cups, reports would be provided to 
the agency responsible for enforcing the regulations that would be CFIA at the 
federal level or possibly the provinces/territories where a product is manufactured 
and sold within provincial/territorial borders. 
 
Health Canada and CFIA in conjunction with the provinces/territories will have to 
make these policy decisions so that there is a consistent approach and to 
communicate the decisions to suppliers.  In addition, agreement should be 
reached among the enforcement authorities about whether or not there will be 
one national database that is accessible to all and what enforcement actions 
should be taken when a report is not made.  One of the major issues to be 
resolved will be how the new reporting system and analytical expertise required 
will be financed and resourced.   It may also be necessary to establish with the 
provinces/territories a protocol for reporting of food safety problems to CFIA 
beyond what is already in place. 
 
Responsibilities of Members of the Supply Chain 
The responsibilities of the different members of the supply chain for Konjac Jelly 
Mini-cups differ significantly from one country to another.  For example, in 
                                            
575  CFIA, Food Safety Enhancement Program, 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/polstrat/haccp/haccpe.shtml 
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Europe, members of the supply chain have been divided into two groups, 
producers consisting of manufacturers and importers, and distributors consisting 
of distributors and retailers.  In the United States, the responsibilities for all 
members of the supply chain are the same.  Health Canada, in consultation with 
CFIA, will have to determine whether or not all members of the chain will be 
required to meet the same obligations.  If not, then clear policies will need to be 
articulated to ensure that all suppliers are fully aware of their obligations.   
 
The other aspect to be considered is the ability of small and medium sized 
enterprises to comply with the GSR or similar regulatory provisions.  Anecdotal 
information from manufacturers and EU officials appears to suggest that SMEs 
are not complying with the GSR in Europe due to costs and confusion about what 
they are required to do.   
 
Impact Assessment  
As with the Bicycle case study, a cost/benefit analysis is required to fulfill the 
requirements of the Directive on Lawmaking and the requirement for a RIAS in 
the Regulatory Policy.  It will have to consider the costs not only to all members 
of the supply chain but also to Health Canada, CFIA and the provinces/territories.  
 
Operational Changes 
Due to the implementation of a GSR or similar regulatory amendment that 
requires all hazards in products even those in regulated products to be 
addressed, operational changes will be required. In the case of Konjac Jelly Mini-
cups, both Health Canada and CFIA will be involved.  It may also involve the 
provinces/territories depending on the decisions that are made and the 
agreements that are reached.    
 
The GSR could provide new authorities that result in a greater reliance on 
standards and codes to achieve policy objectives.  In the food area, a great deal 
of reliance has been already placed on the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s 
standards and codes.  Both Health Canada and CFIA participate extensively in 
the development of these instruments at the international level.  Moreover, CFIA 
is moving forward on promoting and mandating the establishment of HACCP 
quality systems and auditing these systems.  Therefore, unlike what was found in 
the first case study, the expertise already exists within the organizations 
responsible for food safety to utilize standards and quality management systems 
effectively. 
 
Since no mandatory reporting of adverse health incidents related to Konjac Jelly 
Mini-cups currently exists, systems and expertise to collect and analyse reports 
of adverse incident will have to be established.  However, CFIA through its 
policies, audits and inspections and sharing of information with other jurisdictions 
does obtain information on many products that pose a risk to consumers. The 
mandatory monitoring and reporting of incidents, which is assumed to be part of 
a GSR or regulatory amendment, should help CFIA in identifying and addressing 
safety problems in the food supply.   
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The operational changes that will need to be made to deal with unregulated 
products have been outlined.  The same type of operational changes will have to 
be made to deal with products that are inadequately regulated.  The main 
difference for Konjac Jelly Mini-cups will be the fact that any operational changes 
will also involve CFIA and potentially the provinces and territories. 
 
To ensure that the transition from the existing authorities to the new ones is 
smooth, all the governments responsible for food safety will have to agree on 
many policies and procedures.   Therefore, it is logical that the 
federal/provincial/territorial working groups that deal with food issues should be 
involved in drafting these policies and details of the new procedures. If that is not 
possible, it may be necessary to establish new working groups for this express 
purpose.  The policies and form of any working relationship developed with CFIA 
and possibly the provinces/territories could be of mutual benefit to all by filling in 
any gaps in authorities and having a consistent approach for industry. 
 
 
Case Study 3:  Electrical Household Products - Products Subject to 
Federal and Provincial/Territorial Regulation 
 
The existing Canadian legislative framework governing the safety of consumer 
products consists of both federal and provincial/territorial statutes.  Although 
effective, the system can be complex and confusing for suppliers, regulators and 
consumers particularly where the two levels of government have the authority to 
deal with the same product and the requirements may or may not be consistent 
across the country.  Moreover, due to the distribution of powers under the 
constitution, the federal and provincial/territorial authorities may not have the 
authority to deal with certain facets of the problem. Concerns have been raised 
not only about the gaps that exist in this system but also about the overlap if a 
General Safety Requirement is implemented.  To illustrate these issues 
household electrical products will be used.   
 
Current Situation 
Although the Health Canada has the authority to regulate these products under 
the Hazardous Products Act576 (HPA), traditionally the provinces/territories have 
dealt with them under their legislation and regulations governing the electrical 
supply system.  The fact that no regulations for these products have been 
developed under the HPA makes it difficult for Health Canada to deal with any 
potential problems associated with these products.  All the provinces and 
territories, however, have enacted legislation and regulations to deal with the 
installation and safety of electrical equipment connected to the electrical system 
including equipment used in and around the home. These regulations mandate 
the Canadian Electrical Code (CEC) and require that all household electrical 
products are approved by provincial/territorial authorities or are certified to the 
product standards referenced in the CEC.   
 
                                            
576  Justice Canada, Hazardous Products Act, Paragraphs 6.1 (a) and (b), March 3, 2006 
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The electrical code was developed as a model code that could be referenced by 
all the provinces/territories.  This code lays out practical and reasonably 
predictable sets of rules for the installation and safety of electrical products.  
Since all provinces and territories in their legislation and/or regulations with only 
minor deviations reference this model code, the goal of consistency across the 
country for the most part is achieved.  The Canadian Standards Association 
(CSA) is responsible for developing the code in conjunction with 
provincial/territorial electrical safety officials, fire authorities, industry and users.  
It not only drafts the code but also is responsible for the development and/or 
choice of the standards referenced in the code.  Globalization and free trade has 
led CSA to adopt a number of North American harmonized standards and 
international standards developed by the International Electro technical 
Commission (IEC), which is responsible for standards regarding electrical, 
electronic and related technologies.  The time to develop a standard and the four-
year period between revisions of the CEC often results in lengthy delays in the 
adoption of standards that cover new products or unanticipated hazards not 
addressed by existing standards. 
 
The reliance on IEC standards for household electrical products by provinces or 
territories and possibly the federal government in the future is to some extent 
problematic.  Canada does not have voting status on the IEC technical 
committee responsible for the development of the standards for these products. 
This means that the safety concerns of Canadian consumers may or may not be 
addressed. The situation has arisen due to the significant reduction in Canadian 
manufacturers who normally would participate, lack of funding for those 
representing consumers and the reduction in government funding for standards 
development work.    
 
Under the current situation, no level of government has the authority to order a 
mandatory recall of a dangerous household electrical product or to require 
suppliers to monitory their products and report adverse incidents.  Although most 
household electrical products are imported, the provinces/territories do not have 
the authority under the constitution to deal with importation and stop dangerous 
products at the border.  In addition, the enforcement powers provided to the 
provincial and territorial officials are not consistent from one province/territory to 
another.  For example, only Alberta and Saskatchewan have included 
manufacture in the scope of their legislation and most provinces/territories do not 
have the power of seizure.  As a result, there are a number of gaps in the ability 
of governments to address risks related to consumer electrical products. 
 
The provincial and territorial legislation/regulations require that all household 
electrical products sold within their borders be approved or certified to the safety 
standards under the CEC.  Recently, imported products that do not bear a 
certification label have been sold not only in small retail outlets such as the dollar 
stores but also in major retail chains in contravention of provincial/territorial 
statutes577.  Since the provinces/territories are unable to stop such products from 
                                            
577  CBC Marketplace., “From the Store Shelves:  Marketplace shopping test”, April 9, 2006. 
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entering the country and do not have the resources to check every retail outlet, 
these products, many of which are unsafe, continue to be sold.  Moreover, this 
places suppliers who work to ensure that the products they produce and sell are 
as safe as possible and comply with provincial/territorial requirements at a real 
disadvantage.  
 
One of the major safety problems related to electrical products that has garnered 
recent attention578 of suppliers, provincial/authorities, certification bodies and the 
police579 is counterfeiting both of the products and the certification marks on the 
products.  For example, counterfeit extension cords, which melted and caught fire 
in minutes or power bars, which present fatal shock or fire hazards,580 are being 
sold in Canada placing the public at risk.  Due to the inability of the 
provinces/territories to deal with imported products at the border and the gaps in 
existing legislation to deal with counterfeiting, this has proven to be a very difficult 
problem for all levels of government, retailers, certification bodies and the police 
to deal with. 
 
Potential Options to Resolve the Issue 
The establishment of a GSR to act as a safety net that can be used to address 
safety problems not covered by existing federal or provincial/territorial regulations 
and includes provisions for mandatory recall and reporting is one way of filling the 
identified gaps. In situations where a newly identified hazard in a product is not 
addressed by a standard referenced under the CEC or where no standard exists, 
it would be possible for the federal government to address the hazard and 
mitigate the risk to consumers in a timely manner by using the powers under a 
GSR. In many ways, this would result in a similar situation to what exists in the 
United States where the individual states mandate the National Electrical Code 
and provisions exist federally to cover unregulated risks.  At the federal level in 
the USA, Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act 581 requires that all 
adverse incidents including those involving consumer electrical products be 
reported to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).  The CPSC 
evaluates the incidents and a determination is made with respect to whether or 
not it is a substantial product hazard that requires a recall or corrective action.  
Moreover, the development of a GSR would address not only any identified 
problems with consumer electrical products but also with any other group of 
consumer products regulated by the provinces/territories that can pose risks to 
the public such as gas appliances. 
 
Another option that could be considered is the addition of provisions, in whole or 
in part, similar to those that would be included in a GSR in regulations under the 
HPA.  The provisions could be added to individual product-specific regulations 
                                            
578  Canadian Anti-Counterfeiting Network, Position Paper:  The Need for Legal Reform in Canada to 
Address Intellectual Property Crime, ,January 2006. www.cacn.ca 
579  RCMP, Police Charge Two Toronto Men with Selling Dangerous Counterfeit Electrical Products, 
Press release March 30, 2005. www.rcmp-grc.ca/on/press/2005/2005_mar_30_e.htm 
580  CSA International, Counterfeit Products Can Kill, Warn Experts at Anti-Counterfeiting 
Conference, April 7, 2005.  www.csa-international.org/news/releases 
581  Consumer Product Safety Commission, Consumer Product Safety Act, Section 15. 
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using the authority of paragraph 5(a)582 of the HPA or the authority provided by 
paragraph 6(3)583 in hazard-based regulations.  Moreover, it would appear to be 
possible under paragraph 5 (a) to include in either type of regulatory approach 
provisions that require the supplier to monitor the market, report any adverse 
incidents and correct any problems. This approach was taken in Europe where 
the Low Voltage Directive584 (LVD) was designed to cover all risks and 
categories of risks associated with consumer electrical products.  As a result, the 
General Product Safety Directive does not apply585 to the risks associated with 
consumer electrical products covered by the LVD.   It is possible in regulations to 
covers all risks and to require mandatory reporting of adverse incidents.  A 
Canadian example of this type of regulation is the risk based regulatory 
framework and mandatory reporting provisions586 of the Medical Device 
Regulations under the Food and Drug Act.  By requiring suppliers to notify the 
Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate of serious incidents that occur in 
Canada or in another country, the Inspectorate is able to ensure that problematic 
devices are corrected or recalled in a timely manner.  The reporting 
requirements, which are harmonized with other jurisdictions, enable Canadian 
participation in an international alert system developed under Mutual Recognition 
Agreements. 
 
Every Province and Territory has product liability laws that allow a person injured 
by a product to sue the supplier in a civil action after the injury has occurred.  
These actions are normally very expensive and take a long time to reach a 
verdict.  If the supplier is found to be negligent about the safety of the product, 
financial compensation to the victim may result but the product could remain on 
the market, as a judge does not have the authority to order the removal of an 
unsafe product. 587  Criminal law, however, removes many of the problems 
associated with tort civil actions and a GSR or similar provisions in regulations 
under federal criminal legislation provides a means for government to act quickly 
and, where appropriate, remove the product causing the injury from the market.  
 
                                            
582  “authorizes the advertising, sale or importation of any restricted product and prescribing the 
circumstances and conditions under which and the persons by whom the restricted product may be 
advertised, sold or imported”. 
583  “may describe a product, material or substance or by reference to any other criteria and any 
product, material or substance that has those properties or characteristics or meets those criteria 
shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have been added by the order of Part I or  , as the 
case may be of Schedule I.” 
Directive 72/23/EEC and 93/68/EEC, Electrical Equipment - Low Voltage Directive, 1973 
amended 1993. 
585  European Commission’s Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection, Guidance 
Document on the Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive and Certain Sector 
Directives with Provisions on Product Safety, November 2003. 
586  Justice Canada, Sections 59 to 62 of the Medical Device Regulations, Food and Drugs Act, 
February 2006, states “the manufacturer and the importer of a medical device shall each make a 
preliminary and a final report to the Minister concerning any incident that comes to their attention 
occurring inside or outside Canada and involving a device that is sold in Canada”.  
587  D.N. Dewees and M.J. Trebilcock, “Study of the Effectiveness of Tort as a Deterrent to the 
Production and Supply of Hazardous Consumer Products”, January 25, 1994. 
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Irrespective of the approached followed; there are significant benefits to the 
implementation of any provisions in cooperation with the provinces/territories.  
Consideration also may be given to providing them with the authority to enforce 
any general safety, recall, or mandatory reporting provisions included in federal 
legislation or regulations that apply to consumer electrical products. The 
establishment of such agreements could help provincial and territorial authorities 
in identifying products that pose a danger to the public and having them removed 
quickly from the market.  The policies and the form of any working arrangements 
developed with the provinces and territories will have a significant impact on 
whether or not the overlap that will exist between a GSR or similar regulatory 
requirements and provincial/territorial legal instruments has a negative or positive 
benefit. The WHMIS Program under the HPA, which is enforced by the 
provinces/territories, is an example of how governments and other stakeholders 
can work together to provide mutual benefits.  This type of working relationship 
also benefits industry and consumers by establishing consistent and predictable 
rules across the country.  
 
Implications of a GSR for Suppliers 
The establishment of a GSR in any new legislation or similar provisions in 
regulations under the HPA could increase the confusion and complexity for those 
supplying household electrical products to the Canadian marketplace.  Not only 
would suppliers of household electrical products have to comply with 
provincial/territorial regulatory requirements; but they would also be responsible 
for complying with any new provisions established at the federal level.  Normally, 
the provisions included in a GSR or similar regulatory initiatives require a 
producer to assess and manage all risks associated with a product, monitor the 
product in the marketplace and report any adverse incidents.  As a result, a 
producer could comply with all the standards under the CEC mandated by 
provincial/territorial regulations and still be at risk of Health Canada taking action 
against him/her under the criminal code if a hazard not addressed by the 
standards was identified.   
 
Compliance  
In order for a household electrical product to be marketed in Canada, the law 
requires that it comply with all provincial/territorial regulations. In addition, if a 
GSR or similar provisions in regulations were implemented, the producer would 
be required: 
• To identify any hazards associated with a product; 
• To assess the risk that the hazard presents to the public;  
• To determine if the existing standards referenced under the CEC 
address the potential risk;  and 
• To take action to eliminate or manage the risks.   This could involve 
reviewing other standards that could be followed to address the risk, 
making changes to the design of the product, components used, 
manufacturing processes or accompanying safety information. 
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An example of the process that a producer could use to assess the risks is 
presented in Appendix 3.  As was the case with Bicycles,588 and Konjac Jelly Mini 
cups,589 it can be very difficult to assess the risks due to the lack of data on 
adverse events and their cause, and the problem of obtaining relevant 
information about the design, components and manufacture of the product from 
foreign manufacturers.   Since the standards referenced under the CEC, are 
based on or adopted from international standards, it is unlikely that other 
standards for the product or similar products exist elsewhere that could be used 
to address any risks not addressed in the CEC standards.   
 
The actions described above require a producer to have the scientific capacity or 
the resources necessary to purchase the capacity to assess the risks, evaluate 
standards and identify what would be required to eliminate or manage the 
identified risks.  However, it may not necessarily be a simple process of making 
the changes to the product to eliminate the risk if the changes result in a product 
that does not conform to the existing standards under the CEC.   
Provincial/territorial legislation requires that electrical equipment must be 
approved through certification by qualified third parties to the standards under the 
CEC590.  A supplier who has taken steps to comply with a GSR or similar 
provisions under regulations may find him/herself caught between 
provincial/territorial requirements and federal requirements.  The result may 
mean that he/she is unable to sell his product in Canada without changes being 
made to the standards under the CEC or obtaining approval from the individual 
Provincial/Territorial Electrical Authorities. 
 
The private sector is often affected as much by the implementation and 
enforcement of new requirements as the requirements themselves.  In order to 
comply with new legislative/regulatory requirements, a company normally has to 
make changes that have internal financial and operational implications that in the 
end result in price increases.  If new provisions are not enforced equitably across 
all suppliers, an uneven playing field results making it difficult for responsible 
suppliers to compete with those who do not comply with new provisions.   
 
Monitoring and Reporting  
As indicated earlier, there are no mandatory requirements at either the federal or 
provincial/territorial levels to monitor the market and report adverse incidents 
associated with a product as exists in Europe or the United States.  In fact, 
authorities in Canada often obtain information about potential problem products 
by monitoring the recall information produced by the US CPSC as many of the 
same products are sold in Canada.   From the perspective of a Canadian 
producer, there could be significant impacts if mandatory monitoring and 
reporting is implemented in Canada.  The impact could be mitigated, in some 
                                            
588  Described in section 4.3. of case study 1 
589  Described in section 5.2.1 of case study 2. 
590  For example, the Nova Scotia Electrical Installation and Inspection Act  states “No corporation, 
company, or person shall sell, have for sale, display, rent, lease, advertise, install or use any 
electrical device, appliance or equipment unless it is certified as approved equipment, as defined in 
the Code, by a certification organization acceptable to the Chief Electrical Inspector” 
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cases, if the system of reporting and the safety level that triggers reports or 
recalls is substantially the same as that in the US since many products are sold 
in both jurisdictions.   
 
The reporting requirement could also significantly impact distributors as well as 
producers depending on their obligations to report adverse incidents included in 
any legislative or regulatory changes.  It could result in producers and suppliers 
having to establish incident reporting systems and hire staff to input the data, 
analyse it and report it to the government.   As with bicycles and Konjac Jelly Mini 
Cups, the provisions of the Personal Information Protection and Electronics 
Documents Act would have to be respected. 
 
Provision of Information  
How a household electrical product is used or maintained contributes to 
managing any risks associated with it. Therefore, it is assumed that a GSR or 
equivalent regulatory amendment will require suppliers to provide consumers 
with information about the safe use and maintenance of these products.  The 
effectiveness of warnings and safety information depends on many factors such 
as an individual’s ability to understand and read the information, their attitude to 
risk, the quantity of information presented and easy access to the information at 
the time of use or maintenance.  In the case of household electrical products, the 
use and information requirements are normally specified in the standards for the 
products referenced under the electrical code and suppliers are already 
supplying the information to the public.  As a result any such provisions 
incorporated in a GSR or HPA regulations should not have an impact on 
suppliers unless the information required is different than that specified in the 
existing standards.   
 
Summary 
As with the case studies for Bicycles and Konjac Jelly Mini Cups, the 
establishment of a GSR or GSR like provisions in regulations would result in 
operational and financial impacts for a supplier.  These impacts on producers 
could be more significant than on distributors depending on the obligations for 
each specified in any legislative or regulatory changes.  The impact would also 
depend on what is already in place in terms of technical capacity to assess and 
manage potential risks, and monitoring and reporting systems. The producer of a 
product where not all hazards are covered by existing regulations will need to 
identify any gaps that exist in the skills set of staff, management processes and 
systems and fill these gaps either internally or externally.   
 
The implications of failing to comply with a GSR or HPA regulatory obligation 
could mean fines, recalls, seizures or a complete ban of a product.  The financial 
costs to the organization and the damage to its brand image would negatively 
affect the company.  In addition, the company could possibly be sued for 
damages under tort legislation. 
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Implications of a GSR for Health Canada and Provincial/Territorial 
Governments  
 
Since the existing legislative/regulatory framework governing the safety of 
household electrical products consists of both Federal and Provincial/Territorial 
Statutes, the establishment of a GSR or similar requirements in HPA regulations 
will impact both levels of government.  In many ways the implications for Health 
Canada will be very similar to those identified in the two previous case studies 
except that it will have to work with the provinces/territories when developing 
policies or procedures.  Otherwise, there could be a duplication of effort, no 
consistency in policies or processes between the two levels of government and 
complexity, confusion and added work and costs for suppliers.   
 
As was the case with bicycles and inadequately regulated products, suppliers will 
need clarification from Health Canada in a number of areas.  For example, they 
will need to know  
• Whether or not HC will accept, like the provinces/territories, certification of 
a product to the standards under the CEC to demonstrate that all 
reasonable care was taken to market a safe product? If not, which 
standards or codes would be acceptable? 
• What process should be used to identify the hazards and assess the  risks 
associated with a household electrical product and what level of certainty 
is expected? 
• What level of safety will be considered acceptable or will trigger a report of 
an adverse incident or recall of a product? 
• What type of safety information, method of presentation and level of detail 
would be considered to be acceptable?  Will it be consistent with what all 
ready exists in the standards under the CEC? 
• To whom will reports of adverse incidents be made?  To Health Canada in 
Ottawa, to Health Canada Regional Offices or the Provinces or 
Territories? 
• What enforcement actions will be taken and will they be consistent with 
those of the different provinces/territories? 
• What will happen where action is taken to mitigate a risk but which results 
in non-compliance with the standards under the CEC? 
 
The decision on these issues and the form of any working arrangements 
developed with the provinces and territories will determine whether or not 
duplication exists or there is a negative or positive impact.  A working 
arrangement where the two levels of government agree on the policies and 
procedures could provide operational and financial benefits for both levels of 
government and industry.   
 
Policies to be Developed and Implemented 
Acceptable Level of Safety 
It is a well-recognized fact that there is no absolutely safe product but only 
different degrees of safety that are acceptable to the public.  This lack of clarity 
with respect to what is considered a safe or unsafe product could lead to 
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confusion and disagreement between suppliers, consumers and the various 
governments involved in enforcement of a GSR or a similar regulatory framework 
that addresses household electrical products.  Specification of the safety level 
that would trigger a report of an adverse incident, a recall or corrective action is 
one of the key demands of suppliers.  
 
Suppliers assume that compliance with provincial/territorial-mandated standards 
is the benchmark that is acceptable in Canada.  Therefore, in the case of 
household electrical products, it is very important for responsible authorities to 
provide guidance to suppliers and those responsible for enforcing any new 
provisions on the meaning of the term unsafe and how it will be evaluated.  Such 
guidance will help suppliers determine whether or not the electrical products are 
considered safe and can be marketed, whether corrective action needs to be 
taken and whether or not an incident needs to be reported.  From the perspective 
of the regulators, clarification of the term unsafe will assist them in providing 
advice to suppliers and, more importantly, facilitate consistency in enforcement 
across the country and among the various levels of government. One of the 
issues that will have to be taken into account is the advantage of having trigger 
levels for reporting or recalls that are the same as those in the US.  This could 
result in lower implementation and ongoing administrative costs to both 
government and industry since the same suppliers market many products in both 
countries.  
 
Agreement with the provinces/territories on the following questions will have to be 
reached:   
• How the provinces/territories will work with the federal agencies to 
implement the GSR or regulatory provisions?   
• Whether or not the provinces/territories will be able to draw on the 
provisions of the GSR or HPA regulations to identify and take action 
against products that present a danger to the public? 
• What level of safety will be considered unacceptable and will trigger 
enforcement action or reporting of an adverse incident? 
• What type of information manuals and/or training will need to be 
developed to assist suppliers and government officials in understanding 
and carrying out their obligations? 
 
Compliance  
A supplier, in order to comply with a GSR or similar regulatory provisions, must 
know which regulations, standards or quality management systems are 
acceptable to demonstrate conformity.  For household electrical products, the 
main issue will be the status of compliance with the standards referenced in the 
CEC and mandated by provincial /territorial regulations as a defence.  
 
Normally, a GSR requires that, if an existing regulation or standard does not 
cover an identified product hazard to which the public can be exposed, action be 
taken to eliminate or reduce the problem.  The implementation of requirements 
from alternative standards or changes in design, materials or manufacturing that 
remove the hazard, are examples of some of the actions that could be followed to 
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demonstrate that all reasonable steps were taken to market a safe product.  
However, in the case of household electrical products, it will be difficult to identify 
other standards since the standards referenced in the CEC are adopted or based 
on those existing internationally.     Producers will want to know how they will be 
able to demonstrate compliance under such circumstances, whether or not it will 
be necessary to develop a new standard or carry out a detailed risk assessment 
and whether or not an ISO 9000 management system certified by a third party 
will be acceptable.  Therefore, there will be a need for Health Canada to develop 
policies and assistance to suppliers in conjunction with the provinces/territories to 
clarify the issues around acceptable due diligence defences.   
 
Monitoring and Reporting 
Constant monitoring, analysis of data and correction of any identified problems 
are primary elements in any system to assess and manage risks.  These 
obligations are included in GSR or GSR-like provisions in Europe and the United 
States.  If similar requirements are implemented in Canada, they could have a 
significant impact not only on suppliers of household electrical products but also 
on Health Canada and possibly the provinces/territories depending on the system 
established.  The same situation would apply to inclusion of such provisions in 
regulations under the HPA.    
 
Health Canada and/or the provinces/territories will have to make a number of 
policy decisions so that there is a clear and consistent approach across the 
country.  Moreover, it will be necessary to communicate the decisions to 
suppliers and the responsible government staff.  The decisions that will have to 
be made around post market surveillance and reporting of adverse incidents 
include: 
• What level of safety will trigger a report of an adverse incident? Will it be 
the same level that will trigger a recall or corrective action?  Will it be 
consistent across the country and with other countries such as the 
United States? 
• To whom will reports of adverse incidents be made?  To Health Canada 
in Ottawa, to Health Canada Regional Offices or the Provinces or 
Territories? 
• Will there be one national database that is accessible to all? 
• How will government finance and resource the new reporting system and 
the expertise required to analyze the data?  Will resources be provided 
to the provinces/territories if they are involved? 
• What information will be required to be included in any report?  Will it be 
consistent with that already required by the US CPSC? 
• What system for reporting will be set up?   Is there an advantage of 
basing it on the well-established system within the Health Products and 
Food Branch? 
• What enforcement actions should be taken when a report is not made?    
 
In establishing a system that collects data on adverse incidents, Health Canada 
will have to address the issues related to its legal obligations about what it is 
required to do when it becomes aware of a potential problem in the marketplace.  
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From the experience of the CPSC, the number of reports can run into the 
thousands each year.591  The CPSC’s Office of Compliance, which reviews the 
reports and determines the action to be followed, developed criteria to ensure 
that only essential reports and information are provided in order to reduce the 
number of reports to a manageable level.  It is anticipated that, since many 
Canadian suppliers are owned by American companies and carry the same 
products, the number of reports made in Canada could be very similar.  The 
principle of proportionality should be applied to reporting requirements for 
products that exhibit different levels of adverse health effects.  In particular, policy 
decisions are required that set threshold levels of safety below which not 
notification is required as is the case in Europe.592   This would help to ensure 
that limited resources are focused on addressing the most serious problems and 
that Health Canada is not overwhelmed by incident reports.  In addition, 
consideration could be given to harmonization with existing reporting system in 
the United States to help in the sharing of information, the eventual integration of 
the systems, the usefulness of the data collected and the minimization of the 
costs for industry and government. 
 
Recalls 
The Consumer Product Safety Bureau of Health Canada currently provides 
general guidance to suppliers about when and how to carry out a recall.593  It 
states that, a company should initiate a product recall when they become aware: 
• Of a defect that makes a product unsafe; 
• Of an injury or death to consumers caused by an unsafe product; or 
• That a product doe s not comply with legislative requirements. 
 
Health Canada’s Consumer Product Safety Program enforces the Hazardous 
Products Act and Regulations, and the Cosmetic Regulations under the Food 
and Drugs Act.  Health Canada may request that a company initiate a recall 
when: 
• A product does not comply with applicable legislation:  or 
• A product poses an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of the 
consumer or user.” 
 
Both Europe594 and the United States 595 provide detailed advice to suppliers on 
what they consider to be level of hazard that would trigger a product recall.  In the 
future, Health Canada will need to provide greater specificity with respect to the 
levels that will result in a recall.  The development to a risk rating system that is 
                                            
591  Mullan John Gibson, Director of Compliance CPSC, A working Model for Retailer Reporting under 
Section 15, ICPHSO Annual Meeting, Orlando, February 23, 2005.  
592  European Commission, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to the 
Competent Authorities of the Member States by  Producers and Distributors in Accordance with 
Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/95/EC, December 2004. 
593  Consumer Product Safety Bureau, Health Canada, Recalling Consumer Product – a guide for 
industry, April 2005.  http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/cps-spc/advisories-avis/child-enfant/recalling-guide-
2005-04-rappel_e.html 
594  UK Consumer Union sponsored by the European Commission, Product Safety in Europe: A guide to 
corrective action including recalls, June 2004. 
595  US Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook, May 1999. 
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compatible with Europe and the US would allow Health Canada to leverage its 
resources through improved sharing of information on problem products, and 
reduce the cost to suppliers who may be required to recall products from many 
different countries.  The development of more specific guidance documents, 
manuals and/or training for suppliers and staff of Health Canada and the 
provinces/territories will ensure transparency and consistency.  Not only will 
suppliers and government staff understand what is required to comply with any 
new GSR or regulatory provisions but also responsible officials will be able to 
provide better advice and enforced the new provisions consistently across the 
country. 
 
Impact Assessment 
In order for Cabinet to decide on whether issues related to the safety of 
household electrical products should be addressed by new legislation or 
regulation, it requires accurate, complete and up to date information based on the 
results of: 
 
• An analysis of the proposal and the alternative solutions considered; 
• The consultation with those who have an interest in the matter, including 
other departments that may be affected by the proposed solution; 
• An analysis of the impact of the proposed solution on the operating 
environment and costs to small, medium and large suppliers; and 
• An analysis of the resources that the proposed solution would require, 
including those needed to implement or enforce it.596 597  
 
Therefore, like the situation with bicycles or Konjac Jelly Mini Cups, consultation 
with the suppliers of household electrical products and other concerned parties is 
required.  Moreover, a cost/benefit analysis that includes the costs to suppliers 
and government, and possibly a Business Impact Test would have to be carried 
out to fulfill these requirements and those for a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement. 
 
Privacy Impact Assessment  
The establishment of any new data collection system such as the collection of 
information on adverse health incidents must respect the Privacy Act.598 
According to Treasury Board policy a Privacy Impact Assessment will need to be 
carried out. 599 
 
Operational Changes 
Operational changes will be required if a GSR or similar regulatory amendments 
are implemented requiring all risks associated with household electrical products 
to be addressed.  Changes may also have to be made by the provinces/territories 
depending on the decisions that are made and the agreements that are reached.    
  
                                            
596  Justice Canada, Cabinet Directive on Lawmaking, 2003-07-08.  
597  Privy Council Office, Regulatory Policy, June 2000. 
598  Justice Canada, Privacy Act, 1985. 
599  Treasury Board, Privacy Impact Assessment Policy, May 2002. 
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The GSR or regulatory amendments under the HPA could provide new 
authorities that result in a greater reliance on standards and codes to achieve 
policy objectives.  A great deal of reliance has already been placed on the 
standards referenced in the CEC in the case of household electrical products.  
Although the provinces/territories participate extensively in the development of 
these standards nationally, Health Canada does not.  Moreover, at the 
international level, Canada is not a member of the IEC technical committee that 
drafts and maintains these standards and its ability to have the concerns of 
Canadians addressed is limited.  If Health Canada is to adopt a GSR or similar 
regulatory provisions, it will need to examine its participation in critical 
committees that develop the standards.   In many cases, it may not have the 
specific expertise required or the resources to participate and may wish to work 
closely with the provinces/territories to share the added workload that would be 
required.  For example under the CEC, there are more than 50 technical 
committees and hundreds of subcommittees that draft and maintain the 
standards for household electrical products nationally and similar numbers of 
committees at the international level. 
 
Many of the standards in the electrical area reference a number of other 
standards, which will require substantial monitoring, and/or participation by 
government officials to ensure that these standards also address the health and 
safety concerns of Canadians. 
 
The operational changes that will need to be made to deal with unregulated 
products have been outlined.  The same type of operational changes will have to 
be made to deal with household electrical products that could be regulated by 
both the federal and provincial/territorial governments. The main difference will 
be the fact that operational changes will have to be made not only within Health 
Canada but also within the provinces and territories.  To ensure that the transition 
from the existing authorities to any new ones that are adopted is smooth, 
consistent nationally and does not result in duplication of effort, all the levels of 
government responsible will have to work together.   
 
Summary 
In conclusion, the establishment of a GSR or similar provisions in regulation has 
the potential of benefiting both levels of government in carrying out their 
responsibilities to protect the health and safety of the public.  The success will 
very much depend on the working relationship that is developed between the two 
levels of government and their ability to influence the development of standards 
on which so much of the safety of household electrical product are based.  
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Appendix 1.  Equivalent Provisions to GSR in Existing Legislation 
 
                             Food and Drugs Act  HPA 
Food Drugs Med 
Devices
Biologics Nat 
Health 
Cos-
metics 
Vet 
Drugs
RED 
Act 
Pre 
Market 
Evaluation 
  x x x x  x  
Safety of 
all 
products 
covered 
  x x x x  x  
Mandatory 
Reporting 
  x x x x  x  
Voluntary 
Reporting 
x to 
CFIA 
    x  x 
Analysis 
of Reports 
x x x x x x x x x 
 Recall   x x x x  x  
Follow up 
action 
HECS CFIA  HPFB HPFB HPFB HPFB HECS HPFB HECS
 
 
  274
 
Product 
 
Act/Regulation 
 
Obligation of Supplier 
 
Comments 
 
Health 
Products -
Drugs, 
Natural 
Health 
Products, 
Biologics  
 
Food and Drug 
Act and 
Regulations 
 
Mandatory reporting for 
all products. 
 
Health Professionals 
report on a voluntary 
basis. 
 
 
Health Canada’s Marketed 
Health Products Directorate, 
through the Canadian Adverse 
Drug Reaction Monitoring 
Program, is responsible for 
collecting and assessing 
reports for these products 
marketed in Canada with the 
exception of vaccines. 
 
The Public Health Agency of 
Canada collects case reports 
on adverse events following 
immunization from provincial 
and territorial health 
departments, health care 
professionals and the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Biologics 
and 
Genetics 
 
Food and Drug 
Act and 
Regulations 
 
Before a biologic is 
approved, sufficient 
scientific evidence must 
be provided by the 
manufacturer to show 
that it is safe, 
efficacious and of 
suitable quality. 
 
Manufacturers must 
also supply Product 
Specific Facility 
Information that 
outlines the method of 
manufacture of the 
biologic. 
An inspection of the 
manufacturing facility is 
completed to assess the 
production process and 
facility 
 
With higher risk biologics, 
each lot is tested before 
being released for sale in 
Canada. Moderate risk 
biologics are periodically 
tested at the discretion of 
Health Canada , in 
collaboration with the 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada  
 
Drugs 
 
Food and Drug 
Act and 
Regulations 
 
A manufacturer must 
present substantive 
scientific evidence of 
a product's safety, 
efficacy and quality 
Before drug products are 
authorized for sale in 
Canada, Health Canada 
reviews them to assess 
their safety, efficacy and 
quality.  
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Product 
 
Act/Regulation 
 
Obligation of Supplier 
 
Comments 
 
Natural 
Health 
Products 
 
Natural Health 
Products 
Regulations 
under Food and 
Drug Act 
 
Supplier must provide 
information on  - 
medicinal ingredient, 
quantity per dosage 
unit, and its potency 
in order to obtain a 
product License that 
is necessary prior to 
selling product. 
 
 If the Minister has 
reasonable grounds to 
believe that a natural 
health product may no 
longer be safe when used 
under the recommended 
conditions of use. 
Minister may request that 
the licensee provide 
information and documents 
demonstrating that the 
natural health product is 
safe when used under the 
recommended conditions . 
Medical 
Devices 
 
Medical 
Devices 
Regulations of 
the Food and 
Drug Act. 
 
Risk Classification 
System that covers all 
medical devices.  
Requirements differ 
for safety and 
effectiveness 
information that needs 
to be provided for pre-
market application for 
a license depending 
on risk posed by the 
product. 
. 
  Mandatory reporting 
of any incident 
involving a medical 
device that is sold in 
Canada when the 
incident occurs either 
within or outside 
Canada; relates to a 
failure of the device or 
a deterioration in its 
effectiveness, or any 
inadequacy in its 
labeling or in its 
directions for use 
(section 59(1)(a)); 
and has led to the 
death or a serious 
deterioration in the 
state of health of a 
patient, user or other 
Reports sent to Health 
Product and Food Branch 
Inspectorate, which 
analyses the reports and 
determines what if any 
action is required. 
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Product 
 
Act/Regulation 
 
Obligation of Supplier 
 
Comments 
 
person, or could do so 
if it were to recur 
(section 59(1)(b)).  
 
Cosmetics 
 
Food and Drug 
Act and 
Regulations 
 
No person shall sell any 
cosmetic in Canada 
that: 
• has in or on it any 
substance that may cause 
injury to the health of the 
user when the cosmetic is 
used (section 16, FDA) 
Sections 29 and 30 of the 
Cosmetic Regulations state 
that 
evidence of the safety of a 
cosmetic product must be 
provided if requested by Health 
Canada. 
  
 
Voluntary reporting of 
incidents to Consumer 
Product Safety Offices 
of Health Canada 
 
 
Food 
 
Food and 
Drugs Act  
 
4. No person shall sell 
an article of food that 
(a) has in or on it any 
poisonous or harmful 
substance; 
(b) is unfit for human 
consumption; 
(c) consists in whole 
or in part of any filthy, 
putrid, disgusting, 
rotten, decomposed 
or diseased animal or 
vegetable substance; 
(d) is adulterated; or 
(e) was 
manufactured, 
prepared, preserved, 
packaged or stored 
under unsanitary 
conditions. 
 
Labelling must not be 
false, misleading or 
deceptive or likely to 
create an erroneous 
impression.  
Regulations establish 
labelling requirements 
for many products. 
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Product 
 
Act/Regulation 
 
Obligation of Supplier 
 
Comments 
 
 Canadian Food 
Inspection 
Agency Act. 
 
19. (1) Where the 
Minister believes on 
reasonable grounds that 
a product regulated 
under an Act or 
provision that the 
Agency enforces or 
administers by virtue of 
section 11 poses a risk 
to public, animal or 
plant health, the 
Minister may, by notice 
served on any person 
selling, marketing or 
distributing the product, 
order that the product be 
recalled or sent to a 
place designated by the 
Minister. 
 
General 
Consumer 
Products 
 
Hazardous 
Products Act 
 
Statute does not provide 
authority to take action 
against a non-regulated 
product. 
 
Action is voluntary – recalls, 
reporting 
 Voluntary 
Reporting 
 
Reporting to 
Consumer Product 
Bureau. 
 
Radiation 
Emitting 
Devices 
 
Radiation 
Emitting 
Devices Act 
 
“No person shall sell, 
lease or import into 
Canada a radiation 
emitting device if the 
device:(a) does not 
comply with the 
standards, if any,  (b) 
creates a risk to any 
person of genetic or 
personal injury, 
impairment of health or 
death from radiation by 
reason of the fact that it 
(i) does not perform 
according to the 
performance 
characteristics claimed 
for it, (ii) does not 
accomplish its claimed 
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Product 
 
Act/Regulation 
 
Obligation of Supplier 
 
Comments 
 
purpose, or (iii) emits 
radiation that is not 
necessary in order for it 
to accomplish its 
claimed purpose. 
 Mandatory 
Reporting 
 
Report any adverse 
effect related to a 
radiation-emitting 
device (for example: 
ultrasound equipment, 
X-ray devices, 
microwave ovens, 
tanning equipment, or 
lasers) to the Consumer 
and Clinical Radiation 
Protection Bureau. 
 
 
 
Reporting of non-radiation 
type of hazards are not 
required. 
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Appendix 2: Some Unregulated Consumer Products that Would Be 
Caught by a GSR 
 
Acids other than those listed in item 2 of Schedule I 
Adhesives, cleaning solvents, thinning agents and dyes that do not contain 
toluene or acetone 
Antifreeze preparations that do not contain ethylene glycol or diethylene glycol 
backpack baby carriers (hazard of baby falling out) 
bicycle and ski helmets (mechanical hazards) 
bicycles (mechanical hazards) 
bunk beds (mechanical hazards) 
candles ( flammability hazards) 
chain saws (mechanical hazards) 
chest waders (drowning hazard) 
children's novelty purses (hazard of petroleum distillates) 
children's playground equipment (mechanical hazards) 
children's highchairs (mechanical hazard) 
children's PVC teethers/rattles with DINP plasticizer 
children's stationary activity centres (mechanical hazard) 
children's clothing with drawstrings (strangulation hazard) 
CO detectors 
Flammable adhesives 
food container (plasticizer) 
Gas powered go-karts 
halogen lamps (electrical hazard) 
hammocks (strangulation hazard to children) 
lightweight children's dressers (tipover hazard) 
non-factory installed remote car starters (mechanical hazard) 
ozone generators (hazardous ozone level) 
Products that off-gas resulting in poor indoor-air quality 
recliner chairs (entrapment hazard) 
soccer goal nets (mechanical hazard) 
toboggans (mechanical hazard) 
Upholstered furniture (flammability) 
utility barbecue lighters (not child-resistant since not for  cigarettes, cigars and 
pipes) 
window blind cords (strangulation hazard) 
 
Drinking Water  
1) devices used in the treatment of water, including filters that remove uranium 
from water 
2) components of water systems that come in contact at any time with water 
destined for human consumption from its collection to its use by the consumer. 
3) treatment additives (with respect to their effect on the resulting water or on 
persons that drink or otherwise use the treated water), including disinfectants 
used in drinking water 
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Appendix 3: Demonstrating Compliance with a GSR 
As with most GSRs, it is assumed that if a product causes harm a government 
would not have to prove criminal intent or negligence but a supplier would be 
required to demonstrate that all reasonable care had been exercised to market a 
safe product.  Therefore, a supplier would be required to make certain decisions 
about what risks are associated with a product; what instrument exists that could 
be used to address the risks adequately; what design or process controls need to 
be established to reduce or eliminate the risks; and how controls can be 
implemented to ensure the consistent production of a safe product.  
 
A number of factors are normally considered600 by a government when 
determining whether or not a supplier has exercised reasonable care.  These 
include:  
• The nature and severity of the injury or damage that a product may cause; 
• The probability of the adverse incident and the number of people that 
could be exposed; 
• Who will be exposed and how vulnerable are they; 
• How the risk compares with historical risks and risks associated with 
similar products; 
• The extend to which safe guards are present to protect against the hazard; 
• The knowledge of the user about the risk and how to control it; 
• Whether the product was assessed objectively to identify and mitigate any 
risks; 
• The level of safety that can reasonably be expected; 
• The extent to which a supplier monitors potential risks after the product is 
marketed; 
• Scientific knowledge and state of technology about the product; and 
• The level of expertise one can reasonably expect from the various 
participants involved in the supply chain and their respective 
responsibilities. 
 
These factors are similar to those normally considered when carrying out a risk 
assessment of a product.  A number of standards, guidance documents and 
information on what needs to be considered when carrying out a risk assessment 
have been published   These include those developed and published by Health 
Canada601, the US CPSC602, the European Guide to corrective action603, IEC’s 
Advisory Committee on Safety604, the University of Nottingham’s605 work on safe 
                                            
600      based on Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook, Washington, 1999, European 
Union, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to the 
Competent Authorities of the Member States by Producers and Distributors In Accordance With 
Article 5(3) Of Directive 2001/95/EC, 2005, and Health Canada, Health Protection Legislative 
Renewal, Detailed Legislative Proposal, 2003. 
601      Health Canada, Decision Making Framework, August 1, 2000. 
602  US Consumer Product Safety Commission, Handbook for Manufacturing Safer Consumer Product, 
Washington, August 2005. 
603   Intertek Research and Testing Centre and Uk Consumers Association supported by the EC, Product 
Safety in Europe:  A guide to corrective action including recalls, June 2004.  
604  IEC Advisory Committee on Safety, Development of a standard for Safety Related Risk 
Assessment in the area of low voltage, July 29 2005.  
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design and the Canadian National Standard on Risk Management606.  All of 
these documents recommend that data about the design, use, incidents, injuries 
and harm associated with a product be brought together in order to identify the 
hazards, assess the risks and identify potential risk reduction measures.  By 
following the practices, a supplier will be able to demonstrate that all reasonable 
care was taken to identify, eliminate or reduce the risks to an acceptable level 
and market a safe product. 
 
The Process 
What is described in this section is a basic risk assessment/management 
process.  It is based on the models referenced above that could be used by a 
supplier or safety authorities.  The process outlines the questions that need to be 
considered when identifying, assessing and mitigating any risks. 
 
1. Determine Whether the Act Applies to Product 
Initially the producer must determine whether or not the product falls under the 
scope of any proposed legislation.  It must meet the definition for a product and 
not be exempted from the provisions of the legislation  
 
A determination then has to be made regarding whether or not the product is 
intended to be marketed in Canada to consumers, or will it foreseeably be 
marketed in Canada to consumers.  Products manufactured for export may or 
may not be covered under the legislation depending on the provisions included in 
any new legislation.      
 
2. Identify all Possible Users. 
The identification of all possible users means thinking about everyone who might 
come into contact with the product whether an intended user, potential user or an   
unintended user.   The knowledge and capabilities, which are required by the 
user to operate the product safely, should be identified.  In the case of vulnerable 
users such as seniors and children, it is important to focus on their physical and 
psychological characteristics and capabilities.  Others who are not direct users of 
the product may also be exposed and affected.  For example, an exercise cycle 
with unprotected moving parts may result in finger injuries to small children who 
are in the environment where the product will be used. 
 
 
3. Identification of all Potential Hazards  
In trying to identify all potential hazards, a producer will need to anticipate 
everything that could go wrong or be dangerous.  For example, a product could 
present a hazard because it exhibits unacceptable side effects, or is adulterated, 
mechanically defective emits harmful substances or radiation, or it is poisonous, 
corrosive, flammable, explosive toxic, infectious, or dangerously reactive. In 
addition, hazards can be caused by product deterioration, maintenance 
                                                                                                                                  
605  Beverly Norris and John R. Wilson, Designing Safety into Products, Product Safety and Testing 
Group, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, October 1997. 
606  Standards Council of Canada, CAN/CSA - Q850 - 97 (reaffirmed 2002), Risk Management:  
Guidelines for Decision Makers, National Standard of Canada, Ottawa 
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instructions that are hard to understand, and unusual operating conditions. There 
are a number of things that a producer can do and sources of information that 
he/she can use to determine the potential hazards including: 
• The intended use and reasonably forseeable use of the product;  
a design review against safety criteria which examines the 
materials,configuration, packaging and labeling: 
• The limits of the product such as durability, life span of parts or 
deterioration due to weather;   
• Whether the hazards are visible and well understood by the user (e.g. 
knife blade);  
• Potential hazards that have been identified in regulations, standards, 
previous risk assessments or guides for the product or similar products;  
• Injury scenarios, research and medical literature; and  
• Expert opinion. 
 
Once the hazards have been identified, it will then be possible to attempt to 
determine their cause and to take steps to eliminate or reduce them. In many 
cases, there will be gaps in the information available to a producer.  For example, 
product-related injury data often does not exist in Canada and information about 
product design and raw materials may not be made available to an importer by 
the manufacturer in another country.  It may, however, be possible to obtain 
injury or research data from other countries and information from standards that 
exist for similar products. 
 
Risk Assessment 
Once the hazards are identified, the next step in the process is to evaluate the 
risks associated with each potential product hazard or hazardous situation.  The 
concept of risk involves a combination of the severity of harm that may result, the 
likelihood that an adverse health incident will actually occur, the number of users 
who may potentially be exposed and the technical and human possibilities of 
avoiding or limiting the harm.  This is illustrated below.607. 
 
                                            
607  IEC Advisory Committee on Safety, Development of a standard for Safety Related Risk 
Assessment in the area of low voltage, July 29, 2005. 
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Figure 4.  Risk Assessment. 
 
Ultimately, however, any risk assessment will involve not only scientific evidence 
but also an element of subjective judgment in determining the degree of risk 
aversion among the population, interpreting evidence and weighting the relative 
importance given to each of them. The many factors that normally are taken into 
account when determining whether or not a product presents an unreasonable 
risk, whether a producer has exercised reasonable care or whether an adverse 
health incident should be reported to the authorities, include:  
• The nature and severity of the injury or damage that the product might 
cause;  
• The probability of an adverse health incident;  
• The size of the population potentially exposed to the product, including the 
extent to which third parties/bystanders may be at risk;  
• The comparison of the risk with risks historically judged to be acceptable;  
• The physical and psychological characteristics and vulnerability of the 
likely user and their previous experience with similar products;  
• The extent to which the product incorporates safeguards against the 
hazard;  
• The consumer’s knowledge of, or control over the risk — how obvious is 
the hazard and is it possible to take precautions against it;  
• The voluntary or involuntary nature of the risk; and  
• The utility of the product and the extent to which the hazard is necessary 
for the function of the product. 
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The hazards identified and the risks estimated are essential to selecting an 
appropriate instrument to be used as a due diligence defence.   However, these 
elements can have a more important role to play when no regulations, standards 
or codes exist that address the problems identified.  The knowledge obtained 
about the hazards and risks associated with a product make it possible for the 
producer to establish measures such as design changes, manufacturing or 
distribution controls or improved consumer information that will eliminate or 
reduce the risk.  In this way, the producer will be in a position to demonstrate that 
all reasonable care was taken to market a safe product.   
 
Evidence about the hazards and risks associated with a product is also valuable 
in evaluating adverse health incidents, determining whether or not reporting is 
necessary, and whether immediate corrective action is required.  In Europe and 
the United States, for example, incidents where the hazards cause slight harm, 
where exposure is rare and it is possible to avoid the hazard are classified as low 
and reporting is not required.  Figure 2, page 18, illustrates the system that 
Europe uses to make this determination. 
 
Identification and Implementation of Corrective Actions 
Having identified the hazards and the risks associated with a product, appropriate 
corrective action must be taken by the manufacturer or importer to eliminate or 
minimize the hazards and risks identified.  These actions could take the form of 
changing the design or instructions, reconditioning of the product in the 
distribution chain, recall, return and replacement of products, establishment of 
compliance programs to ensure that raw materials and parts meet specifications 
and that the critical points in production or distribution are controlled, training of 
staff, and initiating inspection and testing prior to distribution.    
 
Evaluation and Selection of an Acceptable Standard or Instrument. 
With the information about potential hazards and the mechanisms that need to be 
put in place to eliminate or reduce these hazards, it is possible to evaluate and 
select the most appropriate standard or instrument to demonstrate compliance 
with the provisions of a GSR. Where a regulation exists that covers a product, 
compliance is required under the law irrespective of whether or not the regulation 
addresses the potential hazards associated with the product.  If the regulation 
does not address all the potential risks, the product will not be considered to be 
safe.  Any risk the regulation does not address will fall under the provisions of a 
GSR and must be dealt with by other means. 
 
Another challenge that a producer must face is that a regulation, standard or 
instrument could address each hazard or risk associated with a product yet not 
specify a level of safety that prevents injury and is expected by society.  For 
example, a standard may set a level for lead that is higher than the level that 
causes or contributes to lead poisoning in children.  In such a case, other 
instruments should be considered that set levels for lead in the range 
recommended by the medical profession, or the World Health Organization    
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Monitoring the Product. 
In order to meet the objective of reporting adverse health incidents to authorities 
and taking appropriate action to eliminate or minimize any risks, a GSR would 
normally require a supplier to monitor adverse health effects throughout the life 
cycle of the product and take appropriate corrective action.   The evidence 
collected from complaints or injury reports can be used to identify the 
interventions that need to be taken to resolve any problems.  Others in the supply 
chain such as retailers and distributors in most cases are required to cooperate 
with the manufacturer and importer in implementing corrective actions and 
reporting adverse health incidents Health Canada has published a number of 
guidance document related to mandatory reporting of adverse health incidents 
involving health products608 609 and provides guidance on voluntary recalls for 
consumer products.610  In other jurisdictions, guidance has been provided to 
suppliers on when to notify a problem consumer product611 and how to carry out 
a recall.612 613   
 
The exact type and nature of the system required have not been established at 
this time.   
                                            
608   Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, DRAFT Guidance Document Mandatory and 
Voluntary Problem Reporting for Medical Devices, July 2001. 
609   Natural Health Products Directorate, Adverse Reaction Reporting Guidance Document, Jan. 2004. 
610   Health Canada’s Consumer Product Bureau, Recalling Consumer Products - A Guide For 
Industry, April 2005, www.hc-sc.gc.ca/cps-spc/advisories-avis/child-enfant/recalling-guide-
2005-04-rappel_e.html 
611  European Commission, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to the 
Competent Authorities, Dec 2004, 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/guidelines_en.htm 
612  Intertek Research and Testing Centre and UK Consumers Association supported by the EC, 
Product Safety in Europe:  A guide to corrective action including recalls, June 2004.  
613   US CPSC, Recall Handbook, May 1999. 
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Appendix 4: Regulations and Standards for Bicycles  
 
There are over 200 International and National standards that exist for bicycles or 
components that are used in bicycles.  What are listed below are those standards 
that specifically deal with the overall safety of a bicycle, are available in Canada 
and are published in English or French. 
 
Table 1:  Regulations and Standards for Bicycles 
 
Country 
 
Type 
 
Title 
 
Comments 
 
Australia 
 
Consumer 
Safety 
Standard 
under the 
Trade 
Practices 
Act 
 
Pedal Bicycles: 
Safety 
Requirements, Nov 
1999 
 
Mandatory and sets design 
requirements, performance 
requirements and assembly 
and use requirements for all 
manually powered bicycles. 
 
 Australian 
and New 
Zealand 
National 
Standard 
AS/NZS 1927 – 
1998 Pedal 
Bicycles - Safety 
requirements 
 
Referenced under Trade 
Practices Act as above. It 
differs from the international 
standard developed by ISO. 
 
CEN – 
European 
Committee 
for Standard- 
ization 
European 
Standard  
 
PREN 14764: 2003 
Bicycles for use on 
public roads - 
Safety 
requirements and 
test methods 
 
 
 European 
Standard 
 
PR EN 14765 
2003Bicycles for 
young children - 
Safety 
requirements and 
test methods; 
German version 
prEN 
 
 European 
Standard 
 
PREN 14781: 2003 
Racing bicycles - 
Safety 
requirements and 
test methods 
 
 
 European 
Standard 
 
PREN 14766:2003 
Mountain-bicycles - 
Safety 
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Country 
 
Type 
 
Title 
 
Comments 
 
requirements and 
test methods 
  
European 
Standard 
 
 
PREN 14822 2003 
Bicycles - 
Accessories for 
bicycles - Luggage 
carriers 
 
 
 
France 
 
National 
Standard 
 
NF R30 – 020  
Cycles. Safety 
requirements for 
bicycles, all terrain 
bikes and bicycles 
for young children. 
 
  NF R30 – 003:  
Bmx bicycles. 
Safety 
requirements. 
 
International 
Standards 
Organization 
ISO 
 
Internation
al standard 
 
ISO 8098: 2002.  
Safety 
Requirements for 
bicycles for young 
children.  2nd 
Edition 
 
 
 Internation
al 
Standard 
 
ISO 4210: 1996 
Cycles - Safety 
Requirements for 
Bicycles, Fourth 
Edition 
 
 
Japan  
 
National 
Standard 
 
JIS D 9203:  
Method of Stability 
Test for Bicycles 
 
English 
 
 National 
Standard 
 
JIS D 9301:  
General 
Specifications for 
Bicycles  
 
English 
 
 National 
Standard 
 
JIS D 9302:  
Bicycles for Young 
Children 
 
 
 
New Zealand 
 
Regulation 
 
Product Safety 
 
Covers adult bicycles 
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Country 
 
Type 
 
Title 
 
Comments 
 
 under the 
Fair 
Trading 
Act 
 
Standards (Pedal 
Bicycles) 
Regulations 
 
including powered bicycles, it 
does not cover children’s 
bicycles 
 
  
 
New 
Zealand 
National 
Standard 
 
 
 
AS/NZS 1927 – 
1998 Pedal 
Bicycles - Safety 
requirements 
 
 
 
Design, assembly, safety of 
handlebars, seats, brakes 
etc.   
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
Regulation 
under 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 
 
Pedal Bicycles 
(Safety) 
Regulations 2003 
(SI  No. 145) 
 
Adult bicycles must be 
constructed and assembled 
to comply with BS 6102: 1992 
Standard for Pedal Bicycles 
and BS 6102 Part 2: 1982 for 
reflectors. 
 
 Road 
Traffic Act 
 
Pedal Cycles 
(Construction and 
Use) Regulations 
1983 
 
Cycle (of any sort) must have two 
braking systems 
 
 Road 
Traffic Act 
 
Road Vehicles 
Lighting 
Regulations 1989 
as amended 2005 
 
Pedal cycles to have various 
lights and reflectors fitted, clean 
and working properly between 
sunset and sunrise 
 
 BS 6102 
Part 1. 
National 
Standard 
 
Cycles Part 1: 
Specification for 
Safety 
Requirements for 
Bicycles 
 
Safety requirements for adult 
bicycles, the components and 
instructions.  Mountain cycles 
are not covered 
 
 BS ISO 
8098 
 
Cycles - Safety 
Requirements for 
Bicycles for Young 
Children 
 
 
United States 
 
Regulation 
under 
Consumer 
Product 
Safety Act 
 
Requirements for 
Bicycles, 16 CFR. 
Part 1512 
 
Requirements for different 
components for regular and 
sidewalk bicycles. e.g. 
Braking, steering, pedals, 
chain, guards, tires, wheels, 
hubs, forks, seat, reflectors 
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Country 
 
Type 
 
Title 
 
Comments 
 
and assembly.  Test 
procedures and instructions.  
 
 ASTM  US 
National 
Standards 
 
F2043 Standard 
Classification for 
Bicycle Usage. 
 
Bicycle Usage Conditions 
 
 ASTM US 
National 
Standard 
 
F2273  Standard 
Test Methods for 
Bicycle Forks 
 
Mechanical tests for 
compression load, bending 
load, impact resistance and 
fatigue life of bicycle forks 
 
 ASTM US 
National 
Standard  
 
F 2274 
Standard 
Specification 
for Condition 
3 Bicycle 
Forks  
Standard for Mountain type 
bicycles to be used on rough 
terrain. 
 
 ASTM US 
National 
Standard 
 
F963 
Standard 
Consumer 
Safety 
Specification 
for Toy 
Safety 
Specifications for Tricycles 
and children’s products. 
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Annex 2 - Questionnaire on the Quality of Some Existing 
Standards614 
 
 
NOTICE:  Standards are the property of national standardisation bodies and 
can only be obtained from them615. 
 
 
 
 
Please register yourself: 
You are: public authority   
  Consumer association  
  Producer    
  Distributor    
  Standardiser    
  Other (please specify): 
Name: 
Address: 
Telephone: 
 
and fill-in one questionnaire per standard/product from the Annex.
                                            
614 Please use the list of standards in Annex. 
615 The list of national standardisation bodies can be found in: 
http://www.cenorm.be/cenorm/members/members/index.asp 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE QUALITY OF SOME EXISTING STANDARDS616 
NOTICE:  Standards are the property of national standardisation bodies and 
can only be obtained from them617. 
(please fill-in one form per standard/product) 
 
1. Standard: (Please choose from the list in annex) 
 
2. Do you consider that the above standard addresses all the risks 
/categories of risks associated with the product (risk scope)? 
 YES.  
 NO. Please specify which risks are not covered. 
 DO NOT KNOW.  
 
3. Do you consider that the standard covers in an adequate way the risks 
/categories of risks associated with the product that it covers (quality of 
the standard)? 
 YES.  
 NO. Please specify which risks are not properly covered. 
 DO NOT KNOW.  
 
4. Do you consider that the standard ensures a high level of safety? 
 YES.  
 NO. Is this justified by reasons answered in questions above?  
 YES   NO. Please justify. 
 DO NOT KNOW.  
 
5. Do you know of any statistical data/ information on accidents directly 
related to the product covered by the standard? 
 YES. Please give details and source. 
Had the product involved been manufactured according to the relevant 
standard?  
 YES   NO  DO NOT KNOW 
 NO 
 
6. Do you think that the standard(s) should be revised? 
  YES. 
  NO 
  DO NOT KNOW 
 
7. Do you have any proposal of additional safety requirements that should 
be addressed in a revision of the standard (s)?  
 YES. Please specify. 
  NO 
  DO NOT KNOW 
 
                                            
616 Please use the list of standards in Annex. 
617 The list of national standardisation bodies can be found in: 
  http://www.cenorm.be/cenorm/members/members/index.asp 
. 
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8. Do you consider that this standard fulfils the general safety requirement of 
the Directive on General Product Safety and that the Commission should 
publish its references in the Official Journal of the European Union? 
 YES.  
  NO. Please justify. 
  DO NOT KNOW 
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Annex 3 - Key Factors Affecting Compliance618  
  
 
Factors Influencing Voluntary Compliance 
 
1.  Knowledge of the Rules  
 
The laws and regulations are clear.  
 
There are relatively few unintentional violations. 
 
Knowledge of the rules is improving satisfactorily under the compliance 
program. 
 
2.  Cost-Benefit (Advantages / Disadvantages of violation vs. compliance) 
 
The time, money, effort and intangible costs, such as loss of reputation, 
favour compliance by the target group. 
 
3.  Level of Acceptance of the Regulatory Scheme 
 
The policy, laws and regulations are perceived to be reasonable; they 
enjoy wide acceptance in the target group, or  
 
The policy, laws and regulations are not perceived to be reasonable in 
some situations but the Program is addressing those situations effectively. 
 
4.  Loyalty and Obedience of the Target Group 
 
The compliance and enforcement program builds on the basic willingness 
within the target group to comply, a priori, with the laws and regulations 
established by government.  It is administered fairly, efficiently and 
effectively.  It does not detract from base compliance levels, for example, 
by failing to deal effectively with poor performers. 
 
5.  Social Controls / Peer Pressure   
 
Non-compliant behaviour by the target group is likely to be detected and 
sanctioned by other than government authorities, or by a peer group, 
because it offends community standards or values. 
 
Informal control is exercised within the target group and its environment: 
family, friends, fellow workers, or business competitors. 
 
 
 
Control Factors 
 
                                            
618 Reproduced from Enhancing Compliance with Human Rights Objectives, 1999, Annex A, prepared by 
Lyle S. Fairbairn, Q.C. and Margot Priest, for the Canadian Human Rights Act Review 
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6.   Informal Reporting of Violations 
 
Violations are likely to come to light even without government intervention, 
for example, due to third party reporting mechanisms, or an effective 
complaints process.   
 
7.  Likelihood of Detection of Violations 
 
The target group perceives that there is a likelihood of detection. 
 
 8.  Probability of Official Response 
 
The regulated community is familiar with the Program’s compliance and 
enforcement policies and government practices under them 
 
There is a general perception that non-compliance will attract a timely and 
appropriate official response. 
  
9.  Selectivity (Targeting) 
 
There is increased likelihood of government controls or sanctions being 
imposed due to the targeting of firms and persons likely to violate the 
rules, as well as actions and areas in which violations are likely to occur.  
 
Sanctions 
 
10.  Probability of Sanction  
 
Violations or offences are likely to be met with administrative, civil or 
criminal sanctions.  
 
11.  Severity of Sanction 
 
The sanctions imposed are proportionate to the seriousness of the 
violations.   
 
Respondents are not re-offending  
 
The target group is not treating sanctions a “cost of doing business.”  
 
The sanctions imposed escalate with the seriousness of the offence and 
for repeat offenders.” 
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Annex 4 – Outline of Issues Discussed with European Union 
Experts   
 
Evolution of the General Safety Requirement 
 
1. What was the central policy rationale for the adoption of the GSR (or 
equivalent) in the E.U. / U.S.?   Is there a governing regulatory policy in 
place? What was the case for reform? 
 
2. What were thought to be the GSR’s advantages and limitations at the time of 
its introduction?   
 
3. What has experience in the EU since the promulgation of the original 
Directive on General Product Safety demonstrated to be the GSR’s main 
advantages and limitations? 
 
Scope of Application 
 
4. How far is the application of the GSR limited to consumer products? 
 
5. What are the considerations / advantages / limitations to making the GSR 
comprehensively applicable to all products, subject to enumerated policy-
based exemptions?  (e.g. products used in the workplace, or other products 
where the risk in question may already be regulated under dedicated 
legislation) 
 
6. How has the EU circumscribed the scope of operation of the GSR in relation 
to other, possibly overlapping, legislation regulating consumer products?  Are 
the distinctions clear?  If not, what ongoing initiatives are in place to clarify the 
operation of the GSR? 
 
7. What is the EU's experience under the GSR Directive(s) with the concept of 
"lifecycle management" of products? For example, UK Guidance Notes, 
dated July 5, 2005, linked to the implementation of the EU's revised Directive 
on General Product Safety, refer to implicit obligations on Distributors and 
Producers to "help ensure that a product remains safe throughout its 
reasonably foreseeable use."  What is the EU's experience with implementing 
and enforcing lifecycle management of product obligations? What is the 
position of key stakeholders on these obligations, whether explicit or implicit? 
 
Legislative Experience 
 
8. Following the promulgation of the original Directive on GSR (92/59/EEC), the 
original Directive and the transposing legislation in Member States has been 
revised.  (2001/95/EC).  What were the principal limitations that the revision 
sought to address?  Have these been effectively addressed in transposing 
legislation enacted on or January 2004, the date for implementing the 
Revised Directive? 
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Implementation of the GSR / Operational Considerations 
 
9. Were there any significant delays or complications in implementing the GSR?  
Did you observe resistance to implementation either on the part of those 
involved in the traditional regulatory process, or on the part of regulated 
business, whether in product manufacturing, sales, or importing?  Were there 
any surprises or unanticipated aspects of the implementation experience you 
consider particularly noteworthy? 
 
10. In order for us to understand the implementation process in greater detail, are 
there any jurisdictions within the EU whose experience might be particularly 
instructive?  Are there any studies of implementation either completed or 
currently underway which we should attempt to examine during the course of 
this project?  
 
11. What are the core resource requirements to implement an effective GSR 
regime?  (e.g. standard setting capabilities, core information needs, 
communications, training, monitoring and enforcement capabilities)  Were 
any cost/benefit studies, or implementation analyses, undertaken prior to its 
introduction?  
 
12. What are the legislative and administrative means employed to enable the 
regulated communities to know when they have complied with the statutory 
duty to produce only “safe” products?  (ie: definitions, interpretation 
guidelines, deemed compliance provisions, Q’s and A’s, etc.)  Are these 
means considered effective?  By Government?  By industry and business?  
By other stakeholders?  Are additional measures contemplated? 
 
13.   Given the special emphasis in GSR regimes on risk assessment and 
compliance with identified standards, what is the impact on human resources,  
and training needs under a GSR regime?.  (E.g. Compliance audits require 
quite different skills than traditional inspections.) 
 
14.   Are the additional reporting requirements inherent under a GSR regime 
accepted as a consequence of the increased flexibility given to industry under 
this regulatory approach?  Or are they regarded, by some, as an unjustifiable 
regulatory burden?  
 
15. What inter-agency coordination issues had to be addressed in implementing 
a GSR regime.  How, specifically, have they been addressed?  
 
 
Compliance and Enforcement 
 
16.  What are the major reasons for observed non-compliance under the GSR 
regime?  How are the compliance issues being addressed? 
   
17.  Does the EU, or Member States, maintain written compliance and 
enforcement policies, guides to enforcement, or make annual reports on 
compliance and enforcement experience under the GSR?  Are these 
documents publicly available?  Generally, how do the public authorities 
account to oversight bodies and/or the public for its administration of the GSR 
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regime? 
 
18.  What remedies and sanctions are available to Member States to enforce the 
GSR?  Are criminal sanctions available?  What are viewed as the most cost-
effective remedies?  Are informal processes available to find facts and 
resolve disputes?  What is the relative reliance placed on civil, administrative 
and criminal processes? 
 
19.  What are the conditions precedent to recalling a product under the GSR 
regime?  Could an effective GSR regime be maintained without the recall 
power? 
 
20.  How are penalties modulated under the GSR regime to account for 
infractions of varying severity and to prevent such penalties being treated as 
“the cost of doing business”? 
 
Harmonization of Standards  
 
21.   The international trade regime embodies a number of initiatives intended to 
promote harmonization and to alleviate obstacles to trade.  These include the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property.  Did the EU anticipate or experience any trade-related 
effects from the adoption of the GSR approach?  Is there any indication of the 
effects of the GSR approach on harmonization of product standards?  
 
Legal Considerations   
 
22. What key legal issues arose, or were considered, in relation to the original or 
revised Directives, or in relation to their transposing legislation? 
 
23. Have there been any significant legal proceedings, or case law precedents, 
involving enforcement or liability under the GSR regime?  What is the basic 
legal framework underlying the GSR regime(s)?  (Regulatory?  Or criminal? 
Civil Code? Or Common Law?)  How has the underlying legal framework in 
different member States affected the operation of the GSR regime? 
 
24.  Is the defence of “due diligence” available in a prosecution under the GSR?  
How far is the concept of due diligence spelled out in legislation, guidelines 
or “deemed to comply” provisions?   
 
25. Has the operation of the GSR, in effect, raised the standard of due diligence 
applicable to the manufacturing, distribution or importation of “safe” products 
following its introduction?  Has the GSR contributed in any significant way to  
the development of a “comprehensive culture of safety” on the part of 
manufacturers, distributors, or importers of consumer products, that is,  to 
assess, rectify or report risks before harm occurs? 
 
26. How has the GSR affected the tort liability of the regulated community, if at 
all?  Or the exposure of public authorities to liability for negligence in the 
administration of the GSR regime? 
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Stakeholders’ Position on Aspects of the GSR 
 
27.   Do the various stakeholders under the GSR regime (manufacturers, 
distributors, importers, consumers, interest groups) understand and support 
the GSR?  If they have concerns about aspects of the GSR regime, what are 
they?  How have they been addressed? 
 
Policy Options 
 
28.  Apart from the General Product Safety Requirement, how do Member States 
deal with new products presenting risks of harm before that harm occurs.  
What are the preventive strategies they employ? 
 
29.  Are obligations placed on manufacturers, distributors and importers to 
assess, rectify, or report risks of harm in consumer products without 
necessary intervention by the public authority?  How is this achieved? 
 
__________________________________ 
 
Supplementary Issues & Endnotes 
 
Supplementary Questions by Chantal Trepanier (HC – Legal Services) 
 
30. Under "Implementation of the GSR - Question 9 - We are particularly 
interested to learn about the experience of the various Member States 
within the EU. Are there differences among the Member States on the 
manner the GSR was implemented? If so, what are the reasons for these 
differences?  
 
31. Specifically, what was the experience of the UK with the GSR? Why were the 
UK prohibitions with regard to product safety taken out of the Consumer 
Protection Act and placed in the regulations as a result of General Product 
Safety Regulationsin 1994 and in 2005? In terms of resources, what has 
been the impact of introducing the GSR in 
the UK? 
 
32.  Under "Implementation of the GSR" - Question 13 - What was the 
experience of the EU Member States with respect to the new reporting 
requirements? On average, how many reports of unsafe products are made 
by industry in the various EU Member States? Were there more or less 
reports than ad originally been anticipated? Does each report 
investigated? Do the EU Member States share information with respect to 
reports of unsafe products? 
 
33. Under "Legal Considerations" - A concern that was raised by some of our 
Canadian stakeholders during our consultations related to the use of the 
terms "under reasonably foreseeable conditions". Some members of the 
Canadian industry thought that it would be difficult for them to 
anticipate all the usage that the public may make of their products. 
Therefore, we are interested to know if there have been similar issues 
raised by the industry in the EU Member States? These terms appear in 
the definition of the term "product" in the EU Directive and have been 
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transposed in the Member Stated legislation. Is there any case law in 
the UK or other EU Member States on the interpretation/application of 
these terms? 
 
Supplementary Issues raised by Jaime Benedickson 
 
34. In the general pre-recall "incident-reporting" process; who receives? Who 
assembles such information? Is there a threshold of incidents in terms of 
frequency or severity, which triggers some further consideration of the matter 
preceding actual recall? 
 
35.  What is the nature and frequency of any post-recall claims by 
manufacturers, distributors etc where they feel the recall was inappropriate 
and seek to recover some of their losses? 
 
36.  What the issues in the EU experience around what actually happens to 
products/materials that are recalled: storage only; retrieval; destruction? 
 
Supplementary Issues arising from Research  
 
37.  Is there a trend within the EU to make greater use of regulations, relative to 
Directives?.619  If so, how far will this trend bear on the practice under the 
General Product Safety Directive in the future? 
 
38. What are the “ New Approach” Directives and what is their underlying 
rationale? 
 
39. What administrative tasks had to be undertaken to implement the GPSD? .   , 
How much and what kind of additional resources and new skills were 
required to undertake these tasks?620  
 
Netherlands 
 
40. Under Dutch administrative law, the Inspectorate for Health Protection 
requires the approval of the Public Prosecutor before organizing the 
withdrawal of a product from market.  Query, what criteria does the Public 
Prosecutor bring to bear on this decision? 
 
41. As of 2000, only the Public Prosecutor could impose fines following a report 
of an economic offence by the Health Protection Inspectorate, with recourse 
to the Courts only when the violator objected to the fine.  It was proposed to 
give some power to impose fines directly to the Inspectorate.  Has this 
occurred?  Under what circumstances?  (Relationship to the criminal law 
process?  To economic (regulatory?) offences? Or an administrative 
                                            
619 See the Scottish Parliament’s Subordinate Legislation Committee Report , 9th Meeting, 2005 (Session 2), 15 
March 2005, Associated Written Evidence from the the Food Standards Agency of Scotland under the heading 
Reform and Simplification 
 
620 The focus here is to determine the nature and kind of resource requirements unique to implementing the 
GSR and the impact on existing compliance and enforcement personnel. 
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penalty?) 
 
42. How does the Netherlands deal with the marginal professionals who pay fines 
as the cost of doing business, or frequently change name or place of 
business to avoid accountability? 
 
43. Has there been any development at the Community level to achieve some 
greater consistency amongst Member States in the approach to sanctioning 
offenders for breaches of consumer protection legislation?621  
 
44. What is the rationale for excluding medicines, and medical instruments from 
the operation of the GSR in the Netherlands? 
 
45. In practice, what use did the Netherlands (which has comprehensive product 
safety legislation) make of the standards criteria listed in Article 4 of the (92) 
Directive, if at all?  (The Netherlands did not initially transpose Article 4 but 
apparently used it in practice for some purposes) 
 
Permanent prohibition of a product (as of 2000) can only be done through 
a Public Prosecutor or by drafting specific legislation.  What is the 
rationale for this under Netherlands law? 
                                            
621 This possibility was alluded to in the Member State (Netherlands) report. 
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Annex 5 -  Experts Interviewed in Europe Nov/Dec 2005  
  
European Commission 
 
BERNARDO DELOGU  
Head of Unit  
Product and Service Safety  
Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General  
European Commission, Brussels, Belgium  
 
ERIK HANSSON 
Deputy Head of Unit  
Product and Service Safety 
Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General  
European Commission, Brussels, Belgium 
 
Member States 
 
Belgium 
JAN DECONINCK 
Office of the Minister for the Environment, Consumer Protection and 
Sustainable 
Development  
Brussels, Belgium   
 
The Netherlands 
DIRK MEIJER  
Director, Region SW 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 
Zwijndrecht, The Netherlands 
  
JAN VAN LEENT 
 Senior Public Health Officer 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 
Zwijndrecht, The Netherlands 
  
The UK 
GRAHAM BARTLETT  
Assistant Director 
General Product and Services Safety 
Department of Trade and Industry, London, UK  
 
ADEBAYO IGE 
Policy Advisor and Product Delivery Manager 
Health and Safety Executive, London, UK 
 
PHIL PAPARD  
Head, Product Safety Section  
Health and Safety Executive, Manchester, UK 
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ARNOLD PINDAR  
Head of Consumer Affairs 
  British Standards Institute, London, UK  
 
ANTHONY ZACHARZEWSKI  
Better Regulation Executive, London, UK 
 
 
Simmons & Simmons Law Firm 
MARK DEWAR  
Partner  
Simmons & Simmons Law Firm, London, UK 
 
MILES ALEXANDER 
Partner  
Simmons & Simmons Law Firm, London, UK 
 
Oxford University 
CHRISTOPHER HODGES 
Visiting Research Fellow  
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies  
Oxford University, Oxford, UK 
 
MAGDALENA SENGAYEN 
Research Officer in Product Liability and Regulatory Issues 
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies  
Oxford University, Oxford, UK 
 
Stakeholders 
 GOTTLOBE FABISCH 
ANEC 
Brussels, Belgium 
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Annex 6 - The European Experience with the General Product 
Safety Directive: Highlights of the Interviews with European 
Union Experts 
 
Evolution of the General Safety Requirement 
 
1. Case for Reform 
 
There was a need to harmonize regulations to enable free trade within the 
European Union. Under the old approach where everything had to be specified 
within the law, it was impossible to produce enough legislation harmonized 
amongst the Member States to meet the demand.  The Cassis de Dijon decision, 
which was a free market decision, was the first one where the European Court 
gave a clear signal that it would assist with the creation of an internal common 
market without barriers to trade between Member States.  About the same time, 
there was a new directive stating that if a Member State wanted to enact new 
technical rules, they would have to give notice to the Commission and every 
other Member State.  This made everyone aware of the serious intent and force 
of the common market on domestic law making.  
 
These challenges led to the development of The  New Approach by the 
European Council in May 1985. It is a tool for technical harmonization, which 
politically changed the rules and allowed the EU to get into the business of 
developing domestic laws. The  New Approach has variously been referred to as 
a policy, philosophy, strategy, but is generally regarded as a regulatory 
technique including an “enforcement measure” or a framework for dialogue.  The  
New Approach is a two tier system in which legislative essential requirements, or 
the broad principles, related to health, safety and the environment are defined in 
EU Directives, and the details on how these requirements can be fulfilled are 
found in standards which are not included in the law.  
 
The 1992 General Product Safety Directive had a GSR and followed the style of 
the  New Approach Directives in that it contained the essential legislative 
requirements and some common safety denominators with the details on how to 
meet those requirements specified in standards. Member States were obliged to 
transpose the requirements of the GPSD into their country legislation. Since 
many already had a GSR type of approach in their own consumer legislation, the 
GPSD did not result in major changes in approach although some of the powers 
in the GPSD differed.  In particular, recall was not in the UK legislation and 
resulted in the UK not transposing the first Directive.  
 
The GPSD was designed as a “final safety net” in case European harmonization 
was not fully achieved to ensure, at a minimum, that products were “safe” 
throughout the EU. The second objective was to provide Member States with the 
obligations and powers to ensure safe products. The purpose and role of the 
GPSD may be changing from a safety net to an alternative form of regulation622.  
                                            
622 In Canada, there could be pressure to use the GSR excessively as an alternative mechanism to weak or 
lacking remedies or sanctions in the sectoral legislation if those remedies are not separately reviewed for 
their sufficiency – a catchall that could, by default, become an alternative approach to regulating.  
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It was not designed for this; it was to be a means of bridging an enforcement 
gap, to prevent harm while a safety issue is being assessed and sometimes, to 
bridge the gap to formal regulation of the risk.  
 
The GPSD concept did not evolve from the common law; it originated from the 
EU flowing from the Product Liability Directive, which preceded the General 
Product Safety Directive.  
 
Some feel that education and border control should be the real focus, not the 
GPSD623 particularly since there is no massive evidence of enforcement under 
this legislation anywhere throughout Europe.  It was not under its predecessor, 
or under national predecessors, but the 2001 Directive places the most impetus 
on the Member States to get their act together.   
 
There were parallel activities going on in the UK and the EU. Consumer product 
legislation was started in Member States some time before it got going in the EU.  
 
The UK had consumer product legislation in1961 and1978. There was a 
consultation in 1984 leading to a revised UK Consumer Protection Act in 1987. It 
seems that it was simply a modernization with no real change in policy.  There 
were some inadequacies in the legal remedies, for example, prohibition, but 
these were consistent with the need to modernize.  There was no evidence of 
any major safety problems, and it might be questioned what the case for reform 
was in the UK.  In the absence of a General Product Safety Directive, the UK still 
had its Consumer Protection Act of 1987 that had a general safety requirement 
provision. A broad policy of standardization was adopted in the UK, which was 
politically important, especially for industry at that stage. The timing was 
important though, because a report in 1984 with the act in 1987 is virtually 
contemporaneous with the adoption of strict liability in the separate area of tort, 
which was suddenly agreed in 1985.  At that point, there was a lot of discussion 
about unsafe products and a lot of expectation when the product liability 
Directive came in that there would be a lot of claims and that there were a lot of 
unsafe products around. It was this background development which underscored 
the need for modernization of the regulatory legislation…”to control the situation”.  
 
Health and Safety and Consumer Product Safety reform have developed 
separately in the UK although there seem to be commonalities. It was 
acknowledged that there may have been some cross fertilization of ideas flowing 
from the Robens Inquiry.  
 
There were other legislative activities occurring in the UK at this time. 
Thalidomide was another important development in the early 1960’s that gave 
rise to two different strands of legislation in the UK; there was a shift from 
negligence to strict liability (different definition than the one used in Canada) with 
a strict liability Directive in 1985. Product liability had never been a large 
phenomenon in the UK, but politically it was very important at this time because 
there was a sense that there were large numbers of unsafe products on the 
market. The other strand was the evolution of regulation.  Product regulation 
would have been inevitable because of the existence of the common market and 
                                            
623 Christopher Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 2005,  Oxford University Press  
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the wish to have single rules.  Medicines were the first in 1965 and have gone on 
being amended over time, e.g. human tissue engineering, use of cell tissues, 
bioengineering etc. Product regulation took a long time to develop even though 
there was a national statute in place as early as 1961.  Medicines have been 
regulated since 1965 in EU, especially developed in the early seventies, 80’s and 
90’s.  
  
2. Advantages of the GSR and limitations at the time of introduction  
 
The purpose of the GSR specified in the 1992 GPSD was to enable free trade of 
consumer products within the EU while at the same time ensuring that these 
products did not present a risk to health and safety. The role of the GPSD was to 
be a backstop, safety net, long stop to be applied as a last resort when there are 
no applicable regulations.  It was not designed as an alternative to regulation; 
rather as a means of bridging an enforcement gap, to prevent harm while a 
safety issue is being assessed and sometimes, to bridge the gap to formal 
regulation of the risk. 
 
DG Enterprise conducted a study of obstacles to business caused by regulation 
and found the least obstacles were created by the GPSD.  It was viewed as 
prescribing only what should be common practice.  Industry saw it as a kind of 
checklist of what they should have in place.  
 
In an historical context, a key point that was made was that GPSD was quite late 
in that it post dated most of the other vertical directives as well as Member State 
legislation that included a GSR.  One interesting point was that all other 
directives came out of DG Enterprise with the exception of the GPSD which 
came out of DG SANCO.  There was speculation that this might signal greater 
attention to health and safety.  
 
3. Advantages and limitations based on experience since implementation of the 
original GPSD 
 
In the EU, a first Directive is testing the water with a view to developing it over 
time. In an in depth review of the 1992 GPSD, the Catholic University of Louvain 
concluded that improvements were needed.  Details of their review are 
summarized in Annex 9, Operative Provisions of the European General Product 
Safety Directive.  In general, they found that Member States were unclear as to 
the application of provisions in the GPSD to their legislation, obligations for 
suppliers, surveillance, notification, emergency measures, even which products 
were covered. There was no obligation for suppliers to inform government or 
consumers when they took action on a product. There were weaknesses in the 
standard setting, and they did not confer a “presumption of conformity” the way 
the harmonized standards under the  New Approach did. There was uneven 
enforcement across the Member States. This review led to a revised GPSD in 
2001, which became effective in 2004.  
 
The revised Directive seeks to clarify the relationship between the GPSD and 
other sectoral legislation, extends the scope and gives tools to the EC to deal 
with Member States that are not performing well enough. It also addresses the 
other problems identified in the review. Details are provided in Appendix… 
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The legal profession is much more interested in the new GPSD, in particular the 
new obligation on business to notify authorities when they have placed non-
compliant products on the market.  There is not that much case law yet, but more 
legal practitioners participate in the EC meetings. 
 
The purpose and role of the GPSD may be changing from a safety net to an 
alternative form of regulation624.  There are several reasons for this: firstly, the 
regulatory policy has a bias against new regulations unless a very strong case 
can be made out; secondly, the five year targeted period for reviewing standards 
seems not to be entirely effective, leaving a broader scope for application of the 
GPSD; thirdly, the GPSD may be relied upon more by new countries entering the 
EU which do not have comprehensive (or perhaps any) consumer product 
legislation as a first resort; fourthly, some of the standards developed by the 
standards groups, by reason of committee make up, industry imperatives or 
intransigent positions are not effective.   
 
 
Scope of Application 
 
4. How far is the application of the GSR limited to consumer products? 
 
The GPSD applies to all non-food consumer products and products that are not 
subject to specific vertical directives. This covers less than 50% of the products 
on the European market. There are GPSD requirements including labelling, 
tracking and notification that apply to specific vertical regulations. In addition, the 
powers in the GPSD can be used across the vertical directives. Cosmetics use 
some of the powers from the GPSD.  Gaps in the vertical directives should be 
filled by revision, but the GPSD can be used in emergencies. For example, it was 
used to ban phthalates in toys. The GPSD can be used for life cycle 
management, although the view is that a product should be unusable before it 
becomes unsafe.  
 
The scope for GPSD may be diminishing as new product legislation comes on 
but there is pressure to avoid too much regulation, so there is not much new 
legislation.  The practical scope of the GPSD is different from practice depending 
upon the subject matter.  For technical requirements, it is very limited; but for 
safety management it is more widely used.   
 
5. Considerations/advantages/limitations to making GSR comprehensively 
applicable to all products 
 
Since the powers in the GPSD may be used across other vertical directives, it is 
in effect comprehensively applicable across all products.  
 
6.  Containment of the scope of operation of the GSR in relation to overlapping 
legislation relating to consumer products 
                                            
624 In Canada, there could be pressure to use the GPSD excessively as an 
alternative mechanism to weak or lacking remedies or sanctions in the sectoral 
legislation if those remedies are not separately reviewed for their sufficiency – a 
catchall that could, by default, become an alternative approach to regulating.   
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This does not appear to be a problem since the GPSD is, in essence, residual to 
the vertical directives. 
 
7. Life Cycle Management  
 
Reasonably foreseeable use conditions are not a big issue in Europe, and there 
are not many questions on it.  In most cases the problem solves itself.   If an 
accident happens outside the normal use of the product, it won’t apply.  It has to 
be assessed on a case by case basis and it is impossible to spell it out in 
advance.  In principle, it can be interpreted that a product should become 
unusable before it becomes unsafe so far as the duration is concerned. Disposal 
is covered under environmental legislation. 
 
 
Legislative Experience 
 
8. What were the limitations that the revised GPSD sought to address? 
 
The limitations and the remedies contained in the revised GPSD are outlined in 
detail in Chapter 6, the Operative Provisions of the European General Product 
Safety Directive (GPSD). 
 
In discussions in the UK we were informed that there were different intermediate 
remedies that may provide a framework for discussion, including, improvement 
notices, prohibition notices, withdrawal and recall. Clearly, the UK had a 
spectrum of remedies ahead of the GPSD, which enabled a proportionate 
response to violations of varying degrees of seriousness.  It will be important to 
review the complementary remedies under the Health Canada acts to see if they 
are adequate to prevent overuse or abuse of a new GPSD remedy. 
 
Words to the effect that “The UK does not have a product safety problem” 
appeared in the RIAS prepared for the revised Directive.  It may be that this is 
largely “spin”, although the UK system does seem more effective, in relative 
terms, than many in the EU.  There was also the view that consumer groups 
have been largely “neutered” since they have been recently given new 
responsibilities and funding which makes them unlikely to want to be too 
aggressive. It was suggested that the UK government does appear to adopt the 
view that product safety is “done and dusted” in the UK. 
 
Legislated criteria for assessing safety are not transparent. There was a test 
case in which two groups of Member States used the criteria in the GPSD to 
determine whether a hypothetical product was “safe”. One group found the 
products safe; the other found it unsafe625.  
 
Implementation of the GPSD/Operational Considerations  
 
9.  Were there significant delays or complications in introducing the GSR? 
                                            
625 Fairbairn: This kind of uncertainty in a penal context could be fatal to a prosecution. 
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The first GPSD was adopted in 1992, with quite some reluctance in some states.  
Germany took the EC to the Court of Justice on the basis that it had exceeded its 
discretion.  By 1997, Germany and several other states had still not transposed 
it.  In discussions on the revision, there was still reluctance on the part of some of 
the business federations: they just wanted it repealed.  The process was very 
useful for both the states and business community; they came to understand it 
was in the interest of business, to have good laws and good enforcement; it led 
to a level playing field.   Now, business lobbies harder than consumers in 
ensuring there is effective enforcement 
 
10. Member State Experience with GSR prior to GPSD   
 
UK had the first consumer legislation in 1961; Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and some others, had legislation about the same time but it was pretty 
embryonic.  The UK Act was partly consumer protection, but also pro-industry in 
the sense that it facilitated a base for standardization. The UK, Germany, Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands were seen as the forerunners and by the mid 80’s 
there were GSR provisions in their consumer product safety legislation.  The 
Netherlands also had the possibility to implement the vertical directives for 
consumer products. Thus the GPSD did not affect their behaviour. Belgium also 
had legislation that embodied the general provision for product safety. 
The UK was one of the last to develop transposing legislation for the revised 
GPSD and resisted recall for a long time.  The UK has quite a good enforcement 
mechanism in the form of the Training Standards Units in the communities. 
 
We were told that the center of gravity within the UK industries has always been 
the DTI and therefore pro industry. The policies in dealing with what is now the 
UK General Product Safety Regulations, indeed all product liability, have been 
careful not to upset industry. One important background reason is that UK 
industry by and large produces safe products.   
 
Over the past 40 years in the UK, there has developed an industry-made form of 
self regulation through quality systems in what has become ISO 9000, plus 
standards to go with it. Therefore the British Standards Institute becomes very 
important, along with internal quality systems.  Importantly, much later, when the 
EU harmonization got under way to prevent too much diversification, the 
regulatory systems, which are mainly contained in the  New Approach Directives, 
(20 or so different highly technical Directives) are almost all based upon a quality 
system approval and use of standards.  Under these Directives, EU harmonized 
standards are given specific legislative or legal standing within the regulation.  
 
Now, the latest GPSD adopts the same procedure by facilitating compliance with 
a GSR through the introduction of harmonized consumer product safety 
standards.  There have not yet been any harmonized standards for consumer 
products under the GPSD, and it will probably take some time.   
 
11. Core Resource Requirements  
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There are three main factors leading to successful implementation of a new 
regulation626. All of these factors require resources. 
 
a. The first one is the degree to which the target group knows and 
understands the rules.  
 
The first GPSD was adopted in 1992, and it was not well received. This 
was due to lack of understanding of what it meant and confusion over 
what the target group (both industry and Member States) had to do. 
Consultations on the revisions to the Directive provided a forum to 
increase the understanding of both the regulated community and the 
regulators in the EC and Member States. As a result there is greater 
acceptance of the revised GPSD.  
 
 In the EU, it appears that the greatest number of non-compliant products 
is toys and electrical products, mostly from China627, and even though it is 
the largest manufacturer of consumer products in the world, the statistics 
are disproportionately high. Since it appears that small importers may not 
even be aware of the standards and the Chinese manufacturers even 
less, the EC is taking the initiative to educate them about the standards 
with which they should comply and is sending the incidents (RAPEX) 
reports to China with a view to encouraging the Chinese authorities to 
follow up internally.  
 
b. The second factor that can influence implementation of a regulation is 
the degree to which the target group is willing to comply voluntarily. This 
will be driven not only by the costs to the target group, but also whether it 
has been consulted before implementation and whether the government is 
serious about enforcing the regulation to deter non-compliance.   
 
Enforcement (includes monitoring, surveillance and enforcement) results in 
significant costs to government since implementation of the GPSD results in a 
switch from a pre-market approach to a post-market one. The EC has made 
calculations on costs and determined that the GPSD is more costly than the old 
system. In some cases, some testing costs can be redeemed from business, but 
the government has to enhance enforcement, custom control, put in place 
systems to track suspicious goods even at the investigation stage, and collect 
injury data and share this information with other member states. In addition, the 
revised GPSD is explicit on requiring recall, although it is considered a last resort 
and less intrusive action should be taken if possible. 
 
Cost-benefit studies undertaken prior to introduction 
It does not appear that there were detailed cost-benefit studies done prior to 
implementation of the first GPSD in 1992.   There was strong political interest in 
reducing technical barriers to trade within the EU. The first step was the 
introduction, in 1985, of the  New Approach, which was a tool for technical 
harmonization. This approach was extended to consumer products in the 1992 
GPSD. There was an in-depth review done for the EC leading to a subsequent 
revision of that Directive in 2001.  Although there was evidence that a GSR 
                                            
626 OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance, 2000 
627 RAPEX Report 2004 
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would be more costly than the existing regulatory systems within each of the 
Member States, these costs were considered to be outweighed by the significant 
economic benefits emanating from enhanced free trade of European 
manufactured goods within the EU.  The costs of implementing a GSR in Canada 
are likely to be similar to those in Europe, but the benefits may be significantly 
different.  
 
Business, it seems has accepted the costs of complying with a GPSD as simply 
the kind of things that business should do as a common practice to protect 
themselves from being sued.  For government, there are some studies which 
indicate that the costs are outweighed by the reduction in lost income and 
hospital costs resulting from accidents. The part of government benefiting from 
this is Health Services, not the group responsible for implementation of the 
GPSD. 
 
It seems that many Member States are moving away from strict cost benefit 
analyses and focusing now on whether a new regulation is a worthwhile policy 
using the Dutch Table of 11, and how likely is the regulation to be voluntarily 
complied with. 
 
Organizational Structure 
At the time the 2001 GPSD was negotiated, everyone knew that the system 
needed to evolve further.  There was a lot of discussion with US Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and much of the new Directive was based 
on the CPSC model, without there being a proper centralized control.   Although 
it is unlikely that the EC could establish a central agency, industry made a case 
for a one.  The mandate could be postulated, and if it were to be effective, the 
next step would be to provide what the CPSC did, that is quick access to 
information with a huge population data base centralized through an agency 
There are a number of models in existence in Europe including the European 
Medicines Agency, which along with the WHO has a large database, the 
Pharmacovigilance Post-marketing system that allows rapid action if there are 
health problems with a pharmaceutical. Unfortunately a central agency for 
consumer products seems to be a step too far for the Member States at this 
point. 
 
There is a proposal to create a Consumer Trading Standards Agency in the UK 
that would be concerned with safety issues, although its specific mandate and 
location are unclear.  There is disagreement between the Office of Fair Trading 
(competition regulator) and the Office of Consumer Trading, which wants to take 
this function.  It has been recommended that the Consumer Trading Standards 
Agency should have a central control over the international companies because 
prosecutions by the local trading standards department office have been 
dropped due to lack of funds. 
  
Cost Implications for Government for Enforcement 
There are significant resource implications both at the EC and the Member State 
levels. The EC is funding the upgrade of RAPEX, the PROSAFE initiative and 
CEN. 
 
The Netherlands coped with the need for increased resources for enforcement in 
a stepwise fashion. They have their own laboratories to test products and in the 
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overall product safety area, the resources include fair grounds, toys, machinery, 
electric, personal protective equipment, etc. They now have about 120 full time 
equivalent personnel and a budget of 15 million Euros, which compared to other 
European countries, is quite high (this includes some activities beyond 
enforcement of the GPSD).  There are about 1 million additional Euros for 
implementation of the new GPSD, which will be used to improve RAPEX, and to 
do the increased number of anticipated investigations resulting from inclusion of 
notification and recall in the new GPSD.  
 
The observation in Belgium is that since the GPSD is a “safe guard for products 
not covered by a specific vertical Directive, it makes planning difficult. It also has 
significant resource implications because the government has to be responsive 
to complaints and the 50 million Euro budget is insufficient to handle it. This is 
further exacerbated by the government responsibilities in administering the 
GPSD.  
 
c. The third factor influencing implementation is the degree to which the target 
group is able to comply. This will be influenced by their skills and capacity and by 
the information and guidance provided by government. The legal profession was 
concerned about how to interpret the Directive in practice, what kind of guidance 
could be found to design and produce a product, what standards and documents 
were available and what assistance was available to business.   
 
Standards 
The introduction of new systems, both legal systems and standards can, 
depending upon the sector or the product, cause enormous burdens and small 
businesses have gone out of business with the introduction of new regulations. 
But all businesses should be able to meet the “basic safety requirements” as a 
cost of being in business.  The UK industry, including small industry, has not had 
any difficulty keeping up to speed with standards – given the enforcement policy.  
There is some balance achieved through grant programs to encourage 
innovation.  The GPSD does not set the standard too high; it requires that only 
safe products be produced and leaves it up to industry to determine what that 
entails. It should also be noted that in the EU, the requirements vary according to 
size, capacity and volume of the supplier and an administrative discretion is 
applied to the circumstances of the distributor. The UK situation does reinforce 
the need to help small business under a self regulatory scheme.  Since SMEs 
have difficulties in developing standards, the government helps them do it. 
 
“The  New Approach entrusted private organizations, namely the European 
standardization organizations with the task of defining European safety 
standards, or in other words, the European level of safety, on the basis of 
defined safety objectives.  This delegation of powers from the legislator, this 
privatization of law-making was both its key to success, because it simplified law-
making and its drawback because it induced a democratic deficit”628.  Under the  
New Approach of the EU, legislative harmonization is limited to essential 
requirements related safety, health, consumer and environmental protection. 
Manufacturers are free to use any technical solution provided that the product 
complies with the essential requirements. Only those products that comply with 
Directives can be placed on the EU market and bear the CE marking. It is the 
                                            
628 Fabisch, ANEC2005/GA/044, 30 November 2005 
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responsibility of Member States to allow only complying products to be placed on 
the market through their market surveillance activities. Harmonized European 
standards are technical specifications adopted by the European Standardization 
Bodies (CEN,CENELEC and ESTI) through a stakeholder driven consensus 
building process and are considered to be voluntary standards. The GPSD builds 
on this and introduces the concept of presumption of conformity with the 
European standards629. There is no concept of minimum standards in the GPSD.  
More frequently, situations are seen where there are no standards, usually for 
novel products. In some cases existing standards are changed to account for 
new risks. 
 
Given the role of voluntary standards, it is important to understand how they are 
set. In the UK, the BSI (British Standards Institute which is the National 
Standards Agency) has responsibility for creation, coordination and 
dissemination of standards.  It has a number of technical committees, primarily 
drawn from the relevant industrial sector. They are faced with issues concerning 
whether they should have consumer representation, or government 
representation if there are highly technical issues in a particular regulatory area.  
Today, the focus is mostly on the pan-European context, so the BSI is simply 
one national agency feeding into one of the European Standardization Bodies 
(CEN, CENELEC or ESTI). This causes difficulties in operation and coordination 
since it involves traveling long distances and getting the right people there.  
There have been criticisms the standard setting system does not operate quickly 
enough. The latest GPSD adopts the same procedures as developed by the BSI 
with the intent of facilitating compliance by introducing a number of consumer 
product safety standards.  That has yet to happen and will probably take some 
time.   
 
Concern was raised that available resources were not sufficient to do the 
maintenance on old standards and keep up with the new.  In practice the five-
year review cycle was not considered sufficient.  
 
There are differing views on the use of standards. Some feel that the origin of 
standards was not for product safety, and although there is movement towards 
safety, the process is still governed by the producers and not the safety experts. 
Thus, there is reluctance to give standards a big role given this lack of influence 
on the process. On the positive side, 80-90% of the standards used on a daily 
basis as reference sources do not provide problems. But in difficult areas there is 
a large burden on the Member States, which is made more complicated by the 
GPSD because there are two types of standards, those issued by European 
standards organizations and a higher category called community standards that 
are published in the official journal of the EC. Concern was also expressed about 
the use of ISO standards. Others feel that even though the 2001 Directive 
introduced the possibility of standards for consumer products, not much has 
happened.  However, for the standards for all the other industrial products 
covered under the  New Approach or National legislation, there has been huge 
activity and the standards have worked very well.  Today, some of it is put into 
global standardization.  The view of the EC is that the standardization process 
means all parties should be involved and make their voices heard, and the 
mandate given to the standard setting agencies is to find the “essential safety 
                                            
629 Hansson, Presentation, Appendix…. 
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requirements”.  If EC did not regard a resulting standard as credible, it would not 
publish it and would refer it back. 
 
Although reasonably well accepted in the EU for the purpose of promoting 
internal trade, the  New Approach which “privatizes the regulatory process” still 
causes some problems, especially with ANEC and other consumer interest 
groups which may feel that their modest influence is overwhelmed by industry 
interests and that the standards, once published can be difficult to amend or 
place under review.  There is pressure from ANEC for equal representation for 
consumers on Standardization Committees630.   
 
The standards process is not transparent, although efforts to make it more so are 
proceeding.  
 
Consumer groups always say they have very little influence and while probably 
true, it is the view of some that it is unlikely to have made any real difference in 
the output.  Consumer groups now have improved access to experts who are 
capable of sitting on these standardization bodies although they may not feel it is 
enough.  Industry has its own problems in locating sufficient experts to do the 
work.  Nevertheless there does not appear to be evidence that the resulting 
standards are biased or ineffective. The more interesting observations may be to 
note the impact on public participation in an expert dominated process as well as 
how far are the bodies moving beyond strictly technical to more subjective issues 
where direct input may be quite relevant. 
 
One observation is that the main activities in Europe have been to emphasize 
the ability to use standards for compliance and not the development of new 
standards, which is more important.  The application of standards across all 
sectors will have variable impacts. Big enterprises have the resources to explore 
and use innovative methods whereas SMEs are more inclined to look for a 
precise standard to follow to gain confidence that their products are safe and to 
be sure to have the benefit of the presumption of conformity.  In practical terms, 
there should not normally be a difference between the producers and importers.  
SMEs generally do not have the technical ability to demonstrate that the 
essential requirements can be met by another means and are better advised to 
follow the standards as a blueprint. SMEs constitute ~60% of the industry in 
Europe. 
 
12. Legislative and administrative means employed to enable regulated 
communities to know when they have complied with statutory duty 
 
There is a need for consistency in standard setting and the assessment of 
product conformity with the standard. The EC has developed numerous 
guidance documents to assist industry including Product Safety in Europe- A 
guide to corrective action including recalls631.  Despite these efforts by the EC, 
conformity is not always transparent.  
                                            
630 This resonates with the evolution of labour representation on Workplace Safety Committees.   Labour 
demands for equal representation on such Committees fuelled industry concerns about a labour move 
toward “co-management” of corporate enterprises, especially when legal entitlement to refuse to work in 
an unsafe environment came into issue. 
 
631 http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers 
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Uncertainty by companies as to whether their products are in compliance with 
the standards has led many to submit their products to independent testing 
bodies called Notified Bodies (NB). In the case of toys and electrical products, it 
is a requirement to send the products for such testing to Notified Bodies.  It also 
helps build a defence in the case of enforcement action.  This third party 
certification is a growing industry.  
 
“A NB is an inspection body or organization (private company) which is 
competent to perform tasks relating to the conformity assessment mentioned in 
certain Directives. This authority is designated by the Member State on the 
territory where it is established if it satisfies the criteria with regard to 
competence and the requirements established in the relevant Directive and is 
notified to the Commission and to the other Member States. It could be called an 
approved laboratory,”632 authorized by the government, in the country in which it 
exists to do testing within the GPSD for approval for the CE marking for example. 
This information has to be provided to the regulatory authority as part of the 
technical file.  A complication is that in the NL, since the NB is considered by the 
judiciary to be part of the public legislation, government and the NB have to 
agree on the position before taking action on the product.  
 
One criticism of NBs is that they only test what the company asks even though it 
may not be a complete testing of the safety of the product. If the product meets 
the standard, the authority would have problems prosecuting despite the 
incomplete testing. Concern about the independence of the NB from industry 
was also expressed by the Dutch. The U.S. FDA and other U.S. authorities have 
been scathing in their criticism of these bodies.  These are industry experts in the 
main, working in the NBs.  NBs may also be influenced by industry and 
“shopping” for sympathetic NBs, while prohibited, appears to occur sometimes. 
 
For products where there are no standards, no regulations, no laws, the authority 
submits the product for testing and the test house determines what sort of criteria 
should be used to determine whether or not the product is safe. Relevant 
standards will be referenced as well. It appears that for SMEs who do not know 
how to do a risk assessment on their product in the absence of a standard, the 
UK transfers the responsibility for the products for which there is no standard to 
the local authority.  It appears that this is done in other (unnamed) Member 
States. 
 
There seems to be a general regard for having a GSR that requires any product 
that is put on the market to be safe and for the due diligence on the part of the 
producer as a more efficient way of enforcing safety than making lots and lots of 
different regulations about safety in particular product areas.  That said, the take 
up of GSRs is nowhere nearly as extensive as the general support for it appears 
to suggest.  The UK chose the GSR method a long time ago because the 
minister does not have to be involved every time something appears to be wrong 
with a product and having to make orders or make emergency regulations.  The 
local enforcement authorities can go out, look at a product, and if they think it 
                                            
632 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Belgium, Quality and Safety Administrator, Safety Division, Product 
Safety Department, Nov.1999. CE What? Why? How? Introduction to Technical in the Area of Product 
Safety in the European Union p. 19 
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might be unsafe, issue a suspension notice under their own authority, have it 
tested under whatever terms that the test house may determine. Then they will 
come to a conclusion whether or not they think it is safe or unsafe.  If they 
conclude that it is unsafe, they can issue a withdrawal notice. The trader can 
apply to the courts if they disagree with the determination of the local authority. 
Then the courts decide. That is the method used in the UK. 
 
13. Impact of emphasis on risk assessment and compliance with identified 
standards on human resources and training needs 
 
Given the subjective nature of the determination of safe, the EC concluded that it 
needed to take a concrete decision about safety.  It is developing risk 
assessment procedures that should be used for determination of severity of the 
injury data in the RAPEX system and for product recall. It is important that there 
be consistency in determining what level of risk the product has caused so that 
all Member States may take similar action in restricting, removing or recalling the 
product from the market.  
 
In practice, the Member State asks the producer for more information, what tests 
have been carried out and what tests have been applied. Based on that, it might 
be decided that further tests might be needed, and these would be done in 
house or through certification houses.  Normally there would be a dialogue with 
the company, usually with a representative present.   For low priced Chinese 
exports, there would not be such a dialogue since the retailer might not know 
much about the testing done, if any.  The practices vary from State to State.  In 
the Nordic countries the tendency is to negotiate more; in France there is a more 
formal judicial system.  They move more quickly to a formal decision.  In the 
Nordic countries they would reach an agreement which might never be 
formalized if the company does what they need to do.  In the end, if there are 
inconsistent decisions, there might be an appeal.   
 
14. Acceptance of the additional reporting requirements 
 
The additional reporting requirements were met with mixed reactions by industry. 
There was quite an evolution. There were early objections by some but not the 
trend setters. They saw it as an expression of good business practice as well as 
a tool to get rid of the non-compliers. Product safety has a higher profile and, 
because of the reporting requirements, they have been pro-active.  More and 
more big companies are organizing themselves with proper compliance plans, 
and they have determined that even recalls can work to the benefit of their 
reputation if handled appropriately.  There are probably small companies that 
have no knowledge of or position on such practices. 
 
Effective market surveillance is an important component of enforcement. 
According to the UK Consumers’ Association, approximately 7% of consumer 
products in the UK are unsafe, and enforcement officers in the Netherlands have 
identified 15-20% unsafe products. RAPEX, the existing notification system for 
cases of serious risk, supports this, identifying such hazards as choking, 
suffocation and electric shock633.  Under RAPEX, the Member States are obliged 
to notify the Commission when they adopt measures to prevent, restrict or 
                                            
633 Fabisch, ANEC2005/GA/044, 30 November 2005 
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impose conditions on the marketing or use of a consumer product and when 
industry takes voluntary measures on products in cases of serious risks. The 
current level of reporting under RAPEX is extremely variable as is the capacity to 
identify cases of serious risk from products on the market and to notify other 
Member States.  
 
The EC has been concerned about the robustness of the notification process 
and as a result, is now developing an information technology application where 
notification can be made by and to all EU Member States. According to the EC, 
the notification content should include information enabling precise identification, 
a full description of the risk, information for tracing the product and actions 
undertaken to prevent the risks. There are challenges involved in this because 
there are inconsistencies in the information required by various Members.   
 
CPSC was asked to participate in RAPEX but was unable because they could 
not share the information as is done in EU.  
 
The need for trace back was emphasized during the crisis when it was found that 
there was dioxin contamination in chocolates. Since producers in other countries 
are not covered by Belgian law, the distributors who are Belgian are turned to 
when information is needed.  
 
15. Interagency Coordination 
      
In the EU, responsibility for enforcement rests with the Member States, and 
currently, there is considerable variation in the enforcement structures amongst 
Member States. Some have one person responsible for a range of products; 
others have specialists dealing with toys, electrical products, etc. Some enforce 
at the regional level; the UK does it at the local level. As a result, the EC is 
financing a project, to be carried out by PROSAFE over three years, on a 
common approach to enforcement, to develop guidelines and best practices on 
surveillance and enforcement.  Prosafe634 is an informal network that allows 
discussion ( not at an official level) amongst market surveillance officers across 
the EU on issues arising on products, and sharing of what worked and what did 
not work. It is currently chaired by Dr. Dirk Meijer of the Netherlands. They are 
looking to establish a rapid advice forum consisting of experts on market 
surveillance acting on their own behalf, not the Member State. The target is to 
provide the advice within 48 hours and no longer than one week.  
 
Some feel it is possible that this strong movement toward the harmonization of 
national enforcement mechanisms will be a big problem because of the 
difference in approaches and resources.  In particular, there is a big North / 
South divide: the Germans, French, Swedish, British and Dutch have long 
established consumer regulation and good national enforcement coupled with a 
lot of practice and much consistency of approach.  The southern countries 
sometimes have no people, budget or expertise so it can be quite arbitrary, if any 
action is taken at all.   The imminent arrival into the EU of central Europe, where 
there was virtually no consumer product legislation, emphasized the need for a 
framework; thus the second Directive has requirements for authorities, for 
people, budgets, standards, powers, annual reports, surveillance.  
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Compliance and Enforcement 
 
16. Major reasons for observed non-compliance and how these are being 
addressed 
 
As discussed under implementation, the main reasons seem to be lack of 
awareness of the GPSD, and incapacity to do the risk assessment. The EC has 
signed an MOU with the Chinese consumer product regulatory authorities to 
assist them in raising the compliance of their industry. 
 
17. Documentation and administration  
 
Businesses see highly variable performance from local authorities on the same 
type of decisions.  The difference is not transparent.   LACORS has a role to try 
and get consistency but has not done well; its principle function is as a lobbying 
organization with central government.  They have many lobbying groups, 
consumer protection, environment, health industry groups, but very little 
coordination.  An example of the inconsistency was the use of the terms 
chocolate flavour, or chocolate flavoured.  One supermarket labelled one way at 
the suggestion of a local authority; six months later another authority ordered it 
labelled the other way. 
 
The UK Better Regulation Office has just been just created to do the things 
LACORS is supposed to do (definitions, performance assessment, etc), but is 
not doing.  The Concordat is just being revised, and it is at an early stage. 
 
Effect of legislating the Concordat – It has not yet been decided whether to make 
it statutory, and it could be a while before a decision is taken.  There are pros 
and cons.  The regulators would have to show consistency with the code of 
practice; otherwise they would be liable to judicial review; their performance 
assessment would be based on conformity with the code. In prosecutions, a 
judge could use failure to follow the code as a mitigating factor.  It is possible that 
something may be done ahead of judicial review, like the US fairness courts.  
 
Enforcement – The Concordat has had mixed results.  It had quite an impact 
initially, but it is now largely worn off since it does not really have the teeth to 
make things happen, and it does not have the definitions within it to enable 
people to know what they must do. Ninety-six per cent of regulators have signed 
up, but the practice has not really changed since there is no stick behind it. 
Changes in the Concordat prompted by Hampton report and Less is More 
Report, might include: a proper definition of risk assessment.  LACORS standard 
of risk assessment is 50/50.  Fifty per cent based on criteria, 50 per cent on 
whether local authority thinks the business is a bit “dodgy”   Now however, they 
want risk assessment to drive regulatory resources.   
 
The best local authorities are the largest, because they are taking the time to 
step back to reflect on why they are doing what they are doing.  Their conviction 
rate per number of inspections is much higher. 
 
18. Remedies and Sanctions  
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Remedies/Sanctions/Recall. The inclusion of recall in the revised Directive 
caused anxiety in some of the Member States which felt that there were other 
less draconian ways of removing unsafe products. Relevant to the issue of recall 
in the EU is the proportionality principle. In the latest European Treaty, 
proportionality is mentioned as a broad principle where steps should not be 
taken that are disproportionate to the needs or seriousness of the issue. The 
inclusion of the Precautionary Principle in the GPSD appears to be in conflict 
with the proportionality principle. Another complication in Europe is the principle 
of subsidiarity meaning that a matter cannot be legislated on a European law 
basis where unnecessary, and it should be left to the Member States to legislate 
for themselves.  The Member States have the residual or original jurisdiction.  
Clearly, there is a balance between Community and National Sovereignty. Given 
all the issues, the EC is proceeding carefully in terms of developing guidelines on 
recall so as not to upset the balance between proportionality, subsidiarity and 
precautionary principles.  
 
The EC considers that recall is a last resort and that less intrusive action (than 
full recall) should be taken if possible, although there may be some increase in 
recalls because of the attention paid to it in the revised Directive. In the UK, 
section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act allows the Secretary of State to make 
regulations in respect of the product. He can do that on an emergency basis 
without consulting or on a general basis with consultation (the emergency 
regulation). The action can last for 12 months, and if it needs to be extended 
there has to be a proper consultation.  The recall power does not appear to have 
been abused. In one case in the European court, not under the GPSD, but some 
other Directive, the court found the action was correct.   
 
 
19. Conditions precedent to recall and impact of a lack of recall powers on an 
effective GSR regime 
 
In the UK, over 90 per cent of the recalls under the original Directive were 
“voluntary”.  (Given the teeth in the UK / EU regime, and the natural pressures on 
companies to produce safe products, this is perhaps not surprising.) Since the 
UK did not interpret the 1992 Directive as requiring a recall, it was made explicit 
in the revised Directive.  There is EC guidance on recall, and it has worked 
smoothly in all the other States.  The EC considers that recall is a last resort and 
less intrusive action (than full recall) should be taken if possible, although there 
may be some increase in recalls because of the attention paid to it in the revised 
Directive. In the UK, section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act allows the 
Secretary of State to make regulations in respect to the product. He can do that 
on an emergency basis without consulting or on a general basis with consultation 
(the emergency regulation). The action can last for 12 months, and if it needs to 
be extended there has to be a proper consultation.  The recall power does not 
appear to have been abused. In one case in the European court, not under the 
GPSD, but some other Directive the court found the action was correct.   
 
In summary635, recall is very much a topical area that is evolving quite quickly 
now.  Recall, in Europe, was almost unheard of 20 years ago.  Industry 
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developed recall as standardization took hold during globalization.  The car and 
food industries have quite effective operating systems for recall.  Recall was half 
mentioned in the first Directive, and is now fully mentioned in the revised 
Directives.  Europe has a couple of guidelines on recall, one based on guidelines 
developed, initially, in the UK. 
 
The UK guidelines were developed collaboratively by the Department of Trade 
and Industry and the consumers association (their technical people did most of 
the work), and the Confederation of British Industry and a large British Retail 
Association.  So, the four relevant big players got together and wrote the recall 
guideline, which was adopted as a European guideline.   It tells “how to”; it 
doesn’t answer the very difficult question of “when to”.  This question can be very 
difficult, getting into complex scientific modeling and data against which no 
baseline or criteria exist.  The problem has been around for decades. 
 
20. Modulation of penalties under a GSR Regime 
 
Some believe that the penalties should be higher.  In the UK, there is an ongoing 
debate as to whether there should be a “corporate manslaughter” offence, that 
is, the company, as well as the Directors, may be prosecuted.  This is an area 
that has been fiercely fought for a long time, and the Government has only made 
a few tentative steps into that arena for the moment.   
 
Harmonization of Standards 
 
21. Trade-related effects of the GSR Harmonization of Standards 
 
Standard setting is complicated in the EU. There is a push to have harmonized 
or Community standards that would enhance trade amongst Member States. The 
early approach to harmonization was slowed down by too much detail at the 
political level, aggravated by the need for unanimity.  Later, 70 per cent became 
the voting consensus in the EU, although the Standardization Bodies always 
strive for consensus standards.  As a pragmatic matter, the process of 
separating essential requirements from technical detail was beginning to happen 
at the level of standardization committees; partly because the political dialogue, 
in many cases, had become quite uncivil, and there was difficulty in moving 
matters forward; it took 6 years to get agreement on the allowable lead levels 
from ceramic dishes in the early years. 
 
The cost of establishing new standards is mainly paid for by industry. However 
for standard setting through CEN, the EC R&D program puts up 50 % of the 
money for development of methods of analysis, and the EC funds the secretariat.  
Everyone who participates pays for his/her own time and travel costs.  The EC 
pays for travel costs for consumer representatives, but not the work time.   In 
most standardization committees, there are may be 10 industry representatives 
and only 2 consumer representatives. Nevertheless the standards still have to be 
accepted by the Member States and the EC.  There has to be a proper outcome.  
(Based on this process in the EU, there are implications that the Canadian 
government might have to consider assuming an oversight and approving role as 
well as a financial role.) 
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There are additional financial implications. Standards are developed at the 
general (product sector) level, not on the basis of individual products. SMEs 
require considerable help under a standards regime including, often, testing by 
the public authority and compliance advice on a case by case basis.  The 
capacity to participate effectively in international and intergovernmental 
standards setting processes incurs costs for such items as travel and 
accommodation, publication of resulting standards and assistance for consumer 
groups to participate meaningfully.  
 
There may be some national standards not covered by harmonized standards 
(e.g. flammability of mattresses).  Some of the national standards could be 
harmonized by being adopted at the EU level.  That in fact is the source of many 
of the harmonized standards, although there is often much internal discussion 
before this occurs. Once harmonized standards are in place, further national 
standards might be viewed as a trade barrier unless it falls within one of several 
exceptions such as ones that are necessary to ensure local safety (e.g. car 
bumpers in Finland to deal with car moose collisions).   
 
Some feel that the answer to these global issues is to press for ISO standards. 
The EU has evolved from national to harmonized European standards and there 
is some movement towards harmonization between European and International 
standards.  
 
(Canada has some reservations about adopting ISO as a default position.   Also, 
there are other North American standards, which are not ISO standards that 
Canada must take into account. ) 
 
Voluntary Standards  - Industry Bias636  There is concern in Europe by some 
enforcement authorities about the degree of industry influence and control of 
voluntary standards  under a trade-driven regime.  The concerns include:  
 
• Lack of balance in standardization committees 
o The consumer and government perspectives are not always 
well represented.  
o  Government may not have the capacity to monitor, or 
participate in, the work of standardization committees to the 
degree considered appropriate. Industry may effectively control 
the agenda of some standardization committees, or refuse to 
consider developing a standard for a product, even when 
requested.  (e.g  for lighters.)   
o The standardization committees are more vulnerable than 
government to influence from big business or industry, even 
from outside the committee. 
o There is pressure from ANEC for equal representation for 
consumers on Standardization Committees.  (This resonates 
with the evolution of labour representation on Workplace Safety 
Committees.   Labour demands for equal representation on 
such Committees fuelled industry concerns about a labour 
move toward “co-management” of corporate enterprises, 
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especially when legal entitlement to refuse to work in an unsafe 
environment came into issue. 
 
• Notified Bodies may also be influenced by industry and “shopping” for 
sympathetic notifying authorities, while prohibited, appears to occur  
sometimes. 
 
• The competence of accreditation agencies is sometimes questioned.  
 
• Safety issues may suffer in a trade-oriented regime.   
 
 
Legal Considerations 
 
22. What legal issues arose? 
 
The key legal issues that arose or were considered include: the nature of GSR 
and how to interpret in practice (what kind of guidance can be found to design 
and produce a product; what standards exist and documents are available; what 
kind of assistance is available); delegation of legislative responsibility – 
ministerial responsibility; due diligence; liability creep; interface between tort and 
GSR (two aspects are the government liability e.g. for responding effectively to 
complaints and the industry side e.g. the possibility of liability creep; safeguards 
in recall; and the European principle of proportionality and how it is applied. 
 
Another area of concern is executive decision making power, and the fact that 
the criteria on which it is based are not transparent. The EC also does not wish 
to give up its power to issue authorizations. For example, although the European 
Medicines Agency is evolving as a very high quality, fast, efficient technical body, 
with good expertise making reliable decisions, it does not have the authority to 
issue authorizations of pharmaceuticals even though it is responsible for 
evaluating the data upon which the decision to register is made. The Food 
Agency came about as a reaction to the Mad Cow crises of the 1990s  and is 
mainly a figure head since food regulation relies more on local inspection of 
facilities as opposed to close evaluation of the product.   
 
23. Case law precedents 
 
Experience under prosecutions is limited. In the UK, there is very little experience 
in the courts because so few cases go to prosecution, and those that do are 
often heard in Magistrate’s Court and unreported. There are a number of 
disincentives to prosecution, namely: 
 
• Expense -  it is very costly to prosecute cases, in the thousands of 
pounds when opportunity costs including salaries are taken into 
account. 
• Orientation of the regulations – the regulations under the Directive are 
drafted in a way to  facilitate discussion and settlement and to 
discourage confrontation, which can be injurious to trade 
• Enforcement posture – regulatory policy and the enforcement 
concordat encourage a “light touch” approach to enforcement, with 
formal enforcement in the background if the company is disinclined to 
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comply.  (“Voluntary” compliance may be a bit of a euphemism given 
the tension present in settlement or remediation discussions. 
• Proportionality – enforcement actions, when disproportionate to the 
risk involved, can expose the public authority to criticism and judicial 
review.  Proportionality is an aspect of “light touch” enforcement 
practices. 
• Business disruption  - more effective than criminal prosecutions are 
remedies and sanctions which impair an industry’s capacity to market 
its product.  Notification to a Notifying Body (required under the 
Directive in some circumstances) could result in a product being 
removed from the EU market and even banned for export to non-EU 
countries.  Accordingly, there is a leverage impact of a violation in the 
EU in the sense that a problem in one Member State can quickly 
become a problem for marketing the product in all EU States given the 
Notification procedures and the responsibilities and powers of the 
Commission in relation to such transgressions. 
• Reputation – reputable businesses do not want negative publicity 
associated with their products and, in any event, have a natural 
incentive to build safe products if they are to stay in business. 
• Working relationships – inspectors and businesses interface over time; 
a collaborative approach to safety makes long term relationships.  
• Exposure to product liability – a successful prosecution can have 
product liability consequences far greater than any fine imposed. 
(Note: the Cabinet office mentioned the possibility of greatly increased 
fines, including a provision for removing illicit profits in the process, 
along the lines of US practice.  
 
The number of cases under the 1987 UK Consumer Protection Act is quite 
limited.  There are statistics on this.  Some enforcement mechanisms are used; 
others are not.  This is based on the conclusion in the UK that most products are 
safe and thus a “light touch” is justified. Nevertheless a “big stick” is needed to 
wield for a relatively small number of companies.  Occasionally a larger industry 
might be involved, but that is unusual.  Unfortunately, few European statistics are 
kept; they would take some of the sting out of the overheated discussion about 
the importance of the legislation.    
 
24. Defence of Due Diligence   
 
In the UK, the due diligence defence has almost the same wording in the Health 
and Safety at Work Act and the Consumer Protection Act, Part II, carried over 
into the General Product Safety Directives of 1995 and 2001.  It is very difficult 
for that defence to succeed since it has to be shown that the defendant was 
reasonably competent and   that all the necessary steps were taken. The courts 
have shown that “all” means “pretty high”.  That is entirely consistent with having 
a generally low key regulatory approach.  The perception is that U.S. regulatory 
authorities are much more aggressive, in which case HC might want a different 
balance, for constitutional reasons, that is, a broader defence637.   
 
Due diligence is a very difficult defence to make in the UK and has been for 30 to 
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40 years.  That is a quid pro quo for a highly self regulatory system which, of 
course, preceded the GSPD for some time.  The wording has been copied into 
successive statutes.  It is arguably inconsistent with the EU policy under the 
GPSD Directive.  Technically, it isn’t, because the GPSD does not legislate “on 
that point’.   
 
If industry is putting all its faith on due diligence, it is probably on the wrong point. 
It does not appear that the UK industry, including small industry, has had any 
difficulty keeping up to speed with standards given the enforcement policy.  
Some small businesses have gone out of business with the introduction of the 
new regulation.  But all businesses should be able to meet the “basic safety 
requirements” as part of the cost of being in business.  There is some balance 
achieved, of course, through grant programs to encourage innovation.  It is not 
felt that the GPSD sets the standard too high as it says almost nothing just that 
the supplier has to produce safe products638.  
 
There is a technical issue about an inconsistency between the absolute liability 
regulatory regime and the product liability regime, also one of absolute liability.  It 
is argued, usually in product liability cases.  Industry has been mounting a 
defence that there should be a defence, in the product liability context, for 
regulatory compliance.  That argument gains force with the more regulation there 
is and the clearer the regulatory and conduct standards are. This argument is not 
likely to gain much credence in Europe just now (presumably because of the 
state of consumer product legislation and standards). 
 
The very limited case law on the GPSD makes it difficult to assess the impact of 
new and improving standards on the standard of care required to be shown to 
establish a due diligence defence.  There seems to be a presumption that the 
natural result of new and improving standards will inevitably raise the bar on a 
due diligence defence, but the same might have been true no matter the reason 
standards were improved. 
 
There seems to be general agreement that the words “took all the necessary 
steps to prevent the offence” and exercised due diligence, makes a due diligence 
defence very difficult to advance, especially in view of the absolute liability thrust 
of the Directive.  The “all necessary steps” may be used to refer to improving 
standards of risk assessment and advanced process requirements in relation to 
new products.   The UK is probably the only country in the EU to insist upon the 
due diligence defence which sits uncomfortably alongside the absolute liability 
posture of the Directive.   The main use of the due diligence standard, likely, is to 
illustrate to clients what they may/must do to position themselves well to avoid a 
successful prosecution (i.e. by demonstrating that risk assessment has taken 
place, compliance plans have been drawn up, etc.)  To that extent, the defence 
has some preventive value where clients may be expected to consult lawyers. 
 
For harmonization purposes (i.e. to be published as an approved EU standard 
engaging the presumption of conformity), all harmonized standards must meet 
“essential requirements” under the relevant Directive.  To the extent that this 
means “essential safety requirements”, this may reasonably equate to minimum 
safety requirements being met within the due diligence test.  ISO standards, 
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ironically, may tend to be lower than national standards simply by reason of the 
degree of compromise required to achieve a consensus at the international level.  
Standards developed for trade purposes when led by a major company may be 
protectionist in nature, or constitute a barrier to entry or survival of smaller firms.   
 
25. Increase in the standard of Due Diligence and the development of a Culture 
of Safety 
 
It is difficult to assess whether there has been an increase in the standard of due 
diligence since all kinds of dangers of a product cannot be covered (e.g. a knife 
is inherently dangerous, but necessarily so to be useful).  What is looked for is 
whether the product is over represented in the number of accidents (based on 
data and reports from consumers and business federations). Then the first step 
might be to develop a new standard since standards developed 10 years ago do 
not represent the state of the art, new technologies have developed, often they 
become cheaper and more affordable.  There is no concept of minimum 
standards in the GPSD. 
 
The impact of standards on the tort standard of care is almost impossible to 
identify.  It is clear however, that standards in practice have improved greatly 
over 40 years.  A theoretical argument can be made that if there is a regulatory 
standard – an official standard – that it will affect the standard of care in the law 
of negligence over time.  But what drives negligence is the end result of an 
injury. If there is an injury and you have contractual liability, fault liability and what 
the UK calls strict liability, the fact of a shift in the standard of care is not going to 
make a lot of practical difference.  (In Canada, maybe more so, given the 
absence of an absolute liability component.639) 
 
In Holland, the notification regulations were not implemented because there was 
concern about self-incrimination. This was not the case in the UK. Notification is 
seen to be one of the more important aspects of the regulations, certainly far 
more important than recall because it aids transparency.  It means that where 
there is a risk people know about it. The UK enforcement authorities are not 
inclined to prosecute people if they put their hands up and say actually we’ve got 
a problem here and this is what we’re doing about it.  The authorities are trying to 
build relationships with businesses in their areas so that they can work jointly 
together to deal with problems.  Prosecution means the system has failed 
largely; the intent is to make sure there is cooperation and voluntary action 
where it is necessary.  So prosecution danger is meaningless in the UK. 
 
Deterrent Nature of the GPSD 
 
Since the Directive requires that there be an opportunity for business to state its 
case and that business does not want to appear in public to be obstructive, they 
might take remedial measures even if they disagree. The role of the GPSD in 
improving the behaviour of industry may be no more of a deterrent than the 
common law of negligence.  Since the vast majority of products are safe, there is 
no need for overregulation or an aggressive enforcement policy.  An important 
part of the UK’s enforcement philosophy is encouraging compliance rather than 
using a big stick, although the big stick needs to be available. In the UK, 
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historically, the only real problem has been with cheap electrical products from 
the Far East, some toys and children’s clothing.  Counterfeit goods are, now, a 
large problem. 
 
26. Regulatory Liability of the regulated community and public authorities   
 
This issue was not discussed at length, the opinion was that any attempt to sue a 
public authority in negligence for failing to react appropriately to complaints or 
notifications, would be a “wash”.  This, presumably, is a reference to the case 
law that modified the results of the Anns case that gave rise to this concern and 
which has been largely overturned in the UK, although the approach continues to 
influence Canadian law.   
 
As for the regulatory liability of public authorities, the Anns case was the high 
point, but there have been some more recent cases modifying the effect of Anns.  
There are some academic articles as well.  There have been a couple quite 
recently where the House of Lords said, quite frankly that people should assume 
some personal responsibility.  There are very few cases against product 
regulatory authorities and none based on negligence. 
 
Stakeholders’ Position on Aspects of the GSR 
 
27.  Stakeholder reactions to GPSD 
 
Consumers were generally very positive about GPSD, especially its wide scope.  
One specific problem was where the EC wanted to introduce child resistant 
lighters.  They tried to develop a standard and planned to publish a reference to 
that standard in the Journal – resulting in a presumption of conformity.  The 
problem was how to get rid of all the non-child resistant lighters.  Several 
Member States and consumer organizations found this too weak.  They wanted 
specific prescriptive legislation.  The EC view was that a specific product, child 
resistant lighters, had too narrow a scope to warrant legislation.  As a result, the 
EC has taken the view that all lighters must conform to the standard.  Consumers 
might have wished for a stronger instrument. 
 
Consumer groups say they have very little influence, and that is probably true. 
The view was that it is not clear whether that has made any real difference in the 
output.  Consumer groups now have improved access to experts who are 
capable of sitting on these standardization bodies.  Industry has its own 
problems in locating sufficient experts to do the work.  There does not appear to 
be any evidence that the resulting standards are biased or ineffective. (Note the 
impact on public participation in an expert dominated process.  Also, how far are 
the bodies moving beyond strictly technical to more subjective issues where 
direct input may be quite relevant640.)  
 
Trade-driven international standards may not adequately address local safety 
concerns or local risk tolerances.   
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46.  
 
Annex 7 - Case Law Related to the GPSD 
 
Notwithstanding a paucity of case law related to the GSPD, there are a few 
noteworthy decisions concerning:  
 
• The jurisdictional underpinnings of the GPSD in Europe;641   
 
• The scope of the European Commission’s ‘direct’ authority to act against 
specific products and hazards;642 
 
• The jurisdictional constraints against enacting Directives for the sole, or 
primary, purpose of protecting public health and safety (Challenge to EU’s 
Tobacco Directive);643 
 
• The interface between the GPSD and Member State legislation dealing 
with similar products or hazards (Second-hand car);644 
 
• The exercise of the public authority’s power to warn the public of 
dangerous products  (Baby Walkers); 645 
 
• The extent to which the element of ‘causation’ in tort law is relevant, if at 
all, under a general product safety provision in assigning responsibility for 
successive failures to meet obligations imposed by the GPSD throughout 
the supply chain  (for example, as an excuse for retailers seeking to 
escape their obligations under the GPSD where producers and 
distributors failed earlier to meet their own product testing obligations. )  
(Claw hammers imported form China); 646 
 
• The application of the defence of due diligence in a UK Criminal Court (toy 
caps for cap pistols); 647 
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sponsorship of tobacco products., European Court reports 1994 Page I-03681 
643 Ibid. 
644 Caerphilly County Borough v. Stripp [2000] E.W.J. No. 1779.  
 
645 Baby Products Assn. V. Liverpool City Council, [1999] E.W.J. No. 6012; Case No: CO/3733/99, Also 
reported at: [2000] L.G.R. 171  
 
646 See, Padgett Brothers (A-Z) Limited vs The Coventry City Council, CO/3892/97, H.C.J. (Queen’s 
Bench, Divisional Court); accessed on September, 17, 2006 at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
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647 Powys County Council v. David Halsall International Limited, CO/9162/2005 
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• An approach to dealing with an alleged regulatory gap in the context of an 
application to amend pleadings (Felt Pen caps – childrens’ choking 
hazard); 648  
 
• The importance of leading evidence as to the degree of hazard presented 
by a product in a prosecution under GPSD regulations (Shaggy Dog soft 
toy);649 and 
 
• Uncertainty in the formulation of a ‘Secondary’ Offence Under the GPSD 
(Laser Pointers).650 
 
Jurisdictional Issues 
 
In the Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union,651  the 
Court considered the jurisdictional basis of the General Product Safety Directive.  
Germany challenged the European Council’s authority under Article 9 of the 
GPSD ((92/59/EEC) to require Member States to take temporary remedial or 
corrective measures from among those listed in Article 6.652  Germany argued 
that Council had no authority to apply the law to individual cases in the place of 
the national authorities, as permitted by Article 9 of the Directive.   
 
The Court found that Article 100a(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 95) provided 
the legal authority for the GPSD.  That Article empowered the Council to adopt 
measures having as their object the abolition of barriers to trade arising from 
differences between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States.  The harmonization effected by the GPSD was unique 
in that it provided for a form of "horizontal" harmonization. 
 
Since the authority for the GPSD was trade-based, some linkage had to be made 
between product safety and establishing an internal European common market 
to sustain the European Council’s authority to act under Article 9.   Articles 7 and 
8 of the GPSD, the Court found, “entrusted the Commission with the task of 
supervising measures taken by Member States which are likely to hinder 
trade.”653  The Court summarized its position as follows: 
                                            
648 R. v. Newcastleupon Tyne Magistrate’s Court (Ex parte Poundstretcher Limited,) [1998] EWHC Admin 
251 (3rd March, 1998), accessed on September, 17, 2006, http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/1998/251.html&query=%22general%20product%20sa
fety%20%22  
 
649 The Queen v. The West Midlands Magistrates, Ex Parte PMS International  Group PLC, [1993] E.W.J. 
No. 3485, CO 1446/92  
 
650 R. v. Thames Magistrates Court (Ex Parte Academy International PLC), H.C.J. C.O. C.).-293-99, 
[1999] EWHC Admin 548 (June 14, 1999) 
651 European Court reports 1994 Page I-03681, accessed on September 13 at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=eu/cases/EUECJ/1994/C35992.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%20
%22  
652 The measures include such matters as imposing conditions of marketing particular products, public 
warnings, prohibiting supply, and organizing withdrawal of the product. 
653 Ibid., para. 27   Under Article 7, Member States must inform the Commission of measures which 
restrict the placing of a product or product batch on the market or require its withdrawal from the market, 
specifying their reasons for adopting them.  Under Article 8, Member States must as a matter of urgency 
inform the Commission of emergency measures which they have adopted or decided to adopt in order to 
prevent, restrict or impose specific conditions on the possible marketing or use, within their territory, of a 
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As is apparent from the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth recitals of the 
preamble to the Directive and from the structure of Article 9, the purpose of that 
provision is to enable the Commission to adopt, as promptly as possible, 
temporary measures applicable throughout the Community with respect to a 
product which presents a serious and immediate risk to the health and safety of 
consumers, so as to ensure compliance with the objectives of the Directive. The 
free movement of goods can be secured only if product safety requirements do 
not differ significantly from one Member State to another. A high level of 
protection can be achieved only if dangerous products are subject to appropriate 
measures in all the Member States.654  
 
The Court concluded, therefore, that Council action under Article 9 of the GPSD 
was not contrary to Article 100a(1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Union. The measures which the Council is empowered to take under that 
provision, it stated, are aimed at "the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market".  In certain fields, and particularly in that of product safety “the 
approximation of general laws alone may not be sufficient to ensure the unity of 
the market.”  The Court also found that the concept of "measures for the 
approximation" of legislation must be interpreted as encompassing the Council' s 
power to lay down measures relating to a specific products or class of products 
and, if necessary, individual measures concerning those products.”655 
 
Trade? Or Public Health and Safety? The Dominant Purpose Consideration 
(Tobacco Advertising)  
While the protection of public health and safety may properly be an incidental 
purpose of the GPSD, actions taken under the GPSD having no real or 
substantial connection to establishing or enhancing internal trade will be found to 
be void in Europe.  This is clear from Germany’s challenge656 to an EC Directive 
banning advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products throughout the 
Community.  The challenge was based on various grounds, including that: 
 
• The Directive presented no appreciable obstacles to trade in tobacco 
advertising media or to the exercise by advertising agencies of their 
freedom to provide services and that there was no appreciable distortion 
of competition between such agencies, and  
 
• That recourse to Article 100a (the legal authority underpinning the GPSD)  
was not possible where the 'centre of gravity of a measure is focused not 
on promoting the internal market but on protecting public health. 
 
With respect to Article 100a of the Treaty, Germany submitted, firstly, that Article 
100a granted the Community legislature competence to harmonize national 
legislation to the extent to which harmonization is necessary in order to promote 
the internal market.  But a mere reference to that article in the preamble to the 
                                                                                                                                 
product or product batch by reason of a serious and immediate risk presented by the said product or 
product batch to the health and safety of consumers. Member States may also pass on to the Commission 
any information in their possession regarding the existence of a serious and immediate risk before deciding 
to adopt the measures in question. 
654 Ibid., para. 34 
655 Ibid, para. 37 
656 ECJ, Case C-376-98 dealing with directive 98/43/EC, banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship of 
tobacco products. 
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measure adopted is not sufficient, otherwise judicial review of the selection of 
Article 100a as a legal basis would be rendered impossible. The measure must 
actually contribute to the improvement of the internal market.657  Germany 
argued that the Directive had the contrary effect in that it had “the sole result of 
introducing new permanent obstacles to trade, whether immediately or in the 
future.”658 
 
The Court found for Germany and voided the Tobacco Advertising Directive 
notwithstanding a vigorous defence by the European Parliament and Council and 
a series of supportive interveners, including France, the United Kingdom, Finland 
and the Commission of the European Communities. 
The Court stated that a measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the EC 
Treaty must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.  The Court, 
nevertheless, noted that, if the conditions for recourse to Articles 100a, 57(2) and 
66 as a legal basis were fulfilled, the Community legislature could not be 
prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that public health 
protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made because the third 
paragraph of Article 129(1) provided that health requirements were to form a 
constituent part of the Community's other policies and Article 100a(3) expressly 
required that, in the process of harmonization, a high level of human health 
protection is to be ensured.659 
 
In brief, the dominant purpose of a Directive under the section of the EC Treaty 
upon which the GPSD is founded (Article 100a) must be the ‘improvement of the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market’, although 
a public health and safety objective may be considered as an ancillary, albeit 
sometimes decisive, factor in a particular case.  
 
In this case, however, the court found that, for numerous types of advertising 
prohibited by the Tobacco Advertising Directive, the prohibition could not be 
justified by any need to eliminate obstacles to the free movement of advertising 
media or the freedom to provide services in the field of advertising.660  Implicitly, 
the Court found that the Tobacco Advertising Directive - founded on the same 
authority as the General Product Safety Directive - had the protection of health 
and safety as its dominant purpose and was, therefore, invalid.   
 
To North Americans, this may seem a somewhat convoluted approach to dealing 
with safety issues, but it is clearly an inescapable ‘fact of life’ in Europe in order 
to meet jurisdictional requirements.  For what seemed so clearly a public health 
and safety initiative, it is instructive to read the ingenius, detailed, and trade-
based arguments, both for and against the validity of Europe’s Tobacco 
Advertising Directive.  It is difficult to determine how far European safety 
initiatives are adversely affected by the ‘trade and industry’ focus, but is the 
                                            
657 Ibid. para 23 
658 Ibid. para. 27 
659 Ibid., para 84 
660 For example, the prohibition of advertising on posters, parasols, ashtrays and other articles used in 
hotels, restaurants and cafés, and the prohibition of advertising spots in cinemas, prohibitions which in no 
way helped to facilitate trade in the products concerned. 
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subject of some comment in this Paper under the heading Implementation and 
Operational Experience. 
 
Interface with Sectoral Regulations 
In this case, the respondent, a car dealer, was charged with supplying a second-
hand VW Golf motor car found to be a dangerous product, contrary to Regulation 
13(b) of the UK General Product Safety Regulations 1994 and Section 2 of the 
European Communities Act 1972.   The Respondent objected that the applicant 
authority had not pleaded, as it might have done, that the offence also 
constituted and offence under the Road Traffic Act, 1988.    
 
The essential question was whether, in circumstances where the prosecution 
wished to proceed against a motor trader who has offered to supply a second-
hand car which it was alleged to be so defective as to be in a dangerous 
condition, the prosecuting authority may, if they choose, proceed under the 1994 
UK General Product Safety Regulations, or whether they are obliged to proceed, 
if at all, under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
 
The choice in the manner of proceeding was significant to the Retailer because 
the penalties under the Road Traffic Act were considerably less and involved no 
possibility of imprisonment.  There were, however, some important practical 
advantages to the Appellant Public Authority in terms of available sanctions, 
reduced inspection costs and administrative expediency in proceeding under the 
General Product Safety Requirement:  
 
The two provisions plainly complement each other to a very large extent. As 
might be expected, however, there is a practical reason why the appellants wish 
to bring proceedings under the Regulations rather than the Act. By Section 77 of 
the 1988 Act, authorised examiners are empowered to enter premises to inspect 
the condition of motor vehicles offered for sale. However, only qualified vehicle 
examiners are so authorised under the 1988 Act. Different considerations apply 
to enforcement of the provisions of the 1994 Regulations which grant powers of 
entry, search and inspection to local authority officials who are not qualified 
vehicle examiners. It is thus easier and cheaper for the local authority to use its 
own inhouse officials rather than using the powers under the 1988 Act.  
 
No doubt that is what happened in this case, and it explains why there was no 
application to amend the summons to allege an offence under the 1988 Act. If 
the evidence of alleged defects had been obtained by inspectors exercising their 
powers under the 1994 Regulations, there would be plain evidential difficulties in 
the way of the prosecution.  
 
The Court concluded that the definition of “dangerous product” in the General 
Safety Regulations was very broad and included the observed defects presented 
by the second-hand Volkswagen in question.   The Court noted that the General 
Product Safety regulations did not apply, however, to “any product where there 
are specific provisions in rules of Community law governing all aspects of the 
safety of the product."   Since the national Road Traffic Act was domestic law, 
and not a rule of Community law within the meaning of the Regulation, the Court 
found that the prosecution had discretion to proceed under the General Product 
Safety Regulations. 
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Exercise of the Public Authority’s Power to Warn the Public of Dangerous 
Products 
In Baby Products Assn. V. Liverpool City Council, the court examined a public 
authority’s power to warn of dangerous products under the GPSD.  In this case, 
the Court found that the Authority’s press release was contrary to law by reason 
of the Authority’s failure to comply with statutory conditions precedent to the  
exercise of the power, which conditions provided for important legal safeguards 
for the producer..661   
 
On 28 April 1998 Liverpool City Council issued a press release concerning some 
models of babywalker, which were said to fail standard tests of safety. The issue 
on this application was whether, in issuing that press release, the Council acted 
unlawfully. The ground of challenge was not that the Council acted irrationally or 
in bad faith or with any improper motive, nor was the Council accused of 
procedural unfairness. The sole ground of challenge was that, having regard to 
the legislative scheme governing regulation of the safety of consumer products, it 
was beyond the power of the Council to issue the press release which it did.  
 
On 28 April 1998 the Council issued the disputed press release announcing that 
samples of ten models of babywalkers had been tested and found not to comply 
with the British Standard Safety specification.  In the previous month, Council 
had warned the applicant (unincorporated trade association representing the 
interests of manufacturers and importers of baby products) of its intention to 
issue the press release.  Solicitors for the applicant had strongly contested 
alleged non-compliance and challenged the Council’s authority to issue the 
proposed release, which, nevertheless, proceeded. 
 
At the time of this case, the enforcement provisions for the General Product 
Safety Regulations were those contained in the Consumer Protection Act, 1987.  
In reviewing the provisions governing suspension, prohibition and warning 
notices, carefully noted the safeguard provisions against the arbitrary exercise of 
the Authority’s power to notify the public directly of dangerous goods, including 
the producers rights to make oral and written representations to the Authority, 
rights of further appeal, rights to compensation in some circumstances. 
 
In the result, the Court found that the Council had attempted to do indirectly with 
a prematurely released warning notice, what it should have done directly using 
formal powers of suspension and prohibition after giving the producers an 
opportunity contest the Council’s actions: 
 
Mr Fordham accepted that, generally speaking, it was open to local authorities to 
publish information relating to their activities, at any rate within their areas. Had 
the Council issued suspension notices in accordance with section 14 of the Act, 
that fact could (he accepted) have been announced to the public. Had the 
Council initiated any criminal proceedings that fact, and the outcome of such 
proceedings, could similarly have been announced to the public. Sections 142(2) 
and 111(1) gave authority to make such announcements if statutory authority 
was needed. What, however, was impermissible was to make a public 
announcement having an intention and effect which could only be achieved by 
implementation of clear and particular procedures prescribed in an Act of 
                                            
661 1999] E.W.J. No. 6012; Case No: CO/3733/99, Also reported at: [2000] L.G.R. 171  
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Parliament when the effect of the announcement was to deny the companies the 
rights and protections which Parliament had enacted they should enjoy. So to act 
was to circumvent the provisions of the legislation and to act unlawfully662 
(emphasis added) 
 
Throughout this Paper, reference is made to the enormous discretion given to 
officials under a General Safety Requirement and the corresponding need to 
balance these new powers with appropriate legal safeguards.  This case 
illustrates the manner in which the UK has sought to achieve that balance. 
 
Whether Failure of Producer and Distributor in Duty of Care Excuses 
Retailer 
In Padgett Brothers (A-Z) Limited vs The Coventry City Council, 663 the facts 
found and were these.  
 
In 1995 Padgett imported a consignment of something over 12,000 claw 
hammers from China. A term of the contract for the supply had been that they 
must meet British Safety Standards. When they arrived, an employee of 
Padgetts tested a number of these hammers by striking them against the ground 
and, as they did not break, he concluded that the tools fulfilled the contractual 
requirement. No more rigorous tests were carried out. 
 
Some of these hammers were subsequently sold to a wholesaler (Westcliffe), 
with a oral assurance that they were safe. That wholesaler could have 
demanded written evidence that they met the relevant British Safety Standard or 
could have had safety tests conducted itself, but in fact the wholesaler did 
neither of these things. 
 
The wholesaler then sold some of the hammers on to the retailer (Forum), and 
that retailer likewise could have demanded evidence that the hammers were safe 
or could have had them tested, but in fact did neither. 
 
On 13th March 1996 the retailer sold three of the hammers to a trading 
standards officer, a Mr Robinson, employed by the Respondent authority.  When 
tested later against the requirements of the applicable safety standard (BS 876: 
1995), all three of the hammers became distorted and the heads began to 
detach, thus failing the tests. When this was reported to the Appellant company, 
they made efforts to recall all of the hammers that they had supplied for sale. 
 
No specific act or default by Padgetts (the retailer) was alleged other than the 
supply by them of the hammers into the distribution chain.  The retailer asserted 
that there was no causal connection between that act and the commission of the 
offences by Forum (the wholesaler). 
 
What the Appellants are saying here, as I understand it, is that the Appellants 
could perhaps have been properly convicted under Regulation 13(a) (placing on 
the market) but not under 13(b) (supply), because, so as far as the latter is 
concerned, failures further down the chain of supply, for example by the 
wholesaler or retailer, break the chain of causation. 
 
It is, therefore, a straightforward submission that the Appellants make, and none 
                                            
662 Ibid., para 22. 
663 CO/3892/97, H.C.J. (Queen’s Bench, Divisional Court); accessed on September, 17, 2006 
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the worse for that reason. However, as we shall see, the equally straightforward 
answer, in my judgment, on the facts of this case is that the chain of causation 
was not broken at all. The Appellants' act in supplying the unsafe hammer was, 
at the very least, an operative cause, I find, of the supply of the dangerous 
hammers later on by Forum to the prosecutor.664 
 
The Court, however, agreed with the Respondents position that the GSP 
Regulations expressly anticipate that more than one person may be guilty of an 
offence in relation to the supply of an item to which the regulations apply.665  The 
Court agreed with Council that this reflects the overall scheme of the Regulations 
which places duties upon both the producer of the item (in this case the 
Appellants) and any distributor, effectively negating ‘causal chain’ arguments in 
tort. 
 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court also relied on Lamb v Sunderland and 
District Creamery, Limited666 where there had been a supply by the Respondents 
to a retailer of deficient or defective milk.  The Court in that case found that the 
mere selling of the defective milk constituted an act or default, and, furthermore, 
that two people may be convicted in such circumstances, namely the supplier 
and the retailer himself, if he has not used all due diligence. 
 
Due Diligence  
Powys County Council v. David Halsall International Limited,667  provides a 
recent, isolated, example of a successful due diligence defence under the UK 
General Product Safety Provision.    
 
In Powys , the prosecution alleged that the accused supplied 'Sure Shot' ring 
caps (a Category One firework imported from Taiwan) that did not comply with 
the relevant requirements of Part 2 of British Standard 7114, when tested in 
accordance with the appropriate test method in Part 3 of BS7114  contrary to 
Regulation 3(1) of the Fireworks (Safety) Regulations 1997 and section 12 of the 
Consumer Protection Act, 1987.   
 
The respondent had imported from Taiwan Sure Shot 96 Ring Caps ("the caps") 
and supplied Builth Bargain Centre with this product.  The caps were supplied in 
plastic rings of eight caps per ring, but packaged in two different ways. A different 
product code was allocated, dependent on the packaging: product code 40388 
as a pack of two tubes, each tube containing 6 rings; product code 40389 in a 
blister pack card, containing 15 rings.  
 
Tests were conducted by the County Trading Council following a complaint by a 
member of the Institute of Quality Assurance.that the sampled caps were 
defective.  They did not meet the construction and performance criteria of part 2 
                                            
664 Ibid.,  
665 Regulation 15 of the General Product Safety Regulation, 1994,  provided:  
"Where the commission by any person of an offence to which regulation 14 [the due diligence regulation] 
above applies is due to the act or default committed by some other person in the course of a commercial 
activity of his, the other person shall be guilty of an offence and may be proceeded against and punished by 
virtue of this paragraph whether or not proceedings are taken against the first-mentioned person."  
666 [1951] 1 KB 923, 
667 CO/9162/2005, [2006] EWHC 613 (Admin), High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Divisional 
Court 
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of BS7114, in that: they failed to meet the construction and performance criteria 
as two of the primary packs contained more than five patches of exposed 
composition, and upon test firing a cap in each pack, five of the caps tested 
communicated the explosive reaction to more than 50 per cent of the remaining 
caps in the pack; 
  
The tests conducted by the company differed from those conducted by the 
Council.  The respondent had not arranged independent laboratory testing for 
40388 or 40389, but had relied upon a report from Intertek Taiwan's test that 
40389 met BS7114. (Intertek Taiwan is a worldwide testing company 
independent of retailers or manufacturers).  The products coded 40388 and 
40389 were almost identical. The packaged product 40389 was British standard 
compliant and tests in the UK were not necessary.  There was no UK company 
at that time available to undertake independent testing on caps. The respondent 
was aware of this and made in-house testing arrangements.   
 
The details of the Company’s defence of due diligence, ultimately approved at 
trial and on appeal, were pleaded as follows: 
 
1. Being aware that there was not an accredited UK laboratory, the company 
established procedures whereby each shipment of product 40388 was tested by 
in-house procedures, which were reasonable and sufficient in all the 
circumstances.  
 
2. By developing staff training and quality control standards, and applying those 
standards and compiling manuals for reference.  
 
3. The product 40389 was tested by an independent foreign testing house and 
found to comply with BS7114. Product 40388 and 40389 differ only in type of 
packaging and number of rings in each pack. Therefore by implication product 
40388 was also compliant.  
 
4. The respondent company employed a statistician to develop statistical 
sampling techniques for both products coded 40388 and 40389. Upon receipt of 
each and every shipment sampling for quality and safety of the product would 
take place.  
 
5. The statistician developed a formula to calculate the number of products to be 
sampled from each consignment:  
2,400 received -- 16.5 tested.  
 18,000 received -- 16.8 tested.  
 The sample figures were rounded up.  
A test sample of 17 would apply to shipments varying from 2,400 to 150,000.  
 
6. The in-house testing comprised: recording the dates of the product deliveries; 
recording the date tested; checking the quantity delivered; checking the 
manufacturer's grade assigned by the respondent ie: grade B (UK); checking the 
wording of warnings on packaging; checking the print is in English; a visual 
check to ensure there was no loose powder within the packaging of the caps; the 
caps were fired using a cap gun.  
 
7. The in-house tests above were the same as BS7114 composition tests. The 
communications test within BS7114 was not the same as the firing test, but was 
directly comparable. Had the product sample tested by Mr North been subject to 
the in-house procedures, the defect would have been identified and the product 
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withdrawn from supply.  
 
8. Whilst it is accepted that testing was not carried out to BS7114, the in-house 
testing procedure established by the statistician and administered by the quality 
control manager ensured the product was safe for supply to the public.” 
 
On appeal, Council had strongly challenged the Company’s claim (paragraph 7, 
above) that the in-house ‘composition’ test and the BS 7114 ‘communications’ 
test were ‘comparable’. 
 
14 In his skeleton argument, on behalf of the appellant, Mr Crowther submitted 
that there was no evidence before the justices from which they could properly 
come to the view that the respondent's firing test was directly comparable with 
the ignition test in BS7114. He further submitted that the preponderance of the 
evidence suggested significant differences, not least that one test was carried 
out in packaging and another with the ring caps installed in the cap gun. There 
was no evidence before the justices from which they could conclude that the 
firing tests adopted would ensure the supply of a safe product; rather, the 
evidence showed incontrovertibly that there had been no safety testing of the 
supplied caps in their packaging. There was no evidence before the justices from 
which they could properly conclude that the results of the manufacturer's tests on 
ring caps 40389 would apply equally to ring caps 40388, as the test was carried 
out on packaging, and the packaging was different, holding the rings of caps in 
contact with each other in 40388 but separate and apart in 40389. There was no 
evidence upon which the justices could properly conclude that members of the 
public were granted the same level of protection as though BS7114 tests had 
been undertaken, as no equivalent testing had been undertaken. It was 
accordingly submitted that the justices erred in finding that the company had 
acted with all due diligence and had taken reasonable precautions. 
 
As compelling as those arguments might have been, the appeal was in the form 
of a ‘stated case’ on questions of law and the Council had neglected to pose a  
question as to whether there was sufficient evidence on the question of 
comparability of the tests, or to order the trial transcripts for the Appellate Court 
to review.  The Appellate Court, therefore, was left with the findings of the 
Magistrates below that the tests were comparable. 
 
While the value of this case suffers from procedural defects, it does provide an 
excellent, though isolated, example of just how difficult it is for a defendant to 
establish a defence of due diligence in the U.K under the General Product Safety 
regime.  Notwithstanding the detailed efforts made by the Company in its in-
house testing program, and the absence of any independent testing laboratories 
in the UK to undertake such testing, the Company’s successful result in this 
decision must be qualified as a ‘close call’.  Had a question been posed on the 
sufficiency of the evidence establishing the comparability of the tests, the 
decision might easily have gone the other way. 
 
Use of the GPSD to Deal with Regulatory Gaps 
In R. v. Newcastle Upon Tyne Magistrate’s Court (Ex parte Poundstretcher 
Limited,),668 the central issue was whether a charge should have been laid under 
                                            
668 [1998] EWHC Admin 251 (3rd March, 1998), accessed on September, 17, 2006, accessed on 
September, 18, 2006 at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/1998/251.html&query=%22general%20product%20safety%
20%22  
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the General Product Safety Regulations, or as regulations under the Toys 
Directive.  Council had sought to amend the charge and the respondent retrailer 
objected, on the grounds that a six month limitation period had expired and no 
new charges could be laid. 
 
In Poundstretcher, the facts were as follows:  
 
The applicant is a retailer of various goods including children's toys. On 16 July 
1996 a Trading Standards Enforcement Officer employed by the Newcastle upon 
Tyne City Council entered the applicant's trading premises at Kingston Park 
Shopping Centre, Newcastle upon Tyne and purchased four "Kids Collection" art 
sets. Each of these sets included three coloured fibre-tipped pens. The sets were 
subsequently forwarded to the public analyst's laboratory for testing in 
accordance with British Standard 7272 of 1990, which is the British Standard 
specification for safety caps for writing and marking instruments, in order to 
determine the air flow through the caps of the fibre-tipped pens. Paragraph 3.4 of 
the specification provides that caps shall permit a minimum air flow of 8 litres a 
minute. The ten caps that were tested failed to meet this requirement. The air 
flow achieved in each case was less than one litre a minute. A report to this 
effect was produced to the City Council on 11 September 1996. In addition to 
this report, in December 1996 the City Council obtained a statement from an ear, 
nose and throat surgeon to the effect that any pen top which is readily accessible 
to small children, and which does not conform to British Standards 7272, 
represents an asphyxiation hazard to a child and if inhaled will cause irreversible 
brain damage within a few minutes.” 
 
On the basis of this information, the Council laid an information alleging a 
contravention of regulation 7 of the General Products Safety Regulations 1994, 
which provided that no producer shall place a product on the market unless the 
product is safe.  Regulation 3(c) provided that the 1994 regulations do not apply 
to any where there are specific provisions in rules of Community law governing 
all aspects of the safety of the product.  Regulation 4 provided that:   
 
The requirements of these Regulations apply to a product where the product is 
the subject of provisions of Community law other than the GPS Directive insofar 
as those provisions do not make specific provision governing an aspect of the 
safety  of the product. 
 
In fact, the broad risk in question (suffocation) was covered in 1995 regulations 
enacted under the E.U.’s Toys Directive, the essential requirements of which 
were that:  
 
Toys and their parts and the packaging in which they are contained for 
retail sale must not present risk of strangulation or suffocation. 
 
The enforcement officers were aware of the existence and significance of both 
the Toys and the General Product Safety regulations. They decided that it was 
not appropriate to lay the information under the Toys regulations for two reasons:  
 
First, they were aware that testing for compliance with the 1995 (Toys) 
regulations is usually done by reference to British Standard 5665, the British 
Standard relating to the safety of toys. The specific risk of inhalation of pen tops 
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is not covered by this standard. For that reason, therefore, they thought that the 
1995 regulations did not make relevant specific provisions such as to exclude the 
1994 regulations. Secondly, they had regard to paragraph 1(d) of section 2 of 
Schedule 2 to the 1995 (Toys) regulations, which states:  
 
‘Toys and their component parts and any detachable parts of toys which 
are clearly intended for use by children under 36 months old must be of 
such dimensions as to prevent their being swallowed and/or inhaled.’”  
 
The enforcement officers therefore considered that there was a gap in the 1995 
(Toys) regulations, in that the specific risk of swallowing and inhaling was only 
covered in respect of children under 36 months old. The 1995 regulations made 
no provision in respect of this specific risk for children over 36 months old. Since 
a product must, however, be generally safe, the officers laid an information under 
the provisions of the 1994 (General Product Safety) regulations. The applicant, 
argued that insufficient air flow through pen tops fell within Schedule 2 of the 
1995 (Toys) regulations; that it was therefore a risk specifically covered by those 
regulations; and that consequently the 1994 regulations could not apply.  
 
Without acknowledging the validity of the (retailer) applicant’s position on the 
correct charge, the enforcement authority sought leave to amend the information 
to include a charge under the Toys regulation largely because retailer’s own 
evidence (which had been served on the Council) showed that the pens were 
unsafe because of the risk associated with insufficient air flow through the pen 
tops. 
 
The issue of the correct charge was not ultimately dealt with in this case, except 
in so far as to determine the enforcement authority’s application to amend the 
information after the expiration of a six month limitation period for laying an 
information.  The Court allowed the amendment, noting that the offences 
charged were not materially different, and there would be no prejudice to the 
retailer in doing so. 
 
Importance of Leading Evidence on the Degree of Hazard Presented by a 
Product 
In The Queen vs. The West Midlands Magistrates, Ex Parte PMS International  
Group PLC, 669 a toy importer was charged under the GPSD regulations in 
relation to a ‘Shaggy Dog’ soft toy.  A Trading Standards officer had purchased 
an example of the toy from a wholesale outlet for testing purposes. 
 
The ‘Shaggy Dog’ was allegedly unsafe because its hair came out easily and 
could therefore choke its young owner. In the course of the hearing the 
Importer’s lawyer wished to cross-examine and lead evidence which included the 
attitude of the trade and other manufacturers to the risk involved in this type of 
toy, the opinion of British standards or those involved with British standards as to 
the risk involved in this type of toy being on the market, and evidence about 
whether or not there had been incidents of the kind alleged to constitute the risk 
here involving similar toys.  
 
                                            
669 [1993] E.W.J. No. 3485, CO 1446/92  
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The Magistrates refused to allow the proposed cross examination and, though 
requested to do so, refused to state a case for an Appellate Court on the 
grounds that the application was frivolous. 
 
The Appellate Court, in ordering the Magistrates to state a case for their 
consideration, emphasized the importance of the evidence which the Importer 
had sought to present: 
 
No doubt there are cases where the question of the admissibility of the evidence, 
which is always a question of law, is of such minimal importance to the real 
issues in the case and its outcome, that the Justices would be justified in 
refusing to state a case. But in my judgment that obviously is not the case here. 
This was a substantial point. It clearly did affect the conduct of the Applicant's 
defence to the charge and there can be no basis upon which the Magistrates, 
properly directing themselves could have concluded that the application to state 
a case was frivolous. Indeed, in the affidavit they do not say why they considered 
it to be frivolous. In my judgment it was not a frivolous application and therefore 
the application for mandamus should be granted.  
 
 
Uncertainty in the formulation of a ‘Secondary’ Offence Under the GPSD / 
Due Diligence 
R. v. Thames Magistrates Court (Ex Parte Academy International PLC), 670  
involved an application by an importer of laser pointers for judicial review of a 
decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate at Thames Magistrates' Court that a 
prosecution of it for a "secondary" or "bypass" offence contrary to Regulation 
13(b) of the General Product Safety Regulations 1994 was not time-barred by 
virtue of a six month limitation period in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.  
 
Regulation 13(b) of the UK’s GPSD regulation makes it an offence for a producer 
or distributor to possess for supply a dangerous various product. Regulation 14 
provides a defence of due diligence which, if it involves an allegation that the 
offence was another's fault, the alleged primary offender must notify the 
prosecutor at least 7 days before the hearing of the proceedings. Regulation 15 
provides for what the Court called a "secondary" or "bypass" offence by that 
other where a Regulation 14 defence applied. It provides:  
 
Where the commission by any person of an offence to which regulation 14 above 
applies is due to the act or default committed by some other person in the course 
of a commercial activity of his, the other person shall be guilty of an offence and 
may be proceeded against and punished by virtue of this paragraph whether or 
not proceedings are taken against the first-mentioned person. 
 
Under the 1994 GPS regulations, a penalty was provided for a breach of the 
General Product Safety provision, but no separate penalty was provided for 
regulation 15.  The importer argued that it was unclear by reason of the wording 
of regulation 15 and the absence of any specified penalty, whether the regulation 
15 (secondary) offence was a separate offence from that created by the GPS 
provision (in which case the limitation period had expired), or was simply a 
provision deeming the GPS offence to have been committed by the third party.  
The importer argued that certainty was a cardinal requirement of penal legislation 
                                            
670 H.C.J. C.O. C.).-293-99, [1999] EWHC Admin 548 (June 14, 1999) 
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and, due to the uncertainty alleged in relation to the by pass offence, the charge 
should be dismissed. 
 
Mr de Haan emphasised that a statutory provision should not be interpreted as 
having a penal effect so as to deem a person guilty of a criminal offence 
committed by another in the absence of very clear language. He prayed in aid 
the need for certainty in penal legislation, not only a cardinal principle of our 
domestic law but as recognised by European Union law and enshrined in Article 
7 of the European Convention of Human Rights. He cited as applications of the 
general principle in those regimes:  R v Kirk [1984] ECR 2689; Westminster City 
Council v Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Limited, 12 February 1999 
(unreported); Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) EHRR 397; and Hertel v Switzerland 
(59/1997/843/1049). As Mr De Haan acknowledged, those regimes state general 
principles, which are familiar in English domestic law, and the particular factual 
applications of them in the authorities to which he referred are of little assistance 
on the issue of interpretation arising in this case. (emphasis added) 
 
The Court concluded that, in reading the GPS regulation as a whole, there was 
no uncertainty.  There was a clear and certain provision by Regulation 15 (the 
secondary offence) in the circumstances specified for guilt under Regulation 13 
(the primary GPS offence) for which Regulation 17 (the penalty provision) 
expressly provided a penalty. For that reason Regulation 16 operated expressly 
to extend the time limit to such a prosecution, from the usual six months under 
the Magistrate’s Court Act to 12 months under the 1994 UK General Product 
Safety Regulation.  In concluding, the Court stated:  
 
I am reassured by the good sense of the outcome, for I can see no good reason 
why the draftsman of the Act would have wished to differentiate between the two 
types of offender in this respect. The Regulation 15 procedure may often only be 
engaged after the alleged principal offender is the subject of proceedings and 
has served the requisite notice on the prosecutor, which may be up to 7 days 
before the hearing of the case. There could be an argument for giving the 
prosecution longer time in which to institute proceedings against the secondary 
offender than against the principal offender. Mr de Haan suggested that this is 
merely a theoretical possibility, since prosecuting local authorities are normally 
likely to be put on notice of a possible secondary offender at an early stage of 
their investigation. Whether or not that is so, the machinery of the Regulations 
contemplates that the Regulation 14 procedure may be initiated by the primary 
offender at a late stage in the proceedings which could be well into the limitation 
period.  
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Annex 8 - Reporting Obligations and Notification Requirements 
 
Reporting Obligations:  
 
Legislative commentary prepared by the department anticipates that suppliers 
(“any person who manufactures, imports, distributes, promotes or markets a 
product or an activity”) would be responsible for “reporting adverse health 
incidents, as prescribed by regulation.” (B3.2.3) In addressing offences or 
prohibitions, the legislation is expected to establish that “no person shall fail to 
report adverse health incidents, as prescribed by regulation.”(B2.7) 
 
An initial observation with regard to the reporting requirement is that it serves, 
even within the context of a general safety requirement, as a residual safety net. 
It exists to provide a systematic basis to identify and where appropriate to 
respond to situations in which an unsafe consumer product may have entered 
the market-place either because pre-market assessment failed to identify the 
existence of some form of risk, under-estimated the likelihood or severity of a 
risk, or because such assessment was not, in fact, ever undertaken.  
 
What is involved in fulfilling the reporting obligation then falls to be determined. In 
general, we can identify several components of the reporting obligation: 
• The threshold or trigger: What degree of severity is required to constitute 
an adverse incident of a reportable nature? 
• Form of reporting: What information is required in a report? In what 
manner is it to be presented? To whom is it to be provided? 
• Timeliness: Within what period of time from the moment a supplier has 
knowledge of an adverse incident should the report be provided? 
 
There is clearly room for variation in relation to each of these elements. If the 
threshold is set too low, there is a risk that minor or trivial incidents might over-
whelm the capacity of officials to perform review functions effectively. The 
information provided needs to be responsive to the nature of the hazard while 
respecting victim privacy and other elements of the legal process. With regard to 
the latter, it may be worth highlighting that suppliers are required to report 
adverse incidents; they are not required to report that they have or may have 
committed an offence relating to an unsafe product or products. As Elizabeth 
notes in the Implementation Case Study Report, it must also be determined 
whether reports would be submitted to Health Canada in Ottawa, to regional 
offices, or to provincial or territorial officials. Reports should be provided in a 
timely manner but requirements must permit some reasonable compliance 
period, bearing in mind the varied capacities of those subject to the reporting 
requirement and the existence of a penalty for failure to comply. 
 
In connection with timing, for example, several options would appear to be 
available. Reports might be required on a uniformly fixed delivery schedule, 
either at fixed intervals, or within a fixed number of days of a reportable incident. 
Or, reporting requirements might vary depending upon the severity of the 
incident, with injury reporting allowing for a longer delay than in circumstances 
involving death. Generic or notional requirements are also possible, taking the 
form of “forthwith,” “immediately,” or “without delay.” 
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While each of these matters remains to be determined, we can nonetheless look 
to experience in other settings for some guidance as to what might be involved. 
Sources of such guidance include the European and American contexts where 
similar issues have already been addressed and other Canadian legislation 
where adverse incident reporting requirements presently exist. Each of these is 
briefly discussed in turn. 
 
Europe:  
The reporting obligations of producers and distributors within the European 
context are described in the current Directive (Article 5.3) as follows: 
“Where producers and distributors know or ought to know, on the basis of the 
information in their possession and as professionals, that a product that they 
have placed on the market poses risks to the consumer that are incompatible 
with the general safety requirement, they shall immediately inform the competent 
authorities of the Member States thereof …” 
Annex 1 to the Directive sets out in more detail the manner in which this 
reporting obligation is to be carried out, noting in particular that in the context of 
“serious risks” the information provided shall address at least the following 
matters: 
• Information enabling a precise identification of the product or batch of 
products in question; 
• A full description of the risk that the products in question present; 
• All available information relevant for tracing the product; 
• A description of the action undertaken to prevent risks to consumers.671  
 
United States: 
 
Reporting requirements under the US Consumer Product Safety Act will be 
addressed to some degree by Professor Nick Ashford in Annex 12. Here, for 
convenience are the reporting provisions of what is conveniently referred to as 
section 15 of the U.S. CPSA: 
 
(a)  For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘substantial product hazard’’ means— 
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule which 
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or 
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of 
defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or 
otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to the public. 
 
(b)  Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every 
distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which 
reasonably supports the conclusion that such product— 
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or with a 
voluntary consumer product safety standard upon which the Commission has 
relied under section 9; 
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard 
described in subsection (a)(2); or 
                                            
671 See also: European Commission, Guidelines for the Notification of Dangerous Consumer Products to 
the Competent Authorities of the Member States by Producers and Disrtibutors  in Accordance with Article 
5(3) of Directive 2001/95/EC, December 2004.: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/notification_dang_en.pdf 
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(3) creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death, shall immediately 
inform the Commission of such failure to comply, of such defect, or of such 
risk, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge 
that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect, failure to 
comply, or such risk.  
[Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 USC §2064(b).]672 
 
Canada:  
Many Canadian statutes currently require those involved in an operational 
capacity in a wide range of industries and activities to provide information or to 
report adverse incidents to officials. These generally provide the foundation for 
follow-up action either by government or the responsible parties in order to 
prevent or minimize injury to health or the environment. 
 
In the environmental context, CEPA, 1999 contains general and specific 
provisions concerning information gathering. A general authority over information 
gathering is set out in CEPA, 1999 sec. 46 where the Minister, for such purposes 
as conducting research, creating a data base or inventory, issuing guidelines, or 
reporting on the state of the environment may, on the basis of a notice in the 
Canada Gazette or elsewhere require “any person described in the notice to 
provide the Minister with any information that may be in the possession of that 
person or to which that person may reasonably be expected to have access.” 
The types of information required to be provided under this authority include 
information relating to a wide range of substances governed by the legislation. 
The information obtained pursuant to sec. 46 constitutes the basis for a National 
Pollutant Release Inventory which the Minister is required to establish. Further 
information and discussion on NPRI, timeliness of reporting, confidentiality 
requests, etc. is available: Commission for Environmental Co-operation, North 
American Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 10, Public Access to Government-
held Environmental Information and The Precautionary Principle in North 
American and International Law.673 
 
In connection with Toxic Substances addressed in CEPA, provides that: 
Where a person (a) imports, manufactures, transports, processes or distributes a 
substance for commercial purposes, or (b) uses a substance in a commercial 
manufacturing or processing activity, and obtains information that reasonably 
supports the conclusion that the substance is toxic or is capable of becoming 
toxic, the person shall without delay provide the information to the Minister 
unless the person has actual knowledge that the Minister has the information.674 
 
Canada’s new Pest Control Products Act (2002) also provides for more formal 
post-registration control of pesticides. In particular requirements are included for 
reporting new information concerning health and environmental risks of 
registered pesticides. In response to such reports, the Minister may initiate at 
Special Review and must alert the public concerning significant risks. In cases 
where data has not been provided, the Minister may remove pesticides from the 
market. 
                                            
672 See also: US Consumer Product Safety Commission, Regulated Products Handbook, 3rd Edition, 
January 2005, Washington, DC: http://www.cpsc.gov/BUSINFO/8001.pdf 
 
673 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2003) 63-5; see also Molly Grindley  
 
674 1999 Part V, section 70 
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It is also noteworthy that a range of adverse reporting requirements are now 
found in relation to a range of regulated products within the general mandate of 
Health Canada. For convenience, these and some supplementary 
documentation are reviewed here. 
 
In respect of adverse reporting, the Food and Drug Regulations675 require that: 
 
(1) No manufacturer shall sell a drug unless the manufacturer, with 
respect to any adverse drug reaction or any serious adverse drug 
reaction known to the manufacturer that occurs after this section comes 
into force, furnishes to the Director 
(a) a report of all information in respect of any serious adverse 
drug reaction that has occurred in Canada with respect to the 
drug, within 15 days after receiving the information; and 
(b) a report of all information in respect of any serious unexpected 
adverse drug reaction that has occurred outside Canada with 
respect to the drug, within 15 days after receiving the information. 
(2) The manufacturer shall, on an annual basis and whenever requested 
to do so by the Director, conduct a concise, critical analysis of the 
adverse drug reactions and serious adverse drug reactions to a drug 
referred to in subsection (1) and prepare a summary report in respect of 
the reports received during the previous twelve months or received during 
such period of time as the Director may specify. 
(3) Where, after reviewing any report furnished pursuant to subsection (1) 
and any available safety data relating to the drug, the Director considers 
that the drug may not be safe when used under the recommended 
conditions of use, the Director may, for the purpose of assessing the 
safety of the drug, request in writing, that the manufacturer submit 
(a) case reports of all adverse drug reactions and serious adverse 
drug reactions to that drug that are known to the manufacturer; 
and 
(b) a summary report prepared pursuant to subsection (2). 
(4) The manufacturer shall submit the case reports and summary report 
referred to in subsection (3) within 30 days after receiving the request 
from the Director.676  
 
Similar requirements exist under the Natural Health Products Regulations:677 
 
24. (1) A licensee shall provide the Minister with 
(a) a case report for each serious adverse reaction to the natural 
health product that occurs inside Canada, within 15 days after the 
day on which the licensee becomes aware of the reaction; and 
(b) a case report for each serious unexpected adverse reaction to 
the natural health product that occurs inside or outside Canada, 
within 15 days after the day on which the licensee becomes aware 
of the reaction. 
                                            
675 Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870. 
676 Ibid., at para. C.01.016 et seq. as am. by: SOR/95-521, s. 2.  [Emphasis added.] 
677 SOR 2003-196 
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(2) A licensee who sells a natural health product shall annually prepare 
and maintain a summary report that contains a concise and critical 
analysis of 
(a) all adverse reactions to the natural health product that have 
occurred inside Canada; and 
(b) all reactions for which a case report is required to be provided 
under subsection (1), that have occurred 
(i) during the previous 12 months, and 
(ii) at a dose used or tested for the diagnosis, treatment or 
prevention of a disease or for modifying organic functions 
in humans. 
(3) If after reviewing a case report provided under subsection (1) or after 
reviewing any other safety data relating to the natural health product, the 
Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that the natural health 
product may no longer be safe when used under the recommended 
conditions of use, the Minister may request that, within 30 days after the 
day on which the request is received, the licensee 
(a) provide to the Minister a copy of any summary report prepared 
under subsection (2); or 
(b) prepare and provide to the Minister an interim summary report 
containing a concise and critical analysis of 
(i) all adverse reactions to the natural health product that 
have occurred inside Canada, and 
(ii) all reactions for which a case report is required to be 
provided under subsection (1), that have occurred 
(A) since the date of the most recent summary 
report prepared under subsection (2), and 
(B) at a dose used or tested for the diagnosis, 
treatment or prevention of a disease or for 
modifying organic functions in humans.678 
 
Again, under the Medical Devices Regulations:679 
 
60. (1) A preliminary report shall be submitted to the Minister 
(a) in respect of an incident that occurs in Canada 
(i) within 10 days after the manufacturer or importer of a 
medical device becomes aware of an incident, if the 
incident has led to the death or a serious deterioration in 
the state of health of a patient, user or other person, or 
(ii) within 30 days after the manufacturer or importer of a 
medical device becomes aware of an incident, if the 
incident has not led to the death or a serious deterioration 
in the state of health of a patient, user or other person, but 
could do so were it to recur; and 
(b) in respect of an incident that occurs outside Canada, as soon as 
possible after the manufacturer has indicated, to the regulatory agency 
                                            
678 Ibid., at s. 24 et seq.  [Emphasis added.] 
679 SOR/98-282. 
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referred to in paragraph 59(2), the manufacturer’s intention to take 
corrective action, or after the regulatory agency has required the 
manufacturer to take corrective action.680 
 
As the Case Study report indicated, the Health Product and Food Branch 
Inspectorate, has prepared a guidance document outlining expectations in 
relation to voluntary and mandatory reporting for medical devices. The guidance 
document is in respect of the Medical Devices Regulations,681 promulgated 
under the Food and Drugs Act.  The purpose of the Regulation is to compel 
manufacturers and importers of medical devices to disclose adverse incidents to 
Health Canada, in a timely682 and standard683 manner.  
The guidance document is particularly relevant for present purposes in 
light of its definition of “serious deterioration in the state of health” which serves 
as a trigger or threshold. 
 
“Serious deterioration in the state of health” means a life-threatening 
disease, disorder or abnormal physical state, the permanent impairment 
of a body function or permanent damage to a body structure, or a 
condition that necessitates an unexpected medical or surgical 
intervention to prevent such a disease, disorder or abnormal physical 
state or permanent impairment or damage.684 
 
The guidance document, more generally sets out to explain the requirements for 
manufacturers and importers of “medical devices.”685 As the guidance document 
states:  
 
Use of this guidance document will help to assure that all adverse incident 
reports are comprehensive and accurate. Please note that the guidance 
document is a supplement to the Regulations and not a replacement. If there are 
                                            
680 Ibid., at s. 60. 
681 SOR/98-282.  [Regulation] 
682 For incidents occurring within Canada a “preliminary” report is required within 10 days of a 
manufacturer or importer becoming aware of an adverse incident where the patient dies, or suffers “a 
serious deterioration in the state of health” (s. 60(1)(a)(i)); and 30 days of an incident where the patient 
affected did not die or so suffer, but could were the incident to recur . (s. 60(1)(a)(ii)).  For incidents 
occurring outside Canada, the manufacturer or importer is required to negotiate a time frame with Health 
Canada for reporting, but only if the incident prompted the manufacturer elected, or the foreign regulator 
required the manufacturer, to take “corrective action.”  (See Regulation at s. 60(1)(b) and Guidance 
Document at s. 2.3.3) 
683 While a “standard form” has not yet been produced for “final reports.”  A standard form for preliminary 
reports is appended to the Guidance Document, and final reports are instructed to mirror that standard 
form. 
684 Ibid., at s. 1. 
685 “Medical device” should be a defined term.  The regulation defines the term as having the same 
meaning as in the Food and Drugs Act.  However, “medical device” is not defined in the Act, nor does it 
even appear.  “Device” is defined in the Act as: 
any article, instrument, apparatus or contrivance, including any component, part or accessory 
thereof, manufactured, sold or represented for use in 
(a) the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or abnormal 
physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals, 
(b) restoring, correcting or modifying a body function or the body structure of human 
beings or animals, 
(c) the diagnosis of pregnancy in human beings or animals, or 
(d) the care of human beings or animals during pregnancy and at and after birth of the 
offspring, including care of the offspring, 
and includes a contraceptive device but does not include a drug 
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any conflicts between the Regulations and this guidance document, the 
Regulations take precedence.686 
 
The Regulation and the Guidance Document also provide for the voluntary 
disclosure of adverse incidents.  The Guidance Document explains how 
manufacturers and importers of medical devices may do so.687 
 
Existing reporting requirements attached to regulated products and incident 
reports that may eventually be made available for consumer products that have 
not been subject to pre-market regulatory approval will ordinarily be associated 
with specific product-related risks. To the extent, however, that there may be a 
broader policy interest in overall injury data it may be observed that reporting 
under a general safety requirement may make such a contribution as well. 
 
Injury Data 
It has recently been suggested that, “The disease that should be of most 
concern, especially to individuals under the age of 45, is a disease about which 
most people know very few facts – injury.”688 Although injuries, certainly the most 
severe of these, result in medical examination and treatment, comprehensive 
information as to the extent of the injury problem in Canada is lacking. Instead 
there is considerable reliance on extrapolation from selected data sources, for 
example, the Canadian Hospitals Injury Reporting and Prevention Program.689 
 
Although medical reporting, in contrast with supplier reporting, is not central to 
this report, it is appropriate to mention elements of the inter-relationship. The 
central consideration is perhaps the extent to which – as we have noted in 
connection with principles of regulatory effectiveness and, in particular, 
compliance – a public policy problem has been clearly identified and understood, 
not only by regulators, but by members of the public and of the regulated 
community or communities. In the absence of reliable documentation concerning 
the extent of a consumer product safety problem in Canada, it may be difficult to 
summon sufficient political will and public support for a vigorous response such 
as the general safety requirement would represent.  
 
One factor contributing to the lack of comprehensive data on consumer injury 
rates in Canada may be appreciated on the basis of the following observation: 
 
In the course of treating patients, particularly in emergency wards, public health 
personnel may gather information about whether individuals were victims of 
crime, perpetrators of offences, or witnesses to crimes. Caregivers may not only 
obtain information, but may come into custody of physical evidence, ranging from 
bodily samples to instrumentalities of crime. While public health workers, like 
other citizens, may have a natural inclination to co-operate with the authorities in 
the investigation of offences, the basic rule is that public health workers and 
facilities must keep information and bodily samples gathered during treatment 
                                            
686 Guidance Document, at s. 1.1. 
687 See also: Health Canada’s Therapeutic Products Directorate, Guidelines for the Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Industry on Reporting Adverse Reactions to Market Drugs (Vaccines Excluded), Revised 
July 2001. http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/medeff/guide-ldir_indust_e.pdf 
688 Ries et al, 219. For some indication of the burden of injury (said to be overwhelmingly associated with 
vehicles, falls and poisonings,) see Ries et al, 221-2 
689 Ries et al, 269 
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confidential unless the patient provides informed consent, or the law otherwise 
permits or requires disclosure. 690 
 
The Role of Consumer Organizations 
Consumer organizations potentially represent another source of more systematic 
access to product safety information. As reported by the European Commission 
in the context of the review of experience under EEC Directive 92/59 on General 
Product Safety, consumer organizations play varying roles: 
 
In four countries consumer organizations play a special role in the field of 
product safety: France (lobbying and suing), Denmark (market surveillance), 
Austria (market surveillance and information on the law), and the Netherlands 
(safety tests, awareness-raising and training of professionals, drafting of a code 
of conduct on the emergency procedures). In the other countries the consumer 
organizations’ role is normally confined to performing comparative tests, whose 
results are published in the magazines, and to collecting consumer complaints. 
In Ireland, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Luxembourg consumer 
associations play a relatively minor role in the field of product safety at least.691  
 
Inter-jurisdictional Information Exchange and Responsibities 
Within the context of the European Union, where a Directive calling for general 
safety requirement legislation by Member States was introduced nearly fifteen 
years ago, concern for the well-being of other members of the community is 
unremarkable. It is notable, however, that at the time of the review of experience 
under this original Directive, the European Commission reported to Parliament 
and the Council that uncertainty and delays had arisen in connection with 
obligations to exchange information between Member States and that, despite 
general satisfaction, a number of difficulties had arisen in connection with 
emergency situations and the Rapid Exchange of Information System 
(RAPEX).692  
 
Chapter IV of the revised Directive sets out the obligations and powers of 
Member States with Article 10 (2) (a) specifically addressing administrative 
cooperation around such issues as “ the exchange of information on risk 
assessment, dangerous products, test methods and results, recent scientific 
developments as well as other aspects relevant for control activities.” Chapter V 
establishes the foundations for the exchange of information within the community 
concerning product safety and for provides for rapid intervention. 
 
The small size of the Canadian marketplace suggest that consumer product 
safety information will limited, certainly in comparison with the more heavily-
populated jurisdictions encompassed by the European Union and the United 
States. Thus it will be highly beneficial to maintain or establish arrangements for 
information exchange around product safety. In the case of the United States, 
that country’s Consumer Product Safety Commission already contributes 
importantly to consumer safety in Canada: children’s products recalled in the 
                                            
690 Ries et al. 436 See also re significance of authorization/duty to disclose information about health 
incidents Ries et al. 436-9 
 
691 Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council on the experience acquired in the 
application of Directive 92/59/EEC on general product safety 
692 Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Experience Acquired in the 
Application of Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product Safety, COM/2000/0140 final 
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U.S. are automatically recalled in Canada.  In the eighteen month period to June 
2006, at least three quarters of the forty major recalls in Canada were initiated on 
this basis.693 
 
The revised EU Directive also anticipates such relationships: 
 
Access to RAPEX shall be open to applicant countries, third countries or 
international organizations, within the framework of agreements between the 
Community and those countries or international organizations, according to 
arrangements defined in these agreements. Any such agreements shall be 
based on reciprocity and include provisions of confidentiality corresponding to 
those applicable in the Community.694 
 
The Community’s recognition of the interests of third parties extends beyond 
reciprocal information exchange to affirmative measures of protection: 
Export from the Community of dangerous products, which have been the subject 
of a decision, [at the Community level in relation to products posing serious risk 
to health and safety] shall be prohibited unless the decision provides 
otherwise.695 
                                            
693 Carly Weeks, “Health Canada unable to ensure product safety” Ottawa Citizen 4 July 2006, p.5 
694 Chapter V, Article 12 (4) 
695 Chapter V, Article 13 (4)] 
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Annex 9 - Comment on Proposed (1994) Regulatory Efficiency 
Act  
 
Excerpts from a Discussion Paper of the Law Reform Committee of the 
Parliament of Victoria, May 1997, on proposed "Regulatory Efficiency 
Legislation" similar to failed Canadian legislation696 
  
Canadian Regulatory Efficiency Bill (C-62) 
 
"3.4 The Committee believes that the first legislative embodiment of the concept 
of alternative compliance mechanisms is contained in the (Canadian) Regulatory 
Efficiency Bill (C-62) (the Canadian Bill). Under this Bill, which was introduced 
into the Canadian Parliament in 1994, Ministers would be able to approve 
alternative methods of complying with regulations applying to a particular 
business or industry. 
 
3.6 Under the scheme proposed by the Canadian Bill, the Governor in Council, 
on the recommendation of the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister 
responsible for a particular set of regulations, would be able to make regulations 
designating:  
 
          (a) that the particular set of regulations may be subject to compliance 
plans; 
 
          (b) that any Act or regulation may be subject to ‘administrative 
arrangements’; or  
 
          (c) that a Minister or other person or body act as the regulatory authority 
for approving proposed compliance plans or changes to approved compliance 
plans or for entering into administrative agreements. 
 
Problems with the Canadian Bill (Regulatory Efficiency Act) 
 
3.13 The Committee’s current information is that the Canadian Bill lapsed and is 
unlikely to be reintroduced in the short term. It is useful to set out some of the 
reasons for this outcome, as they have relevance to elements of the Victorian 
proposal, which is set out in Chapter 4. 
 
3.14 It appears to the Committee that one of the most significant reasons why 
the Canadian Bill has not received a smooth and speedy passage through the 
Canadian Parliament is that it was the subject of a fairly scathing report by the 
Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (the Canadian Scrutiny 
Committee). While taking no issue with the goals of the Canadian Bill (that is, to 
relieve the public, especially businesses, from the effects of unnecessarily 
burdensome or costly regulations and the like), the Canadian Scrutiny 
Committee stated that the Bill represented ‘a major departure from traditions of 
                                            
696 See Discussion Paper on Regulatory Efficiency Legislation by the Law Reform Committee of the 
Parliament of Victoria , accessed on September 25, 2006, at : 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/Regulatory_Efficiency/ref/may97/default.htm#TopOfPage 
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law and government’ and, as a result, ‘ought to be very carefully examined and 
tested’. 
 
3.15 The Committee believes that it is important to set out the concerns of the 
Canadian Scrutiny Committee in detail because of the likelihood that similar 
concerns will be expressed in relation to the Victorian proposals. Those 
proposals will then have to be examined against the Canadian concerns, to see 
whether (and to what extent) the Victorian proposals warrant similar concern.  
 
3.16 The particular problems that the Canadian Scrutiny Committee identified 
were:  
 
          (a) that it would give the Executive a discretion to grant dispensations from 
the operation of subordinate laws in favour of individuals; and 
 
          (b) that it was inconsistent with other constitutional values.  
 
3.17 In relation to the first of these issues, the Canadian Scrutiny Committee said 
that the scheme proposed by the Canadian Bill amounted to a partial abrogation 
of the Bill of Rights of 1689, which declared illegal the exercise of a power of 
dispensation by the Crown.  If the Executive was given the power to grant 
dispensations from subordinate laws, the Committee questioned how long it 
would be before another government sought to extend its authority to the ability 
to grant dispensations from not just regulations but statutes themselves in the 
name of efficiency. 
 
3.18 In relation to the second issue, the Canadian Scrutiny Committee stated 
that the Canadian Bill was contrary to the Rule of Law, because: 
 
          It would put into place a system whereby governmental authorities have an 
uncontrolled and unreviewable discretion to set aside the law in particular 
instances and substitute for it a private agreement that is not legislative in nature 
but that would nevertheless be made binding on persons who are not parties to 
it. For the first time in this country, citizens could be convicted and fined or 
imprisoned, not because they disobeyed a law, but because they disobeyed a 
private agreement between a designated regulatory authority ... and their 
employer. Such a system can hardly be said to be consistent with the Rule of 
Law or with the principles of equity and fairness which are derived from it. 
 
3.19 The Canadian Scrutiny Committee also expressed concerns that the Bill 
was contrary to the principles of equity and fairness. The Committee felt that the 
compliance scheme plan offended the principle of equality before the law as it 
put forward a system where there could eventually be ‘as many different rules as 
there were persons initially subject to a particular Regulation. The Committee 
expressed the view that while it could be theoretically argued that the scheme 
allowed for equality of opportunity, giving all people an equal opportunity to seek 
a dispensation from regulations, practical reality dictated that those with greater 
financial resources would have better opportunities to gain approval of a 
compliance plan.  
 
3.20 The Canadian Scrutiny Committee felt that the fairness of a system where 
large corporations could easily obtain dispensations from regulations while 
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smaller competitors due to their lack of resources continued to be bound by 
regulations, had to be questioned. They further questioned the fairness of a 
system where public officials did not have to justify their refusal of dispensations 
and where laws enacted by parliament could be set aside as a result of private 
negotiations without prior notice to other concerned people.  
 
3.21 Finally, the Canadian Scrutiny Committee suggested that the proposals 
contained in the Canadian Bill were contrary to the principles of government 
accountability. This suggestion was made on the basis of an assessment that, 
under the operation of administrative arrangements, there would be no Minister 
answerable to the Parliament for a dispensation from the operation of a law. The 
Canadian Scrutiny Committee also stated that the tabling provisions in the Bill 
were ‘ineffective’." 
  
  352
 
Annex 10 - Recall Under the UK General Product Safety 
Regulations, 2005 S.I. No. 1803 
 
15. — (1) Subject to paragraph (4), where an enforcement authority has 
reasonable grounds for believing that a product is a dangerous product and that 
it has already been supplied or made available to consumers, the authority may 
serve a notice ("a recall notice") requiring the person on whom it is served to use 
his reasonable endeavours to organize the return of the product from consumers 
to that person or to such other person as is specified in the notice. 
 
     (2) A recall notice may require— 
(a) the recall to be effected in accordance with a code of practice 
applicable to the product concerned, or 
 
(b) the recipient of the recall notice to— 
(i) contact consumers who have purchased the product in 
order to inform them of the recall, where and to the extent it 
is practicable to do so, 
 
(ii) publish a notice in such form and such manner as is likely 
to bring to the attention of purchasers of the product the risk 
the product poses and the fact of the recall, or 
 
(iii) make arrangements for the collection or return of the 
product from consumers who have purchased it or for its 
disposal, 
and may impose such additional requirements on the recipient of 
the notice as are reasonable and practicable with a view to 
achieving the return of the product from consumers to the person 
specified in the notice or its disposal. 
(3) In determining what requirements to include in a recall notice, the 
enforcement authority shall take into consideration the need to encourage 
distributors, users and consumers to contribute to its implementation. 
 
(4) A recall notice may only be issued by an enforcement authority 
where— 
(a) other action which it may require under these Regulations would 
not suffice to prevent the risks concerned to the health and safety 
of persons, 
 
(b) the action being undertaken by the producer or the distributor 
concerned in fulfillment of his obligations under these Regulations 
is unsatisfactory or insufficient to prevent the risks concerned to the 
health and safety of persons, and 
 
(c) the authority has given not less than seven days notice to the 
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person on whom the recall notice is to be served of its intention to 
serve such a notice and where that person has before the expiry of 
that period by notice required the authority to seek the advice of 
such person as the Institute determines on the questions of— 
(i) whether the product is a dangerous product, 
(ii)  whether the issue of a recall notice is proportionate to the 
seriousness of the risk, and 
(iii)   the authority has taken account of such advice. 
    (5) Paragraphs (4)(b) and (c) shall not apply in the case of a product posing a 
serious risk requiring, in the view of the enforcement authority, urgent action. 
 
    (6) Where a person requires an enforcement authority to seek advice as 
referred to in paragraph (4)(c), that person shall be responsible for the fees, 
costs and expenses of the Institute and of the person appointed by the Institute 
to advise the authority. 
 
    (7) In paragraphs 4(c) and (6) "the Institute" means the charitable organization 
with registered number 803725 and known as the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators. 
 
    (8) A recall notice served by an enforcement authority in relation to a product 
may require the person on whom it is served to keep the authority informed of 
the whereabouts of any such product to which the recall notice relates, so far as 
he is able to do so. 
 
    (9) Where the conditions in paragraph (1) for serving a recall notice are 
satisfied and either the enforcement authority has been unable to identify any 
person on whom to serve a recall notice, or the person on whom such a notice 
has been served has failed to comply with it, then the authority may itself take 
such action as could have been required by a recall notice. 
 
    (10) Where— 
(a) an authority has complied with the requirements of paragraph (4); and 
 
(b) the authority has exercised its powers under paragraph (9) to take 
action following the failure of the person on whom the recall notice has 
been served to comply with that notice, 
then the authority may recover from the person on whom the notice was served 
summarily as a civil debt, any costs or expenses reasonably incurred by it in 
undertaking the action referred to in sub-paragraph (b). 
 
    (11) A civil debt recoverable under the preceding paragraph may be 
recovered— 
(a) in England and Wales by way of complaint (as mentioned in section 58 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, 
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(b) in Northern Ireland in proceedings under Article 62 of the Magistrate's 
Court (Northern Ireland) Order 1981. 
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Annex 11 - Interim Order Provision – The Hazardous Products 
Act 697 
 
5.1 (1) The Minister may make an interim order that contains any 
provision that may be contained in a regulation made under this Part if 
the Minister believes that immediate action is required to deal with a 
significant risk, direct or indirect, to health or safety. 
5.2  
(2) The Minister may make an interim order in which any power referred to in 
section 6 is deemed to be exercised, if the Minister believes that immediate 
action is required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to health or 
safety. 
(3) An interim order has effect from the time that it is made but ceases to 
have effect on the earliest of 
(a) 14 days after it is made, unless it is approved by the Governor in 
Council, 
(b) the day on which it is repealed, 
(c) in the case of an interim order made under subsection (1), the day on 
which a regulation made under this Part that has the same effect as the 
interim order comes into force and, in the case of an interim order made 
under subsection (2), the day on which an order made by the Governor in 
Council under this Part that has the same effect as the interim order comes 
into force, and 
(d) one year after the interim order is made or any shorter period that may 
be specified in the interim order. 
(4) No person shall be convicted of an offence consisting of a contravention 
of an interim order that, at the time of the alleged contravention, had not been 
published in the Canada Gazette unless it is proved that, at the time of the 
alleged contravention, the person had been notified of the interim order or 
reasonable steps had been taken to bring the purport of the interim order to 
the notice of those persons likely to be affected by it. 
(5) An interim order 
(a) is exempt from the application of sections 3, 5 and 11 of the Statutory 
Instruments Act; and 
(b) shall be published in the Canada Gazette within 23 days after it is made. 
(6) For the purpose of any provision of this Part other than this section, any 
reference to regulations made under this Act is deemed to include interim 
orders, and any reference to a regulation made under a specified provision of 
this Act is deemed to include a reference to the portion of an interim order 
                                            
697 (S.C. 2004, c. 15, s. 67) 
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containing any provision that may be contained in a regulation made under the 
specified provision. 
(7) A copy of each interim order must be tabled in each House of Parliament 
within 15 days after it is made 
8) In order to comply with subsection (7), the interim order may be sent to 
the Clerk of the House if the House is not sitting. (emphasis added) 
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Annex 12 – Nicholas A. Ashford 
Options for a Statutory General Safety Requirement (GSR): 
Lessons from Selected Experiences in the United States  
 
Introduction: The Legal and Policy Framework for Consumer 
Protection  
 
Product Safety in the US Legal System  
The safety of consumer products, devices, materials, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food, equipment, machinery and motor vehicles -- 
hereafter collectively called ‘products’ -- for consumers and users is addressed in 
advanced economies through both common-law traditions and legislation.  In the 
United States, common-law protection is generally provided through the case-
developed state law, sometimes later codified in state statutes, reflected in tort 
traditions and the availability of injunctive relief to protect consumers from 
harmful products.   
 
Federal statutory protection for consumer products is provided by the Federal 
Consumer Product Safety Act and for hazardous substances through the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, both administered by the U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission.  Excluded from both acts are pesticides, tobacco, 
pharmaceuticals, food, medical devices, cosmetics, motor vehicles and firearms.  
Harms from those categories are protected by their own particularized statutes.  
Other countries’ jurisdictions may differ as to what is protected under general, as 
opposed to particularized product safety. 
 
Activities Relevant to Product Safety 
The plethora of activities relevant to product safety include: 
• Designing a safe product at the outset; 
• Choosing to market or use a safely-designed – or safer designed -- 
product from readily available options (off-the-shelf); 
• Establishing guidelines or mandatory standards for the safety of some 
aspect of a product – including product characteristics, labels, and product 
bans, recalls, & seizures; 
• Controlling the hazardous or harmful aspects of a product; 
• Providing meaningful warnings, instructions and antidotes; 
• Mitigating the harm from a dangerous product; 
• Monitoring and tracking the harms once the product is in commerce (data 
collection); 
• Reporting harm/harmful incidents from a product, if known; 
• Recalling a product; and 
• Compensating those harmed/injured. 
 
The first two activities – developing or adopting a safe/safer product – are pro-
active or preventive in nature.  Activities falling into the third activity – standards 
and guidelines -- are preventive/proactive only to the extent that they encourage 
technical improvements in product safety; requirements reflecting existing 
technological options may foster diffusion of best practices, but are much less 
likely to encourage product technology innovation.   Actions falling into the fourth 
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activity include secondary prevention approaches such as cut-off electrical 
devices, blade shields, and the like.  These approaches are acknowledged as 
reactive, rather than proactive; they might be described as ‘end-of-pipe’ 
approaches in that they do not require changes in the functioning concept of the 
product or in the fundamental product design.  The fifth activity shifts the 
avoidance of injury onto the user.  The remaining activities are mitigating or 
minimizing damage, rather than preventing harm in the first place.  In examining 
or developing options for government intervention, one important criterion is the 
extent to which a particular intervention mainly fosters primary prevention, 
secondary prevention, or mitigation. 
 
Not all of these activities are backed up by statutory Directives, and not all 
statutory Directives appear in the same legislation.  Statutory provisions may 
creative an affirmative duty on the part of government or those that introduce the 
product into commerce – or they may simply encourage one or more of these 
practices.  Standards may be nothing more than voluntary guidelines, or they 
may be requirements for voluntary commercial certification, or they take the form 
of mandatory requirements/regulations.  Adherence to, or departures from, these 
varying requirements have different consequences for common-law or statutory 
liability as to both the admissibility as evidence and as to the creation of 
presumptions of guilt or innocence of violations of legal duties and liabilities. 
 
Since the 1980’s in the United States, two somewhat contrary trends are visible: 
(1) the movement of producer responsibility from the control of risk to the 
prevention of possible harm and (2) the trend towards greater reliance on 
voluntary action, rather than on government imposition of responsibilities.  In 
Europe, these two trends are also visible, and volunteerism characterized most 
early European approaches, but recently the need for stronger government has 
been recognized and the rise of the importance of environment in the European 
Union’s legal structure has caused Europe and the EU to “trade places” with 
regard to regulatory aggressiveness and the creation of mandatory standards in 
environmental, health and safety regulation698.  Within Europe, philosophical 
tensions continue between some EU bureaucrats who tend to favor voluntary 
approaches involving all the stakeholders, characteristic of the “corporatist state”, 
and some ‘northern’ EU members who press for more Directive, mandatory 
standards.  In spite of these political waves, lessons relevant to a GSR can be 
learned from both arenas.   
 
Terminology 
Terminology turns out to be important and in need of clarification.  Regrettably, in 
the European realm, ‘standards’ sometimes mean mandatory requirements and 
sometimes, voluntary guidelines.  This confusion is accelerated by the activities 
of the ISO and other private ‘standard’- setting bodies.  The term ‘Regulation 
tends to be unambiguously mandatory.   
 
Another confusion attends the label ‘performance’.  It is an adjective-label that is 
both attached to the term ‘standard’ and is found in the term ‘performance-based 
approach.’  For our purposes, a performance standard is one that that specifies 
compliance with a safety aspect of a product describing it’s safety-relevant 
                                            
698 Vogel, David (2003) The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited:  The New Politics of Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation in Europe, British Journal of Political Science 33: 557-580. 
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characteristics, e.g., ‘being able to withstand a pressure of 250 lbs/square inch’ 
or ‘not containing phthalates’.  Performance standards are preferred by the 
CPSC.  They are distinguished from ‘specification standards’ that usually specify 
content/product characteristics in a positive sense – e.g., ‘made of chromium 
steel’ or ‘wood treated with anti-fungal chemicals’.  (The line is not always a 
sharp one, e.g., is requiring a transformer to have an output of 6 volts with an 
operating input of 110-240 volts a performance or specification standard?)  
Performance standards give more leeway to the product provider or user, while 
specification standards tend to be more restrictive in choices.  That is one reason 
they are favored by product manufacturers and users.   On the other hand, 
commercial actors – especially small ones or those in developing countries -- are 
not always in a position to make informed choices and welcome clarity 
associated with specification standards.  In the context of trade, exporters from 
developing countries suspect that specification standards – indeed the entire ISO 
regime -- are being used to minimize competition.  WTO Trade disputes are 
scrupulous about examining whether standards are masquerading as non-tariff 
trade barriers.  Other standards include product bans and labels describing 
contents, articulating warnings, and providing instructions as to product use.      
 
Voluntary Versus Mandatory Approaches 
So-called ‘performance-based approaches’ to ensuring product safety are used 
in two different senses.  One is to encourage performance standards, rather than 
overly-detailed specification standards.  The other meaning is as a euphemism 
for voluntary, rather than mandatory requirements, be they performance or 
specification in nature.699  The literature is unfortunately mixed on the usage.  
Terms such as “common-sense approaches,” “regulatory reinvention” “incentive-
based compliance evaluation,” etc. should raise a red-flag as emphasizing 
voluntary approaches and the discouragement of mandatory requirements, 
reflecting a laissez-faire approach to product safety.  Of course, and combination 
of mandatory and voluntary approaches might be indicated in a specific 
jurisdiction or system.  Two different questions should be kept in mind when 
comparing (or choosing) approaches: (1) which approaches or combinations of 
approaches are favored in achieving compliance with existing guidelines? and 
(2) which approaches or combinations of approaches are more likely to favor ‘a 
culture of safety’ that fosters inherently-safer700 design, marketing and use of 
product?  These different questions suggest different evaluation criteria and 
philosophies. 
 
Incentives and Disincentives 
The government, producers and consumers all have potentially important roles in 
advancing product safety.  The government may be committed to a strong 
Directive role if it has an emboldened sense of its responsibility under the ‘social 
contract’. Otherwise, government action appears reactively in support of strong 
government involvement only after some social disaster such as that which 
followed the occurrence of asbestos-related harms, the Ford Pinto automobile 
injuries, BSD/mad cow disease, the VIOXX problem, and the like.  Note that 
government does not attempt to sell voluntary programs following these kinds of 
disasters and events. 
                                            
699 See Coglianese, Cary and Jennifer Nash (eds.) (2001) Regulating from the Inside, Resources for the 
Future, Washington DC. 
  
700 See the discussion of inherent safety in Section 4 infra.  
  360
 
Producers may be motivated by cost considerations that flow directly marketing 
unsafe products or by enlightened self-interest to avoid product recalls, 
withdrawals, or tort litigation, but it would be a stretch to say this latter motivation 
is sufficient to ensure the public safety – especially where advertising and re-
branding products can mitigate the losses brought about by harm to reputation, 
such as with the Ford Explorer and renaming Firestone Tires.  In the U.S., the 
tendency of courts of appeals to dramatically reduce punitive damages has taken 
the bite out of tort as a financial deterrent.  It is true that some producers – e.g., 
Volvo in automobiles and Fisher-Price in toys – do actively market product 
safety, but this is a rare occurrence.  Mandatory and voluntary standards do have 
an evidentiary role to play in tort, depending on the particular state or jurisdiction 
in which suit is brought or in the U.S. which state laws are followed in federal 
diversity cases, but since tort is generally acknowledged to be a waning 
deterrent in the U.S., the differences may not be all that important.  At a 
minimum, violation of either a mandatory or voluntary industry standard is 
evidence of negligence.   
 
Consumers may be safety conscious on their own, but usually an organization – 
such as the Consumers Union, The National Consumers League, the National 
Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides, the Center for Auto Safety, or Ralph 
Nader’s Health Research Group (on pharmaceuticals) – can be traced to 
fostering increased consumer awareness through their activities, publications, 
and lawsuits.  Readily-available information on product-related injuries provided 
by either government (for example the CPSC’s product injury tracking system – 
the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System) or NGOs is essential for 
fostering active participation of consumers in product safety.  Some consumer 
groups participate in private standard-setting organizations such as the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM), or the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).  
Individuals (citizens or academics) may participate in ‘professional’ organizations 
that influence worker health and safety such as the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) concerned with the toxic effects of 
chemicals or the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE). 
 
Life-cycle Considerations and Extended Producer Responsibility 
In a real sense, developing policies focusing only on the consumer safety 
aspects of products is out-of-date.  Environmental pollution and safety risks from 
the extraction of materials, their transformation into feedstocks and starting 
materials for product manufacturing, product manufacturing, transportation, 
product use, and product disposal are all part of the life-cycle of products701 .  
While the EU Integrated Product Policy (discussed later) focuses mostly on 
environmental impact, it does pay some attention to consumer safety associated 
with products.  Partial attempts to integrate various stages of a product’s life are 
reflected in the developing laws implementing extended producer responsibility, 
whereby producers of industrial chemicals have obligations to ensure safe use 
by their industrial customers, buy-back provisions are established as with used 
motor-oil in Germany, and the EU WEEE Initiative for electronics establishes a 
complex system linking producers and users.  The essential point, of course, is 
                                            
701 See Geiser, Kenneth (2001) Materials Matter: Towards a Sustainable Materials Policy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 479 pages. 
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that these various health, safety, and environmental concerns ideally should be 
taken into account at the design stage, where the choice of materials, 
manufacturing methods, safety, and disposal consequences must be considered.  
The design of sustainable products is an important part of sustainable 
development.     
 
In the remainder of this paper, we address important features of the U.S. and EU 
regulatory systems that suggest options for a GSR, the role of standards and 
guidelines in tort and product liability in ensuring product safety, prevention and 
inherent safety: technological innovation in product and process design, and 
compatibility of a GSR with U.S. regulatory traditions and practice. 
 
 
The Regulatory System 
 
In this section, we not only review authorities and practices of the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, we also explore the possible contributions of the 
authorities under (1) the ‘general duty’ requirement to provide a safe workplace 
under the US Occupational Safety and Health Act, (2) the ‘general duty’ 
requirement to design and maintain a safe (chemical) plant under the US Clean 
Air Act Section 112r, (3) the US Pollution Prevention Act, (4) the EU Seveso 
Directives for chemical plant safety, and (5) the EU Integrated Product Policy 
(emphasizing eco-design) in support of creating an affirmative duty to design, 
maintain, and periodically review the safety of consumer products in a General 
Safety Requirement in order to promote a ‘culture of safety’. 
 
The interplay between the regulation of product safety and liability for harmful 
and/or defective products is important but very different in the United States and 
the EU.  For an insightful treatment, see Geraint G. Howells, International Torts: 
A Comparative Study: The Relationship Between Product Liability and Product 
Safety -- Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability 
Through a Comparison with the U.S. Position, Spring, 2000, 39 Washburn L.J. 
305-346. 
 
Product Safety Regulation under the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CPSA) of 1972 as amended and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
(FHSA) 
 
Section 4 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2053) of the CPSA establishes the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission and provides: that the Commission is a five-member 
“independent regulatory commission” headed by a chairperson.  The members 
are appointed by the President, but with limitations on presidential power: (a) no 
more than three can come from the same political party; (b) there is a seven year 
fixed term; (c) removal is allowed only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in 
office;” (d) no member can have a direct tie with the industry. 
 
The CPSA 15 U.S.C. Section 2051 et seq. states as its purposes: 
 
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with 
consumer products; 
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer 
products; 
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(3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products…; and  
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes of product-related 
deaths, illnesses, and injuries. 
 
On its face, and in regulatory practice, the term ‘unreasonable risks’ in the first 
purpose anticipates a social balancing/cost-benefit approach between providing 
consumer protection and minimizing the burden to industry.  Indeed preparation 
of a “regulatory analysis” is a statutory requirement precedent to establishing a 
consumer product safety rule.702 Predating the emergence of the ‘precautionary 
principle,’ the strength of evidence justifying the existence of risks before CPSC 
imposing regulations has varied with Administrations.  However, in the area of 
toxic substances, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals review of CPSC’s proposed 
standard for Urea Formaldehyde Foam,703 resulted in the court’s invalidating the 
standard because carcinogenicity in one animal species was deemed insufficient 
to justify the standard.  As in other environmental law cases, decisions of the 
Fifth Circuit – the geographical location of the U.S. petrochemical industry -- are 
a variance with those of the other circuit courts on the burden that environmental 
agencies need to bear to justify their actions. 
 
In the early 1980s following the “Reagan Revolution,” CPSC authority for 
designating and regulating a substance (or article/product containing that 
substance) as a “hazardous substance” was transferred from the CPSA to the 
FHSA (15 U.S.C. Sections 1261−1278).  Authority over such substance is 
retained “only if the Commission by rule finds that it is in the public interest to 
regulate such risk of injury…” A regulatory analysis identical to that required by 
Section 9(f)(2) of the CPSA is required before the CPSC can classify an article or 
substance as a banned hazardous substance or issue a regulation of toys or 
articles intended for use by children under the FHSA.  
 
Legislative Authority Relevant to Product Safety: Promulgation of 
Mandatory Consumer Product Safety Standards, Labeling, Recalls, Bans, 
Seizures, and Data Collection    
 
CPSA 
Section 5 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2054): CPSC “shall” perform a data-gathering function. 
  
Section 7 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2056): CPSC “may” promulgate consumer product 
safety standards (in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 9), which 
may be one or both of two types: 
 
  (a) performance requirements; or 
  (b) warnings or instructions. 
 
Section 9(d)(2) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 2058(d)(2)]: a rule establishing a consumer 
product safety standard is to be promulgated according to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, except that “an opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, 
or arguments” is to be provided. 
 
                                            
702 Section 9(f)(2); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2058(f)(2)   
703 Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 Fed. Rep. 2nd ser. 1137 (Fifth 
Circuit Court, 1983). 
  363
Section 9(f)(3)(A) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 2058(f)(3)(A)]: CPSC cannot promulgate a 
consumer product safety standard unless it finds “that the rule (including its 
effective date) is reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable 
risk of injury.” 
 
However, as discussed below, there is now a preference stated in the act for 
voluntary (industry) standards over the promulgation of agency standards 
[Section 7b (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2056b)]. 
 
Section 8 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2057): CPSC “may” ban a consumer product where: 
 
  (a) the product presents an “unreasonable risk of injury,” and 
 
  (b) a consumer product safety rule would not adequately address 
that risk. 
 
CPSC must follow the procedural requirements of section 9 in promulgating such 
a ban. 
 
Section 12 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2061):  Where there is an imminent and 
unreasonable risk of death, serious illness, or severe bodily injury, CPSC “may” 
seek appropriate relief (including seizure of the product) in the appropriate U.S. 
District Court. 
 
Section 15 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2064): Where there is a substantial risk of injury to 
the public, either because of a violation of a consumer product safety standard or 
because of a product “defect,” CPSC may require that notices of the risk be 
given, and may, after providing an opportunity for a hearing, order conformity, 
replacement, or rebate. 
 
Section 30(d) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 2079(d)]: There is a “pass through” to the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act [as well as the Poison Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. 
1191 et seq.) and the Flammable Fabrics Act (Section 1191 et seq.)] for 
consumer products that (i) are (or contain) hazardous substances, and (ii) can be 
addressed adequately under that statute. 
 
FHSA 
 
Section 2(f) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 1261(f)] states that: 
 
The term “hazardous substance” means: 
 
(1)(A) Any substance or mixture which is (i) toxic, (ii) corrosive, (iii) is an 
irritant, (iv) is a strong sensitizer, (v) is flammable or combustible, or (vi) 
generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or by other means, if 
such substance or mixture may cause substantial personal injury or 
substantial illness during or as a proximate result of any customary or 
reasonably foreseeable handing or use… 
 
Section 2(f) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 1261(f)]: any substance or mixture that meets one of 
the statutory definitions, or that is designated as hazardous by CPSC under the 
first statutory definition. 
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Exclusions: pesticides, drugs, food, and cosmetics, containerized fuels, tobacco 
products, and nuclear material regulated under the Atomic Energy Act. 
 
Section 2(p) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 1261(p)]: A “misbranded hazardous substance” is 
any hazardous substance “intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use in 
the household or by children,” which 
 
(i) fails to comply with an applicable labeling regulation issued by 
CPSC under the Poison Prevention Packaging Act; or 
 
(ii) fails to comply with the labeling requirements set forth in this 
section of the statute (or with more specific labeling requirements 
for this substance established by CPSC under section 3 of the 
FHSA). 
 
Section 2(q)(1): A “banned hazardous substance” is 
 
(A) any “toy, or other article intended for use by children,” which is or 
“bears or contains” a hazardous substance that is “susceptible to access 
by a child” to whom it is entrusted (although items such as chemistry sets 
are exempted); or 
 
(B) a hazardous substance “intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for 
use in the household,” that the CPSC classifies as a banned hazardous 
substance after a finding that “notwithstanding such cautionary labeling as 
is or may be required under this Act for that substance, the degree or 
nature of the hazard involved in the presence or use of such substance in 
households is such that the objective of the protection of public health and 
safety can be adequately served only by keeping such substance, when 
so intended or packaged, out of the channels of interstate commerce.” 
 
Section 3 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1262) provides:  
 
(a) CPSC can, following designated Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
procedures, declare a substance to be “hazardous” under the section 
2(f)(A) definition. 
 
(b) CPSC can, if it finds that the labeling requirements of section 2(p) “are 
not adequate for the protection of public health and safety” from a 
particular hazardous substance, promulgate more specific labeling 
requirements for that substance. 
 
(c) & (d) If CPSC finds that full compliance with (some or all) the act’s 
labeling requirements “is impracticable or is not necessary for the 
protection of public health and safety,” or that the substance “is 
adequately regulated by other provisions of the law,” CPSC must (in 
the first case) and may (in the second case) exempt the substance 
from those labeling requirements. 
 
(f), (g) & (h) impose extensive procedural requirements on CPSC’s 
designation of a “banned” hazardous substance, give “any person” the 
  365
right to propose an existing standard (or develop a voluntary standard) 
meant to regulate the use of the substance rather than ban it, and require 
CPSC to promulgate such a standard (in lieu of a ban) if it finds that the 
standard will be adequate.  Subsection (i)  prohibits CPSC from banning a 
substance unless it first finds that the benefits of such a ban “bear a 
reasonable relationship to its costs,” and that the ban is “the  least 
burdensome requirement which prevents or adequately reduces the risk.” 
 
In classifying a substance as “hazardous,” or in banning a hazardous substance, 
CPSC must also follow certain procedures of the FDCA applicable to the 
establishment of a “standard of identity” for a food.  These procedures give an 
objecting party the right to an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Section 4 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1263): The following acts are prohibited: (a) the 
introduction or delivery for introduction into commerce of a banned or 
misbranded hazardous substance; (b) the alteration, obliteration, etc., of a 
hazardous substance label so as to make the substance a “misbranded” 
hazardous substance. 
 
 
Judicial Review of CPSC Decisions 
Section 12 (15 U.S.C Sec. 2061) of the CPSA: Judicial review is in the 
appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals; consumer product safety standards are 
subject to the “substantial evidence” standard; and attorney and expert witness 
fees are available to a prevailing party. 
 
CPSC’s classification of a substance under the FHSA as a “hazardous 
substance” under the act is governed by section 409(g) of the FDCA – the 
agency’s findings and conclusions must be “based upon a fair evaluation of the 
entire record,” after a hearing. 
 
 
Citizen’s Roles 
Citizens may appeal, as above, if they are adversely affected by a CPSC rule 
issued under the CPSA or the FHSA. 
 
Section 9(i) [15 U.S.C. Sec. 2058(i)] of the CPSA provides: citizens may petition 
for rulemaking under the APA, and CPSC must consider and respond. 
 
Section 24 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2073) of the CPSA provides:  citizens may sue to 
enforce a consumer product safety standard, and may recover fees if they 
prevail. 
 
Section 23 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2072) of the CPSA provides:  there is a private cause 
of action, for monetary damages, for injury caused by a violation of a consumer 
product safety standard; prevailing plaintiffs may recover fees. 
 
Section 3(j) (15 U.S.C. 1262(j) of the FHSA provides: Anyone may petition CPSC 
for a rulemaking, and the agency must grant or deny the request within a 
“reasonable” time. 
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Voluntary Standards and Guidelines in the CPSA 
Section 7b (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2056b): CPSC “shall rely upon voluntary consumer 
product safety standards rather than promulgate a consumer product safety 
…whenever compliance with such voluntary standards would eliminate or 
adequately reduce the risk of injury addressed with such voluntary standards.”  
The origin of this section lies in the 1981 changes to the CPSA during the anti-
regulatory period heralded by the election of Ronald Reagan. 
 
Howells supra comments on the different attitudes towards voluntary standards 
in the U.S. and the EU: 
 
[There is a] different nature of [voluntary] standards in the U.S. and Europe. 
Whereas in the U.S. these remain very much voluntary standards, established by 
private actors, in Europe, at least in areas covered by " New Approach 
Directives," their use has become quasi-mandatory. 
 
The CPSC now works on eight to fourteen mandatory standards per year and 
forty to fifty voluntary standards. There are numerous standards writing 
organizations. The three with which the CPSC works most closely are the 
American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), American Society for Testing 
and Materials ("ASTM"), and the Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. ("UL"). 
 
Voluntary standards have no legal effect as such. Although industry is often 
eager to develop voluntary standards and to comply with them, not only to help 
defend products liability claims and stave off any remaining threat of mandatory 
regulation, but also to use compliance as a marketing tool both at home and 
increasingly in the international marketplace. Also, if a producer inaccurately 
claims that its product conforms to a product safety standard when it does not, 
then it will be in breach of the truth and labeling laws administered by the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
 
In the U.S., however, there is no bridge between mandatory and voluntary 
standards. Except in extreme cases, the U.S. system has forgone mandatory 
regulations and is left to rely upon freestanding voluntary standards. In contrast, 
in Europe, the legislatures have managed to keep a hand on the tiller of product 
safety regulation by developing Directives, which establish a framework that 
integrates voluntary standards. This integration is an effort to achieve those 
levels of safety considered politically desirable by means with which industry is 
comfortable. The integration of the standards into the legal framework has also 
permitted greater public participation in the formation of standards. 
 
The extent of public or other stakeholder participation in the EU should not be 
overstated.  As in the U.S., large manufacturers tend to dominate SMEs and 
consumer/citizen groups both of which have less time and ability to defray the 
costs of participation. 
 
Finally, in both the U.S. and the EU context, one could argue that there has been 
a ”privatization of the regulation,” although perhaps to a  different extent. Should 
Canada adopt either approach, care would have to be taken to ensure the 
changes are compatible with Canadian legal tradition.   
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Section 7b (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2056b): provides that for “any person [who] 
participates with the Commission in the development of a consumer product 
safety standard, the Commission may agree to contribute to that person’s cost…”  
 
Originally, the obligation to report a consumer product safety problem obligation 
arose only when a person obtained information that the product failed to comply 
with an applicable consumer product safety rule or contained a defect which 
could create a substantial product hazard.   In an attempt to increase the rate of 
reporting, the basis for reporting was extended by the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 1990. The obligation to report is now triggered when a 
product fails to comply with a voluntary product safety standard relied upon by 
the CPSC and by situations where the product creates an unreasonable risk of 
serious injury or death [Section 15b (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2064(b)]. 
 
 
Dealing with Emerging, Unregulated or Orphan Risks 
Either on its own initiative (described under the section on Legislative Authority 
above), or in response to a citizen petition (described under the CPSA and FHSA 
in the section on Citizens’ Roles above), the CPSC can take regulatory action.14  
 
 
Extended Producer Responsibility 
Manufacturers have no formalized responsibility under the CPSA or FHSA 
beyond the initial transmission of control to a buyer or recipient.  However, 
should they become knowledgeable about a product defect or harmful product in 
the line of commercial/personal usage, responsibilities could ‘run with the 
product’.  If the product is used in an unforeseeable and unintended way, product 
liability may not attend, but products may none-the-less be recalled by the 
CPSC. 
 
 
Other Relevant U.S. Regulatory Regimes 
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (the OSHAct) of 1970 
The OSHAct of 1970 envisioned two routes to the creation of permanent worker 
safety and health standards: (1) the administrative adoption of so-called 
(industry) consensus standards, the adoption being restricted to a two year 
period at the beginning of the act’s implementation, and (2) the promulgation of 
permanent standards after a notice-and-comment period.  The act also 
established a general duty on the part of employers to provide a ‘safe and 
healthful workplace.’  The OSHA experience with consensus standards, 
permanent standards and with the general duty obligation may be instructive in 
devising a General Safety Requirement or other means for advancing consumer 
product safety. 
 
The consensus standards, while voluntary in their creation, were mandatory on 
employers under the law.  The general purpose of the act was “to assure every 
working man and woman a safe and healthful workplace and place of 
employment as far as possible”.  Thus, unlike the CPSA, the statute was to 
provide extensive protection, limited only by feasibility, and not subject to a cost-
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benefit balancing.  The technology-forcing aspects of OSHA standards are well-
known and served as a model for other U.S. environmental regimes704. 
 
OSHA can begin the promulgation of standards either on its own or in response 
to petitions from other parties, including the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
under the Centers for Disease Control, state and local governments, any 
nationally-recognized standards-producing organization, employer or labor 
representatives, or any other interested person. The standard-setting process 
involves input from advisory committees and from NIOSH. When OSHA 
develops plans to propose, amend, or delete a standard, it publishes these 
intentions in the Federal Register. Subsequently, interested parties have 
opportunities to present arguments and pertinent evidence in writing or at public 
hearings.  NIOSH, a non-regulatory scientific organization in CDC, has played a 
very significant role in OSHA standards development.  There is no counterpart in 
the U.S. or in Europe for independent scientific advise on the safety of products. 
 
Under certain conditions, OSHA is also authorized to set emergency temporary 
standards705, which take effect immediately, but which are to be followed by the 
establishment of permanent standards within 6 months. To set an emergency 
temporary standard, OSHA must first determine that workers are in grave danger 
from exposure to toxic substances or new hazards and are not adequately 
protected by existing standards. Both emergency temporary and permanent 
standards can be appealed through the federal courts, but filing an appeals 
petition does not delay the enforcement of the standard unless a court of appeals 
specifically orders it. Employers may make application to OSHA for a temporary 
variance from a standard or regulation if they lack the means to comply readily 
with it, or for a permanent variance if they can prove that their facilities or 
methods of operation provide employee protection that is at least as effective as 
that required by OSHA.  The legal provision of variances could be important in 
the consumer product safety realm. 
 
The OSHAct specifically addresses the subject of toxic materials. It states, in 
Section 6(b)(5) of the act, that the Secretary of Labor (through OSHA), in 
promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, 
shall set the standard that “most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on 
the basis of the best available evidence that no employee will suffer material 
impairment of health or functional capacity, even if such employee has a regular 
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working 
life” (emphases added). These words indicate that the issue of exposure to toxic 
chemicals or carcinogens that have long latency periods, as well as to 
reproductive hazards, is covered by the act in specific terms. 
 
Under Section 6(b) of the OSHAct, new health standards dealing with toxic 
substances were to be established using the mechanism of an open hearing and 
subject to review by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The evolution of case law 
associated with the handful of standards that OSHA promulgated through this 
                                            
704 See Ashford, N. A. and Caldart, C.C. (1996). Technology, Law and the Working Environment. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
705 This power is likened to the Canadian Minister’s power under the Canadian Hazardous Products Act to 
issue interim orders with respect to any matter that might be appropriate for a regulation (See Hazardous 
Product Act. 1985 section 5.1). 
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section of the OSHAct is worth considering in detail. The courts addressed the 
difficult issue of what is adequate scientific information necessary to sustain the 
requirement that the standards be supported by “substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole.” The cases also addressed the extent to which economic 
factors were permitted or required to be considered in the setting of the 
standards, the meaning of “feasibility,” OSHA’s technology-forcing authority, the 
question of whether a cost–benefit analysis was required or permitted, and, 
finally, the extent of the jurisdiction of OSHAct in addressing different degrees of 
risk. 
 
In Section 6(c), the OSHAct authorizes OSHA to set, on publication in the 
Federal Register and without recourse to a formal hearing; emergency temporary 
(6-month) standards (ETSs) for toxic exposures constituting a “grave danger.” 
Before OSHA lowered its permanent standard for asbestos from 2.0 to 0.2 
fibers/cm3, it attempted to protect workers by promulgating an ETS at 0.5 
fibers/cm3. In 1984, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied OSHA the ETS, 
arguing that the cost involved defeated the requirement that the ETS be 
“necessary” to protect workers. Attempts by OSHA to establish an ETS for 
hexavalent chromium likewise failed court review. 
 
In addition to requiring employers to comply with specific standards, the OSHAct 
imposes on virtually every employer in the private sector a general duty “to 
furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which 
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm….” (emphasis added). A recognized hazard may be a 
substance for which the likelihood of harm has been the subject of research, 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion, or a substance for which an OSHA standard 
may or may not have been promulgated. The burden of proving that a particular 
substance is a recognized hazard and that industrial exposure to it results in a 
significant degree of exposure is placed on OSHA. Because standard setting is a 
slow process, protection of workers through the employer’s general duty 
obligation could be especially important, but it is crucially dependent on the 
existence of reliable safety or health effects data, as well as on the willingness of 
a particular OSHA administration to use this as a vehicle for protection. 
 
In 1971, under Section 6(a) of the act, allowing for their adoption without critical 
review, OSHA initially adopted as standards the so-called permissible exposure 
limits (PELs): the 450 threshold limit values (TLVs) recommended by the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) as 
guidelines for protection against the toxic effects of these materials. In the 1970s, 
under Section 6(b), OSHA set formal standards for asbestos, vinyl chloride, 
arsenic, dibromochloropropane, coke oven emissions, acrylonitrile, lead, cotton 
dust, and a group of 14 carcinogens. In the 1980s, OSHA regulated benzene, 
ethylene oxide, and formaldehyde as carcinogens and regulated asbestos more 
rigidly as a carcinogen at 0.2 fibers/cm3. In the early 1990s, OSHA regulated 
cadmium, bloodborne pathogens, glycol ethers, and confined spaces. OSHA 
also lowered the PEL for formaldehyde from 1 to 0.75 parts per million (ppm; 
averaged over an 8-hour period) and issued a process safety management 
(PSM) rule (see the discussion in the next section). 
 
The inadequacy of the 450 TLVs adopted under Section 6(a) of the act is widely 
known. The TLVs originated as guidelines recommended by the ACGIH to 
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protect the average worker from either recognized acute effects or easily 
recognized chronic effects. The standards were based on animal toxicity data or 
the limited epidemiologic evidence available at the time (1969) of the 
establishment of the TLVs. They do not address sensitive populations within the 
workforce or those with prior exposure or existing disease, nor do they address 
the issues of carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and teratogenicity. These standards 
were adopted en masse in 1971 as a part of the consensus standards that 
OSHA adopted along with those dealing primarily with safety.  Many of these 
ANSI standards were purged after their adoption, on the urging of industry.   
 
An example of the inadequacy of protection offered by the TLVs is the 1971 TLV 
for vinyl chloride, which was set at 250 ppm, whereas the later protective 
standard (see below) recommended no greater exposure than 1 ppm (as an 
average over 8 hours)—a level still recognized as unsafe, but the limit that the 
technology could detect. Another example is the TLV for lead, which was 
established at 200 µg/m3, whereas the later lead standard was established at 50 
µg/m3, also recognizing that that level was not safe for all populations, such as 
pregnant women or those with prior lead exposure. In 1997, OSHA promulgated 
a new PEL for methylene chloride of 25 ppm, replacing the prior TLV of 500 
ppm. The ACGIH updates its TLV list every 2 years. Although useful, an updated 
list would have little legal significance unless formally adopted by OSHA. OSHA 
did try, unsuccessfully, to adopt an updated and new list of PELs in its Air 
Contaminants Standard in 1989 (see later discussion). However, OSHA 
continues to maintain that it is intent on revising the list. The fact that the official 
OSHA TLVs are more than 30 years out of date compared with industry’s own 
“voluntary” consensus standards is not welcomed, especially by the more 
modern firms in industry. 
 
It is obvious that the slow, arduous process of promulgating individual health 
standards under Section 6(b)(5) of the OSHAct could never catch up with 
advances in scientific knowledge concerning the toxicity of chemicals. The 
ACGIH has updated its TLV list every 2 years, and although not as protective as 
workers and their unions would have liked, the recent updated lists did advance 
protection over the 1969 list that OSHA adopted into law in 1971. In 1989, OSHA 
decided to update the original list in a single rule-making effort through the 6(b) 
standard revision route. The agency issued more protective limits for 212 
substances and established limits for 164 chemicals that were previously 
unregulated. Neither industry nor labor was satisfied with the standards. Industry, 
although giving general support, objected to the stringency of some of the PELs. 
Labor objected to their laxity, citing NIOSH recommendations not adopted, and 
generally objected to the rush-it-through process. The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the standard in 1992, ruling that OSHA failed to establish that a 
significant risk of material health impairment existed for each regulated 
substance (required by the benzene decision) and that the new exposure limit for 
each substance was feasible for the affected industry. OSHA decided not to 
appeal the decision to what it perceived as a conservative Supreme Court. Thus, 
the original and inadequate TLV list remains in effect, and 164 new substances 
remain unregulated. OSHA periodically expresses its intent on updating the list 
through new rule making, but no new action has been forthcoming. In the 
meantime, OSHA could argue that those 164 substances are “recognized 
hazards” and enforceable through OSHA’s general duty clause, but conservative 
OSHA administrations have not been willing to emphasize this approach in the 
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case of the TLVs, although OSHA has used the general duty obligation to force 
compliance with good ergonomic practices in nursing homes. In 20 years, OSHA 
has issued only about a dozen general duty citations for substances covered by 
the original TLV list. Recently, OSHA’s reluctance to use the general duty 
obligation in the case of the outdated TLVs was in part due to the many 
congressional attempts to pass legislation prohibiting such use.  
 
A testimonial to the possibly potential significant impact the general duty clause 
is the fact that  OSHA inspectors were ordered not to issue general duty violation 
citations to employers when the Reagan Administration came in, and that there 
were constant attempts to limit its use by a anti-regulatory Republican congress.  
The reasons for this are clear.  In the waning years of the Carter Administration 
(1976-1980), the number of general duty citations began to increase, and 
industry was fearful of the uncertainty associated with the discretion of the OSHA 
inspectors to issue citations if the found the workplace unsafe, regardless of the 
absence of violations of specific standards.    OSHA inspectors viewed their 
ability to issue general duty citations as their most important leveraging tool in 
conservative administrations which had promised to “keep government off of 
industry’s backs.”   
 
The Chemical Safety Provisions of the Clean Air Act 
Although the first congressional response to the concern generated by the 
deadly industrial accident in Bhopal, India, was the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act of 1986, the chemical safety provisions of that law 
are focused almost solely on mitigation and not on accident prevention. A much 
greater potential for a direct focus on accident prevention can be found in the 
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, although that potential has yet to be 
realized by EPA and OSHA. 
 
As amended in 1990, Section 112 of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to 
develop regulations regarding the prevention and detection of accidental 
chemical releases and to publish a list of at least 100 chemical substances (with 
associated threshold quantities) to be covered by the regulations. The 
regulations must include requirements for the development of risk-management 
plans (RMPs) by facilities using any of the regulated substances in amounts 
above the relevant threshold. These RMPs must include a hazard assessment, 
an accident prevention program, and an emergency release program. Similarly, 
Section 304 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990 directed OSHA to promulgate 
a Process Safety Management (PSM) standard under the OSHAct. 
 
Section 112(r) of the revised Clean Air Act also imposes a “general duty” on all 
“owners and operators of stationary sources,” regardless of the particular identity 
or quantity of the chemicals used on site. These parties have a duty to:   
 
“… identify hazards that may result from [accidental chemical] releases using appropriate 
hazard assessment techniques, 
… design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent 
releases, and 
… minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.” [emphases 
added]  
 
Thus, firms are now under a general duty to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate 
accidental releases. In defining the nature of this duty, Section 112(r) specifies 
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that it is “a general duty in the same manner and to the same extent as” that 
imposed by Section 5 of the OSHAct. Because Section 112(r) specifically ties its 
general duty obligation to the general duty clause of the OSHAct, case law 
interpreting the OSHAct provision should be directly relevant. In the 1987 
General Dynamics case706, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that OSHA standards and the general duty obligation are distinct and 
independent requirements and that compliance with a standard does not 
discharge an employer’s duty to comply with the general duty obligation. 
Similarly, compliance with other Clean Air act chemical safety requirements 
should not relieve a firm’s duty to comply with the act’s general duty clause. 
Further, the requirement that owners and operators “design and maintain” a safe 
facility would seem to extend the obligation into the area of primary prevention, 
rather then merely hazard control. 
 
Finally, the 1990 amendments established an independent Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board (CSHIB). The board is to investigate the causes of 
accidents, perform research on prevention, and make recommendations for 
preventive approaches, much like the Air Transportation Safety Board does with 
regard to airplane safety. 
 
As required by the 1990 Clean Air Amendments, OSHA promulgated a 
workplace Process Safety Management (PSM) standard in 1992. The PSM 
standard is designed to protect employees working in facilities that use “highly 
hazardous chemicals,” and employees working in facilities with more than 10,000 
pounds of flammable liquids or gases present in one location. The list of highly 
hazardous chemicals in the standard includes acutely toxic, highly flammable, 
and reactive substances. The PSM standard requires employers to compile 
safety information (including process flow information) on chemicals and 
processes used in the workplace, complete a workplace process hazard analysis 
every 5 years, conduct triennial compliance safety audits, develop and 
implement written operating procedures, conduct extensive worker training, 
develop and implement plans to maintain the integrity of process equipment, 
perform pre-startup reviews for new (and significantly modified) facilities, develop 
and implement written procedures to manage changes in production methods, 
establish an emergency action plan, and investigate accidents and near-misses 
at their facilities. Many aspects of chemical safety are not covered by specific 
workplace standards. Most OSHA standards that do apply to chemical safety 
have their origin in the consensus standards adopted under Section 6(a) of the 
OSHAct in 1971, and hence are greatly out of date. Arguably, the general duty 
obligation of the OSHAct imposes a continuing duty on employers to seek out 
technological improvements that would improve safety for workers. 
 
In 1996, the EPA promulgated regulations setting forth requirements for the 
RMPs specified in the Clean Air Act. The RMP rule is modeled after the OSHA 
PSM standard and is estimated to affect some 66,000 facilities. The rule requires 
a hazard assessment (involving an offsite consequence analysis—including 
worst-case risk scenarios— and compilation of a 5-year accident history), a 
prevention program to address the hazards identified, and an emergency 
response program. In 2003, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
urged OSHA to amend its 1996 regulations in order to achieve more 
                                            
706 815 F.2nd 626 (D.C.Cir. 1987). 
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comprehensive control of “reactive hazards” that could have catastrophic 
consequences and asked OSHA to define and record information on reactive 
chemical incidents that it investigates or is required to investigate. These 
recommendations have largely fallen on deaf ears. The board also expressed 
concern that the material safety data sheets (MSDSs) issued by OSHA do not 
adequately identify the reactive potential of chemicals. Legislation is being 
promoted to require OSHA to prepare or revise MSDSs for the list of chemicals 
in the PSM standard, and to generally strengthen OSHA’s approach to chemical 
safety. Despite the fact that a memorandum of understanding between EPA and 
OSHA had been signed in 1996, in 2001 the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) issued a report indicating the need for better coordination between EPA, 
OSHA, the CSHIB, and other agencies. 
 
The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 
The Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) of 1990 breaks with U.S. regulatory tradition 
in its proactive approach to preventing at the source rather than controlling 
pollution at end-of-pipe in the hierarchy of regulatory options.  While never really 
implemented, the act also requires the Administrator to examine every regulation 
issued under the media-based (air, water, waste) legislation – for both gradual 
pollution and sudden and accidental release of chemicals – and regulations 
issued under toxic substances and pesticide legislation to ensure that pollution 
prevention initiatives were fashioned as the preferred choice of interventions. 
 
 
Taken together, the regulation of chemical safety under the Clean Air Act and the 
PPA impose a duty on manufacturers to design and prevent sudden and 
accidental releases from chemical production, use and storage facilities.  The 
design and prevent approach is one that could be embodied in a GSR for 
consumer products.  Commentators on U.S. and EU regulation of consumer 
product safety conclude that in neither jurisdiction is consumer product protection 
as effective as it could be [see Howells supra].  A design-and-prevent approach 
would make either system more effective.    
 
Relevant EU Initiatives Other Than Consumer Product Safety   
In the EU, a combination of Directives and Policies represents a similar legislated 
preference for design-and-prevent as U.S. regulation of chemical plant safety 
and pollution prevention through the EU Seveso Directives for Chemical Safety, 
the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive, and the 
European Integrated Product Policy.   
 
The EU Seveso Directives for Chemical Safety 
In response to the chemical accident at Bhopal, India, EU Directive (82/501/EEC) 
on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, the so-called ‘Seveso 
Directive’, was first adopted in 1982, and required EU member states to ensure 
that all manufacturers prove to a ‘competent authority’ that major hazards have 
been identified in their industrial activities, that appropriate safety measures – 
including emergency plans – have been adopted, and that information, training, 
and safety equipment have been provided to on-site employees.  A revised 
version of the Seveso Directive, the Seveso II Directive, came into effect in 
February 1997 (96/82/EEC).  Seveso II strengthens the original provisions and 
coverage of accident-prevention activities, as well as broadens the types of 
installations, which must comply.  Particularly worthy of note is the mention of 
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inherent safety as a preferred approach to preventing chemical accidents in the 
accompanying guidance document for the preparation of the safety report 
required by the revised Directive.  Other updates include a revision and 
extension of the scope, the introduction of new requirements relating to safety 
management systems, emergency planning and land-use planning and a 
reinforcement of the provisions on inspections to be carried out by Member 
States. 
 
The Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive 
The purpose of the European Union’s Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive (IPPC), adopted in 1996, was to provide a high level of 
environmental protection by preventing wherever practicable, or otherwise 
reducing (controlling) emissions to air, water, and land (i.e., waste) from a range 
of industrial processes, such as the energy sector, the production and 
processing of metals, the mineral and chemical industries, waste management 
facilities, food production and intensive livestock farming.  Like the U.S. Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990, the EU IPPC Directive clearly favors prevention over 
end-of-pipe control and recycling as preferred approaches.  Around 60,000 
installations across the European Union will be required to operate with IPPC 
permits by October 2007.  The permits are to be ‘coordinated’ in addressing 
together all waste and pollution streams and are to be based on the concept of 
Best Available Techniques (BAT) for minimizing pollution from various point 
sources.  In many cases, BAT means radical environmental improvements within 
the industries, and it is expected that sometimes it may be costly for companies 
to adapt their plants to BAT.707  The implementation of these new and 
considerably tougher BAT rules on all existing installations in the European 
Union could be expensive and thus the Directive grants the covered installations 
an eleven-year long transition period counting from the day that the Directive 
entered into force.  Identification of required performance levels achievable by 
BAT is undertaken by the EU Center in Seville, Spain.  As is the custom in the 
EU, the Directive has to be ‘transposed’ into the National Law of the member 
states. 
  
The European Integrated Product Policy 
While the EU Directives discussed above deal with environmental emissions and 
waste the EU Commission is pursuing a strategy for strengthening product-
related environmental policies with a view to promoting the development of a 
market for greener products.  This strategy focuses mainly on environmental 
impacts throughout the life-cycle of products and envisions the use of eco-labels 
both to serve as a voluntary market-focused screening mechanism (through the 
exercise of consumer choice) and to transmit important information about 
products.  It is linked to the EU  New Approach. 
 
In commenting on the Integrated Product Policy, the European Consumers’ 
Organization BEUC based in Brussels, representing a federation of national 
consumer organizations from the EU and other European countries, believes  
                                            
707 Note that BAT in the European context can include performance requirements for technology that 
anticipate innovation, and not just levels of control achievable by existing technology that the US use of 
the term ‘best available technology’ implies.  In other words, BAT requirements can involve technology 
forcing. 
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product safety is one of the key issues and BEUC wants information about 
chemicals used in every-day consumer products to be made available to 
the public.708  
 
Taken together, these three initiatives support inherently-safer and 
environmentally-sounder production and products. 
 
  
The Role of Tort and Product Liability in Ensuring Product Safety 
 
For an insightful comparison of product liability in encouraging product safety in 
the U.S. and EU treatment, see Geraint G. Howells, International Torts: A 
Comparative Study. Howells writes:709 
 
The main reason for the greater impact of products liability litigation in the U.S. is 
the level of damages. American damage awards are considerably higher -- this 
in itself acts as a magnet for litigants. These high awards are due to the lack of a 
social security system to cushion the impact of accidents, the high costs of 
medical treatment, the lack of public healthcare services, generous awards of 
pain and suffering damages, and the availability of punitive damages. 
 
… The role of punitive damages in the U.S. suggests that the regulatory function 
of litigation is important. Moreover, the threat of wide scale products liability 
litigation can be seen as an incentive for producers to improve the quality of their 
products, often with fiscal incentives from insurers. Although civil liability rules 
have a regulatory dimension in Europe, my impression is that products liability is 
more responsive to the compensatory needs of accident victims than to the 
regulatory aspects. Many Americans consider Europe to have a weak products 
liability litigation culture, but I gain the impression that there is sometimes a 
failure to appreciate the depth of the product safety regulatory regimes, which 
may explain why there is less need for products liability litigation as a means of 
regulatory control. 
 
The FHSA expressly preempts any state labeling (warning) requirement for a substance 
that is more stringent than a labeling (warning) requirement established for that 
substance under the FHSA.  Many courts have held that this applies to “failure to warn” 
tort claims for money damages as well as to state statutes and regulations.  However, a 
state tort law claim may be based on a failure to follow the labeling requirements of the 
FHSA. 
 
Violations of Mandatory Requirements  
Violation of a mandatory standard in the majority of states is conclusive evidence 
of the defective nature of a product, while a minority of states regards it as a 
rebuttal presumption or mere evidence of negligence. [See Mathias 
Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard? Fall, 2003, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 
751.]  Similarly, compliance with a standard creates a presumption of due care, 
but one that can be overcome by the specifics of the case. 
                                            
708 see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ipp/pdf/study_final_clean_report.pdf).  Safety aspects of products 
as well as environmental impact is to be included in life-cycle analysis.  
 
709 Geraint G. Howells, International Torts: A Comparative Study: The Relationship Between Product 
Liability and Product Safety -- Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through 
a Comparison with the U.S. Position, Spring, 2000, 39 Washburn L.J. 305-346. 
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Violations of Voluntary Standards and Guidelines 
Violation of a voluntary standard is evidence of the defective nature of a product, 
but the presumption can be overcome.  
 
 
Prevention and Inherent Safety: Technological Innovation in Process 
and Product Design710 
 
The concept of inherent safety 
Inherent safety as a concept similar to – or a natural extension of -- pollution 
prevention or cleaner production.  The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 
(discussed earlier) covers both.  The common thread linking the two concepts is 
that they both attempt to prevent the possibility of harm, rather than to reduce the 
probability of harm -- from accidents, pollution, or products -- by eliminating the 
problem at its source.  Both typically involve fundamental changes in production 
technology: substitution of inputs, process redesign and re-engineering, and/or 
final product reformulation or redesign. 
 
Inherent safety is an approach to chemical accident prevention that differs 
fundamentally from secondary accident prevention and accident mitigation. 
Sometimes also referred to as “primary prevention,” inherent safety relies on the 
development and deployment of technologies that prevent the possibility of a 
chemical accident.  In contrast, “secondary prevention” reduces the probability of 
a chemical accident711, and “mitigation” and emergency responses seek to 
reduce the seriousness of injuries, property damage, and environmental damage 
resulting from chemical accidents.  
 
Secondary prevention and mitigation, by themselves, are unable to eliminate the 
risk of serious or catastrophic chemical accidents, although improved process 
safety management can reduce their probability and severity.  Most chemical 
production involves “transformation” processes, which are inherently complex 
and tightly coupled. Specific industries use many different processes.  In many 
cases, alternative chemical processes exist which completely or almost 
completely eliminate the use of highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals. So-
called “normal accidents” arising in these systems result in significantly less 
harmful chemical reactions or releases. Replacement of existing production 
systems with such benign chemical processes a practice sometimes called 
                                            
710 Much of this discussion is taken from N.A. Ashford and G. Zwetsloot, "Encouraging Inherently Safer 
Production in European Firms: A Report from the Field" Journal of Hazardous Materials, Special Issue on 
Risk Assessment and Environmental Decision Making, A. Amendola and D. Wilkinson (eds.), 1999, pp 
123-144. 
711 In the accident prevention literature in the traditional chemical engineering journals, there is much 
attention given to the concept of the “root cause” of accidents.  Enquiry into root causes has stimulated 
mostly secondary prevention by attempting to make production technology more “fail-safe,” that is, 
stronger vessels and piping able to sustain higher pressures, neutralizing baths, and automatic shut-off 
devices.  A different tradition of analyzing accidents comes from tort and compensation law, where the 
“but-for” test is used to apportion responsibility between faulty technology and alleged careless workers.  
If the technology is not “fool-proof”, that is, it is not impossible for a human to initiate an event leading to 
an accident, then the firm is held at least partially liable -- because, “but-for faulty design, the accident 
would not have occurred.”  Primary prevention promotes “fool-proof”, rather than “fail-safe” technology. 
Another formulation is “error tolerant”. 
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“green chemistry,” as well as nonchemical approaches, are examples of primary 
accident prevention. 
 
Secondary prevention and mitigation are similar in concept to pollution control 
and remediation measures, respectively, in that each involves only minimal 
change to the core production system.  In particular, secondary accident 
prevention focuses on improving the structural integrity of production vessels and 
piping, neutralising escaped gases and liquids, and shut-off devices rather than 
changing the basic production methods.  When plants expand beyond the 
capacity they were initially designed for, secondary prevention capacities may be 
exceeded.  Sometimes, overconfidence in these added-on safety measures may 
invite an expansion of production capacity.  Accidents, of course, may also 
disable secondary safety technology, leading to runaway chemical reactions. 
   
The superiority of pollution prevention and cleaner production as a tool of 
environmental policy has been recognised for more than a decade in both 
Europe and North America.  International meetings of the Cleaner Production 
Roundtables and the Pollution Prevention Roundtables are held annually in 
Europe and North America, respectively.  The United Nations Environment 
Programme has spearheaded an aggressive cleaner production program.  The 
U.S. EPA has established a hierarchy of policy choices, with pollution prevention 
given the highest priority over reuse or recycling, treatment, or disposal.  In 1990, 
the U.S. Congress codified, as national environmental policy, a preference for 
pollution prevention over pollution control, when it passed the Pollution 
Prevention Act.  The EU supports its Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC) by funding research in Seville, Spain for the identification of 
Best Available Techniques (BAT).  
 
Incentives, Barriers, and Opportunities for the Adoption of Inherently Safer 
Technology 
Although they are conceptually similar, however, pollution prevention and 
accident prevention differ in the response they have thus far received from 
industry. While many firms are embracing pollution prevention (some 
enthusiastically, some more tentatively), far fewer are moving to primary accident 
prevention. In all likelihood, this disparity is due to a difference in incentives. 
 
The reasons that firms are embracing pollution prevention and cleaner 
production today are because of (1) the increased costs of continuing the current 
practices of waste transport/treatment and pollution control, (2) liability for 
environmental damage due to industrial releases of toxic substances, (3) 
increasingly available information about pollution and toxic releases to the public, 
and (4) the EU IPPC Directive  (and possibly the EMAS and ISO 14000 
requirements), and to a lesser extent the Pollution Prevention Act of 1996 in the 
United States, force increased attention to changing production technology, 
rather than relying solely on end-of-pipe, add-on technologies. Thus, both 
economic and informational mechanisms are causing a gradual cultural shift 
away from pollution control and waste treatment and towards pollution 
prevention and cleaner production. 
 
With regard to primary accident prevention, the same economic signals are not 
really there.  Firms do not pay the full social costs of injuries to workers (or to the 
public) and firms are under-insured.  Unlike pollution, which has to be reckoned 
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with as a part of production planning, accidents are rare events and their 
consequences are not factored into the planning process. Thus, firms may 
anticipate accidents, and may be motivated to take some steps to avoid them, 
but they do not feel a strong financial incentive to invest in primary accident 
prevention. Further, while some of the information reportable under EPCRA is 
relevant to chemical accidents, this information alone—without detailed and 
plant-specific data on production processes—does not allow the firm, or the 
public, to assess the accident potential of a particular facility. 
 
Furthermore, an organisation’s gradual emissions or wastes can be observed 
and calculated for any given time period, and this information can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of the organisation’s pollution prevention efforts.  
Because acute chemical accidents are relatively rare events, an organisation 
implementing an effective chemical safety program may therefore receive no 
form of positive feedback whatsoever.  Because the safety system is working, 
accidents do not occur.  Of course, a hazardous chemical plant may eventually 
receive negative feedback, but only when it is too late to take preventive 
measures. 
 
Ashford712 has summarized the barriers to primary prevention: 
 
These include: (1) inadequate information about the potential for catastrophic 
accidents, the significant costs of secondary prevention and mitigation and the 
costs of chemical accidents, and the existence of inherently-safe[r] alternatives; 
(2) insufficient economic incentives - in the form of workers’ compensation, the 
tort system, regulatory fines, and insurance; (3) organisational and managerial 
barriers -- linked to corporate attitudes, objectives, structure, and internal 
incentives, and the lack of a labour-management dialogue on safety; (4) a lack of 
managerial awareness and expertise about inherently safe[r] technologies; (5) 
inadequate worker knowledge about primary accident prevention; (6) 
technological barriers limiting primary accident prevention; and (7) regulatory 
problems.  Primary prevention shares some of these barriers with secondary 
prevention and mitigation, but these barriers are of different importance.  
 
Many of these barriers are present in the case of designing inherently-safer and 
environmentally-sounder products 
 
Although firms sometimes do anticipate accidents and try to avoid them, the 
expenditures for adequate prevention have not been, and are not likely to be, 
invested without the right incentives.  To the extent that the firm knows that the 
costs of maintenance and the inflexibility of traditional safety approaches are 
greater than using more reliable inherently safer approaches, the firm may 
respond by changing its technology.   
 
One way of providing firms with more visible economic incentives would be to 
encourage them to exploit the opportunity to prevent accidents and accidental 
releases (1) by identifying where in the production process changes to inherently 
safer inputs, processes, and final products could be made and (2) by identifying 
the specific inherently safer technologies that could be substituted.  The former 
                                            
712 Ashford, N. A., Gobbel, J. V., Lachman, J., Matthiesen, M., Minzner, A. and R. F. Stone. (1993), The 
Encouragement of Technological Change for Preventing Chemical Accidents:  Moving Firms from 
Secondary Prevention and Mitigation to Primary Prevention.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for 
Technology, Policy and Industrial Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston. 
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we call Inherent Safety Opportunity Audits (ISOAs).  The latter we call 
Technology Options Analysis (TOAs). Unlike a hazard, risk, or technology 
assessment, these techniques seek to identify where and what superior 
technologies could be adopted to eliminate the possibility, or to dramatically 
reduce the probability, of accidents and accidental releases.713  
 
From a general safety perspective, it is widely recognised that safety 
performance is determined by three elements: 
• management and organisational factors; 
• technological factors; and 
• behavioural factors (also referred to as the human dimension, i.e: people) 
 
These three factors interact and influence the safety of industrial manufacturing 
and production processes through their effects on the willingness, opportunity, 
and capability of organisations and people to change. 
  
In some approaches that promote the adoption of inherent safety, the emphasis 
is on mainly technological factors, i.e., on identifying and disseminating 
information on superior technologies. In the current approaches to safety 
management -- especially those falling under the rubric of Safety Management 
Systems -- the emphasis is on management and organisational factors, and also 
on the human dimension, addressing the management of safety; these 
approaches assume minimal technological change, implicitly leaving the core 
and secondary production technologies essentially unchanged.  Both of these 
distinct approaches are by themselves insufficient to maximize the adoption of 
desirable inherently safer technologies and frustrate further progress in safety 
performance and continual progress in safety management.  There is therefore a 
clear need, both from a technical point of view and from an industrial practice 
perspective, for a generally accepted approach that bridges traditional safety 
management with inherent safer technology. 
 
What is needed is to encourage complementary managerial and technological 
changes aiming at making companies more willing and able to identify and use 
(or develop) inherently safer technologies for achieving Inherently Safer 
Production and Products. 
                                            
713 A [risk] assessment, in practice, is generally limited to an evaluation of the risks associated 
with the firm’s established production technology and does not include the identification or 
consideration of alternative production technologies that may be inherently safer than the ones 
currently being employed.  Consequently, [risk] assessments tend to emphasize secondary 
accident prevention and mitigation strategies, which impose engineering and administrative 
controls on an existing production technology, rather than primary accident prevention strategies, 
which utilize input substitution and process redesign to modify a production technology.  In 
contrast to a [risk] assessment, a technology options analysis would expand the evaluation to 
include alternative production technologies and would facilitate the development of primary 
accident prevention strategies. 
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Inherently-safer and Environmentally-sounder Products 
While not originally applied to product safety, the fundamental concepts of 
inherent safety are directly applicable and transferable to products.  We have 
already extended the concept of pollution prevention (what the Europeans call 
clean technology) to products.  Green products, sustainable products, and 
environmentally-sound products are just some of the names characterizing this 
extension.  The EU Integrated Product Policy (discussed above) relies on the 
concepts of cleaner and environmentally-sound products.  It is no artificial stretch 
to conceive of inherently-safer products that eliminate the possibility or 
significantly reduce the probability of harm to consumers.   Of course innovation 
may be required.  The holistic approach to health, safety and environmental 
improvements would be to encourage or require the development and use of 
inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder products and processes.  For this 
to become a reality, single-purposes improvements to industrial technology have 
to be replaced with multi-dimensional technological change. 
 
Compatibility of a GSR with U.S. Regulatory Traditions and Practice 
 
General Discussion 
The EU 2001 Directive establishing a General Safety Requirement follows other 
EU approaches to regulating health, safety and the environment: a general 
statement of responsibilities (here for product safety) followed by some 
particularized regulations (as for child toys) and some general reference to 
‘voluntary standards’ developed by one of three European standards 
organizations.  Compliance with these ‘voluntary standards’ creates a 
presumption of safety to satisfy the general obligation under the GSR; thus, there 
is some considerable pressure on industry to comply.  In the United States, the 
CPSC works with the private standard-setting organizations and lists/publicizes 
those standards it deems acceptable or compliant with the CPSA’s statutory 
requirements.  Compliance with voluntary standards in the United States that 
CPSC does not have a role in developing or standards that are not 
listed/publicized does not create a strict legal presumption, but in practice they 
may well deter an inadequately-funded CPSC from taking up the issue in the 
context of a particular consumer complaint about a product.  The nature of 
standard-setting organization s in the U.S. and the EU are very different (see the 
discussion below).  
 
In this section, we outline what shape an effective GSR requirement would take 
as a complement to the CPSA.  Other, complementary amendments may be 
indicated as well.   Inasmuch as (1) consumer product safety regulation is 
regarded as one of many examples of the exercise of federal power under the 
Commerce Clause of the U. S. Constitution – and not part of the federal criminal 
law per se -- and (2) judicial review is provided explicitly or through the reach of 
the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §551, et seq. ) – whereas its use in 
Canada may be different -- straightforward import into Canadian Law would no 
doubt present some challenges.  Nonetheless, the holistic approach explored 
here should be considered.     
 
In order to maximize its effectiveness, the GSR has to be much more than a 
generalized duty/responsibility for product safety, and in that sense, a simple 
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addition of the authority found in the European context to the CPSA would miss 
an opportunity to create an operationally-meaningful  ‘culture of safety.’   It has to 
be particularized and complement (1) the producer’s duty to adhere to 
mandatory standards, (2) mechanisms to report and track product-related 
injuries, (3) the existence of voluntary industry guidelines and practices, and (4) 
government’s authority for banning, recalling and seizing dangerous products, or 
requiring that existing products be brought into conformity.   
 
It has already been mentioned that the interplay between the regulation of 
product safety and liability for harmful and/or defective products is important but 
very different in the United States and the EU.  Thus, whether for the purposes of 
examining the suitability of a GSR in the U.S. context, or in the Canadian 
context, this has to be taken into account.  Howells supra  writes:     
 
I think American readers will be surprised by the sophistication of the rules and 
the strength of the enforcement culture [in Europe]… What is most striking is the 
extent to which European standardization has been integrated into the legal 
regime. This is not an eulogy for the American system. There are still some 
regulatory aspects in which the U.S. is a world leader, including the accident 
data collection and recall powers.  When established in the 1970's the U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") was seen as a model for an 
integrated consumer product safety agency, which Europe has never been able 
to emulate. There are also many problems with the European system.  However, 
my purpose is to emphasize the European commitment to regulation, rather 
than, litigation as a means of promoting product safety. It will be for the American 
reader to determine whether it is desirable or even possible for the U.S. to 
develop similar regulatory controls. 
 
Describing the current regulatory system in the EU, Howells continues: 
 
The EC's Council Resolution in 1985 on the  New Approach to Technical 
Harmonization and Standards marked a move away from detailed product-
specific rules to broadly categorized Directives. These Directives lay down 
essential safety requirements but leave the details to be fleshed out by European 
standards. The linchpin of the system is the standardization process. 
Additionally, there has been the development of a global approach to certification 
and testing. The new and global approaches have three limbs: (i) more flexible 
legislation, (ii) a prominent role for standardization, and (iii) reliance on 
conformity assessment procedures (leading to the award of the CE mark which 
allows access to the European market).  
 
The " New Approach" was intended to be both flexible, leaving a lot of the 
detailed work to the European standardization bodies, and at the same time 
attempting total harmonization of all safety aspects in order to reassure member 
states that they could safely permit free circulation of conforming products. The 
basic principles of the  New Approach to technical harmonization are set out in 
the 1985 Resolution as being: 
 
• Harmonizing legislation should be limited to adopting essential safety 
requirements to which products should conform, and which if they do so 
conform, should be their passport to free movement throughout the 
Community.  
• Standardization organizations should be entrusted with the task of 
drawing up the technical specifications needed for the production and 
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placing on the market of products conforming to the essential 
requirements.  
• The technical specification should be voluntary.  
• National authorities are compelled to recognize that products 
conforming to the harmonized standards are presumed to comply with 
the essential requirements. Manufacturers should have the choice of not 
manufacturing in conformity with the standards, but in this   case they are 
obliged to prove that their products conform to the essential requirements 
(and third party conformity assessment is usually required).  
 
The presumption of conformity's purpose is to prevent both the routine testing of 
products and requirements that documentation be produced once the product 
has been found to conform to the Directive. Conformity is typically signified by 
the CE mark, which is the effective passport for products to circulate within 
Europe. 
 
What is especially important to realize is that the actual standardization process 
is not undertaken by private standard-setting organizations, but rather under 
contract between the EU and the CEN (the European Committee for 
Standardization).  In 1991, the CEN received 70% of its funding to work on 
harmonizing standards in the EU.  Consumer organizations play an active role in 
the CEN, and the CEN’s activities are well-integrated into the EU regulatory 
process.  The website http://www.cenorm.be describes its process as follows: 
“formal adoption of European Standards is decided by a weighted majority vote 
of the CEN National Members and is binding on all of them. They must 
implement the standards at national level and withdraw conflicting standards” 
The U.S. preference for voluntary standards – over promulgated mandatory 
standards -- is not a faithful replication of the EU  New Approach.  The private 
standard-setting organizations ANSI (American National Standards Institute), 
ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) and NFPA (National Fire 
Protection Association) have very weak stakeholder participation714 and the 
standards are not binding upon their members.  Voluntary standards actually 
have no legal regulatory import; they serve to stave off regulation through the 
CPSA’s Section 30 “escape clause”.  Perhaps the label “voluntary” in the EU 
context is a misnomer; negotiated standards might be closer to the mark715.  
Negotiation in US standards-setting organizations should not be construed as 
meaningful; it is not negotiation among key stakeholders, but rather among 
industry participants.716   
                                            
714 While after 1981, the CPSA allowed for reimbursement by CPSC of “persons” to participate in 
standards-setting, little has actually been realized. See Carl Tobias, cited in Howells at footnote 63. 
    
715 Note, however, that historically the EU experience with negotiated standards in the environmental and 
energy areas are acknowledge to lead to less technological innovation in the technologies of concern than 
mandatory command-and-control regulations.  See Carraro, Carlo and Francois Leveque, “Introduction:  
the Rationale and Potential of Voluntary Approaches” in Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, 
Kluwer, Boston (1999).  
 
716 There is U.S. experience with negotiated standards between industry, government, and key stakeholders 
(unions and environmental groups) in the areas of occupational health & safety and the environment.  Most 
was conducted in conservative administrations and all were judged to be less protective and less 
technology forcing than strict application of the law would have resulted in.  See Ashford, Nicholas A. and 
Charles C. Caldart (2005) “Negotiated Regulation, Implementation and Compliance in the United States”, 
in The Handbook of Environmental Voluntary Agreements Croci, Eduoardo (ed.), Kluwer Academic 
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In examining whether a GSR would be a welcome addition to the U.S. 
Regulatory armament, the duty created under a GSR should address the 
producers’/marketers’/users’ duties:  
• To design an inherently safer product at the outset (primary prevention); 
• To choose to market or use a safely-designed – or safer designed -- 
product from among those readily available; 
• To adhere to mandatory standards; 
• To adhere to voluntary industry guidelines/standards or explain/justify 
departure from recommended practices; 
• To control the [remaining] hazardous or harmful aspects of a product 
(secondary prevention); 
• To provide meaningful warnings, instructions and antidotes; 
• To mitigate the harm from a dangerous product; 
• To monitor and track the harms once the product is in commerce (data 
collection); 
• To report harm/harmful incidents from a product, if known; 
• To recall a product; and 
• To participate in efforts to compensate those harmed/injured. 
 
In addition, the concept of ‘extended producer responsibility’ through the supply 
chain from production to disposal should be considered. 
 
For a general, but particularized to be meaningful, the duty placed on the 
manufacturer/importer should promote inherently-safer products through the 
design, management, periodic review, and redesign of consumer products as a 
proactive measure and it should complement the duty to assess and reduce the 
risk of consumer products.  Second-best is the duty to design (or re-design) 
secondary prevention measures, e.g., involving add-on devices – such as 
electrical cut-off switches or blade shields -- or chemical antidotes.  
 
It could be argued that since the CPSC’s premarket controls have been 
effectively weakened, that its post-market powers – such as notification of 
affected consumers (15 U.S.C. Section 2046c); or manufacturer recalls or 
requirements to repair, bring into conformity, or replace (15 U.S.C. Section 
2046d); or requiring manufacturers to compensate, etc. -- should be 
strengthened.  However, these post-market interventions come late in the game. 
Alternatively, a more prevention-oriented intervention, a premarket GSR 
requirement to conduct options analysis to design or re-design questionable 
products could strengthen consumer protection. 
 
 
The Fashioning of an Effective GSR 
The integration of a GSR into the current U.S. regulatory scheme is suggested 
by various regulatory and legislative innovations in both U.S. and EU regimes 
other than those addressing consumer product safety.  Adopting a general duty 
to promote inherently-safer products borrows from the previously described use 
of a general duty obligation in U.S. worker health & safety legislation and in the 
prevention of chemical accidents in the U.S. Clean Air Act.  The concept of 
                                                                                                                                 
Publisher – Environmental and Policy Series, pp.135-159.  See also Coglianese, Carlo (1997) “Assessing 
Consensus: the Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking” 46 Duke Law Journal 1255. 
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inherent safety is promoted not only in the U.S. Pollution Prevention Act – where 
pollution prevention is viewed broadly as both the prevention of gradual pollution 
and the prevention of sudden and accidental releases of chemicals – but also in 
the EU Seveso Directives where inherent safety is at the top of the list of the 
preferred hierarchy of interventions to prevent chemical accidents.   
 
While not historically applied to products, inherent safety is a necessary focus if 
consumer product safety is to be seriously addressed.  Secondary prevention 
measures are poor substitutes.  These measures – summarily called ‘safety 
devices’ -- can be easily bypassed or disabled, rendering the product unsafe.   
Setting mandatory product-by-product standards, while exemplary and fostering 
of the importance of product safety, can not by itself adequately address the 
myriad of existing or expected future product problems, e.g., from nanomaterials 
or electronic and biotechnology products.  Nor is an increase in the reach of 
voluntary standards likely to suffice.  Unlike a GSR tied to more voluntary 
standards – or “privatization of regulation” -- a GSR tied to a premarket duty to 
design or redesign inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder products 
should be seriously considered. 
 
A change in the culture of safety requires strong Directives to focus on product 
design and redesign, applying holistic approaches than cover more not only 
product safety, but public health and environmental concerns, and permeate the 
life cycle of products, augmenting the approach reflected in the Integrated 
Product Policy.  The goal needs to be the replacement of existing products and 
advent of new products that are inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder. A 
shift in focus from traditional product safety toward a goal of achieving a 
‘modernization of products and production methods’ is central.   
 
Borrowing from the EU model, this general duty GSR should require 
manufacturers/producers/marketers of products to: 
 
1. Identify hazards that may result from the expected and foreseeable 
manufacture, use, and disposal of products using appropriate hazard 
assessment techniques; 
 
2. Undertake an inherent safety opportunity analysis (ISOA) to identify 
what aspects of the product [and the process by which it is made] need to 
be changed so that the product [and the associated 
manufacturing/production process] is [are] inherently-safer and 
environmentally-sounder;717.  
 
3. Undertake a technology options analysis (TOA) to identify specific 
inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder options that will advance the 
design and adoption of products [and production systems] that are less 
inherently unsafe and environmentally unsound; 
 
4. To the extent feasible, design and redesign products so that they are 
inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder; and 
                                            
717  The text in square brackets here and in the next item broadens the scope of government activity beyond 
product safety to process interventions.  This may not be practical in the political process that still focuses 
on narrow problems, one at a time. 
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5. Minimize the adverse consequences of manufacture, use, and disposal    
of products that do occur and that are infeasible to eliminate or 
significantly reduce.  
 
At the same time, authority should exist to promulgate mandatory consumer 
product standards that promote inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder 
products.  The current formulation in U.S. product safety that products not 
present “an unreasonable risk of injury” [i.e., be reasonably safe] requires a 
reinterpretation of the word unreasonable.  What is ‘reasonable’ where the 
producer is expected only to make easily-achievable and low-cost minor changes 
to its products is different than expectations that the design (and redesign) of 
products address a multitude of health, safety and environmental problems that 
provide significant advances in protection, but also change result in economic 
benefits.  The history of pollution prevention activities undertaken by polluting 
firms has demonstrated the significant long term environmental and economic 
benefits of a more holistic, even if radical, approach to product and process 
improvemen1.718  One should expect no less a result from the design (and 
redesign) of inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder products. 
 
As under the U.S. OSHAct, the existence of mandatory standards should not 
lessen a manufacturer’s responsibility under the GSR.  These obligations should 
be co-terminus.  Providing that consumer (and environmental and labor) groups 
are given meaningful opportunities for participation in developing consensus 
standards, multi-stakeholder negotiation can speed up the standard-setting 
process, but the use of voluntary standards in the U.S. sense (they are not really 
consensus standards) should not be part of the regulatory armament.  The EU 
example of relegating standard-setting to an independent body can not easily be 
copied in the U.S. context for many reasons having to do with the nature of 
private standard-setting organizations and the inadequacy of public participation. 
 
The GSR cannot merely be a non-particularized to duty to produce and market 
safe products.  It works in the EU context because it is backed up by standards 
that are quasi-mandatory in nature.  The reason for requiring industry, for 
example, to undertake a inherent safety opportunity analysis (ISOA) and a 
technology options analysis (TOA) articulated above is to attach meaning and 
specifics to what would otherwise be a de facto voluntary and essentially 
unenforceable requirement.719 
 
The third element of the GSR: undertake a technology options analysis (TOA) to 
identify specific inherently-safer and environmentally-sounder options is 
especially important.  The ability to conduct a risk or hazard assessment can be 
time-consuming and beset by uncertainties.  To the extent that the GSR 
                                            
718 Ashford, Nicholas (2002) “Government And Innovation in Europe And North America”, A Special 
Issue on Ecological Modernization, Sonnenfeld, David and Mol, Arthur, (Eds.) American Behavioral 
Scientist, Volume 45, No. 9, pp. 1417-1434. 
 
719 For a discussion on the use of ISOAs and TOAs in the context of chemical plant safety, see Zwetsloot, 
G.I.J.M. and N. Askounes Ashford (2003) “The Feasibility of Encouraging Inherently Safer Production in 
Industrial Firms”, in a Special Issue on Safety and Design, Safety Science, 41(2/3):219-240.  Fadier, E,  Guest 
Editor. 
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encourages a search for alternatives, a full fledged risk assessment might be 
avoided.  Comparative risk (and cost) assessments are much easier to do and 
attended by less uncertainty.  In fact, it might be much easier to identify 
alternatives that had never before been contemplated – because the question 
was never asked – than to become embroiled in controversial risk assessment.  
This approach represents a shift from a risk-oriented inquiry to a solutions-
oriented inquiry.720 
 
Creating a meaningful general duty GSR could be a serendipitous opportunity for 
integrating environmental, health and safety concerns for products, but it may 
also have a profound impact on process and production technology as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
720 See Koch, Lars and Ashford, Nicholas (2006) “Rethinking the Role of Information in Chemicals 
Policy: Implications for TSCA and REACH”, Journal of Cleaner Production 14(1): 31-46 2006 
for a related and detailed approach in the context of the EU REACH initiative for chemicals. 
